Got a Real-World Weapon or Armor Question? Mk. IV

[grimbones]

Matthew,

Thank you for the reply and for the willingness to take this up for my ignorant self. :)

For the sake of discussion, let's call it the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Your point about engagement makes sense to me. Lob a lot of arrows at the other side, march the infantry forward, use them to hold the attention of the opposing army while the knights provide the hammer to the metaphorical anvil.

Was it the ideal that the opposing infantry would break ranks upon the sight of the charging knights?

And, failing that, would trained warhorses actually charge into a mass of men, or would they stop up short?

[grimbones]

The other function of cavalry was to attack enemy cavalry and prevent them from outflanking or otherwise harassing ones own forces.

Ahh... hence the origins of the joust. This is all starting to make sense.

[Fhaolan]

I can't imagine how one would go about identifying the context of the injuries he suggests from a battlefield exhumation (A plate armoured Knight buried wholesale on his horse?). I think he's probably confusing it with the most commonly cited occurence from the twelfth century Itinerarium Cambriae:

It's on the wiki page: English Long Bow (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Longbow)

As far as it goes, to me it's the Long Bow equivalent of the 'mighty blow' that occasionally makes the jump from the Chanson Geste to Historia. It reminds me of certain Roman accounts of the effectiveness of the Ballistae.

If you actually sit on a horse, in armor on a proper war saddle of the period, you would discover some interesting details.

First off, people get a bit confused with the term 'cuirasses'. While technically the cuirass has nothing to do with leg armor, being a breastplate, the term is many times used to refer to the entire harness. This is a red herring, so we'll ignore it.

Second, armor made for horsemen did not have steel plates on the inside of the leg as this inteferes with your seat. The armor you see in museums with plate on the inside of the leg is almost all foot-fighting tourney armor, or parade armor.

Third, the proper war-saddle of the period is like sitting on an A-frame. You're almost standing in the saddle, unlike modern saddles where you are almost sitting on the back of the horse. This is important, because this puts the upper part of the leg higher up relative to the horse than it would be in a modern saddle. Also, the structure of a war-saddle involves a lot of wood, and the arrow will need to miss the saddle frame for maximum penetration into the horse.

Which means for an arrow to penetrate through the upper part of the leg, through the saddle, and into the horse, the arrow would need to be travelling almost straight down. That would also mean it would need to penetrate plate after striking it at an angle, as well as the wooden saddle frame, and be long enough to reach the horse's vitals. Which is a very deep penetration.

What is far more likely, is that the arrow struck at the gap between the cuirasse and the upper leg armor after being shot balistically as part of a volley. This area is normally protected by a maille skirt, and an arrow travelling downward at velocity might penetrate it, or the skirting could be out of place so that it strikes an unprotected area. At that specific location, it is possible that the arrow could miss the saddle's frame as well, going between the wood slats that make up the frame.

So, the shot is possible, but more likely in a literary interpretation of the story rather than a literal one.

[Matthew]

I should probably point out that we don't actually *know* anything about how heavy cavalry was used for sure. This is all theoretical stuff, based on historical sources and experimental archaeology, but to continue...

Yes, ideally the enemy breaks ranks in order for Heavy cavalry to be effective. You can see the results of both at Hastings, where the Saxon Shield Wall was capable of indefinitely holding out against the Norman cavalry, but as soon as part of it broke ranks against them and engaged in an early pursuit, the pursuers were subject to a rapid Cavalry led counter attack, which led to defeat.

Matthew Bennett, in a rather good paper about the effectiveness of Medieval Knights in Medieval Knighthood V, recounts an interesting episode in the Near East where Tancred Prince of Antioch's knights failed to rout the citizen militia infantry of Muslim Shaizar:


'On that same day [in 1110], a number of footsoldiers came out of Shaizar. The Franks charged them, without disturbing their formation. Thereupon Tancred became angry and said, 'You are my knights and each of you receives pay equivalent to the pay of a hundred Muslims. You have these sergeants [by which he meant the infantry] in front of you, and you are not capable of moving them!' They answered, 'We fear only for our horses; otherwise we would have crushed and pierced such enemies with our lances.' Tancred answered, 'The horses belong to me; I will replace anyone's horse that gets killed'. They then made several charges against the men of Shaizar, and lost seventy horses, but could not move the enemy from the position they had taken up.'

Autobiography of Ousama, ed. and trans. G. R. Potter, Londo 1929, 89.


Horses could be trained to charge solid Infantry, as was done during the Napoleonic era, but it was an inefficient use of resources.

Failing effective cavalry deployment, knights made rather good infantry! Battles were actually quite rare during the medieval period; the main form of warfare was by way of rapid raiding (where horses are useful) and siege (where knights generally fought on foot).

[Midnighter1021]

ok my friend and i have been heavily debating this one because we dont know what would be a better choice of weapons, his pick is a Claymore with some sword arm armor and a cuirass (pardon the spelling) where mine is a Scutum ( roman shield) and a Gladius with legionaire type armor could u guys please help before we go in my backyard with the stuff ( im a Ancient warfare reinactor and he's F'ing crazy)

[Storm Bringer]

Please help me to understand how heavy cavalry was effective. (Wikipedia would have me believe that most knights rode up to the battle, dismounted, then fought on foot, but in my heart of hearts I want you guys to prove Wiki wrong.)

the english were known for fighting on foot, but this was a english thing, not a european one. Even then, it wasn't becuase they preffered to, it was that they found that most battles they fought, they were defending agianst bigger french armies and would hold ground better on foot.


The opposing army, sighting the dreaded GitP cavalry, forms up a shield wall with lots of spears poking out the front.

The GitP cavalry, seeing that the army somehow failed to do the same with their flanks (Why again? How many times do you want to be flanked by a guy on a horse?), rides around the side of the army and … Charges!



frist, the charge would be preceeded by a heavy arrow storm by longbows or crossbows, raining thousands of arrows into the tightly packed ranks fo the infantry and causing casualites and confusion in the ranks.

most armies formed up into formations much longer than they were deep, so a line of knights manuvering to attack would be able to bring a lot of men to bear on a much smaller number of footmen. but the spears would be pointing towards the flanks if the knights were attacking in that direction. it's just that the speed of the horses would carry them into contact.


The GitP lancers each manage to spear one peasant. Whee.

....and bowl over several others as they hit home. you're forcing a fairly solid wedge of man and horse at 20 miles per hour into a group of standing men. you're going to trample an aweful lot of infantry.


Let’s presume that we managed to scare the army into routing. The GitP cavalry begins to hack and slash with our melee weapons! Huzzah, the carnage!

this is the key.

the sight of hundreds of heavily armoured horsemen galloping at towards your position, shaking the ground with thier passage, and apprantly intent on killing you, was often capable of loosening the formations of the undertrained and underequipped infantry that formed the bulk of the armies.


once you've broken into the fomation. fear would quickly take hold of anyone in the unit, as once a unit broke, any chance of stopping the kinghts stops with it. thier are huge men on huge horses, riding amongst you and killing at will. it;s a self reinforcing effect: the more people start to run, the more join them to avoid being last in the group and being killed.




The tightly packed army routes. But they are a mob, so it is tough for them all to get out of the way. So one peasant out of every ten, unable to flee for his life, turns around and takes a crack at a horse with his spear.


and the knight, trained in protecting his horse and himself, is able to take the blow on armour or deflect it. he's moving at a trot at this point, so his horse can manuver.....and defend itself with a kick that can break skulls.


Said peasant breaks horse's knee, horse goes down, peasant spears GitP cavalryman in the visor. All those hours of training both warhorse and knight are wasted on … what again?


A) the knight is a porfessional warrior with a lot more combat training than the pesant levy, and able to hold his own on pure martial skill, not counting the still considerable equipment advantage he still has.

B) he's not failed nor has his talen been wasted if he falls. His force has broken and routed an oppsing force to the point where it can no longer function as an army, and will take weeks to reform, if it can at all. He's won.

that said, an aweful lot of charges went something like this:

cav charges

infantry stands frim

cav run onto wall of spear points.

many knights are dismounted and swamped by multiple infantry attackers.

kinghts strenght is wasted on pointles attacks on steady footmen.

[grimbones]

Matthew Bennett, in a rather good paper about the effectiveness of Medieval Knights in Medieval Knighthood V, recounts an interesting episode in the Near East where Tancred Prince of Antioch's knights failed to rout the citizen militia infantry of Muslim Shaizar.

Nods. I'll check out that paper by Bennet; thank you for the recommendation.

I think your quote brings me to the crux of my confusion:

If a citizen militia can hold off mounted knights (a much higher investment in feudal capital, right?) what’s the lure of fielding the knight? Get me some archers, trained pikemen, and pointy sticks to wedge into the ground, and I'm ready to go.

(A little more off topic, I’m starting to suspect that this arises from a bigger question of terrain/theater, and that more often than not a proactive general could arrange for his army to be positioned in a place that negated any possibility of a mounted charge.)

[Matthew]

So, the shot is possible, but more likely in a literary interpretation of the story rather than a literal one.

Yup. Note that the passage above is actually twelfth century; I'd say the translator made a poor choice of terms here; it's much more likely Mail Chausses/Leggings that the author has in mind.


I think your quote brings me to the crux of my confusion:

If a citizen militia can hold off mounted knights (a much higher investment in feudal capital, right?) what’s the lure of fielding the knight? Get me some archers, trained pikemen, and pointy sticks to wedge into the ground, and I'm ready to go.

(A little more off topic, I’m starting to suspect that this arises from a bigger question of terrain/theater, and that more often than not a proactive general could arrange for his army to be positioned in a place that negated any possibility of a mounted charge.)

Right, well, that's a more complicated issue. Basically, Knights were only ever part (and an increasingly small part) of the medieval army. At the end of the eleventh century a Knight was simply a soldier, hopefully mounted, but not necessarily so; by the late thirteenth century those who were previously poorer Knights were Sergeants. If you have access to JSTOR, I can link you a few articles to read on the subject.
Also, a Knight could serve as both Infantry and Cavalry. He was a professional killer, trained, experienced and ready. Whilst we might all like to think we're capable of being a warrior, actually killing somebody is something that requires a great deal of motivation, skill and willingness not to just run the hell away (which is what I would probably do if I were conscripted onto a medieval battlefield).

[grimbones]

Matthew, Storm Bringer,

Thank you both for your time this morning.

Given the time period we're discussing, how big would an "average" army be? Was there ever any accepted "best practices" in terms of troop make up?

(Gods, I feel stupid even posting that question. Was there ever such a thing as an average army?)

[Sundog]

Let me say it here: Sorry for the ignorance.

Please help me to understand how heavy cavalry was effective. (Wikipedia would have me believe that most knights rode up to the battle, dismounted, then fought on foot, but in my heart of hearts I want you guys to prove Wiki wrong.)

So:

The opposing army, sighting the dreaded GitP cavalry, forms up a shield wall with lots of spears poking out the front.

The GitP cavalry, seeing that the army somehow failed to do the same with their flanks (Why again? How many times do you want to be flanked by a guy on a horse?), rides around the side of the army and … Charges!

The GitP lancers each manage to spear one peasant. Whee.

Let’s presume that we managed to scare the army into routing. The GitP cavalry begins to hack and slash with our melee weapons! Huzzah, the carnage!

The tightly packed army routes. But they are a mob, so it is tough for them all to get out of the way. So one peasant out of every ten, unable to flee for his life, turns around and takes a crack at a horse with his spear.

Said peasant breaks horse's knee, horse goes down, peasant spears GitP cavalryman in the visor. All those hours of training both warhorse and knight are wasted on … what again?

Again, sorry for my ignorance. Any accurate reference books to recommend that can explain the culture and practice of heavy cavalry and the mounted charge? Help! :smalleek:

To understand the cavalry charge, you have to understand two things: Psychological impact and decisiveness.

As I mentioned above about the Bayonet: defeat occurs in the mind of the enemy. Supposing you are a pikeman, holding your 16' spear as part of a pikehedge: which do you fear, the charging cavalryman, or an opposing pikeman?

Statistically, you should fear the enemy pikeman. As long as you hold your ground, stand shoulder to shoulder, the cavalier cannot get at you. The enemy pikehedge, on the other hand, can mosey up to you and start hacking - chances are, you're going to die from either a pike in the guts or an arrow, not a cavalier's lance.

But, that cavalryman is so DAMN intimidating! The thunder of hoofbeats, the clatter of armour and shield, the glitter of his maille - he's scary! Plus, you can run away from a pikeman - try and run from a cavalryman and you get a lance in the back.

So, cavalry are more likely to break what they charge. And that gives them decisiveness.

When two pikehedges start going at one another, they'll be at it for some time, hacking, chopping, stabbing, locked up until one or the other runs out of men. Oh, one will probably break - eventually - but you're going to lose as many men as you kill.

But, tie up a hedge with another hedge and then hit them in the flank - and the situation changes radically. The cavalry may only kill a pittance of men on their pass (though, more than you might think - between lance strike, sword swings and trampling by trained horses, a cavalryman can take care of quite a few people), but their organization is thoroughly gone, and without organization, on the pre-gunpowder battlefield, a group of men is just a mob.

A formation will eat a mob for breakfast.

Further, a pikehedge can turn a cavalry charge only if they maintan their formation. If they fail to do so, that cavalry will ride right over the top of them. And throughout much of the feudal period, the professionals were the knights and the amateurs carried the pikes. Oh, the cavalrymen will take losses - but the pikemen will rout, and that means they will almost all die if the cavalry pursues, and will be of no use for the rest of the battle even if they don't.

Cavalry was the offensive arm. It's combination of mobility and hitting power made it powerful. To deny the power of the cavalry charge is as much an error as seeing such a charge as unbeatable - another common mistake.

[Matthew]

Matthew, Storm Bringer,

Thank you both for your time this morning.

No problem.


Given the time period we're discussing, how big would an "average" army be? Was there ever any accepted "best practices" in terms of troop make up?

(Gods, I feel stupid even posting that question. Was there ever such a thing as an average army?)

The population of England around 1100 is estimated to have been under a million. The number of Knights fees was something like 5,000. The Battle of Hastings is thought to have been fought between armies no more than 10,000 combatants a side, but I'm not sure where such estimates really come from (apart from the Doomsday Book for Knights Fees).
Large armies probably ranged from 10,000-30,000, very large armies (such as combined crusading hosts) maybe up to 60,000; however, that would be truly exceptional in my opinion. According to Joinville, Louis IX led 3,000 Knights to Egypt (which was probably something like a tenth of his total army) and, according to Villehardouin, the army of the Fourth Crusade was intended to be about 30,000 strong (4,500 Knights, 9,000 Squires and 20,000 Foot Sergeants), but ended up less than 20,000.
Those are significant armies though. Warfare was also conducted on a smaller scale, where you might be talking only a few hundred on either side.

[grimbones]

Whilst we might all like to think we're capable of being a warrior, actually killing somebody is something that requires a great deal of motivation, skill and willingness not to just run the hell away (which is what I would probably do if I were conscripted onto a medieval battlefield).

*laugh* No delusions there on my part. Although if we didn't have a choice, we might try talking one another into setting that spear and hoping for the best. "You, me, ten other guys, and we might just get out of this alive!"

You guys rock, confusion solved, thank you!

[Matthew]

*laugh* No delusions there on my part. Although if we didn't have a choice, we might try talking one another into setting that spear and hoping for the best. "You, me, ten other guys, and we might just get out of this alive!"

You guys rock, confusion solved, thank you!

Glad to be of service.


ok my friend and i have been heavily debating this one because we dont know what would be a better choice of weapons, his pick is a Claymore with some sword arm armor and a cuirass (pardon the spelling) where mine is a Scutum ( roman shield) and a Gladius with legionaire type armor could u guys please help before we go in my backyard with the stuff ( im a Ancient warfare reinactor and he's F'ing crazy)

Basically, assuming all else is equal, I am led to believe that your friend will have the advantage at the point of contact and after that, given that you survive, you will have the advantage. This is because your friend enjoys a longer reach and may be able to deliver a killing blow before you are able to get close enough to strike with your weapon.

Given that you behave very aggressively and are able to ward off his initial blows with your Scutum, you should find yourself in a position where you are able to thrust the Gladius under his cuirass and into his belly, into his abdomen, into his side, under his arm pit or, perhaps, into his throat or face (if you're lucky). Otherwise, you might consider cutting his leg tendons or opening his thighs in order to incapacitate him and deliver the killing blow.

That said, there are many ways in which the above sequence could transpire differently, neither you or your opponent should be married to one form of combat.

[Midnighter1021]

thanks, im also pretty good with a hoplon and a spear but i would never go at a sword user with a spear. 1<3 my gladius

i also have these in my collection
Katana
Wakisahi
Crossbow (modern)
Throwing stars
gladius
scutum
legionary plate

[Dervag]

They relied heavily on panic and fear, but a peasant attacking a horse is vulnerable to the rider. We might like to think in terms of communal bravery and self sacrifice, but you can bet that peasant is thinking more along the lines of individual survival. Besides which, a fleeing army is usually given room to flee. That said, a rout could easily turn into a counter attack, pursuit was as risky a business as battle.Precisely because the knights were frequently in charge of the overall battle, and they didn't want to die.

Moreover, even a dismounted knight is still dangerous. If he can get off his horse without being knocked to the ground, or if he gets the chance to regain his feet, the peasant warriors are going to be in deep trouble.


I think your quote brings me to the crux of my confusion:

If a citizen militia can hold off mounted knights (a much higher investment in feudal capital, right?) what’s the lure of fielding the knight? Get me some archers, trained pikemen, and pointy sticks to wedge into the ground, and I'm ready to go.First of all, you have to have archers; many regions did not, and if your archers take casualties you basically have to train new ones from infancy. Likewise, you have to have trained pikemen, which requires extended periods of military training, which requires you to take military-age males off the fields and feed them while they train. This is certainly possible, but it isn't easy and you don't get large numbers of troops that way.

The major reason for feudal military structures was economic. An armored knight had far more survivability in combat than any single normal foot soldier; a small group of armored knights could wade into a larger group of normal foot soldiers and scatter them, either by charging on horseback or (if they were trained for it) by fighting on foot. Moreover, training time makes a huge difference in the survivability of melee combatants.

Therefore, armies with at least a small core of armored, trained-from-youth warriors tended to beat armies without such a core, or with a weaker core. Therefore, militaries organized in such a way as to support the existence of large, well-equipped cores of these warriors.

Since the medieval peasant wasn't a very efficient engine of prosperity (he barely made enough to keep himself alive), this required large numbers of dedicated farmers and specialist craftsmen per warrior. Which, in turn, led to feudalism.

Because the feudal warriors and warlords didn't like peasant rebellions, especially efficient ones, they tended to oppose allowing the peasantry to train at arms. Even when they supported the notion, the peasants simply did not have the time or concentrated wealth to amass the kind of experience and equipment that would let them fight armored men-at-arms.

There were exceptions, of course. Certain societies did develop 'yeoman militia' models that worked well as an alternative to feudalism, especially societies living in rough terrain that gave footmen an advantage over cavalry. And if medievals had been fully aware of how effective something like a professionally drilled pike/crossbow army could be, they might well have tried to train them more often. But this knowledge comes in large part from hindsight as we look back on the end of the feudal period. It was not so obvious in advance that training peasants to fight as blocks of infantry could be a viable alternative to using them as a resource base to support elite troops and as a source of low-grade conscripts in wartime.

Of course, there was a full range from the low-grade peasant conscript through the mid-grade man at arms to the fully equipped knight who at least could go mounted, even if he chose not to. Usually when infantry defeated a force of mounted knights despite the knights' effort to disrupt an enemy formation before charging, it was because there were lots of those mid-level men at arms among the infantry. Such men were generally well enough trained and equipped that they stood a far better chance of holding their ground against a cavalry charge.

English longbowmen, for instance, would qualify as a sort of men-at-arms by this description. They were free yeomen with extensive military training and a powerful weapon. Likewise, large portions of the Saxon fyrd that opposed William the Conqueror at Hastings probably fit this description.

[Fhaolan]

thanks, im also pretty good with a hoplon and a spear but i would never go at a sword user with a spear. 1<3 my gladius

i also have these in my collection
Katana
Wakisahi
Crossbow (modern)
Throwing stars
gladius
scutum
legionary plate

Actually, taking a spear against a swordsman is not that bad of an idea, but like many things depends a lot on the training of each of the compatants, and precisely what kind of spear or sword. :smallbiggrin:

Personally, I find a light poleaxe to be the most effective weapon in my collection. Relatively fast, thanks to being two-handed, versatile, and able to deal with the heavier armours, as well as capable of blocking most other weapons. But then, I am unable to fight anymore due to a knee injury that has pretty much taken me out. So I'm not going to be able to do comparison testing the way I used to. Ah well. :smallsmile:

[Ruerl]

Actually, taking a spear against a swordsman is not that bad of an idea, but like many things depends a lot on the training of each of the compatants, and precisely what kind of spear or sword. :smallbiggrin:

Personally, I find a light poleaxe to be the most effective weapon in my collection. Relatively fast, thanks to being two-handed, versatile, and able to deal with the heavier armours, as well as capable of blocking most other weapons. But then, I am unable to fight anymore due to a knee injury that has pretty much taken me out. So I'm not going to be able to do comparison testing the way I used to. Ah well. :smallsmile:

Damn right! A short polearm weapon such as a Lucernhammer or a "knightly poleaxe" is a damn nasty weapon and I for one would much rather have a long hand an a half sword than a sword and shield against that weapon.

As a sidenote, what do people think of this test of mail & gambeson:

http://forums.swordforum.com/showthread.php?t=83020

[Matthew]

Precisely because the knights were frequently in charge of the overall battle, and they didn't want to die.

Well, that rather depends on the period in question. The further you get from the eleventh century, the more true this is, but the ratio of Knights to other combatants is thought to have varied over the period from something like 1:1 to 1:12.

By the mid to late thirteenth century, Joinville describes a situation whereby he was in command of a Battallion of 60 Knights and 600 Men at Arms. According to him, each knight was responsible for 10 Men at arms, but it is unclear if this was an arrangement 'in camp', on the battlefield or at sieges, nor what the function of the Men at Arms were.

The forces intended to be assembled for the Fourth Crusade clearly supposed 2 Squires (9,000) for every Knight (4,500), but 20,000 Men at Arms doesn't divide well into 4,500.


Moreover, even a dismounted knight is still dangerous. If he can get off his horse without being knocked to the ground, or if he gets the chance to regain his feet, the peasant warriors are going to be in deep trouble.

Heh. Knights made excellent Foot Soldiers. According to Robert the Monk (writing circa 1108) 'Those who know something about war are well aware that footsoldiers kill more effectively than cavalry.' - Chapter VII, p. 125.


First of all, you have to have archers; many regions did not, and if your archers take casualties you basically have to train new ones from infancy. Likewise, you have to have trained pikemen, which requires extended periods of military training, which requires you to take military-age males off the fields and feed them while they train. This is certainly possible, but it isn't easy and you don't get large numbers of troops that way.

This is interesting. I think when you're looking at Long/War Bows and truly skilled Bow Men this is true, but I think there must have been a great number of 'casual' Bow Men. Fulcher of Chartres talks about the poorest crusaders arming themselves with Bows on account of the relative cheapness. You often encounter Knights shooting Cross Bows at Sieges.
That said, I wonder what regions you have in mind?


The major reason for feudal military structures was economic. An armored knight had far more survivability in combat than any single normal foot soldier; a small group of armored knights could wade into a larger group of normal foot soldiers and scatter them, either by charging on horseback or (if they were trained for it) by fighting on foot. Moreover, training time makes a huge difference in the survivability of melee combatants.

The economic model for Feudalism is interesting, but I don't think it's the full story. Political, Social and Military breakdown, which may have been the result of economic difficulty, contributed directly to Feudalism. The degree to which Feudalism is evident also varies from region to region. Interestingly, it is most evident in post conquest England, the Holy Land and Latin Greece.
By th by, what kind of knights do you have in mind who wouldn't be trained for foot combat?


Because the feudal warriors and warlords didn't like peasant rebellions, especially efficient ones, they tended to oppose allowing the peasantry to train at arms. Even when they supported the notion, the peasants simply did not have the time or concentrated wealth to amass the kind of experience and equipment that would let them fight armored men-at-arms.

I think we probably need to draw a distinction betwen Rural and Urban localities when thinking about this element.


But then, I am unable to fight anymore due to a knee injury that has pretty much taken me out. So I'm not going to be able to do comparison testing the way I used to. Ah well. :smallsmile:

Aw man. Is this a recent development? Many sympathies.


As a sidenote, what do people think of this test of mail & gambeson:

http://forums.swordforum.com/showthread.php?t=83020

Hell of a lot better than the last lot he did. Live and learn! Still, I expect we'll soon hear from the pro Bow people with regard to the lack of historical authenticity of the tests, followed closely by the pro/anti katana factions.

For the most part, the test results followed my expectations. I was a little surprised at how much better the katana cut than the other swords; I expected it to be better, but the difference was very pronounced. However, his later explanation seems to indicate that the katana was a lot sharper than the other blades tested and that brings up the question of quality. Was the katana simply a better katana than the Angus Trim 1508 was an Angus Trim 1508, if you follow me? Pity he didn't try any Spears or One Handed Swords.

[Fhaolan]

Aw man. Is this a recent development? Many sympathies.


Relatively recent. :)

A little over a year ago I was performing in Sun Valley Idaho in a little renfaire that was attached to their Shakespeare festival. I was MC'ing the Seattle Knights performance, supposedly being Shakespeare himself writing battle scenes on the fly. For the last performance on Sunday, we decided to have a bit of fun, and have all the actors constantly mess up their lines, staging directions, etc. At the end, I was to get so upset that I would grab a spear from one of the performers and run out onto the field saying 'That's not how a Shakespeare play ends! I'll show you how a Shakespeare play ends!" and run around stabbing everyone with the spear. Then I was to yell out "I'm coming for you Marlowe!" and run off the field.

Didn't quite happen as planned. One of the performers I 'killed' didn't just stop where she dropped, but tried to roll out of the way. Instead she rolled into me, pinned my foot to the ground while tripping me. Part of our training is how to fall, so I spun to land on my back rather than my face... but my pinned leg didn't spin with me. I couldn't stand back up, and over the next couple of hours it didn't get any better; the leg couldn't support my weight.

It turns out I severed the cruciate ligament, which is one of the parts of the body that can't heal on it's own. I had surgery to start the repair of the damage several months later (the soonest they could get me in), but it takes a long, long time to heal even then. I can walk now, but I can't run or hop on that leg. Which sorta puts paid to doing any more stage combat or reconstructive archeology.

Ah well. It'll heal eventually, supposedly. :smallsmile:

[Midnighter1021]

to add with the knights topic. What about the Cataphracts, they used Camels instead of horses and that is pretty cool

[Matthew]

Ah well. It'll heal eventually, supposedly. :smallsmile:

Dear me. Well, best wishes for a full recovery, Fhaolan!


to add with the knights topic. What about the Cataphracts, they used Camels instead of horses and that is pretty cool

Hmmn. I don't think Cataphracts conventionally used Camels over Horses (as far as I am aware that was an occasional practice, but perhaps that's what you meant?). However Cataphracts are a really interesting subject, so here's the Wikipedia article to get discussion started: Cataphract (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cataphract).

[Dervag]

Well, that rather depends on the period in question. The further you get from the eleventh century, the more true this is, but the ratio of Knights to other combatants is thought to have varied over the period from something like 1:1 to 1:12.

By the mid to late thirteenth century, Joinville describes a situation whereby he was in command of a Battallion of 60 Knights and 600 Men at Arms. According to him, each knight was responsible for 10 Men at arms, but it is unclear if this was an arrangement 'in camp', on the battlefield or at sieges, nor what the function of the Men at Arms were.

The forces intended to be assembled for the Fourth Crusade clearly supposed 2 Squires (9,000) for every Knight (4,500), but 20,000 Men at Arms doesn't divide well into 4,500.What I mean is that the commander of an army was generally a nobleman with knightly training, and that the prominent leaders of that army were likewise. If there was to be a charge of heavy cavalry, these nobles would be quite likely to participate. As such, it would certainly be in their interests to make sure that heavy cavalry charges were not made recklessly.


This is interesting. I think when you're looking at Long/War Bows and truly skilled Bow Men this is true, but I think there must have been a great number of 'casual' Bow Men. Fulcher of Chartres talks about the poorest crusaders arming themselves with Bows on account of the relative cheapness. You often encounter Knights shooting Cross Bows at Sieges.
That said, I wonder what regions you have in mind?Switzerland. Flanders (Guten Tag! *WHUMP*). The Saxon fyrd, perhaps? Possibly the Scotch Highlands; I don't know.


The economic model for Feudalism is interesting, but I don't think it's the full story. Political, Social and Military breakdown, which may have been the result of economic difficulty, contributed directly to Feudalism. The degree to which Feudalism is evident also varies from region to region. Interestingly, it is most evident in post conquest England, the Holy Land and Latin Greece.I agree; what I'm trying to get at is that there was an underlying economic logic there. Even in nonfeudal societies, the military class tended to be a class, supported by large numbers of noncombatant peasants or slaves, rather than being a citizen soldiery. There were numerous and famous exceptions, but those were exceptions.


By th by, what kind of knights do you have in mind who wouldn't be trained for foot combat?I'm not sure there is or was any such animal, though I can certainly imagine a warrior who trains so extensively on horseback that his ability to fight on foot suffers (there were probably many such among the steppe nomads, though those were outside the purvey of our question).


I think we probably need to draw a distinction betwen Rural and Urban localities when thinking about this element.You're right. But this was an economy where most of the population was rural, and where the rural population (including its attached warrior class) made up the bulk of the 'knights' (that is, heavy cavalry) for purposes of the discussion. So rural localities are more relevant to the discussion in my opinion.


Relatively recent. :)

A little over a year ago I was performing in Sun Valley Idaho in a little renfaire that was attached to their Shakespeare festival. I was MC'ing the Seattle Knights performance, supposedly being Shakespeare himself writing battle scenes on the fly. For the last performance on Sunday, we decided to have a bit of fun, and have all the actors constantly mess up their lines, staging directions, etc. At the end, I was to get so upset that I would grab a spear from one of the performers and run out onto the field saying 'That's not how a Shakespeare play ends! I'll show you how a Shakespeare play ends!" and run around stabbing everyone with the spear. Then I was to yell out "I'm coming for you Marlowe!" and run off the field.

Didn't quite happen as planned. One of the performers I 'killed' didn't just stop where she dropped, but tried to roll out of the way. Instead she rolled into me, pinned my foot to the ground while tripping me. Part of our training is how to fall, so I spun to land on my back rather than my face... but my pinned leg didn't spin with me. I couldn't stand back up, and over the next couple of hours it didn't get any better; the leg couldn't support my weight.

It turns out I severed the cruciate ligament, which is one of the parts of the body that can't heal on it's own. I had surgery to start the repair of the damage several months later (the soonest they could get me in), but it takes a long, long time to heal even then. I can walk now, but I can't run or hop on that leg. Which sorta puts paid to doing any more stage combat or reconstructive archeology.

Ah well. It'll heal eventually, supposedly. :smallsmile:
:smalleek: :smallfrown: You have my most sincere sympathies, and I hope it does get better eventually.


Hmmn. I don't think Cataphracts conventionally used Camels over Horses (as far as I am aware that was an occasional practice, but perhaps that's what you meant?). However Cataphracts are a really interesting subject, so here's the Wikipedia article to get discussion started: Cataphract (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cataphract).My impression is that cataphracts employed virtually every possible style of fighting, from horse archery to heavy infantry, at one time or another, and that "cataphract" was more of a description meaning "Byzantine elite soldier" than a specific term for a specific fighting style.

[Matthew]

What I mean is that the commander of an army was generally a nobleman with knightly training, and that the prominent leaders of that army were likewise. If there was to be a charge of heavy cavalry, these nobles would be quite likely to participate. As such, it would certainly be in their interests to make sure that heavy cavalry charges were not made recklessly.

Ah right, I understand. I can think of a few fairly reckless instances (Louis the IX's brother on the Seventh Crusade springs to mind), but I think that this is probably true. Certainly Richard the Lionheart (somewhat unsuccessfully) tried to hold his cavalry in check at Arsuf, supposedly for the 'perfect' moment. The penalty for breaking ranks and charging off amongst the Military Orders was apparently very harsh (not as bad as for surrendering a castle, though).


Switzerland. Flanders (Guten Tag! *WHUMP*). The Saxon fyrd, perhaps? Possibly the Scotch Highlands; I don't know.

I would be hard pressed to believe it on the whole, but it's possible. The Saxon Fyrd almost certainly made use of Bow Men. I think you can even see one in the Shield Wall on the Bayeux Tapestry. To what degree they used Bow Men is another matter, but chances are, if a society has strongholds, they have men trained to defend/attack them with Bows or Cross Bows. Interestingly, Bows even feature in Beowulf:

"Now shall flame consume our leader in battle, the blaze darken round him who stood his ground in the steel hail, when the arrow storm shot from bow strings pelted the shield wall. The shaft hit home. Feather fledged, it finned the barb in flight."

...which I always thought was really interesting in tandem with the earlier remarks about cavalry and the use of the Bow at the pool of Grendel's mother.


I agree; what I'm trying to get at is that there was an underlying economic logic there. Even in nonfeudal societies, the military class tended to be a class, supported by large numbers of noncombatant peasants or slaves, rather than being a citizen soldiery. There were numerous and famous exceptions, but those were exceptions.

Yeah, fair enough. I'm just wary of the economic model as an explanation for feudalism. Even in modern times, the percentage of combatants to none combatants in standing armies is very small.


I'm not sure there is or was any such animal, though I can certainly imagine a warrior who trains so extensively on horseback that his ability to fight on foot suffers (there were probably many such among the steppe nomads, though those were outside the purvey of our question).

Heh, yeah, that's a good point. I wonder whether any knights suffered from that condition? Doesn't seem beyond the bounds of possibility.


You're right. But this was an economy where most of the population was rural, and where the rural population (including its attached warrior class) made up the bulk of the 'knights' (that is, heavy cavalry) for purposes of the discussion. So rural localities are more relevant to the discussion in my opinion.

Well... there's rural and there's rural, many castles had associated towns that one may or may not consider urban. I think estimates for rural versus urban populations run from 1-10%. At the high end we're talking towns or cities of several thousand people, which did support knights one way or another, but we're probably straying off the point.
Levying and training large numbers of peasants to fight as Spear Men and Bow Men isn't as economically or militarily practical in a politically fragmented society as retaining a professional, flexible, well equipped and highly motivated war band (supplemented at need by mercenaries and levies, of course).


My impression is that cataphracts employed virtually every possible style of fighting, from horse archery to heavy infantry, at one time or another, and that "cataphract" was more of a description meaning "Byzantine elite soldier" than a specific term for a specific fighting style.

Heh, yeah. That'll be because there were so many different types of Cataphracts, I think, which is what makes them interesting. Cataphracts actually originate in Persia, or so I am led to believe. Roman and Byzantine Cataphracts were an adaption. The actual word means something like 'iron clad' or 'protected'.

[Dervag]

Ah right, I understand. I can think of a few fairly reckless instances (Louis the IX's brother on the Seventh Crusade springs to mind), but I think that this is probably true. Certainly Richard the Lionheart (somewhat unsuccessfully) tried to hold his cavalry in check at Arsuf, supposedly for the 'perfect' moment. The penalty for breaking ranks and charging off amongst the Military Orders was apparently very harsh (not as bad as for surrendering a castle, though).I'm sure there were reckless charges; the Middle Ages were a long time and I'm sure there were many incidences where a fool was in command of an army during that period. I'm just saying that a medieval commander who was not a fool and didn't want to die would be leery of making a heavy cavalry charge too soon.


I would be hard pressed to believe it on the whole, but it's possible. The Saxon Fyrd almost certainly made use of Bow Men. I think you can even see one in the Shield Wall on the Bayeux Tapestry. To what degree they used Bow Men is another matter, but chances are, if a society has strongholds, they have men trained to defend/attack them with Bows or Cross Bows. Interestingly, Bows even feature in Beowulf:I'm losing track of what you do or do not believe in this case, I think.

What I was getting at originally was that:
a)There were medieval nations and cultures that did not adhere strictly to the model of a large number of unarmed peasants supporting a small warrior elite, with a class barrier between the two groups. The groups I names, such as the Swiss, were examples of this (I think).
b)Many areas did not produce archers of sufficient number and quality to make them a dominant arm on the battlefield. To be sure there were archers everywhere, but the archers in question were unlikely to turn the tide of a battle the way that, say, Welsh longbowmen or the famous Genovese crossbowmen might. Therefore, they could not simply use archers as 'the counter' for armored knights the way the poster I was replying to suggested.

I think what happened is that I tried to answer your question about my opinion (b) with a list of regions that matched (a). I do not intend to claim that any of those nationalities did not use the bow; I intended to claim that they are possible examples of areas without a strong class barrier dividing the elite warriors and the peasantry, but that I'm not sure about this.


...which I always thought was really interesting in tandem with the earlier remarks about cavalry and the use of the Bow at the pool of Grendel's mother.I always had this image of Beowulf in Valhalla regaling the other Einherjar with his exploits:
(to paraphrase)
"Yeah, so I grabbed the monster, wrestled with him on the floor while my troops' swords skittered right off his hide, then ripped his arm off with my bare hands! We found him dead in the swamp later."
"Pretty good! What happened next?"
"You'll never believe this, but... his mother came to complain."


Yeah, fair enough. I'm just wary of the economic model as an explanation for feudalism. Even in modern times, the percentage of combatants to none combatants in standing armies is very small.Yes, but the need to train soldiers from boyhood has declined somewhat. As many have noted, it's easier to train riflemen than swordsmen. And national governments allow for a more distributed scheme of supporting the troops through large-scale taxation rather than through a series of manors, baronies, or themes.


Levying and training large numbers of peasants to fight as Spear Men and Bow Men isn't as economically or militarily practical in a politically fragmented society as retaining a professional, flexible, well equipped and highly motivated war band (supplemented at need by mercenaries and levies, of course).That is exactly what I was talking about, only said in a far more succinct and economical way.


Heh, yeah. That'll be because there were so many different types of Cataphracts, I think, which is what makes them interesting.I suspect what happened is that the elite Byzantine soldiers saw themselves as 'cataphracts,' but that 'cataphract' came to mean something to the Byzantines similar to what, say, 'Marine' means to Americans. It's a statement about one's group affiliation and the level of one's skill and training, not about the specific weapons one uses. If, for instance, through some inexplicable event the world was plunged into a pre-gunpowder era and everyone had to fight with swords and shields again, you may be sure that the US Marines would still think of themselves as 'Marines' and not as 'swordsmen.' Similarly, if they find themselves fighting in landlocked areas far from shore, so that they are not 'marines' in the sense of being soldiers who fight from ships, they will still think of themselves as being 'Marines.' 'Marine' is a group affiliation, not the name of some particular weapons system.

Similarly, I speculate, cataphracts thought of themselves as cataphracts regardless of what they were fighting with or what they were riding. The heavy armor was a recurring aspect, of course, hence the name; but a cataphract was still a cataphract even if circumstances meant that he was fighting in chain mail on a camel instead of in scale mail with a lance from a horse.


Cataphracts actually originate in Persia, or so I am led to believe. Roman and Byzantine Cataphracts were an adaption.Ah yes, the famous "why don't we have one of those?" effect.

[Matthew]

I'm sure there were reckless charges; the Middle Ages were a long time and I'm sure there were many incidences where a fool was in command of an army during that period. I'm just saying that a medieval commander who was not a fool and didn't want to die would be leery of making a heavy cavalry charge too soon.

Absolutely. Unfortunately, if your cavalry decided it was time to charge, there wasn't a lot you could do about it but join in, which is what apparently happened at Arsuf and was apparently a fairly common danger. As I understand it, the pressure of being harrassed at range is the primary cause of premature charges (perhaps even the purpose of such attacks). But, yeah, I think we're in agreement.


I'm losing track of what you do or do not believe in this case, I think.

What I was getting at originally was that:
a)There were medieval nations and cultures that did not adhere strictly to the model of a large number of unarmed peasants supporting a small warrior elite, with a class barrier between the two groups. The groups I names, such as the Swiss, were examples of this (I think).
b)Many areas did not produce archers of sufficient number and quality to make them a dominant arm on the battlefield. To be sure there were archers everywhere, but the archers in question were unlikely to turn the tide of a battle the way that, say, Welsh longbowmen or the famous Genovese crossbowmen might. Therefore, they could not simply use archers as 'the counter' for armored knights the way the poster I was replying to suggested.

I think what happened is that I tried to answer your question about my opinion (b) with a list of regions that matched (a). I do not intend to claim that any of those nationalities did not use the bow; I intended to claim that they are possible examples of areas without a strong class barrier dividing the elite warriors and the peasantry, but that I'm not sure about this.

Ah right. Here we probably get into more difficult territory. The feudal system (such as it was) seems to have operated alongside a number of other military systems. I would be hard pressed to explain much of it, as I am unclear of the facts myself, but the whole concept of feudalism has recently come into quite serious question. A number of things I should probably make clear:

a) I don't believe that Bows, Cross Bows (or Slings!) ever turned the tide of a battle. Contributed significantly to succes, sure, but I reject the whole notion of these weapons being directly responsible for victory in just about any context. They were very effective for fixing, provoking or disrupting an enemy force, but defeating it is another matter.

b) I do believe that Bows, Cross Bows and Slings were represented to different degrees in different armies, even sometimes completely absent. I couldn't say with any confidence for which armies this might be the case. I think that the same applies to Horse Men and Foot Men. However, in the past it has been strongly argued that it was often the case that major armies were composed of i) only cavalry, ii) only infantry or iii) lacked archers entirely. This is something I am often watching for and am eager to call into question (mainly because I want to test this relatively modern theory as much as possible), so I might have jumped in unwarranted.

c) I do believe that trying to understand the feudal system in a general way will only provide general answers. Just looking at twelfth century military organisation in England leads to unexpected results. The 1181 Assize of Arms, for instance, specified this:

i) Anyone with a Knight's Fee or over 16 Marks in chattels or income is required to possess: Mail Coat, Helmet, Shield, Lance,

ii) Any Free Man with over 10 Marks in chattels or income is required to possess: Mail Shirt, Iron Cap, Lance,

iii) Any Free Man or Burgesse with less than 10 Marks in chattels or income is required to possess: Padded Coat, Iron Cap, Lance,

The system of recruitment described by Robert Bartlett in England Under the Norman and Angevin Kings (1075-1225) is worth a read. He's very general, but I think that demonstrates how complicated the system was rather well. Anyway, I don't think I'm doing much disagreeing with you, but hopefully we're both a bit clearer on our individual views!


I always had this image of Beowulf in Valhalla regaling the other Einherjar with his exploits:
(to paraphrase)
"Yeah, so I grabbed the monster, wrestled with him on the floor while my troops' swords skittered right off his hide, then ripped his arm off with my bare hands! We found him dead in the swamp later."
"Pretty good! What happened next?"
"You'll never believe this, but... his mother came to complain."

Heh,: Einherjar #1: "Holy crap! What did you do?"


Yes, but the need to train soldiers from boyhood has declined somewhat. As many have noted, it's easier to train riflemen than swordsmen. And national governments allow for a more distributed scheme of supporting the troops through large-scale taxation rather than through a series of manors, baronies, or themes.

True.


That is exactly what I was talking about, only said in a far more succinct and economical way.

Good, then we're in agreement.


I suspect what happened is that the elite Byzantine soldiers saw themselves as 'cataphracts,' but that 'cataphract' came to mean something to the Byzantines similar to what, say, 'Marine' means to Americans. It's a statement about one's group affiliation and the level of one's skill and training, not about the specific weapons one uses. If, for instance, through some inexplicable event the world was plunged into a pre-gunpowder era and everyone had to fight with swords and shields again, you may be sure that the US Marines would still think of themselves as 'Marines' and not as 'swordsmen.' Similarly, if they find themselves fighting in landlocked areas far from shore, so that they are not 'marines' in the sense of being soldiers who fight from ships, they will still think of themselves as being 'Marines.' 'Marine' is a group affiliation, not the name of some particular weapons system.

Similarly, I speculate, cataphracts thought of themselves as cataphracts regardless of what they were fighting with or what they were riding. The heavy armor was a recurring aspect, of course, hence the name; but a cataphract was still a cataphract even if circumstances meant that he was fighting in chain mail on a camel instead of in scale mail with a lance from a horse.

Ah yes, the famous "why don't we have one of those?" effect.

Very possible.

[dwagiebard]

This has probably been asked before, but is the Witch-King's weapon a mace, morningstar or flail? It would seem to be a flail, but the head looks quite different. Perhaps something Peter Jackson made up?

http://www.steltercreativewoodworks.com/STELTER1/Witchking_Cost/IMAG0013.JPG

[Matthew]

This has probably been asked before, but is the Witch-King's weapon a mace, morningstar or flail? It would seem to be a flail, but the head looks quite different. Perhaps something Peter Jackson made up?

http://www.steltercreativewoodworks.com/STELTER1/Witchking_Cost/IMAG0013.JPG

It's a 'Fantasy Flail' [with heavy emphasis on the fantasy]. However, Flails have been described as Morning Stars or Maces in the past. These are not particularly technical terms, which is where the confusion often arises. Basically, a 'Morning Star' can denote a weapon (usually taking the form of a Mace with a spiked head) or describe the shaped head of a weapon (such as a Mace or Flail). A Mace is a essentially a club, whilst a Flail is a club with a length of chain and, perhaps, a head attached.

[Dalboz of Gurth]

The definitions for each weapon are pretty specific:

Flail: Any shafted weapon with at least one chain that has a heavy stick or ball attached at an end.

Mace: A club with a heavy and often times spiked end used to break armor.

Morning Star: A club with a spiked ball/bulb at the end (resembling and named after the morning star in the heavens - Venus).

So it is a Flail.


edit: just check your webster's unabridged dictionary for these definitions ;D

[Dervag]

The problem is that there's a bit of overlap in the definitions as historians use them. Depending on whose system of classification you use, the same weapon can be considered a mace, a morning star, or a flail; Webster's may be oversimplifying.

I think this one was addressed in one of the earlier Marks of this thread, but I have no idea where to find it and the links to the earlier Marks seem to be broken.

[Fhaolan]

Here's where we get into a bit of fun with technical terms. :)

Dictionaries tend to simplify technical terms, so they are not always the best source of information.

The weights on the end of the chain(s)/hinge of a flail are technically called 'maces'. This has caused endless confusion, where flails and maces are refered to both as maces in many period sources. Even better, those same documents describe a 'morning star' as a spiked mace. Which could mean a spiked mace, or a spiked flail, or both depending on which definition of 'mace' they are refering to, which is not overly clear.

It's the same confusion that involves the weapon known as a pollaxe. 'Poll' is the technical term for the top of the head, and for the striking part of a hammer, not a misspelling of 'pole'. While the name pollaxe has been attached to a variety of weapons, to be absolutely precise it means a 'hammer-axe', or a weapon with both a hammer head and an axe head. However, even period descriptions of pollaxes have weapons with backspikes instead of hammer heads, or a backspike *and* a hammer head, with no axe...

Names are flexible and tend to be bent around alot, especially as many of these weapons were named different things in different areas simply because of language differences. A lochaber axe is pretty much the exact same weapon as a voulge-guisarme or a bardiche, depending on the exact example you're looking at. They don't all look the same. :smallsmile:

[Matthew]

I think this one was addressed in one of the earlier Marks of this thread, but I have no idea where to find it and the links to the earlier Marks seem to be broken.

Here are working versions of the links:

Mark I: http://www.giantitp.com/forums/showthread.php?t=24294 (18 Pages, 518 Posts)

Mark II: http://www.giantitp.com/forums/showthread.php?t=23290 (16 Pages, 452 Posts)

Mark III: http://www.giantitp.com/forums/showthread.php?t=21318 (28 Pages, 819 Posts)

[Mike_G]

Relatively recent. :)



It turns out I severed the cruciate ligament, which is one of the parts of the body that can't heal on it's own. I had surgery to start the repair of the damage several months later (the soonest they could get me in), but it takes a long, long time to heal even then. I can walk now, but I can't run or hop on that leg. Which sorta puts paid to doing any more stage combat or reconstructive archeology.

Ah well. It'll heal eventually, supposedly. :smallsmile:

Ah. The old ACL.

Common to skiers, when the fall with a ski attatched and their foot goes a different way from their hips. I see a lot of this at the Orthopedic office where I work part time.

Ligaments don't heal well anywhere, since they have a crap blood supply. They generally require surgery. The good news is that people do recover, although slowly, from these injuries. The important thing is not to let the bad leg slow you down so much you get totally out of shape.

My fencing coach ruptured his Achilles tendon in a competition, taught from a wheelchair for a year, but came back to coach and compete again. It can be done.

[Winterking]

Regarding cataphracts, I think some of the difficulty in determining what they actually were comes from the fact that the word spans a thousand years or more of history. Since kataphraktoi basically refers to 'armored cavalry', this could, and historically, did, range from horse archers to camel lancers.

In the 10th-century Byzantine expansion (which I have studied closely), the Byzantine Kataphraktoi were horsemen, not camel-riders. The cataphracts/kataphrakts/dudes (I wish historians would stop going back and forth about how they want to spell Greek words), as generally used on campaign, were almost exclusively melee combatants. The first rank or so of a formation might be armed with lances, but the major weapon was a heavy mace, sword, or hand-axe. Rather than the popular idea of a lance charge, which wins by decisively breaking the enemy (ala Pelennor Fields in RotK), the Kataphraktoi were supposed to charge at a controlled pace into the enemy formation, and grind their way through, methodically fighting their way forward, until the enemy, demoralized by the heavily armored, unkillable (in theory) horsemen, fled.

That's not to say that horse-archery was absent from the Byzantine army. Far from it; the difference is that the horse-archers themselves weren't generally called kataphraktoi, and usually had less armor. The late-10th century Byzantine cavalry formation, a large, blunt, wedge, included both types of horseman: Kataphraktoi in front and in the center/point of the wedge, with archers and lighter-armored lancers on either side and behind the formation. The whole wedge was supposed to advance at a walk, silent but for drums & choreographed shouts calling upon God, and intimidate the enemy. Once the wedge and the frontline Kataphraktoi got stuck in, the archers would fire over the front lines, and into the back of the enemy formation. (Meanwhile, many other light cavalry would be trying to flank or otherwise harass the enemy, adding to the disorder).
Actually, the cataphracts/kataphraktoi were an extremely small part of the cavalry wing of an army, let alone the army itself. Emperor & general Nikephoros II Phokas' book of military instructions suggests a campaign army of around 25,000 men, of whom 12,000 or more are infantry, and the rest cavalry. In such a host, the number of true kataphraktoi--heavily armored, well-trained, elite melee cavalry--was often less than a thousand. The rest of the horse ranged from lightly armerd scouts--archers and lancers--to moderately armored horse-archers and lancers who formed up in the cavalry wedge with the cataphracts.

(most of this from the Praecepta militaria, the above mentioned military manual, and from Sowing the Dragon's Teeth, an excellent book by Eric McGeer on Byzantine warfare.)

[Matthew]

Very interesting WinterKing. I must say I have a hard time believing that the Byzantine Cataphracts advanced at a walk into the enemy. Is that from a primary source or is it historical interpretation?

Interesting point about the lack of lances. I know of some none Byzantine eleventh century Cavalry with a similar predisposition:

Gesta Francorum, p. 150.


Et Agulani fuerunt numero tria milia; qui neque lanceas neque sagittas neque ualla arma timebant, quia omnes errant undique cooperti ferro et equi eorum, ipsique nolebant in bellum ferre arma nisi solummodo gladios.

The Agulani numbered three thousand; they fear neither spears nor arrows nor any other weapon, for they and their horses are covered all over with plates of iron. They will not use any weapons except swords when they are fighting.

Robert the Monk completely screws up the sense, so that in his version the Agulani completely reject the use of any weapons! Exactly who the Agulani are is another question entirely...

[Dervag]

Possibly they went extinct because of their stereotyped battle tactics?

[Matthew]

According to Carol Sweetenham, one theory is that were Turkish Mercenaries, deriving their name from Oghlou, which means son [N. Iorga, Les narrateurs de la premiere Croisade (Paris, 1928), p. 76)]. Another was that the word was derived from Agareni, the biblical sons of Hagar [E. Jamison, 'Some Notes on the Anonymi Gesta Francorum with special reference to the Norman contingent from Southern Italy and Sicily in the First Crusade', Studies in French language and medieval literature presented to Professor Mildred K. Pope (Manchester, 1939), pp. 183-208. The latter interpretation links them to the Aigolant in the Chanson d'Aspremont.

My guess is that they are either a continuation of typical eastern Cataphract practice or were imitations of the Byzantine Cataphracts, maybe even Armenian Heavy Cavalry. Regardless, prolonged conflict between Byzantium and the Turks was bound to lead to some degree of military imitation and the number of Latin Christians serving as mercenaries for the Byzantines probably created some familiarity. Some of the pre crusade activities of Latin Christians in the east are very entertaining and enlightening.

[Dervag]

I'm still tempted to stick with my theory. :smallbiggrin:

It would explain why we don't know who they are...

[Winterking]

Very interesting WinterKing. I must say I have a hard time believing that the Byzantine Cataphracts advanced at a walk into the enemy. Is that from a primary source or is it historical interpretation?

Interesting point about the lack of lances. I know of some none Byzantine eleventh century Cavalry with a similar predisposition:

Gesta Francorum, p. 150.

Robert the Monk completely screws up the sense, so that in his version the Agulani completely reject the use of any weapons! Exactly who the Agulani are is another question entirely...

That's from the Praecepta militaria I mentioned above, but I should clarify what I meant/what the primary source says. It is not so much that the entire charge was at a walk, but rather, that the 'charge'--the fast moving assault-to-carry-all-before-it that we think of with the word--was extremely controlled and deliberate, at least in the ideal world of Nikephoros II Phokas.

Under his instructions, the advance of a cavalry wedge would have as much psychological as actual impact on the enemy. He gives careful instructions that the wedge should move deliberately and in unison (which necessitates a slower advance), without speaking, cheering, shouting, or other human noise, apart from loud drums. The only human noise that he encourages is shouting, in unison, of specific prayers/calls to God for aid. The whole wedge is supposed to maintain formation until it strikes the enemy, rather than disintegrating into a mass of disordered horsemen; the effect of the impact thus would be magnified. Additionally, Nikephoros' instructions suggest that the center of the point of the wedge be aimed at the enemy commander, in order to kill/disable him quickly.
The sense I got, reading that, was that the advance was supposed to strike fear into a less-organized enemy: a silent block of cavalry moves at a walk forward, the hooves of over a thousand horses shaking the ground, armored enough that the enemy arrows have little to no effect, while every few minutes a massed shout erupts, praising their god (who isn't yours), probably cutting through the other noise of battle. Then, at the last minute, they charge home at you--that would unnerve a lot of armies, especially if they had fewer heavy cavalry of their own, or were suffering particularly badly from the horse-archers in back of the wedge. And if the general suddenly ceased to inspire his troops, on account of a chronic case of the deads, the chance of a formation collapse would be even greater.

So, I probably miswrote regarding the walk--think of it rather as a controlled, deliberate, walking advance right up until the last few moments.

Regarding lances...that's an intriguing quote you found. I think that the 10th-c Byzantine lack (well, relative lack) of lances is related to a couple of points--first, the development of the stirrup, and the subsequent massive increase in the potential of the lance. I don't recall when stirrups reached Byzantium, but it takes some time for a culture to discover the potential of the lancer charge. One of the things that made the Normans so powerful was, of course, their armored cavalry, and their use/development of lance tactics. Before the example of Robert Guiscard & co, warriors in the eastern Mediterranean region would more likely have followed the stirrup-example of the steppes, namely, improved horse-archery.
Second is the fact that, once you've charged home, the lance is pretty much useless--in close combat, a sword or mace lets you use the advantage of your height atop the horse, while a lance would just get tangled up in the infantry/cavalry around you. While a lance is useful in the pursuit of a broken foe, the Byzantine lighter cavalry did often have spears/lances for such purposes.

[Sundog]

Second is the fact that, once you've charged home, the lance is pretty much useless--in close combat, a sword or mace lets you use the advantage of your height atop the horse, while a lance would just get tangled up in the infantry/cavalry around you. While a lance is useful in the pursuit of a broken foe, the Byzantine lighter cavalry did often have spears/lances for such purposes.

I've heard this before, but I find it unlikely. The technique of "shortening the lance" - switching to a grip halfway along the lance and using it to stab downwards on the footsoldiers near you - was almost certainly in use PRIOR to the development of the modern stirrup - Roman cavalry using what appears to be the technique are depicted in some martial friezes in Herculaneum. A system by which a lance could be turned against a close in foe is not one I would expect to be lost.

[Adlan]

You don't need stirrups to use a lance properly, Roman Saddles were designed to keep you in place.

http://www.caerleon.net/history/army/saddle.jpg

So I'd assume other historical saddles were also equally robust and supportive.

[Matthew]

Well, there are Lances and there are Lances. Ancient and Early Medieval Lances don't seem to have been much different from Spears of the period, were usable in one hand and were about 6-9' in length. Longer Lances, such as the Kontos, were generally used in two hands and were about 9-12' in length. Later Medieval Lances were longer, but used in one hand. The longer the lance, the less managable it is likely to be in melee after a charge. Norman Knights appear to have used their Spears overarm, underarm and as missiles.

The description of the ordered Byzantine charge reminds me very much of what is often thought to be the typical knightly charge, but I would be hard pressed to produce any evidence off hand. Maybe Anna Comnena? Robert the Monk typically describes the crusaders as being unafraid of Turkish Arrows, protected by Armour and Shield. I can't speak the horses, though! Let's see what I can dig up...

Ah, yes, this looks like an exact replication of what you are describing:

Anna Comnena, Alexiad, trans. E. R. A. Sewter, p. 320.


His son in law Nicephorus (my Caesar) was summoned. He was ordered to pick out the best fighters, expert archers, and post them on the ramparts; they were to shoot volleys of arrows at the Latins, but without taking aim and mostly off target, so as to terrify the enemy by the weight of the attack, but at all costs to avoid killing them. As I have remarked, he was fearful of desecrating that day and he wished to prevent fratricide. Other picked men, most of them carrying bows, but some wielding long spears, he ordered to throw open the gate of Saint Romanus and make a show of force with a violent charge against the enemy; they were to be drawn up in such a way that each lancer had two peltasts to protect him on either side. In this formation they would advance at a walking pace, but send ahead a few skilled archers to shoot at the Kelts from a distance and alter direction, right or left, from time to time; when they saw that the space between the two armies had been reduced to a narrow gap, then the officers were to signal the archers accompanying them to shoot think volleys of arrows at the horses, not at the riders, and gallop at full speed against the enemy. The idea was partly to break the full force of the Keltic attack by wounding their mounts (they would not find it easy to ride in this condition) and partly (this was more important) to avoid the killing of Christians.

I think this may be difficulty of translation, but I doubt the ranks were mixed. I think it more likely a 1:1:1, so perhaps 1,000 Bow Men on each wing and 1,000 Spear Men in the centre.

I'll keep an eye out for any references to Frankish discipline, but I'm not having much success at the moment.

[Stephen_E]

It turns out I severed the cruciate ligament, which is one of the parts of the body that can't heal on it's own. I had surgery to start the repair of the damage several months later (the soonest they could get me in), but it takes a long, long time to heal even then. I can walk now, but I can't run or hop on that leg. Which sorta puts paid to doing any more stage combat or reconstructive archeology.

Ah well. It'll heal eventually, supposedly. :smallsmile:

My cat did that a decade ago, but badly enough that the vet decided to replace the ligament with some sort of artificial material. The cat's still around (although he further wrecked that leg 5 years ago)

Their was a All Black Rugby player who IIRC did the same injury a couple of decades ago. He did recover eventually and go back to international competition, but he went from been considered the best in the world at his position, and possibly the best ever, to simply very good.

So good news is with care and exercise you should recover most of your movement/strength with that leg. Bad news is some of it's gone for good, and it's a slow recovery.:smallfrown:

Stephen

[Stephen_E]

a) I don't believe that Bows, Cross Bows (or Slings!) ever turned the tide of a battle. Contributed significantly to succes, sure, but I reject the whole notion of these weapons being directly responsible for victory in just about any context. They were very effective for fixing, provoking or disrupting an enemy force, but defeating it is another matter.


I would of thought that Agincourt and Crecy were two examples of Bows decivesly winning the battle. I vaguely recall some Roman battles where they also did. Although I will agree that it was rare, and required the "cooperation" of the enemy commander.

Recipe for great military victory.
Ingrediants -
1st - A stupid, energetic enemy commander,
........:smallsmile:

Stephen

[Stephen_E]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Winterking
Second is the fact that, once you've charged home, the lance is pretty much useless--in close combat, a sword or mace lets you use the advantage of your height atop the horse, while a lance would just get tangled up in the infantry/cavalry around you. While a lance is useful in the pursuit of a broken foe, the Byzantine lighter cavalry did often have spears/lances for such purposes.



I've heard this before, but I find it unlikely. The technique of "shortening the lance" - switching to a grip halfway along the lance and using it to stab downwards on the footsoldiers near you - was almost certainly in use PRIOR to the development of the modern stirrup - Roman cavalry using what appears to be the technique are depicted in some martial friezes in Herculaneum. A system by which a lance could be turned against a close in foe is not one I would expect to be lost.

My understanding is that the lance was used after the charge, via a variety of methods, afterall it gives reach, and poking the enemy before they can strike you or your horse is a good idea, but that sooner rather than later it would stick in someone or get broken, and then you switched to your backup sword/mace ectre.

Stephen

[Matthew]

I would of thought that Agincourt and Crecy were two examples of Bows decivesly winning the battle. I vaguely recall some Roman battles where they also did. Although I will agree that it was rare, and required the "cooperation" of the enemy commander.

Recipe for great military victory.
Ingrediants -
1st - A stupid, energetic enemy commander,
........:smallsmile:

Heh, that's the common contention, but I have never come across a statement to that effect in the Primary Sources themselves (though, it may be there, I haven't read them all). What is generally described at Agincourt is a ranged combat that the English Long Bow Men win, forcing the enemy Cross Bow Men to retire, which necessitates a French charge that is defeated by the English Foot Men.

[Dervag]

My cat did that a decade ago, but badly enough that the vet decided to replace the ligament with some sort of artificial material. The cat's still around (although he further wrecked that leg 5 years ago)
Their was a All Black Rugby player who IIRC did the same injury a couple of decades ago. He did recover eventually and go back to international competition, but he went from been considered the best in the world at his position, and possibly the best ever, to simply very good.
So good news is with care and exercise you should recover most of your movement/strength with that leg. Bad news is some of it's gone for good, and it's a slow recovery.:smallfrown:
StephenI'm wondering how the recovery works. If the ligament itself doesn't grow back, what does develop to restore functionality to the leg? Is it muscle growth that somehow allows you to make up for the loss of mechanical linkage by brute force?

If you want, you can consider this a "Real-World Physical Injury" question.

[Irenaeus]

At the end of the eleventh century a Knight was simply a soldier, hopefully mounted, but not necessarily so; by the late thirteenth century those who were previously poorer Knights were Sergeants. If you have access to JSTOR, I can link you a few articles to read on the subject.

Now, this was not directed to me and it appears that the discussion has moved from this subject. Nevertheless; yes, please!

I always need more of that for my Harn and Ars Magica campaigns, and I find it hard to judge the JSTOR articles' quality without actually reading through them.

[Subotei]

I would of thought that Agincourt and Crecy were two examples of Bows decivesly winning the battle. I vaguely recall some Roman battles where they also did. Although I will agree that it was rare, and required the "cooperation" of the enemy commander.

Recipe for great military victory.
Ingrediants -
1st - A stupid, energetic enemy commander,
........:smallsmile:

Stephen

Agincourt was a French masterclass in how not to fight a battle. If you have a chance, get hold of a copy of Juliet Barkers 'Agincourt' - its an excellent read on the subject.

[Ruerl]

Heh, that's the common contention, but I have never come across a statement to that effect in the Primary Sources themselves (though, it may be there, I haven't read them all). What is generally described at Agincourt is a ranged combat that the English Long Bow Men win, forcing the enemy Cross Bow Men to retire, which necessitates a French charge that is defeated by the English Foot Men.

Thats the thing about it though, to read it between the lines:
The french charged uphill against a fortified position: That is stupidity even before the factors of the muddy battlefield making it even harder for cavalery to charge home.

Or in other words: There was no such thing as a necessarry french charge, the french could have gone back out of the battlefield, that would leave the english with two choice: 1: Pursue and abandon their fortified position or 2: wait and secure the position.

Either would have been better for the french commander, whatever the french commander could do the only thing he should *never* consider was an uphill charge through the mud against a fortified english position, in short: He gave battle to the english on the english terms, henche he lost.

[Matthew]

Now, this was not directed to me and it appears that the discussion has moved from this subject. Nevertheless; yes, please!

I always need more of that for my Harn and Ars Magica campaigns, and I find it hard to judge the JSTOR articles' quality without actually reading through them.

These six should get you started:

Sally Harvey, 'The Knight and the Knight's Fee in England' in Past and Present, No. 49. (Nov., 1970), pp. 3-43. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-2746%28197011%290%3A49%3C3%3ATKATKF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9)

Jean Scammell, 'The Formation of the English Social Structure: Freedom, Knights, and Gentry, 1066-1300' Speculum, Vol. 68, No. 3. (Jul., 1993), pp. 591-618. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-7134%28199307%2968%3A3%3C591%3ATFOTES%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23)

Peter Coss, 'Knights, Esquires and the Origins of Social Gradation in England' Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., Vol. 5. (1995), pp. 155-178. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4401%281995%296%3A5%3C155%3AKEATOO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R)

Michael Prestwich, 'Miles in Armis Strenuus: The Knight at War' in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., Vol. 5. (1995), pp. 201-220. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4401%281995%296%3A5%3C201%3AMIASTK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4)

John Gillingham, 'Thegns and Knights in Eleventh-Century England: Who Was Then the Gentleman?' in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., Vol. 5. (1995), pp. 129-153. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4401%281995%296%3A5%3C129%3ATAKIEE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O)

Kathryn Faulkner 'The Transformation of Knighthood in Early Thirteenth-Century England' The English Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 440. (Feb., 1996), pp. 1-23. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-8266%28199602%29111%3A440%3C1%3ATTOKIE%3E2.0.CO%3B 2-S)



Thats the thing about it though, to read it between the lines:
The french charged uphill against a fortified position: That is stupidity even before the factors of the muddy battlefield making it even harder for cavalery to charge home.

Or in other words: There was no such thing as a necessarry french charge, the french could have gone back out of the battlefield, that would leave the english with two choice: 1: Pursue and abandon their fortified position or 2: wait and secure the position.

Either would have been better for the french commander, whatever the french commander could do the only thing he should *never* consider was an uphill charge through the mud against a fortified english position, in short: He gave battle to the english on the english terms, henche he lost.

I'm not quite following you; are you reading between the lines to show the Long Bow won the battle? As far as I can see, all we can do is demonstrate that the French decided to charge (not necessarily with or only with Cavalry) and were ill advised to do so. Their motivations could be anything. Indeed, at least one source indicates that it was frustration and over eagerness (i.e. ill discipline). By 'necessary', I just mean that stage of the battle was over (i.e. the missile exchange).

[Fhaolan]

I'm wondering how the recovery works. If the ligament itself doesn't grow back, what does develop to restore functionality to the leg? Is it muscle growth that somehow allows you to make up for the loss of mechanical linkage by brute force?

If you want, you can consider this a "Real-World Physical Injury" question.

Okay, I can attempt to explain, but remember that I'm not a doctor, I'm just repeating what they told me when this happened...

What the ligaments do is hold the knee together. They don't bend the knee, or anything like that, they just prevent the bones from sliding out of alignment. There are three ligaments in the knee, one running to either side of the knee, and one running right thorugh the center under the kneecap. That's the one that I blew. It prevents the knee from sliding forward and back.

Once severed, ligaments don't heal. However, building up the muscles around the knee can compensate and hold the knee together. It will never be as strong as a ligament, and you will be prone to more knee injuries, but you will be able to function.

If you go the route of surgery, they replace the ligament with a tendon or something similar. The tendon will slowly turn into a ligament over time, which will restore your mobility. It takes a *long* time for this to happen. During this time it's really easy to re-injure the knee. Also, you tend to not use the msucles in your leg as much because you are favouring the injured leg. It is absolutely astonishing how quickly your leg muscles will attrophy. I had my leg in a cast for a couple of weeks, and the leg was visibly smaller afterwards, and because the knee was still unstable, it is taking a long time to build up strength again.

According to the surgeon, I will have full strength back in the knee eventually thanks to new techniques he was able to use on me, but it will take years to truely recover. I'm sitting at about 65-75% strength now. Which is just enough to be too unstable to do anything vigerous like stage combat or horseback riding. I would likely just re-injure the knee if I tried. About another year or so, I predict, before I can do that kind of thing. However, it's going to be hard to convince myself psychologically that I can do it without hurting myself. It was quite a shock to not being able to walk all of a sudden. Even more of a shock because I felt no pain. I had severed the ligament without damaging anything around it that had nerve receptors, so it was completely painless. It just couldn't support any weight at all, and didn't get better. That's quite a mental blow and is very hard to get past.

[Dervag]

It is absolutely astonishing how quickly your leg muscles will attrophy. I had my leg in a cast for a couple of weeks, and the leg was visibly smaller afterwards, and because the knee was still unstable, it is taking a long time to build up strength again.The bit with the atrophying leg muscles happened to me once, albeit with a far, far less serious injury. I broke my ankle and my left leg was really scrawny when they cut the cast off four weeks later. So I definitely believe what you're saying about the atrophying leg muscles.


However, it's going to be hard to convince myself psychologically that I can do it without hurting myself. It was quite a shock to not being able to walk all of a sudden. Even more of a shock because I felt no pain. I had severed the ligament without damaging anything around it that had nerve receptors, so it was completely painless. It just couldn't support any weight at all, and didn't get better. That's quite a mental blow and is very hard to get past.That's going to be a bear; I really hope you do get over it.

[Midnighter1021]

ligament/joint injuries are the worst, I just seperated my shoulder and broke my collarbone playing football and the doc said that I probably wouldn't be back to full strength for about 2-3 seasons. he said i could play after this one but i would have to either play a position like place kicker or something like that where i (hope) i dont get seriously hit and reinjure myself.


stupid linebacker. well the story is, im a tight end and i was going on a 7 yard slant and got the ball when the ROLB hit me under the shoulderpad with a helmet then "pop" and "crunch" there goes my arm

[Ruerl]

I'm not quite following you; are you reading between the lines to show the Long Bow won the battle? As far as I can see, all we can do is demonstrate that the French decided to charge (not necessarily with or only with Cavalry) and were ill advised to do so. Their motivations could be anything. Indeed, at least one source indicates that it was frustration and over eagerness (i.e. ill discipline). By 'necessary', I just mean that stage of the battle was over (i.e. the missile exchange).

No, what I am reading between the lines here is that the french lost the battle before it began, the battle was lost due to the stupidity of a french commander charging a fortified position.

The french commander gave victory to the english on a silver platter, I am in that arguing against the necessity of the aforementioned charge due to the missile exchange failing.
I am in this also arguing against looking at the missile exchange as a "stage" of the battle.

EDIT:
In short: The french lost the battle by giving battle to the english at the english terms, a good commander would have left the battlefield and sought to use his troops on a different battlefield.

[Matthew]

No, what I am reading between the lines here is that the french lost the battle before it began, the battle was lost due to the stupidity of a french commander charging a fortified position.

It may sound stupid, but charging a fortified position is perfectly normal practice. You can see it at the Battle of Hastings, amongst other places.


The french commander gave victory to the english on a silver platter, I am in that arguing against the necessity of the aforementioned charge due to the missile exchange failing.
I am in this also arguing against looking at the missile exchange as a "stage" of the battle.

Actually, you'll have to forgive me. I was actually thinking of Crecy with regard to missile exchange. The French made little or no use of their Bow Men and Cross Bow Men at Agincourt.

However, missile exchanges in medieval battles are usually a prelude to a charge. They are employed to disrupt the enemy lines in order to facilitate an attack. Even when they fail, though, it's not impossible for an assault to be successful. Their function on the battlefield is as a prelude to melee. The sources for Agincourt seem to indicate that the English used their Bow Men to provoke the French to attack. I'm not at all seeing the substance of your argument against missile exchange as a stage of the battle, though.


EDIT:
In short: The french lost the battle by giving battle to the english at the english terms, a good commander would have left the battlefield and sought to use his troops on a different battlefield.

Battles are notoriously unpredictable circumstances and, once committed to, are dreadfully difficult to disengage from. To condemn the French for 'fighting whilst at a disadvantage' is to use 20/20 hindsight. At Agincourt, the English were outnumbered, trapped and low on provisions. I'm sure that if the French leaders thought defeat was likely, they wouldn't have offered battle.

[Storm Bringer]

No, what I am reading between the lines here is that the french lost the battle before it began, the battle was lost due to the stupidity of a french commander charging a fortified position.

The french commander gave victory to the english on a silver platter, I am in that arguing against the necessity of the aforementioned charge due to the missile exchange failing.
I am in this also arguing against looking at the missile exchange as a "stage" of the battle.

EDIT:
In short: The french lost the battle by giving battle to the english at the english terms, a good commander would have left the battlefield and sought to use his troops on a different battlefield.

two things:
1) the French at Agincourt were to the north of the english. That is, between the english and their supply bases. the french had been chasing this battle for several weeks, knowing that if they didn't enguage the english they would escape back to england with any booty they had.

2) the major part of the french attack was on foot. yes on foot. thier was a mounted charge by the french wing cavalry at the opening of the battle, that failed spectacularly, but the vast majority of the french were dismounted and walked into contact.

[KIDS]

I was curious about the large spears in real world. Think something like D&D's Greatspear (Exotic, Reach, 2d6, piercing, 20/x3). Are they of any use outside of a pike formation, like when you're alone or in a small skirmish? Is there a chance of doing something to the enemy if he manages to slip past your spearpoint X feet away or are you basically screwed...?

[Winterking]

To be fair, the majority of sources on the Hundred Years' War (I'm looking at you, Froissart!) would not have been inclined to regard any victory as solely the result of longbowmen, as opposed to the valor of men-at-arms, on account of the sources being written for men-at-arms and their betters, not for the illiterate peasant-types. Especially considering the demonstrated abilities of the longbow (rapid loosing of arrows, the ability at closer range to punch through some, if not all, armor), I cannot imagine a scenario where the English longbowmen--whether at Crecy or Agincourt--had anything but a substantial effect on the entire battle. Yes, at Agincourt the English used longbowmen to provoke the French to attack, but they did not necessarily then pull the longbowmen back to the rear, job over.
Particularly given the large disparity in numbers between the French army and the English men-at-arms, it seems certain to me (even if the primary sources don't spell this out) that the missile fire of the longbowmen played a major role throughout the battle in demoralizing the French and reducing their numbers. And of course, there's the effects of their melee action--charging in on the flanks once the men-at-arms were locked in combat, ganging up on the armored French.

(While not a primary source, John Keegan's The Face of Battle is an essential read, if only for the section on Agincourt)

[Storm Bringer]

full sized pikes are a mass effect weapon, and you need a lot to make it work.

as to what you can do if the foe gets past the point? drop the thing and draw your sword.

[Matthew]

To be fair, the majority of sources on the Hundred Years' War (I'm looking at you, Froissart!) would not have been inclined to regard any victory as solely the result of longbowmen, as opposed to the valor of men-at-arms, on account of the sources being written for men-at-arms and their betters, not for the illiterate peasant-types.

Heh, that's quite true. However, it doesn't therefore follow that the absence of praise for the Long Bow is an indication of its effectiveness.


Especially considering the demonstrated abilities of the longbow (rapid loosing of arrows, the ability at closer range to punch through some, if not all, armor), I cannot imagine a scenario where the English longbowmen--whether at Crecy or Agincourt--had anything but a substantial effect on the entire battle.

Ah well, that's another branch of discussion. If you firmly believe that the Long Bow was possessed of battle winning properties, than there is no way to imagine it not winning battles, if you see what I mean. The fact is, though, that we do not know what the effectiveness of the Long Bow actually was, relative to other ranged weapons and body armour, nor what proportion of the army was arrayed in body armour.


Yes, at Agincourt the English used longbowmen to provoke the French to attack, but they did not necessarily then pull the longbowmen back to the rear, job over.

True, but was that not a matter of necessity on account of being outnumbered? It may well be the case that the Long Bow Man was both effective at Ranged and Close Comabt, but that doesn't mean that the Long Bow changed the course of the battle, it means that the Long Bow men did.


Particularly given the large disparity in numbers between the French army and the English men-at-arms, it seems certain to me (even if the primary sources don't spell this out) that the missile fire of the longbowmen played a major role throughout the battle in demoralizing the French and reducing their numbers.

Well, that is of course, assuming that we accept the figures involved in the battle. Estimates for the French Army apparently range from 5,000 to 100,000 and for the English from 6,000 to 20,000. It's possible that the Long Bow decimated the overwhelming French advantage, and that is the myth of the Long Bow, but it's also possible that the armies were not nearly as unequally matched as we are led to believe and that the Long Bow played a significant, but not unusual, role in the battle.


And of course, there's the effects of their melee action--charging in on the flanks once the men-at-arms were locked in combat, ganging up on the armored French.

Yes, space is certainly now thought to be the primary reason that the French were unable to bring their numbers to bear and Long Bow Men as Light Foot Men seem to have been very effective.


(While not a primary source, John Keegan's The Face of Battle is an essential read, if only for the section on Agincourt)

I think he was one of the first, back in 1976, to substantially debunk the myth of the Long Bow at Agincourt, wasn't he?


I was curious about the large spears in real world. Think something like D&D's Greatspear (Exotic, Reach, 2d6, piercing, 20/x3). Are they of any use outside of a pike formation, like when you're alone or in a small skirmish? Is there a chance of doing something to the enemy if he manages to slip past your spearpoint X feet away or are you basically screwed...?

If you happen to be very strong or fortunate, you might be able to use it as a Staff and push your enemy back. Best off to drop it and draw a shorter weapon. Chances are, though, that if your opponent has gotten past your Spear point, he's moving very fast towards you or has a grip on the shaft of the weapon.

[Fhaolan]

A long time ago, I used to do pike drills with a group of Historical Re-enactors in Ontario. Good people, by the way.

No, you don't use pikes, longspears, or anything like that as a single melee weapon. They're just too slow due to inertia.

In a formation, you have the spearpoints of the people behind you to deal with the person who got past your own spearpoint, as their spear/pike is over your shoulder. However, the first row of a pike formation may be kneeling if the formation has truely hunkered down and is ready to weather a charge. When kneeling, there is a way to hold the pike in one hand and still be able to draw a stabbing sword for use in case someone gets too close. It's a bit odd of a position, but once you're used to it, you can hold like that for hours.

Basically, the position is to go as if you were going to kneel on one knee, that knee being the one opposite of your sword scabbard. (Since this is formation, you are wearing your sword on your left hip. You don't get the option of being left-handed. :smallsmile:) Except that instead of the right knee on the ground, that entire leg is lying on top of the pike. Your right foot is on the ground, turned so that the pike butt is grounded on the inside step. Your left hand is holding the pike with that elbow on the left knee that is still up. If you're balanced right, you can then reach across with your right hand and draw your sword. Again, if you're balanced right, you can hold that position for a very long time.

EDIT: Just remembered 'cheeking your pike'. This is a specific maneuver taught as part of pike drills. Basically you let your pike trail behind you on the ground, holding it by one hand around the 'cheek' of the pike (meaning right below the spear head). This allows you to use the pike as an extremely limited dagger. You can only really attack someone who is kind enough to stand right in front of you, and all you can do is stab, but it's better than nothing...

[Subotei]

I’m sure we had a discussion on Agincourt a while ago. The battle (as outlined in Juliet Barker's account, from her reading of the sources) seemed to go something like this:

The English, realising they need to bring the French to battle quickly to get to Calais, leave their fortified hilltop position and advance down the slope into longbow range of the French, and quickly re-establish their pointed stake protective screen - basically they archers heaved out the stakes, ran down hill, wacked them back in and started firing at the French (seems a dubious and risky tactic to me, but the English were desperate).

This provokes the French into a cavalry charge, but, for whatever reason (rivalries, lack of leadership, confusion etc), seemingly only a small portion of their cavalry attacks (an estimated roughly 400 horsemen). This charge is duly despatched by the (estimated) 5000 English bowmen (assuming each bowmen gets off 2 arrows in the last 50m of the charge, where arrows have a decent-ish chance of penetrating plate armour, that’s 25 per Frenchman….).

Meanwhile the majority of the French advance on foot. The English advance has seemingly narrowed the battlefield, so the wings of the French are forced towards the centre, compressing the troops and, making movement over the ploughed, muddy slope even more difficult. Their cohesion must also have been affected by trying to cope with the remnants of the cavalry charge coming back at them, corpses etc.

Bloody mayhem ensues, with the archers weighing into the melee, once their bows have done their work, with mallets, daggers or whatever melee weapons they have.

The truly shocking part of the battle is the disparity in casualties – many thousands of French vs perhaps 150 or so English. To me, this implies that the French never got to melee range with the English on anything like equal terms. These were the picked men of France – tough, experienced, professional (if that term can be used) fighters who knew their stuff and were well equipped. Man for man in a roughly equal melee you would expect a much more equal distribution of casualties.

The only parts of the French army seeming not decimated were the cavalry, which suggests they didn’t play much part beyond the first weak charge; and also their crossbowmen - many of whom were either sent away from the battle before it started as there wasn’t room to deploy them or ended up stuck in the rear of the French army unable to fire for fear of hitting their own, only to depart once it was clear the battle was a disaster.

[Subotei]

To sum up my post above (as I didn't seem to come to a point - you know when you just go off on one....), there was every chance the English could've lost the battle against a competently lead, coheasive, French Army:

1. The French should not have been provoked - the English we desperate to get to Calais for resupply, the French could've sat on the road until the English were forced to surrender. A failure of leadership, or the desire for a successful battle?

2. Competent deployment of troops - the French had archers and crossbowmen but either deployed them badly or not at all. Any counter-fire from these would soon have weakened the volume of English fire, either from casualties or by forcing them to retire out of range, potentially leaving the English men-at-arms exposed.

Also, with regards to the main foot advance, a competent leader could've predicted, in the circumstances, that the volume of troops advancing would cause problems and have adapted tactics accordingly.

3. A full blooded cavalry charge - the first French attempt was weak and seemingly did not include all their main body cavalry. A coheasive charge by their full complement would've probably have had more effect as it would have reduced the volume of fire per man, increasing the likelihood of the charge carrying into the English line succesfully.

4. Timing of the attack - It seems astonishing to me that the English could advance down the slope as they apparently did and have time to restore some sort of order before the French could mount a charge. Either poor leadership or poor communications.

So, I think, to me it is not a case of the longbow being inherently a battle winning weapon. The English fought competently with all the weapons they had and were competently deployed and lead. The difference between success and failure here for the English was the poor French leadership.

[Matthew]

That sounds about right to me, with one slight modification. The Wings of the French Army may have been mounted. Indeed, it is probably one of the wings that attempted to penetrate and disperse the English Bow Men. The refused wings then ended up retreating through the centre, causing bloody chaos. Indeed, their horses may have been made unmanagable by the arrows of the English.

With regard to casualties, those are likely exaggerated beyond recognition, but there's no denying that the French had very much the worst of it.

[WhiteHarness]

I love this topic, and can bring to bear a few primary source references that support my position that the longbow was not quite the nuclear armour piercer that its fanboys want you to believe.

I had always understood that a good portion of the French casualties at Agincourt were due to Henry's ordering the execution of so many prisoners. Prisoners would imply that the French did indeed survive the arrow-storm and come to grips with the English--and came off second-best.

At least one author, Jean Juvenal des Ursins, writing a few years after Agincourt, relates that the armour of the French did help them against arrows.

I submit the following passage from Dr. Michael Lacy's paper on the Effectiveness of Medieval Knightly Armour. This portion deals with the battle of Flodden (1513) wherein the Scots fielded a force clad in the latest plate infantry armours mass-produced on the Continent:

"...the longbow, so decisive in the wars of the last century, was defeated by the heavy German armour of the Scottish front ranks; a contemporary accounts describe them as "most assuredly harnessed" in armour, and that they "abode the most dangerous shot of arrows, which sore them annoyed but yet except it hit them in some bare place, did them no hurt." Bishop Ruthal, writing 10 days after the battle remarked "they were so well cased in armour that the arrows did them no harm, and were such large and stout men that one would not fall when four or five bills struck them."

Also, I refer you to an anonymous account of the battle of Brouwershaven in 1426 (from a translation of the "Livre des Trahisons"), during which:
""...they (the English) returned fire with their deadly longbows and drove the Dutch back in disorder - However, arrows could make no impression on Philip and his heavily armed knights, who now arrived on the scene....Andrieu de Valines was killed by an arrow in the eye because he was not wearing a helmet..."

From Gutierre Diaz de Gamez's biographical account of the deeds of his master, Don Pero Niño, regarding a raid that the Spanish knight made on the English coast a few years before Agincourt:

"...they were so near them that they could easily tell the fair men from the dark...The standard and he who bore it were likewise riddled with arrows, and the standard bearer had as many round his body as a bull in the ring, but he was well shielded by his good armour, although this was already bent in several places."

It is worth noting that the banner-bearer in this account is none other than the author of the account himself.

What about the Wars of the Roses, when the English turned their longbows on each other? The only accounts we have of (presumably plate-clad) nobles being slain by arrows--namely Lords Clifford and Dacre-- tell us that the archer in question waited until the man had raised his visor for want of air, drink, or in order to yell before he loosed his arrow. If his weapon could reliably pierce plate, he wouldn't have waited to shoot until the armour was out of the way.

The longbow seems only to have been effective when deployed intelligently, and when the English had time to "dig in", i.e. to set up defensive field fortifications, select the terrain, etc.

[Mike_G]

A question to ask, if we wonder how much the longbow contributed to the victory, is "Would the English have won if the Longbowmen were spearmen or billmen instead?"

Given the French advantage numbers, I'd have to go with "no." Or, at least, no so lopsided a victory for the English.

The longbow wasn't a magic wand, but it clearly was a very good missile weapon, and it's users were well trained professionals. I don't think we can discount its usefulness, although it may be getting a lesser version of the "Katana Phenomenon," where it is overhyped as an uberweapon.

As far as the French using their own crossbowmen or archers to drive off the longbowmen, that wasn't gonna happen. In the field, as opposed to a siege where rate of fire is less important, the longbow, in skilled hands, trumps the crossbow. It has no disadvantage in range, and the ability to deliver five or six times the volume of fire would simply result in a loss for the crossbows, like Crecy.

While the longbow's potential against armored knights is up for debate, it was quite capable of wounding or killing horses, whose armor was much less complete, or lighter armored troops like crossbowmen, archers, or footmen.

Given how much of the English army was made up of bowmen, and how disproportionate the English and French casualties were, I can't see how the longbow wasn't a significant factor in the English victory.

[Matthew]

Heh, some good quotes there. Of course, it's a literary trope to say that Armour was invulnerable to the Arrows of enemy, just as it is to say the Bow was uncommonly powerful. There's a great passage in Anna Comnena about the effectiveness of the Frankish Cross Bow; I'll dig it out when I have a bit of spare time.

Mike: How about, if they were armed with normal/Short Bows? For me, it's not so much that Bows aren't effective, but the idea that they can win battles by themselves.

[Storm Bringer]

Heh, some good quotes there. Of course, it's a literary trope to say that Armour was invulnerable to the Arrows of enemy, just as it is to say the Bow was uncommonly powerful. There's a great passage in Anna Comnena about the effectiveness of the Frankish Cross Bow; I'll dig it out when I have a bit of spare time.

Mike: How about, if they were armed with normal/Short Bows? For me, it's not so much that Bows aren't effective, but the idea that they can win battles by themselves.

correct me if i'm wrong, but I don't think thats the position being held by Mike here. My read of his comments is that he's saying that the bowmen were a important part of the army, but not THE most important part or the part that won the battle by it's effort alone. He's saying that the firepower they provided was a important part in the english combined arms tactics, where it disrupted the french attackers and caused casualties before contact.

[Matthew]

correct me if i'm wrong, but I don't think thats the position being held by Mike here. My read of his comments is that he's saying that the bowmen were a important part of the army, but not THE most important part or the part that won the battle by it's effort alone. He's saying that the firepower they provided was a important part in the english combined arms tactics, where it disrupted the french attackers and caused casualties before contact.

I don't know, that's why I'm asking for clarification.

[Mike_G]

Pretty much what Storm Bringer said. I don't think the English would have done so well without the firepower, to use an anachronistic term, of the archers, and I think that the longbow, being better than a short bow, was obviously the best available choice for a missile weapon.

I don't think the longbow was an automatic win, like the Henry-Martini rifle in the Sudan, but I think we have to accept that it was an important factor is winning battles for England in the Hundred Years War.

[Subotei]

That sounds about right to me, with one slight modification. The Wings of the French Army may have been mounted. Indeed, it is probably one of the wings that attempted to penetrate and disperse the English Bow Men. The refused wings then ended up retreating through the centre, causing bloody chaos. Indeed, their horses may have been made unmanagable by the arrows of the English.

With regard to casualties, those are likely exaggerated beyond recognition, but there's no denying that the French had very much the worst of it.

Yes - you're right - the initial cavalry charge seems to have come from both wings - probably part of the problem with it not hitting home in full force; miscommunication between the wings meaning that some parts didn't charge when they should have. When I mentioned wings being compressed I meant the sides of the main body of footmen - I was trying to keep it brief so it was my lazy shorthand for that - apologies.

With regards the casualties, the English records seem to be fairly reliable for the time period. French records seem less complete - partly due to the scale of the losses and partly due to records being lost during the revolution and the other various upheavals in France since that time. Most accounts have French losses in the thousands, but the impact of the defeat is greater than a raw number suggests due to the fact that a high proportion of the casualties were high ranking French nobility and their professional military people. Fewer tears are shed in print when peasants get killed.

[Subotei]

The longbow seems only to have been effective when deployed intelligently....

Amen to that - probably true of all weapons. Good weapons but stupid tactics still means you're going to loose. Eg the Classic example is the poor use the Soviets made of the T34 until they'd learnt tank tactics the hard way. But thats another tangent...

[Adlan]

The Idea that bowmen could win a battle by themselves, is ludicrious. However, the ratio in Armys of Longbowmen to Men at Arms during the 100 years war also tells us that the idea that they were ineffective, that the power of the longbow is a myth, is also ludicrious. Why would a military commander devote 4 out of 5 min in his army to a weapon that was ineffective.

The Longbow was a powerful and effective weapon of war.

However, no matter how good your weapon or your tactic, you need the right opponent to win.

The French were 'Stupid'. They belived in Chivalry, Honour and the nobility of combat. They Gave battle when they didn't need to, had nobility lead charges instead of using 'lesser' troops, to claim the glory, and they sufferd for it. Both at Agincourt and at Crecy, it was the french willingness to attack defended English lines that won the battle. The Longbow facilitated that.

And Men at arms, and foot knights were an intergral part of the army, they were needed just as much as the longbowmen. Longbowmen on their own, unsupported or not dug in are very vulnerable. No matter how much damage they inflict before it, they will eventually be trapped in combat, if their opponent has the men and is willing to take casualtys. I refer you to a battle on 18th June, 1429, though I cannot recall it's name (Patey I think), in which 400 english archers were deployed on the flank, alone, and without time to dig in, were surrounded and massacred by french cavalry.


The Longbow is not a super weapon, the lance is not a superweapon, the Rifle or the Machinegun. is not a super weapon. All the armys using these weapons can be defeated, it just requires an opponent to realise how. After the first time, it requires the opponent being unwilling to change his tactics, to inflict the first shattering defeat that the weapon aloud.

[Stephen_E]

Heh, that's the common contention, but I have never come across a statement to that effect in the Primary Sources themselves (though, it may be there, I haven't read them all). What is generally described at Agincourt is a ranged combat that the English Long Bow Men win, forcing the enemy Cross Bow Men to retire, which necessitates a French charge that is defeated by the English Foot Men.

While I think primary sources are crucial for details of what physically happened, when you come to things such as what caused the battle to be won or lost they're interesting but far from the final word. That isn't to say that hindsight doesn't have it's own weaknesses, but the "official" reports of what caused victory/defeat not matching what someone sees who takes a halfstep back from the event is far from uncommon in more recent combats where data outside the "official" account is more freely available (the last century for example).

Stephen

[Gygaxphobia]

The French were 'Stupid'. They belived in Chivalry, Honour and the nobility of combat. They Gave battle when they didn't need to, had nobility lead charges instead of using 'lesser' troops, to claim the glory, and they sufferd for it. Both at Agincourt and at Crecy, it was the french willingness to attack defended English lines that won the battle. The Longbow facilitated that.

That is a major point that seems to have been missed so far. There was no unifying French leader. A mass batte requires discipline and co-ordination between troops and units. The French acted as small groups of individuals, the English were organised.

[Stephen_E]

Mike: How about, if they were armed with normal/Short Bows? For me, it's not so much that Bows aren't effective, but the idea that they can win battles by themselves.


IIRC the original proposition was whether the longbow had won battles, rather than than inhernetly been inclined to win battles.

To a certain degree you have to decide how you define "winning the battle". A fair point can be made that battles are won by a military force as a whole, and not by any single group within that force. Unfortunately as true as this may be, it is essentaily a useless observation for the purposes of this discussion. For the question to have any meaning I think it's both necessary, and fair, to use the definition that the units that delivered the crucial blow that turned the battle, and many battles do have identifiable "cruxes" where the battle shifted to victory/defeat. Those units can be said to have "won" the battle. When a unit or type of unit is solely responsible for creating and forcing that crux then I think you can legitimately describe them as been the "sole" unit that won the battle. Even if they needed other units to protect them, or simply hold the line until they could create and force the crux, and to finish of the enemy after the tide had swung (stopping any embarrassing last minute rally).

By that definition, and by the accounts of the battle, and the casulties of the battle, that I've seen, as well as much of what's been mentioned here, I think it's fair to say that the Longbow "won" Agincourt and can be described as the sole "winner".

Re: The stupidity ectre of the French, as I earlier mentioned, every great victory I've heard of required the enemy botching. To say that the enemies botching was what decided the battle is like saying that the victory/defeat was due to the politicians deciding to have a war. True but meaningless. Plenty of commanders have botched and been stupid without receiving great defeats.

There was a WW1 battle on the Russian front where the Russians were using early radio with extremely simple codes to transmit orders ecetre. This was stupid, but the Germans still had to think to listen into the enemy radio communications and break the code, and then come up with the plans that created one of the most lopsided victories known of.

Stupid commanders are the flour of great victory cakes. Critics don't talk about flour when they decide what makes a cake great.

Stephen

[Matthew]

By that definition, and by the accounts of the battle, and the casulties of the battle, that I've seen, as well as much of what's been mentioned here, I think it's fair to say that the Longbow "won" Agincourt and can be described as the sole "winner".

I strongly disagree. It can be said that Long Bow Men "won" Agincourt, but not necessarily the Long Bow itself as a weapon. We have no clue what the casualty rate was in relation to the French army as a whole that was inflicted with the Long Bow. We know that the crucial turning point of the battle was during Melee, when the French and English lines met and the Long Bow Men joined in.

[Subotei]

I strongly disagree. It can be said that Long Bow Men "won" Agincourt, but not necessarily the Long Bow itself as a weapon. We have no clue what the casualty rate was in relation to the French army as a whole that was inflicted with the Long Bow. We know that the crucial turning point of the battle was during Melee, when the French and English lines met and the Long Bow Men joined in.

Good point - you could say the mallet or the dagger won the battle, seeing thats how the bowmen killed most of the French once the melee started. I don't think we could make a case for the mallet as the supreme weapon of the period.

[Winterking]

Alright, for an example of a battle in which the longbow (or, at least, a bow of considerable length, used primarily by the Welsh levies involved...) was a deciding factor, if not THE decisive factor: Falkirk, Scotland, in 1298.
Edward I of England, having almost completely failed (again) to pin down and destroy the Scottish forces under William Wallace, is about to go home when his scouts locate Wallace's forces. The latter are too close to run away, and have to fight. The Scots formed up for the battle in the way they knew best--schiltrons, round pike-hedges, complete with simple fortifications at the front. Since the English were the ones who had to attack in ordehr to win, the Scots were confident they could sit back and withstand a cavalry or infantry charge, thanks to the pikes.
However, as it happened, Edward had a large number of longbowmen with him, and they were able to quickly overpower the Scots archers (using weaker bows with less range and less skill), and turn their attentions to the schiltrons. These in turn were picked apart by arrow-fire that they were unable to deal with (not enough cavalry, nor enough troops to actually go on the offensive), fell apart, opening great holes that the English cavalry charged into with predictable effect.

Sure, you could say that the battle was actually determined by the choice of Wallace to fight with fewer cavalry and next to no archers, but if that's the case, it was equally determined, if not more so, by the choice of Edward (who actually had a lot of choices) to bring a strong force of longbow archers.

I believe at least one other English vs. Scots battle was won by a combination of English longbowmen and Scottish idiots (who charged uphill, with pikes and little or no armor, against English men-at-arms and longbowmen). Halidon Hill, that was the one (thanks, wikipedia).

Generally though, I agree that longbows weren't superweapons. But if employed properly, I think they could have significant, if not decisive, effects on enemy forces.

[Neon Knight]

How many examples and/or how much evidence do we have of plate armor being breached or penetrated in battle?

[Swordguy]

How many examples and/or how much evidence do we have of plate armor being breached or penetrated in battle?

Define "plate". Plate armor in the cap-a-pie tradition mostly dates from the War of the Roses era.

Since I can't seem to attach files here, I've uploaded something I've been working on at home, an Excel file of armor by date, cross-referenced with common weapons at the time and by major battles. It's still in the early stages (I've only got about 2 hours work into it), but it may help.

The download link is this: Armor by period. (http://rapidshare.com/files/71435464/Armor_by_period.xls.html)

Also, you may find this interesting:


Unfortunately, for whatever reason, people have a popular image of the French at Agincourt as the stereotypical "Knight in Shining Armor" - meaning cap a pie plate (whether alwhite armor or not is beside the point). This is not the case. As of 1415, plate armor had not developed to this point yet, nor would it for perhaps another 40 years.

Again, we look at primary sources - the armor itself. The very, very most state-of-the art armor found in 1415 might be what could be considered early full plate. The head was protected by a bascinet (often visored) with a maille aventail attached to protect the neck. Besegews still protected the gap between arm and torso, and the large pauldrons so beloved at Renaissance Festivals are nowhere to be seen. At best, small spaulders protect the shoulders. Arm defenses still seem to be a mix between gutter and cannon styles, with the cannon more often protecting the lower arm. The roundels that formerly protected the elbows have been replaced by articulated couters and fan plates (though the interior of the elbow is unprotected but for maille). Leg defenses as well are gutter designs, through articulated sabatons seem more advanced and popular. It is, however, in the vital region of the chest that armor fails the French. From what can be seen from sources (citations follow), the chainmaille hauberk is still worn, and over it sits either a coat of plates (brigandine) or a very, very small globular breastplate (Cherbourg armor, which appeared about 1395 and probably would have formed the vast majority of the armor worn by the French at Agincourt) that leaves the upper chest and abdomen completely exposed but for the hauberk. Finally, mitten-style gauntlets are quite common by this point.


The upshot of this is that the really top-flight good French armor from Agincourt (where you see people say plate gets breached by arrows) looks like this:
http://i115.photobucket.com/albums/n294/wolffe42/armourPartsPrice.jpg


...or this:

http://i115.photobucket.com/albums/n294/wolffe42/HounskullArmour002edit.jpg


More likely, the vast majority looked like this (still light-years better than what the foot-soldiers were wearing):
http://i115.photobucket.com/albums/n294/wolffe42/archetype1.jpg


Looking then at data from the War of the Roses, when armor looked more like this:
http://i115.photobucket.com/albums/n294/wolffe42/Cod2823_fol150r.jpg


...indicates that plate armor is breached rarely, if at all. The following are examples of War of the Roses battle in which archers played a significant enough part to get mentioned in the after-action report.

The First Battle of St. Albans took place in 1455 (it was the first battle in the War of the Roses). Archers massacred the opposing force, but it was a sneak attack; the defenders didn't have armor on.

The Battle of Ferrybridge in 1461 is notable for the sole reason that it is one of the few battle to specifically mention the contibution of archers. In this battle Lord Clifford was killed by an arrow to the throat (having removed his gorget earlier in the day for unknown reasons). It is specifically mentioned that this foolhardness directly cost the Lord his life, as otherwise the arrow would "not have harmed him" (sic).

The Battle of Towton in the winter of 1461 mentions that there was a 1-hour arrow bombardment by the Yorkist forces. In Towton 1461, the author calculates that Lord Fauconberg, Yorkist commander, would have been sending about 120,000 arrows a minute into the enemy ranks. For 1 hour. Yet casualties were sparse. It was estimated the Lancastrians took about 14,000 casualties (between 8k and 20k) in the battle, in TOTAL, and of those, three-quarters took place late in the battle when the Lancastrians were routed. This lack of casualties from arrowfire does not seem to be the behavior of a weapon that can easily penetrate one's defenses.

This is to say nothing, of, for example, the Battle of Patay in erm...1423, IIRC. An army of English longbowmen got themselves trampled to death by the very French heavy cavalry they decimated at Agincourt despite large volleys of coordinated close-range defensive bowfire. What happened? The longbow was most effective when the English had time to set their archers up behind defensive field fortifications. If the longbow were truly as good at piercing all armor as some folks claim, then it would have made short work of the knights at Patay, too.

Oh, and don't forget about all the "armors of proof" from this period. If it can resist gunfire, odds are it can resist longbow fire, no?

[WhiteHarness]

Thanks for the support, SwordGuy. Patay was in 1429, btw--right after Joan drives the English from Orleans. :smallwink:

[Gatac]

This may be a bit "out there", but the my usual sources are spectacularly unhelpful on this:

How far away can a sensor "see" a laser designator's target illumination?

Suppose you use a man-portable laser designator to "paint" a target. Now, I know that this can then be used for terminal guidance of bombs and missiles, but I can't seem to find out the distance at which they are able to lock onto that illumination. Several sources imply that it's possible to get a laser lock from the aircraft while making the attack run, which would require several kilometers worth of effective range, but again, no solid numbers were mentioned.

Also, are there any man-portable weapon systems that rely on laser guidance? I know there was some experimentation with laser-guided mortar shells in the 80s, but I'd like more details on that.

Gatac

[Swordguy]

Thanks for the support, SwordGuy. Patay was in 1429, btw--right after Joan drives the English from Orleans. :smallwink:

D'oh! Serves me right for typing a post without consulting any sources.



This may be a bit "out there", but the my usual sources are spectacularly unhelpful on this:

How far away can a sensor "see" a laser designator's target illumination?

Suppose you use a man-portable laser designator to "paint" a target. Now, I know that this can then be used for terminal guidance of bombs and missiles, but I can't seem to find out the distance at which they are able to lock onto that illumination. Several sources imply that it's possible to get a laser lock from the aircraft while making the attack run, which would require several kilometers worth of effective range, but again, no solid numbers were mentioned.

Also, are there any man-portable weapon systems that rely on laser guidance? I know there was some experimentation with laser-guided mortar shells in the 80s, but I'd like more details on that.

Gatac


Sensor acquisition of laser illumination is largely dependent on terrain and weather conditions. Humidity, cloud cover, rain, smoke, ambient light...all mess with the ability to detect the paint. In general, you're looking at a distance of several thousand meters. The M712 Copperhead rounds that I learned to spot for will pick up the paint at about 3000-3500 meters to the target when fired in ballistic mode.

From what I understand, the LITENING pod on ground attack aircraft (an updated FLIR/CCTV/laser guidance package) has a laser designation range of about 12km. If something is launched sooner, it's generally guided in on optical guidance and switched over to laser once the aircraft is in range of that system.

There are no man-portable laser-guided munitions currently in the US inventory. The closest thing is, as mentioned, the M712 Copperhead 155mm munition.

[Gatac]

Sensor acquisition of laser illumination is largely dependent on terrain and weather conditions. Humidity, cloud cover, rain, smoke, ambient light...all mess with the ability to detect the paint. In general, you're looking at a distance of several thousand meters. The M712 Copperhead rounds that I learned to spot for will pick up the paint at about 3000-3500 meters to the target when fired in ballistic mode.

From what I understand, the LITENING pod on ground attack aircraft (an updated FLIR/CCTV/laser guidance package) has a laser designation range of about 12km. If something is launched sooner, it's generally guided in on optical guidance and switched over to laser once the aircraft is in range of that system.

There are no man-portable laser-guided munitions currently in the US inventory. The closest thing is, as mentioned, the M712 Copperhead 155mm munition.

Thanks! Exactly what I was looking for.

Gatac

[Combatant]

Gatac:
"There are no man-portable laser-guided munitions currently in the US inventory. The closest thing is, as mentioned, the M712 Copperhead 155mm munition."




Not entirely (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directed-energy_weapon) true. (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=165969043060405241&q=future+weapos&total=915&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=0)

[Crow]

Gatac:
"There are no man-portable laser-guided munitions currently in the US inventory. The closest thing is, as mentioned, the M712 Copperhead 155mm munition."




Not entirely (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directed-energy_weapon) true. (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=165969043060405241&q=future+weapos&total=915&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=0)

I think you just totally misunderstood what a laser-guided munition is.

[Swordguy]

Gatac:
"There are no man-portable laser-guided munitions currently in the US inventory. The closest thing is, as mentioned, the M712 Copperhead 155mm munition."




Not entirely (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directed-energy_weapon) true. (http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=165969043060405241&q=future+weapos&total=915&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=0)

Wha...WHAT? Laser-guided, not directed laser (or any other type of energy) weapon.

Beside, everything shown is not in the general inventory. All of them are experimental or limited-run equipment.

[Dervag]

"Laser-guided" means that the weapon has a sensor that spots reflected laser light and can therefore home in on the dot made by a targeting laser shining on the target. It does not refer to any kind of weapon that fires a laser or other kind of energy weapon.

[Altair_the_Vexed]

Scythes.

I know this is a "Real World" thread, and scythes don't really feature much in history as anything but an improvised weapon (as far as I know) - but does anyone know anything about the use of scythes in combat?

How would one fight with a scythe? How dmaging might it be? How defensive could one be while using a scythe?

Help please!

[Thiel]

Skipper Clement's troops used modified scythes during the Danish peasant rebellion in 1536. The blades was reattached so they resembled spears with oversized points.

[Matthew]

Indeed. I think that sort of thing is where the Glaive or something originates from. Basically, rather than develop Scythe fighting techniques, it seems it was preferable to cannibalise the tool.

If I were to guess at it, I would say it would be used something like a Pole Axe.

[Fhaolan]

The weaponized scythe was known as a 'Fauchard'.

There are three forms of sickle-weapons. The first two most well known are what modern people would recognize as a sickle, and as a scythe (or the smaller kama). The sickle form has a highly curved blade that doubles back on itself. This is actually the least common of the forms. The scythe/kama form has a slightly curving blade at 90 degrees to the handle. This is the most common of the forms. Then there is the fauchard. This has the same blade as the scythe/kama, but is mounted so that it projects forwards out of handle, like a curved spear head.

The weapon occured, but it was quickly abandoned as a single weapon. It was, however, incorporated into other poleweapons to produce combination blades for poleweapons, such as the fauchard-fork, the fauchard-glaive, etc. Also axes and halberds with crescent-moon blades have much the same effect, but are not technically fauchards.

I've played with a reproduction fauchard, and found it to be not very efficient as a poleweapon. I prefered the guisarme, which is much the same thing but with a far more radical curve, turning it into a sharpened hook. That was also a weapon that didn't last long as an independent thing, and was incorporated into other blades, glaive-guisarme, guisarme-voulge, etc.

[Edmund]

There's always this (http://www.myarmoury.com/feature_event_wmaw2006.html)

[Norsesmithy]

Thanks for that link, Edmund.

I lost it as a bookmark when my computer crashed, and hadn't yet found it again.

[Neon Knight]

I've heard occasional references to flak jackets, but never actually a description of what a flak jacket is. Someone care to enlighten me?

[Storm Bringer]

a form of bullet-proof vest, in short.

it's not actaully bullet proof, rather it protects agianst lower velocity shrapnel, splinters and smilliar small sharp things travelling fast enough to rip nasty wounds in you.


The logic is that major scorce of wounds in the world wars was arty fire. As it was much easier to make protective clothing that could stop the shrapnel form the shells than it was to make a proper rifle-(or even pistol-) proof vest, many armies issued them in before heavier, more expensive gear, on the basis that giving everyone some protection was better than giving only a few troops good protection and nothing to the rest. They worked quite well in the role they were intended for, but are being replaced by proper bullet proof vests in many forces.

short answer, it's cheap armoured vest that isn't bullet proof, but can still save your life.

note: because flak jackets were so widely issued, and effectivly the frist piece of modern body armour introduced (excluding helmets), the term is effectivly synomous with bullet proof vests.

[Crow]

Bullet Resistant Vest. There is no such thing as a bulletproof vest.

[Om]

it's not actaully bullet proof, rather it protects agianst lower velocity shrapnel, splinters and smilliar small sharp things travelling fast enough to rip nasty wounds in you.Note that the same logic applies to helmets. Early versions at least.

[Dervag]

Right. Those World War steel bowls and tin hats could be drilled rather neatly by a direct hit from a bullet. However, they would stop glancing blows and shrapnel. And since any head wound was quite likely to be fatal then (and even now), even mildly effective armor to protect the head could have a significant effect on the casualty rate.

[Stephen_E]

Right. Those World War steel bowls and tin hats could be drilled rather neatly by a direct hit from a bullet. However, they would stop glancing blows and shrapnel. And since any head wound was quite likely to be fatal then (and even now), even mildly effective armor to protect the head could have a significant effect on the casualty rate.

I recall coming across a mention sometime ago that a study of WW2 helmets found that the German design was actually the best in terms of protection/use. Never saw the study so I don't know what it was based on.

Stephen

[Swordguy]

I recall coming across a mention sometime ago that a study of WW2 helmets found that the German design was actually the best in terms of protection/use. Never saw the study so I don't know what it was based on.

Stephen

That's correct. It's why the US Army based their kevlars off of the German design (and caught a LOT of flak for it too - people called it the "nazi helmet").

The newer Kevlar (started being issued in Spring of 06) has less of a brow ridge and is cut WAY higher in the back so it doesn't slip forward while firing from prone. The ear protectors are also spaced farther out from the ears for better hearing. Basically, it took every bitch that we had about the original and fixed them. :smallbiggrin:

[Crow]

Basically, it took every bitch that we had about the original and fixed them. :smallbiggrin:

Except chinstraps.

[Swordguy]

Except chinstraps.

Point. Good point. Forgot those.

[Dervag]

In what way are the chinstraps a problem?

[pendell]

Awhile back I was reading Victor Davis Hanson's "A war like no other", discussing the Peleponnesian war between Athens and Sparta.

In the section on Phalanx combat, he has some snarky remarks on the difficulty of killing a man in full bronze armor with a spear, and stated that the swords of the Roman legions were far superior for the job.

This leads to several questions:

1) Is this true? If so, why is a spear (which has a reach advantage) not as good as a short sword? If not, is the esteemed historian fact-challenged in this instance?

2) Why exactly were the Roman legions such Engines of Death (TM) as is their reputation ?

3) If they were So Tough, why did they disappear? What made the legions obsolete?

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[pendell]

On a related note:

Reading some Roman history, I think the closest we could get to a
D&D monster in counter would be the animal vs. gladiator matches in the Roman Colusseum, when armed humans were routinely pitted against panthers, tigers, etc. and frequently won. Where can I find out more information about this? It might make useful fodder for a campaign at some point.

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Hurlbut]

2) Why exactly were the Roman legions such Engines of Death (TM) as is their reputation ?

3) If they were So Tough, why did they disappear? What made the legions obsolete?

Respectfully,

Brian P.
They were good because they were displinced and well trained (decent tactics like pilium charges and using shortswords very effectively). Simply that. A half decent commander could use them to great effects.

The "good" Legions disappear not because they were obsolete but because of convenience. The legions in the late empire period were never as good as the ones in earlier periods.

So they didn't simply become obsolete, they only fell by wayside for want of convenience.

Source: "Fighting Techniques Of The Ancient World: 3000 BC ~ AD 500" by Simon Anglim, Phyllis G, Jestice, Rob S. Rice, Scott M. Rusch, and John Serrati.

They were good because they were displinced and well trained (decent tactics like pilium charges and using shortswords very effectively). Simply that. A half decent commander could use them to great effects.

In my opinion, the fall of the legion probably started when the last true roman legion was wiped out and Rome was forced to depend on foreigners for her armies.

Oh it should be noted that after Carthage and Greece, most of the enemies didn't particularly have any troop that were considerably displinced or well trained.

[Matthew]

It depends what period you're talking about. The Roman Legion was different in 300 BC than it was in 200 BC or 100 BC, etc... You get the picture.

Hurlbut is right that the main advantage of the Roman Army (the one that we think of) was that it was disciplined, which is to say it was composed of professionals, rather than part timers.

1) However, the particular fact that Hanson is probably referring to is the adoption by the Roman Legion of the Spanish Short Sword and its effectiveness as reported by Polybius against the latter day Hellenic Phalanx (a quite different formation from the Classical Hoplite Phalanx). The Roman Legion of 200 BC defeated the Hellenic Phalanx of 200 BC. What the precise cause was is up for debate. Polybius describes the flexibility of the Legion and ability to operate in rough terrain as the cause, but he only compares the Roman Legionary to the Hellenic Phalanx man, and does not describe the composite armies of which they were a part. There were some really good posts about this over on RomanArmy Talk recently: Triple Line (http://www.romanarmy.com/rat/viewtopic.php?t=19669) (the best posts are on the second and third pages, particularly the sources cited by Paul McDonnell).

2) Many reasons. Good and consistant leadership, training, equipment, professionalism and a willingness to adapt. Good and consistant tactics, strategy and logistical support. Remember, the Roman Legionary wasn't the be all and end all of the Roman Army. In general, for every Legionary you had at least one Auxillary.

3) The changing nature of warfare, social, cultural, economic and political upheaval. They never actually became obsolete. The basic armaments continued in use until the late middle ages. Lorica Segmentata disappeared for an unknown reason, but more than half the Roman Army probably wore Mail or some other sort of Body Armour. The Gladius disappeared, but Short Swords intended for cut and thrust combat didn't. The Pilum disappeared, but specialised throwing spears didn't. The Scutum disappeared, but large shields didn't, etc... the broad patterns remained the same.

[Storm Bringer]

Awhile back I was reading Victor Davis Hanson's "A war like no other", discussing the Peleponnesian war between Athens and Sparta.

In the section on Phalanx combat, he has some snarky remarks on the difficulty of killing a man in full bronze armor with a spear, and stated that the swords of the Roman legions were far superior for the job.

This leads to several questions:

1) Is this true? If so, why is a spear (which has a reach advantage) not as good as a short sword? If not, is the esteemed historian fact-challenged in this instance?
.

The reason roman infantry could do better at swords length than phalanx spearmen is, in my opinion, due to the more extensive training at swordplay the legionnares recived compared to the greek footmen, who spent thier time working on the complex manuver drills for thier pikes. Also, the romans had large, effective shields while the pikemen needed both hands for their pikes, which would give the romans a serious edge at arms length anyway.


2) Why exactly were the Roman legions such Engines of Death (TM) as is their reputation ?

To be fair, the romans legions lost many a battle agianst non-legion foes (Cannae, Teutoburg Forest, Carrhae, Lake Trasimene, and so on). What was impressive in most of these cases was the ability of the roman populance to absorb the sometimes horrfic losses that would and did maim many other cultures of the time.

However, they did win a aweful lot of the time, due to strong disapline, good leadership (often the key element), and high skill at arms as a whole, as pointed out by others



3) If they were So Tough, why did they disappear? What made the legions obsolete?


Nothing made them obsolete. The western roman empire continued to use close order heavy infantry, armed with swords, large shields and javelins, until the collapse of the western empire. Elements changed (the Lorica Segmentata was replaced by mail, the swords were lengthed, and the javelins took on a more conventional form), but the basic mix didn't. you found men in armour, on foot and with sheilds, up till the gunpower revolution.

In the east, legions were supplanted by cataphracts as the primary arm, but still exisited for most of the bzyantine period in one form or another (the legions record agianst the eastern horse archers was not that brilliant, anyway).

After Rome fell, none of the sucessor nations in western europe had the ability to train, equip and maintain a full-time legionary force. sometime in the late dark ages, armoured horsemen rose to prominace as the elite arm of the armies of europe, but men on foot, armed with spears, swords and sheilds, with a modicum of drill and disapline, could and did hold off cavalry for forever and a day if they held together. however, their were not that many professional warriors in the late dark/early medival, and most of those used horses (at cercy, the french basically didn't count the band of pesants armed with farm tools that passed as thier infantry as a factor when they planned thier attack)

[Fhaolan]

I've always viewed the main advantage to the Roman Legion is that it was composed of a large number of highly trained, highly disciplined professional soldiers.

Much like that movie 300, when King Leonidas asks the Arcadians one at a time 'What is your profession?' getting answers of blacksmith, potter, etc. and then he asks his own Spartans that question... they don't even have to answer with a real word, all 300 just lift their spears in unison and go 'Huh!'

Do the same with troup of modern US Marines, and you'll get much the same answer. They might even use the same enthusiastic simultaneous grunt. :smallsmile:

These are professional warriors. They don't farm, they don't work a desk job, they don't just show up on the occasional weekend and wave swords at each other. All they do is war.

Which is why they win so often.

[Matthew]

That depends on period, though. Only from the Marian reforms are the Roman Legions composed of professionals. Prior to that, they were semi professional, being the result of a general levy (Legio = Levy)

[Dervag]

In the section on Phalanx combat, he has some snarky remarks on the difficulty of killing a man in full bronze armor with a spear, and stated that the swords of the Roman legions were far superior for the job.

This leads to several questions:

1) Is this true? If so, why is a spear (which has a reach advantage) not as good as a short sword? If not, is the esteemed historian fact-challenged in this instance?Because a spear, especially the sarissa of the post-Macedonian phalanx, is long, it has a harder time coming at you from unexpected angles, which makes it easier to block. It only has a reach advantage once; an opponent with good armor and a heavy shield may well be able to get past the spearpoint. A hedge of spearmen can apply multiple spearpoints to individual enemies, but if the swordsmen are equally disciplined they can often break through. The same thing happened during the early gunpowder age when the main infantry units were pike blocks. The Spanish trained units of swordsmen specifically to punch into pike formations and break them up, and these rodeleros were quite successful at the task.

Moreover, a short sword or knife is much better for close-up targeting of the (relatively small) joints and gaps in body armor.


2) Why exactly were the Roman legions such Engines of Death (TM) as is their reputation ?Discipline and a well-developed weapons mix produced by hundreds of years of experience. The legions trained extensively, and not just in battle tactics. They also rigorously practiced the arts of route marching (which meant they could run most other infantry armies into the ground by marching faster than their enemies), and of field fortification (Roman overnight field camps were literally small fortresses, even in friendly territory, and Roman infantry were great at siege warfare).

As for the weapons mix, the combination of sword, pilum, and heavy shield gave the Roman front-rankers a big advantage over other melee infantry and medium cavalry once they developed that mix.


3) If they were So Tough, why did they disappear? What made the legions obsolete?Nothing made them obsolete as such; Roman legions would have been quite effective on the battlefield up until around 1500 AD in Europe and for at least a few centuries after in most of the rest of the world.

What ended the legions was the collapse of the social structure that created and supported them. The Roman farmers who provided the core of the legions' manpower ended up as slaves working on plantations. The empire made up for it by recruiting outside of Italy, and that worked fairly well as long as the legions maintained internal discipline. But when the troops are drawn from the local population, it's harder to keep them loyal to the central government.

At the same time, the frequent civil wars between various contenders for the imperial throne led to a constant stream of casualties among the professional cadre of the Roman army. The Roman economy started to falter. And then the barbarians came in.

It had always been possible for good commanders to beat Roman armies with non-Roman armies. At one time, the Romans would simply form another army and another and another until they wore you down by attrition against their tough, skilled soldiers. But in the mid-to-late imperial period, the weakness of the government made this harder to do. The Roman emperors had to spend a lot of time and money on placating the people of the city of Rome itself, and on keeping their position against ambitious rivals. Emperors busy fighting a civil war couldn't afford to take time out for a campaign against the barbarians, so they often gave barbarians gold or land in the frontier provinces to buy peace and quiet. But the longer that went on, the harder it became for the Romans to defeat invading barbarians, and the more likely barbarian leaders were to attack Roman provinces and seize them. And it became less likely that the Romans could reconquer the province. Eventually, the Western Roman Empire collapsed as this process accelerated beyond the possibility of control in the mid-400s.

[Crow]

Awhile back I was reading Victor Davis Hanson's "A war like no other", discussing the Peleponnesian war between Athens and Sparta.

In the section on Phalanx combat, he has some snarky remarks on the difficulty of killing a man in full bronze armor with a spear, and stated that the swords of the Roman legions were far superior for the job.

This leads to several questions:

1) Is this true? If so, why is a spear (which has a reach advantage) not as good as a short sword? If not, is the esteemed historian fact-challenged in this instance?

One of the reasons the legionary had success against the phalanx was that the maniple organization of the heavy infantry was far more flexible than a line a phalanxes. Multiple maniples could outmaneuver a phalanx formation and hit it on it's flanks where it was vulnerable. When engaged in close-order combat, legionaries made good use of their scutums. Legionaries were taught to attack the target to their right.


2) Why exactly were the Roman legions such Engines of Death (TM) as is their reputation ?

As others have said, they were professionals. In addition to that, as professionals, they had amazing physical conditioning. The legionary could as somebody else put it; "March opponents into the ground". This allowed their maniples, which are a maneuverable unit to begin with, to outmaneuver their enemies. Since legionaries drilled obsessively, they could move fast while maintaining formation, even over rough terrain, which the phalanx was not designed to handle.


3) If they were So Tough, why did they disappear? What made the legions obsolete?

There are many reasons already stated. I will add to this; Many of the organizational reforms of the later empire relied upon smaller units of soldiers. At this time, people like the Goths, Huns, and others were practicing a very mobile sort of warfare which required more flexibility. In order to meet potential threats, roman forces were more spread out, so smaller units could react quicker. This gave rise to more reliance upon the auxilia, which by this point far outnumbered the legions, and were a more rounded combat force. The auxilia could go to war without the legions, but the legions certainly couldn't go to war without the auxilia. This trend continued, and when the empire collapsed, the system which allowed the legions to operate (20-some years service, followed by the state giving you a chunk of land to retire on) ceased to be. Thus was the end of the legion.

[Stephen_E]

I suspect in part the answer to both the 2nd question and the 3rd are the same. The Roman Legions were a prefessional army.

Professional armies are very effective in battle, and also can handle defeats better (which as others have mentioned, the romans had plenty of).

The following is an opinion/theory, and you find many who disagree with it (but also many who agree).

Professional armies are also a significant burden on a society, both economically and culturally/ethically. Basically Professional armies have an inherent tendancy to destroy the society they belong to over time.

Economically: The soldiers of a professional army basically don't contribute to the economy of society but do require the resources of the society to support them. In theory they assist by defending that society, but in practice once created they tend to be used for attacking, which can bring in temporay economic boosts, thus theRoman Legions were used to go beatup the other civilised societies of the time and loot them. But this only works while you're winning, and even then there is a point where you can't adminastratively manage further conquests. There is also the problem that a campaigning army is even more expensive than a standing professional army. Even a successful conquest can cost more than you make.

Culturally: Various aspects occur here. Where do these troops come from. The population. Basically a sense of service to the country and/or a sense of no where better to go. Professional armies ussually involve long service. If you're doing that you're not raising kids and otherwise been part of society. Thus you end up with two cultures. Those who don't fight but instead produce the food and goods that keeps the army fighting, and those who fight. The producers start to lose any sense of service to the army, which has become a seperate entity, and don't encourage their children to enter it. They also start to resent the cost to them of supporting that army. The soldiers come to view themselves has superior to the producers. Afterall they're disciplined and the producers are an undisplined bunch. They know that they can beatup any bunch of fighters that the producers could put together. Indeed without them putting their lives on the line the producers would be invaded and destroyed/conquered. The producers owe them! (Both the producers and the Armies have certain valid points, but IMHO their limited perspectives lead to erronus conclusions. The armies tend to be more erroneus IMHO. Consequently one or both of two things is likely. The armies stop been able to get enough good recruits and start to deterioate in quality. The army deicdes that they should takeover.

Stephen

[Crow]

Professional armies are also a significant burden on a society, both economically and culturally/ethically. Basically Professional armies have an inherent tendancy to destroy the society they belong to over time.

Economically: The soldiers of a professional army basically don't contribute to the economy of society but do require the resources of the society to support them. In theory they assist by defending that society, but in practice once created they tend to be used for attacking, which can bring in temporay economic boosts, thus theRoman Legions were used to go beatup the other civilised societies of the time and loot them. But this only works while you're winning, and even then there is a point where you can't adminastratively manage further conquests. There is also the problem that a campaigning army is even more expensive than a standing professional army. Even a successful conquest can cost more than you make.

While this may be true in some cases, it should be noted that when not on campaign, legionaries were used to help construct public buildings all over the empire. This served to keep the legions busy (they had a little coup problem in a few cases), and also served to help make Rome one of the greatest "building" empires the world had ever seen. So let's not forget that, at least in the context of the legions.


Culturally: Various aspects occur here. Where do these troops come from. The population. Basically a sense of service to the country and/or a sense of no where better to go. Professional armies ussually involve long service. If you're doing that you're not raising kids and otherwise been part of society. Thus you end up with two cultures. Those who don't fight but instead produce the food and goods that keeps the army fighting, and those who fight. The producers start to lose any sense of service to the army, which has become a seperate entity, and don't encourage their children to enter it. They also start to resent the cost to them of supporting that army. The soldiers come to view themselves has superior to the producers. Afterall they're disciplined and the producers are an undisplined bunch. They know that they can beatup any bunch of fighters that the producers could put together. Indeed without them putting their lives on the line the producers would be invaded and destroyed/conquered. The producers owe them! (Both the producers and the Armies have certain valid points, but IMHO their limited perspectives lead to erronus conclusions. The armies tend to be more erroneus IMHO. Consequently one or both of two things is likely. The armies stop been able to get enough good recruits and start to deterioate in quality. The army deicdes that they should takeover.

Stephen

Oh yes, the Sheep, Wolves and Sheepdogs. I am going to take a stab in the dark and guess that you have never been a Sheepdog. Usually this relationship is beneficial to the Sheep and the Sheepdogs (keeping the wolves away from the flock), but that whole thing is a separate conversation in itself.

Anyways, there is a horrid (undesirable) line of thought that can develope among those who protect the sheep. It goes like this;

"Those unwilling to protect themselves, don't deserve to be protected."

While there are individual circumstances where this attitude may prevail, cases of this thinking prevailing on a massive scale are very rare. (If you want to know more about my own personal struggle with this, you can PM me. It gets political.) However in the Imperial era, the legions had a built-in incentive for people to join, which was the promise of a retirement parcel after their service was completed. The legionary had plenty of reason to look forward to reintegration with the civitates upon completion of his term. I am not saying you are wrong, per se, as there are societies historically which have experienced this problem (The Spartans are one particularly extreme example). While this may be a valid argument in many cases, in the case of the legionary, the first true "citizen soldiers" (just using the term, mind you), it is not so strong.

[Stephen_E]

While this may be true in some cases, it should be noted that when not on campaign, legionaries were used to help construct public buildings all over the empire. This served to keep the legions busy (they had a little coup problem in a few cases), and also served to help make Rome one of the greatest "building" empires the world had ever seen. So let's not forget that, at least in the context of the legions.

The trouble is that traditionally give the bosses an army and they'll find a use for it. Standing armies are a sitting temptation for leaders to find a war to use them in. Give the man a hammer and everything starts to look like a nail.




Oh yes, the Sheep, Wolves and Sheepdogs. I am going to take a stab in the dark and guess that you have never been a Sheepdog. Usually this relationship is beneficial to the Sheep and the Sheepdogs (keeping the wolves away from the flock), but that whole thing is a separate conversation in itself.

Anyways, there is a horrid (undesirable) line of thought that can develope among those who protect the sheep. It goes like this;

"Those unwilling to protect themselves, don't deserve to be protected."


I'm not, nor ever have been a soldier so I gusee I'm not a sheepdog/wolf (the difference is often, but not always, more one of perception that actuality) but it should be noted that it hadn't really occurred to me that such thinking would be prevalent amongst professional soldiers until I started comunicating with them and not only frequently ran across the attitude, but got bluntly told in one case that your average US military recruit is physically, intellectually and morally superior to your average US university student. And to go back to your analogy of the Sheep/Sheepdog/Wolves, keep in mind the Sheepdogs and the Wolves are fighting over who gets to eat the sheep, not over whether the sheep get eaten.


While there are individual circumstances where this attitude may prevail, cases of this thinking prevailing on a massive scale are very rare. (If you want to know more about my own personal struggle with this, you can PM me. It gets political.) However in the Imperial era, the legions had a built-in incentive for people to join, which was the promise of a retirement parcel after their service was completed. The legionary had plenty of reason to look forward to reintegration with the civitates upon completion of his term. I am not saying you are wrong, per se, as there are societies historically which have experienced this problem (The Spartans are one particularly extreme example). While this may be a valid argument in many cases, in the case of the legionary, the first true "citizen soldiers" (just using the term, mind you), it is not so strong.

Such thinking doesn't have to prevail on a massive scale to have significanr effects. Very few political concepts have every prevailed on a massive scale, but this has never stopped them effecting and shaping societies. An awful lot of what happens is droven by small groups of passionate people, with much larger numbers going along for the ride. As you note, the Legions did have a mechanism to feed veterans back into society in a posistion of significance (landowners) reimputting the concept of service and keeping the cultures mixing. This mechanism eventually failed (for political/economic reasons) and thus the effects I mentioned got to work largely unopposed.

Stephen

[Swordguy]

Anyways, there is a horrid (undesirable) line of thought that can develope among those who protect the sheep. It goes like this;

"Those unwilling to protect themselves, don't deserve to be protected."


I'd say it was "Those unwilling to protect themselves, but who resent, hate, and fear those who protect them, don't deserve to be protected."

That's just me, though.

More on topic, a spear has a problem getting through armor because it's only real attack angle is straight-on. Even primitive armorers understood (and built into their product) deflective angles. A short sword can work around the armor to attack weak points and gaps, while a spear, while offering a reach advantage (and, as noted, is only a reach advantage for a moment) is so long as to be unwieldy when attacking in anything but a linear motion. Armor deflects attacks more easily.

[Crow]

I'd say it was "Those unwilling to protect themselves, but who resent, hate, and fear those who protect them, don't deserve to be protected."

That's just me, though.

You're right.

Stephen_E, we will have to agree to disagree on that particular topic.

[Dervag]

Professional armies are also a significant burden on a society, both economically and culturally/ethically. Basically Professional armies have an inherent tendancy to destroy the society they belong to over time.I agree, only with two caveats.

One is that tendency means a trend over time, not a guaranteed 100% surefire process.

The other is that this really only applies to large, standing professional armies. There are processes of militarization that do tend to choke societies with large professional standing armies. However, societies with relatively small professional militaries that do not end up dominating the societies they come from are far more resistant to these processes, and if they collapse it will usually not be due to the burden of militarization (see the rise and fall of the British Empire for reference).

A small standing army won't tend to overwhelm the society it protects and will not cause militarization thereof (as, say, the Roman and German armies did).


Culturally: Various aspects occur here. Where do these troops come from. The population. Basically a sense of service to the country and/or a sense of no where better to go. Professional armies ussually involve long service. If you're doing that you're not raising kids and otherwise been part of society.This is really only applicable to armies that spend most of their time in unpeaceful deployments. Even in large professional standing armies it is very common for a large fraction of long-service soldiers to be married with children and involved in society. This is why housing for military dependents has been an issue since Roman times, at the least.


You're right.Here's the catch. If it is true that those who hate, fear, and resent those who protect them do not deserve protection, it is equally true that those who inspire fear, hatred, and resentment in the population they are nominally protecting are doing something very wrong. This usually happens either when the military gets involved in politics (as happened to the Roman Republic during its decline and fall), or when the military places a large economic, social, or human burden on society that is not clearly justified by the immediate defensive needs of society (as happened in the Soviet Union during the late Cold War).

Hence the practical argument against large standing armies, be they professional or conscripted. Large standing armies are more likely to get involved in politics. Sometimes this happens when military leaders try to meddle in politics ("The die is cast"). Sometimes it happens when civilian leaders decide to use the army to achieve a political end ("What this country needs is a short, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution"). Either way, it is far more likely to happen with an army that has more than enough strength to conquer potential opponents and a large manpower base to occupy territory.

And large standing armies are more likely to end up placing a large burden on society not clearly justified by the immediate defensive needs of society, simply by virtue of being larger and therefore more expensive. If you have a large army and no enemies capable of beating you in war on your border, your citizens are eventually going to wonder why you need a large army. More to the point, they will wonder why their taxes should be paying for it instead of paying for more public works, or more public spectacles, or simply not being paid at all. Similarly, if you have a large army taking substantial casualties for years and years in a situation where it is not clear to the average citizen that there is any benefit to them that the war continue, sooner or later they're going to end up resenting the people who got them into the war and who got their relatives killed. Frequently, their target of choice for this anger is the generals, with arms manufacturers and warmongering politicians running a close second because both profit from warfare.

So I would argue that Stephen_E's argument is valid in a number of cases, although the key determining factor is the size of the army, and not its professionalism.

[Crow]

Here's the catch. If it is true that those who hate, fear, and resent those who protect them do not deserve protection, it is equally true that those who inspire fear, hatred, and resentment in the population they are nominally protecting are doing something very wrong.

Nobody stated that it was true. Only that it is a line of thinking which can surface among those charges with protecting the people. Note that I stated it is an undesirable line of thought.

Without touching on politics too much, those who fear, hate, and resent their protectors are often grossly misinformed, inexperienced, and ignorant/unaware of the dangers which the protectors are facing every day on behalf of the sheep. Not in every case, mind you, but more often than you would think.

As to one of Shephen_E's earlier comments; I don't believe that every professional soldier is "physically, intellectually and morally superior" to your average college student. I think that just like any population, there will be variation. Some college students will be physically superior, some soldiers will be intellectually superior...You can't really make statements like this becasue there is no sure-fire way to put them to the test.

Now the following is just my opinion; What I will say, is that it has been my experience, in the context of working in a professional workforce, that 24-year old kids who have completed 6 years of military service are often more prepared for the realities of working in the professional workforce than 24-year old kids who have completed 6 years of college. The track record at least in my field is that they are more willing to work under high-stress conditions, and perform slightly better under these conditions than college grads. As far as intelligence goes, some are more intelligent, and others less so. I have seen no really blatent cases of college grads being any more intelligent than veterans, nor the other way around. Physically, the veterans seem to be in better shape, conditioning-wise. Morally, I have seen no differences whatsoever. Some college grads are ****bags, and some vets are ****bags. Just like any other sample of people.

Stephen_E. Don't let that one guy's ill-informed statement color your opinion of other sheepdogs, whose opinions are not so radical. His point of view is hardly the norm.

[Om]

Without touching on politics too much, those who fear, hate, and resent their protectors are often grossly misinformed, inexperienced, and ignorant/unaware of the dangers which the protectors are facing every day on behalf of the sheep. Not in every case, mind you, but more often than you would think.You don't think that perhaps people have a right to question "their protectors"? Surely instead of waving criticism off as "grossly misinformed, inexperienced, and ignorant", you would accept that in many cases it is positively common sense to actively despise or fear the armed forces of your nation?

The reason for this is simple - the "Sheep and Sheepdog" reasoning is a stunning simplistic view that bears no relation to reality. There are dozens of examples in today's world (which for obvious reasons we won't go into) and countless throughout history in which the "Sheepdogs" were feared by the "Sheep" far more than any "Wolves" that might have been sulking on the borders. Indeed right up to the late 19th C the primary purpose of a nation's army was quashing internal dissent. Similarly, the early 20th saw what happened when large groups of "protectors" began playing an active role in the form and direction of society. I dare one person to say that they wish to return to these days.

If there is a wariness about the military (which apparently translates as ignorance and intellectual dishonesty) it is because history (and common sense!) show that large groups of armed men are only "protectors" when they are firmly subordinated to the will of the "Sheep".


A small standing army won't tend to overwhelm the society it protects and will not cause militarization thereof (as, say, the Roman and German armies did).Of course the opposing logic, and not one that I necessarily subscribe to, is that a smaller and more professional force is more likely to become cut adrift from the society that it is, nominally, supposed to serve. The upshot being that the gulf between civilian and soldier widens... and thus gives rise to perceptions of "Sheep and Sheepdogs". Some of the most brutal atrocities of the 19th C were committed by the, resolutely small and professional, French and British armies against the civilians that they were supposed to be protecting.

[Crow]

You don't think that perhaps people have a right to question "their protectors"? Surely instead of waving criticism off as "grossly misinformed, inexperienced, and ignorant", you would accept that in many cases it is positively common sense to actively despise or fear the armed forces of your nation?

The reason for this is simple - the "Sheep and Sheepdog" reasoning is a stunning simplistic view that bears no relation to reality. There are dozens of examples in today's world (which for obvious reasons we won't go into) and countless throughout history in which the "Sheepdogs" were feared by the "Sheep" far more than any "Wolves" that might have been sulking on the borders. Indeed right up to the late 19th C the primary purpose of a nation's army was quashing internal dissent. Similarly, the early 20th saw what happened when large groups of "protectors" began playing an active role in the form and direction of society. I dare one person to say that they wish to return to these days.

If there is a wariness about the military (which apparently translates as ignorance and intellectual dishonesty) it is because history (and common sense!) show that large groups of armed men are only "protectors" when they are firmly subordinated to the will of the "Sheep".

I said nothing of the people's right to question their protectors. Doing so is prudent, and I support it. But so very often people don't "question" their protectors, so much as level baseless accusations at them, and form opinions based upon second-hand information from those who know no better themselves. Some criticism is valid, but an equal amount is not.

Also, when the "sheepdogs" begin to prey upon their own flock, they are essentially wolves themselves. This has no bearing on the protector-protected relationship debate, as in this case, there are no longer any legitamate protectors.

I await your reply, but I will tell you ahead of time that I am not going to respond after this. Not becasue I don't wish to discuss this further, but because we are walking a very thin line as far as the rules of this board are concerned, and have strayed way off-topic to boot.

Just don't take my silence on this matter from here on to be a retreat of any sort.

[Matthew]

Here's the catch. If it is true that those who hate, fear, and resent those who protect them do not deserve protection, it is equally true that those who inspire fear, hatred, and resentment in the population they are nominally protecting are doing something very wrong. This usually happens either when the military gets involved in politics (as happened to the Roman Republic during its decline and fall), or when the military places a large economic, social, or human burden on society that is not clearly justified by the immediate defensive needs of society (as happened in the Soviet Union during the late Cold War).

I am not sure quite whether your making this distinction, but just in case, I will say this about the Roman Republic. There wasn't a division between military leaders and their political masters. The political masters were the military leaders right from the beginning and participation in the military was an avenue to political participation [i.e. service as an Auxillary was the primary route to citizenship]. That is to say, the military was always involved in politics and the collapse of the republic was not due to the military becoming involved in politics, but the politicians deploying their own military forces against one another. I don't know whether that is in fact what you meant, but I thought it was worth clarifying.

[Dervag]

You don't think that perhaps people have a right to question "their protectors"? Surely instead of waving criticism off as "grossly misinformed, inexperienced, and ignorant", you would accept that in many cases it is positively common sense to actively despise or fear the armed forces of your nation?

The reason for this is simple - the "Sheep and Sheepdog" reasoning is a stunning simplistic view that bears no relation to reality.The practical problem is that not every military can reasonably call themselves 'sheepdogs', except insofar as sheepdogs might keep the sheep in line while they are being herded to the shearing or the butcher. Moreover, the duality between sheepdogs and sheep is somewhat condescending and demeaning to the average citizen. After all, sheep can neither act nor think for themselves. It is absurd to imagine the sheepdogs recruiting among the sheep. The sheep would never be the appropriate people to vote on the conduct of the sheepdogs, which they can never hope to understand.

The sheepdog model is truly accurate only if you assume that the majority of the civilian population constitutes a herd of sheep to be led by an autocratic government shepherd.


I am not sure quite whether your making this distinction, but just in case, I will say this about the Roman Republic. There wasn't a division between military leaders and their political masters. The political masters were the military leaders right from the beginning and participation in the military was an avenue to political participation [i.e. service as an Auxillary was the primary route to citizenship]. That is to say, the military was always involved in politics and the collapse of the republic was not due to the military becoming involved in politics, but the politicians deploying their own military forces against one another. I don't know whether that is in fact what you meant, but I thought it was worth clarifying.What I meant was that the proximate causes of the collapse of the Republic had a great deal to do with the fact that the military became less and less shy about intervening in Roman politics. The trend arguably started with the Marian reforms. Marius's policy of recruiting from the landless Romans and promising them land at the end of their term of enlistment may have strengthened the army, but it also made the soldiers dependent on their generals for their retirement pensions. Which, in turn, meant that the soldiers' political fortunes rose and fell with those generals, which gave them a much greater incentive to back the generals in a coup.

After that, things started to fall apart. Over the next sixty years, generals and their armies would repeatedly march on Rome and use troops to kill or intimidate their political opponents. At the same time, the Marian reforms made the Roman legions an even more effective engine of conquest, allowing the leaders of the armies to conquer vast territories such as Gaul, Asia Minor, and Egypt. This gave them major resource bases that were almost entirely beyond direct Roman control, and which therefore gave them the resources to field large armies even more firmly under their control than those of Marius's time.

In short, Marius made the Roman army such a powerful instrument that it became too strong for the Roman government to keep under control- Roman government technology was inferior to Roman military technology (insofar as organizations and ideologies can be considered as technologies). Granted, the generals and the senior politicians were the same people, but the fact remained that the politicians who proved effective as generals could then use raw military force as a way to control their political opposition. Hence the end of political control over the military, and eventually of the Roman Republic.

[Stephen_E]

I agree, only with two caveats.

One is that tendency means a trend over time, not a guaranteed 100% surefire process.

Bingo. That is exactly why I used the word tendancy.


The other is that this really only applies to large, standing professional armies. There are processes of militarization that do tend to choke societies with large professional standing armies. However, societies with relatively small professional militaries that do not end up dominating the societies they come from are far more resistant to these processes, and if they collapse it will usually not be due to the burden of militarization (see the rise and fall of the British Empire for reference).

The British Empire is an excellent example where the army was mostly a small army of various degrees of professionalism. They also interesting for the purposes of this argument because of their large navy which avoided most of these problems because a large part of the personnal flowed back and forth between the military navy and the merchant navy - thus rather than having a professional military you had a professional navy that was militray when needed, a navy can't prohect power onto land well - thus avoiding the perrenial temptation "have military, must fight", and the use of the navy tended to a more direct and practical positive link to the wealth of the nation - Britain been a sea trading nation.


So I would argue that Stephen_E's argument is valid in a number of cases, although the key determining factor is the size of the army, and not its professionalism.

I think of the size been the most important factor, with a more "professional military" culture causing contibuting tendancies, as opposed to a citizens army, but not been the determining factor.

Stephen E

[Stephen_E]

I was thinking that a better model looking at the relationship between militaries and the societies they're part of is that of Guard/attack dogs and working dogs/pets. In general trained Guard/attack dogs are better in a fight aginst other Guard/attack dogs, and the occasional wolf, but those pets and working dogs aren't helpless and given the incentive are more than capable of taking down the trained Guard/attack dogs, or wolves for that matter.

Harking back to the Roman Empire we saw Spartucus and his slave army, very much a civilian force, smash professional roman armies one after another.

Of course this IMHO shows one of the greatest strengths of a professional army over an amatur/civilain force. Disciplined professional militaries can handle defeat and come back for round 2, 3, or 4, while amatur/civilian forces tend to handle defeats badly.

Again I stress the word "tendancy". There is no "do "x" and "y" occurs".

Stephen

[pendell]

I'm still not quite sure how a simple question about the effectiveness of the legions turned into a thinly-veiled political discourse.

Nonetheless, the 'sheep-sheepdog' analogy, though imperfect, makes sense in Rome -- ancient Rome was a specialized economy. In any economy wealthy enough to support it, professionals supplant and replace amateurs. It's called specialization.

A society wealthy enough to afford it will first pay to separate farmers from tradesman, then tradesman into specialized tradesman, until finally we have the fellow who's hypertrained in one specific area (in our society, say, .NET C++ real-time using MIcrosoft Visual C++ version X.XX) and completely unhireable in any other (said employee above would not be hired to work in GNU C++, despite multiple years of C++ experience).

Why would it surprise anyone that a hyperspecialized society would also have a specialization for warfare? Why would any society that has specialized everything else leave to amateurs the one part of human endeavour which absolutely must be done right? In a specialized society, hiving off a segment of society as a warrior specialization is inevitable.

Later, when that society collapses, society can no longer afford specialization, so you're back to the jack-of-all-trades farmer/merchant/soldier.

I think the poster upthread hit it on the head -- and I'm grateful to him for pointing it out. The Legions did not become obsolete ... it's simply that the legions couldn't exist without the support of an advanced, specialized economy that didn't exist in dark ages Europe.

And I still see no one has answered my questions about roman gladiators and their combats vs. monsters (i.e. predatory animals such as lions).

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Dervag]

And I still see no one has answered my questions about roman gladiators and their combats vs. monsters (i.e. predatory animals such as lions).

Respectfully,

Brian P.I'm not sure what to say about that, to tell the truth. I mean, it's an idea, but other than saying "yes, that makes some sense," there's not a lot of analysis to do as far as I can tell.

[Gwyn chan 'r Gwyll]

Very rarely were animals put up against gladiators. They were mostly reserved for criminals. The "Roman Mysteries" series, which I find very accurate, though fiction, has a book which features hippos, bears, and lions used to kill criminals.

There have been cases where gladiators have been put up against animals, but it is rare, because you cannot tell a lion to stop, let him go. Gladiators were expensive, the first priority was survival of value. The more famous a gladiator, the higher value.

[Stephen_E]

I'm still not quite sure how a simple question about the effectiveness of the legions turned into a thinly-veiled political discourse.


Unfortunately any genralised analysis/comments on how societies work/don't work can largely be applied to societies in all kinds of time and place.

I realised that someone might well assume I was intending that, but if I'd said "please ignore any possible comparison to recent/current times" I'd guarantee that such a connection was made, and commented on.

Much like you can find 3000 year old complaints about children not respecting their parents, moral decadence destroying society and all sorts of issues that people think as "current".

Some social concepts such as Nationalism have become much more common in the last 500 years, and "super-nationalism" where people see the entire world as their state is, I suspect, a fairly new phenomonon, but this last concept is still quite uncommon, if not rare.

Stephen

[pendell]

Some social concepts such as Nationalism have become much more common in the last 500 years, and "super-nationalism" where people see the entire world as their state is, I suspect, a fairly new phenomonon, but this last concept is still quite uncommon, if not rare.

Stephen

Disagree, actually. IIRC, "nationalism" is really an outgrowth of the end of the 30 years war and the Peace of Westphalia. Prior to that, it was a common idea that all the world would belong to One Holy Empire, which would provide peace and justice to everyone. The Romans thought their empire *was* the world, for all intents and purposes.

The idea that other nations and governments deserve to exist and not be conquered by our Holy And Just King (or Emperor, or Caeser, or whatever) is actually pretty new. The idea that nations have a right to self-determination would have been laughed at as recently as 1914. Russia, Ottoman, German, British, French and every other major power was a major power because it had conquered a lot of subject peoples in need of tutelage by Our Glorious Civilization (whatever that civ was).

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Dervag]

The principle of national self-determination had been kicking around since the American Revolution (in practice) and the European Enlightenment (in theory), at least in its beta version. By the late 1800s, nations like Serbia, Greece, and Italy were very interested in asserting self-rule as something other than an extension of one of the Great Powers' all-spanning empires.

So the idea of self-determination wouldn't get you laughed at in 1914. It might get you shot if you expressed it in the wrong place, but not laughed at.

As for the recognition that other nations deserve to exist, you see it in every time and place not dominated by a single empire. For instance, the Greek city-states generally recognized each others' rights to exist as independent entities, albeit as subservient allies if the power relationship between them was steep enough. The major kingdoms of the Middle East in the Bronze Age recognized each other as being ruled by approximate equals.

[Om]

The principle of national self-determination had been kicking around since the American Revolution (in practice) and the European Enlightenment (in theory), at least in its beta version. By the late 1800s, nations like Serbia, Greece, and Italy were very interested in asserting self-rule as something other than an extension of one of the Great Powers' all-spanning empires.Nationalism does not equate to self-determination however. Early Balkans nationalism of the late 19th C (which only became a mass movement towards the very end of the century) was largely couched in terms of irredentism or pan-Slavism. Very, very few politicians (limited almost entirely to liberal philosophers, US idealists, and European Marxists) subscribed to the theory that every ethnic group had the fundamental right to independence. Again, note that this is different from the nationalist groups arguing for their own petty empire.

It wasn't until 1917 (Russia) and 1918 (USA) that the first Great Powers accepted, in principle, self-determinism. It took another three decades before it was enshrined, to a degree, in the international law (UN charter), and the 1960s were almost over before the European empires were finally surrendered.


Some social concepts such as Nationalism have become much more common in the last 500 years, and "super-nationalism" where people see the entire world as their state is, I suspect, a fairly new phenomonon, but this last concept is still quite uncommon, if not rare.Leaving aside medieval examples, the Austrian Empire of the 19th C was a super-national body in almost every regard. Certainly that was how the Empire and its rulers saw it. One could actually argue that the rise of nation-states, in Central Europe at least, is actually newer than that of super-national structures.

[Stephen_E]

I think we're talking at cross purposes.

When I talk about Nationalism and Super-Nationalism, I'm not talking about super-states and politicians claiming their existance as a state. I'm talking about people identifying themselves as part of something larger than a village, clan or city.

The concept of been "French" or "German" at the ground level of population. My understanding is that thei is a relative (centuries) new concept beyond some philosophisers or politicians. For example the USSR was a single political entity, but if you'd gone to a villager, or even many city dwellers, and asked them who they were they wouldn't have called themselves "Soviets". The likely responce would be they were "x" village or Muscovanan, at most a Ukrainian, Russian (i.e. by their Republic).

It's something I find of interest because I beleive it has made a profound effect on the use of military power. Basically pre-common nationalism if you invaded a country all you had to do was bump of the local overlords and so long as you didn't act any harsher than the previous overlords the peasants would just shrug and start paying their taxes to the new boss. With nationalism you get the concept of "we're been invaded by foreigners!" rather than "this other bunch or bosses came and beat the bosses currently lording it over us". Thus conquest is no longer a matter of simply beating the overlord army, you have to convince the population to change their identity or see you as having the same identity. This is a whole different kettle of fish, and is something beyond a mere military solution.

Stephen

[Darkie]

There wasn't a division between military leaders and their political masters.

This brings about a thought related to my own ethnic background:
Military men make better politicians then the other way around.

Imperial China's habit of using political officials as military leaders always seemed off to me, especially when one of exams for becoming an official appears to be focused on memorization of poetry.

Or at least that's what I've always known about Imperial China's military leaders, am I wrong, here?

[Storm Bringer]

In purely Military terms, yes, it's not a good practice to put politicians in charge or armies.


However, war is politics by other means, and form a politicians POV, leaving generals in charge of the army isn't good. They tend to think in purely Military terms, and don't think about the politcal fallout form thier actions.

For example, General MacArthur, commander of the Korean war, was quite willing to use nukes on the chinese army and risk world war 3(and was vocal about it willingness as well). However, his politcal overseers were not willing to end the world for korea, and overruled him.

In the case of the Imperial Chinese, however, it's more a case of the long periods of peace leading to a decline in the army, as it faced no foe that could match it. The choice of commanders has always been involved politcal elements (Maclellan in the US civil war was chosen not only for his superb skills as an organiser, but for his Democratic beliefs under the Republican government), but in china at times the choice lost it's Military elements (thier being no one to fight.)

[Zincorium]

This brings about a thought related to my own ethnic background:
Military men make better politicians then the other way around.

Imperial China's habit of using political officials as military leaders always seemed off to me, especially when one of exams for becoming an official appears to be focused on memorization of poetry.

Or at least that's what I've always known about Imperial China's military leaders, am I wrong, here?

The chinese were neighbors of the mongols. Maybe the focus was to be amusing enough that the invading mongol hordes would keep them around instead of executing them?

On a side note, I agree with your idea. Eisenhower is a good example of a military leader who became an effective and well-liked politician. One of the reasons I think so, is that being a high-ranking military officer means you've been handed countless bad situations to deal with and survived with the polish still on your boots. As well, you're a bit more familiar with the consequences of any military action you send the troops into, and are more likely to negotiate.

[Om]

When I talk about Nationalism and Super-Nationalism, I'm not talking about super-states and politicians claiming their existance as a state. I'm talking about people identifying themselves as part of something larger than a village, clan or city.That's pretty much your basic nationalism. The mistake is in thinking that this and an investment in a super-national structure are mutually exclusive.

To continue with the above example, subjects of the Austrian Empire certainly identified themselves as German, or Hungarian, or Croat, or Czech, etc etc, but they also perceived themselves to be common subjects of the Empire. Right up until 1918 there were national (ie Italian, Croat, Slovak) regiments willingly fighting for the cause of the Emperor. The same applied to the USSR - one layer of loyalty (the Republic) existing alongside another equally strong layer (Moscow). Its very similar to the increasing trend in Europe for citizens to see themselves as citizens of both the national state and the EU.


The concept of been "French" or "German" at the ground level of population. My understanding is that thei is a relative (centuries) new concept beyond some philosophisers or politicians. For example the USSR was a single political entity, but if you'd gone to a villager, or even many city dwellers, and asked them who they were they wouldn't have called themselves "Soviets". The likely responce would be they were "x" village or Muscovanan, at most a Ukrainian, Russian (i.e. by their Republic).Well that's your bog standard nationalism and has been around, in its modern form, for roughly two centuries. Of course peasantry is a notoriously insular class - as late as 1914 (over a century since Napoleon had played the "national card" to fill his armies) the Russian/Ukrainian peasantry remained extremely difficult to mobilise; they simply didn't have any concept of fighting German peasants thousands of miles away. Hardly surprising given that 1914 Russia was still essentially a feudal country.


However, war is politics by other means, and form a politicians POV, leaving generals in charge of the army isn't good. They tend to think in purely Military terms, and don't think about the politcal fallout form thier actions.An excellent example of this being the German General Staff prior to 1914. Generals should never be permitted to take the lead on strategic or political agendas.

[Winterking]

An excellent example of this being the German General Staff prior to 1914. Generals should never be permitted to take the lead on strategic or political agendas.

Hey now, the German Great General Staff in/right before 1914 had a much better idea of what they were doing than popular history tends to give them credit for. The Schlieffen plan (a misnomer, by 1914), while ideally meant to capture Paris quickly, had the secondary effect of targeting the richest, most productive (militarily) regions of the primary western land enemy--France. And the German strategic agenda (through Belgium, into France) required tactical advances (heavy guns, quickly assembled and operated in order to break the Belgian forts) that served them very well in the following years. In fact, if Kaiser Wilhelm II had kept his noise out of military affairs before and after 1914, Germany might have been quite a bit better off.

And for that matter, it was the series of politicians unwilling/unable to negotiate fast enough to halt mobilizations that caused the war, so don't go blaming Germany for that. (the immediate cause; the German-Anglo naval race didn't help matters any, in the long term)

[Dervag]

This brings about a thought related to my own ethnic background:
Military men make better politicians then the other way around.

Imperial China's habit of using political officials as military leaders always seemed off to me, especially when one of exams for becoming an official appears to be focused on memorization of poetry.

Or at least that's what I've always known about Imperial China's military leaders, am I wrong, here?The problem with Imperial China had more to do with disregard for the military that with putting 'civilian' leaders than in charge of military forces. The Romans put their politicians in command of the army throughout the era of the Roman Republic, and often scored great successes. Indeed, as I said earlier, their army grew so successful that a good politician/general in command of a Roman army was too powerful for the central government to restrain.

Which was probably exactly what the Chinese were trying to avoid, so maybe they were on to something after all. China doesn't actually have a worse track record of being invaded and conquered by foreigners than most other parts of the world, after all.


On a side note, I agree with your idea. Eisenhower is a good example of a military leader who became an effective and well-liked politician. One of the reasons I think so, is that being a high-ranking military officer means you've been handed countless bad situations to deal with and survived with the polish still on your boots. As well, you're a bit more familiar with the consequences of any military action you send the troops into, and are more likely to negotiate.I'll buy the first point, but the second point is dubious. There were a lot of generalissimos over the years who tended to try to convert any kind of problem they faced into a military problem.


Hey now, the German Great General Staff in/right before 1914 had a much better idea of what they were doing than popular history tends to give them credit for.They knew exactly what they were doing. The problem is that they were doing the wrong thing. By creating a hardwired plan that essentially required the German military to launch an aggressive campaign in the West as a prelude to any operations in the East, they virtually guaranteed that the Great War would spread to Western Europe. And that Britain would come in- the danger that Germany would topple both France and Russia was not something they could tolerate.

The 'brilliant' von Schlieffen Plan was a good piece of strategy but a terrible piece of grand strategy. It made a very strong assumption about the correct way to wage the war, one which turned out to be false. The Germans might very well have profited a lot more from an intentional defensive campaign in the West, with Belgium neutral, than they did from the Western Front they actually got. If they had concentrated against Russia instead, they would not have run the risk of the Russians overrunning Prussia (which would have happened if not for some very clever work at Tannenberg), and they would likely have been able to secure victory in the East and present the Western Allies with a fait accompli without antagonizing them beyond the point where an armistice was possible.

Of course, the German politicians were no more likely to come up with a plan like this than the German generals were; Germany was still wedded to the idea of beating both France and Russia and securing a permanent position at the heart of a Continental System.

[Zincorium]

I'll buy the first point, but the second point is dubious. There were a lot of generalissimos over the years who tended to try to convert any kind of problem they faced into a military problem.

If it were only the generalissimos that had this problem, I'd concede. Rampant militaristic urges are a constant problem with the past or present leadership of nearly every country and region on this planet that I've learned about.

I will admit that a certain individual whose name would godwin this thread did serve directly in the infantry and later threw the same infantry into a meatgrinder on the eastern front without a thought for the consequences. It is very much a mixed bag.

[pendell]

I will admit that a certain individual whose name would godwin this thread did serve directly in the infantry and later threw the same infantry into a meatgrinder on the eastern front without a thought for the consequences. It is very much a mixed bag.

Do you mean Napoleon? He was a captain of artillery, not infantry. He was of no account until he gave the Paris mob the famous 'whiff of grapeshot', which started his career upwards. He subsequently led a massive army into the snows of Russia, and hardly anyone came back.

On the upside, he did oversee the creation of a fine body of laws (Code Napoleon) which has served many nations well for the past two centuries.

Julius Caeser did an excellent job as well.

The problem is that, against these few very good Emperors who were former generals, you have to set myriads and myriads of tinpot dictators like Castro, Peron, Santa Ana, who were middling-to-poor as both soldiers and statesmen.

It seems that there's as much mediocrity in uniform as out.

In US history, you've got Ulysses S. Grant, who won the civil war, and yet as Wikipedia shows, he was one of the worst presidents EVER. Zachary Taylor, as I understand it, wasn't much better.

So I don't agree that generals make better politicans. There are exceptional individuals who are good at everything they do, whether it be generalling or politicking. But overall, talentless hacks in uniform can do just as bad a job as clueless civilians.

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Joran]

Do you mean Napoleon?

No, invoking Godwin means he meant Hitler. Godwin's Law is "As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one."

[pendell]

I knew that. I was deliberately trying to move the discussion away from Godwin's dictator onto another historical figure who will serve just as well for the purpose of this discussion.

I should know better than to try to be witty.

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Om]

Hey now, the German Great General Staff in/right before 1914 had a much better idea of what they were doing than popular history tends to give them credit for.Dervag's post is an excellent rebuttal of this. To this I'll merely add that the General Staff knew that invading Belgium would lead to certain British intervention and yet they continued to ignore this, and all other political aspects/possibilities, when devising and implementing the plan.

[Stephen_E]

I look on it as the tendancy for military focused people to see military operations as an end to themselves, divorced from political considerations.

vs this you have the tendancy of political focused people to treat military matters with a certain disdain and ignore the fact that once you start down the military combat path, and people start dying, conflicts take on a life of their own and can't just be put aside and stopped when things don't workout the way you thought they would.

The individuals who were successful as both politicians and military leaders were IMHO those who could balance the two drives, and know when to keep their paws out of matters. Churchill was a good example of someone who was an excellent military politician, but for all his talents he couldn't resist getting his paws into actual military operational decisions, at which he varied from been mediocre to crap.

Stephen

[Dervag]

No, invoking Godwin means he meant Hitler. Godwin's Law is "As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one."In and of itself, though, this is merely a statistical observation.

The real humdinger is Godwin's First Corollary, which states that "the argument is then over."

However, Godwin's First Corollary is based on observations of Usenet, which do not have a powerful Giant watching over their Playground, and therefore I consider it irrelevant to this discussion.


I knew that. I was deliberately trying to move the discussion away from Godwin's dictator onto another historical figure who will serve just as well for the purpose of this discussion.

I should know better than to try to be witty.

Respectfully,

Brian P.The problem is that even an elliptical reference to Hitler vastly increases the probability that the thread will cross over the Godwin Horizon. Which is why I do not try to tiptoe around that horizon, but instead dive across it with gusto!

Besides, this thread is well over eighty pages long; I have no doubt that it has already cross the Godwin Horizon. If it had not, Godwin's law itself is in doubt.


Dervag's post is an excellent rebuttal of this. To this I'll merely add that the General Staff knew that invading Belgium would lead to certain British intervention and yet they continued to ignore this, and all other political aspects/possibilities, when devising and implementing the plan.Oh, I have no doubt they knew exactly what they were doing. The problem is not that they knew what they were doing, it is that they did not know why they were doing it or whether it was a smart thing to do under the circumstances.

These questions were not part of the purview of the German General Staff, and the General Staff rightly ignored them in its preparation for a plan of action against the combination of France and Russia under conditions where committing what could technically be considered an act of war against Britain would be acceptable. It was entirely reasonable for them to prepare such a plan, in fact, and were they my general staff I would applaud them for doing so.

The catch is that not all plans should be implemented. The German General Staff wrongly worked itself into a position from which it could enact the modified von Schlieffen plan regardless of circumstances. In this case, the important circumstance that Britain was very likely to respond to even a technical act of war by declaring war.


Churchill was a good example of someone who was an excellent military politician, but for all his talents he couldn't resist getting his paws into actual military operational decisions, at which he varied from been mediocre to crap.

StephenAs was his greatest opponent, Hitler.

(thread Godwin count is now 3)

[Winterking]

What people tend to forget, or not know, is that the Germans had no choice regarding their war opponents: Russia and France were both committed to war if the other attacked/was attacked, so the whole crush-Russia-first idea that Dervag threw out there was pointless. France would invade anyway. And Germany thus HAD to beat both France and Russia.
Besides, 1914 Germans knew that there was no hope of knocking Russia out of the war in a single stroke, in a "fait accompli"--Russia was too big and had too many men. (and in fact, in 1941, when the Germans had a much greater comparative advantage, and much greater mobility, they were still unable to knock Russia out).
France, however, lacked infinite space and manpower (they were already conscripting a far greater % of their population than Germany, just to keep up with the Germans), and there was a reasonably chance that their armies could be held and destroyed, or that the moral center (Paris) could be taken in a reasonable amount of time (unlike Moscow or St. Petersburg).

Please remember also that once mobilization had begun, it could not be stopped without utterly disrupting the economy, running up a sizable debt for no reason, and crippling a country's ability to defend itself. (as the mobilized, then de-mobilized populace filtered back home, and commandeered trucks/horses/trains tried to return to their points of origin, a country would be extremely vulnerable). And to delay mobilization in the face of enemy mobilization would be suicidal as well.

So, France had to be the target, if Germany was to have any hope of avoiding a two-front war. Now, Germany could try and cross the border from Alsace-Lorraine, attacking France directly, but that would be problematic. The rail lines all ran the wrong way, and didn't link up with eachother. Not to mention the fact that the French were almost certain to mass their army there, and had their best defenses along that border. Belgium, on the other hand, had plenty of rail networks and junctions for resupply, a tiny army (even when supplemented by reserves), and offered a quick route into France. The only problems were Britain and the Belgian forts. The Germans had a plan, and tools, for dealing with the forts--superheavy guns, and howitzers. And as it happened, the great forts at Liege, supposed to be impregnable, pretty much collapsed on schedule as the German army marched by.

As far as the German 'error' of tangling with the British, the British had a tiny peacetime army and no conscription system. The Germans could count on them playing only a minor part, as they in fact did at the beginning. Besides, Britain was bound to enter the conflict anyway, thanks to the dreadnought race, Germany's claims to worldwide empire, and their close relations with France at that time.

Yes, a war against Britain was a problem in the long term, but any war was a problem in the long term, because it would involve two or more fronts. (By 1918, Germans were spread out along 3 to 5 fronts, depending how you count --West, East, Italy, Palestine, Greece/Balkans) The German plan dealt with that by taking away some of their enemies' capabilities, and planting themselves along a superb defensive line, better than the pre-war border. (Better, because not only did they move forward in many places and take high ground, but their presence on French soil in the north, and on Belgian soil, forced the allies to make their major efforts there, to 'save France!,' and so fight their way back through northern France and all of Belgium before reaching German territory) Northern France and southern Belgium, along with the Ruhr Valley, had much of Western Europe's coal mining and industrial production. To leave that in the hands of the French, even for a short war, but especially in the event of a long one, would be idiotic. Additionally, holding French territory, rather than simply defending German territory, was a morale boost, proof that the Germans were winning.

Please tell me, in a situation identical to that faced by German in 1914, what would you do? They can't just wait--their best chance to take a dominant position in a future war hinges on a quick defeat of France, and every year, the Russians lay more railroad, for faster deployment of their vast armies.

[Dervag]

What people tend to forget, or not know, is that the Germans had no choice regarding their war opponents: Russia and France were both committed to war if the other attacked/was attacked, so the whole crush-Russia-first idea that Dervag threw out there was pointless. France would invade anyway. And Germany thus HAD to beat both France and Russia.

Please tell me, in a situation identical to that faced by German in 1914, what would you do? They can't just wait--their best chance to take a dominant position in a future war hinges on a quick defeat of France, and every year, the Russians lay more railroad, for faster deployment of their vast armies.[/quote]Be warned that I cannot fully divorce myself from hindsight- specifically, I can't bring myself to ignore the superiority of dug-in troops fighting from defensive positions during this era.

Assuming this superiority as a fact, it is clear that France was doomed to failure in any offensive battle pushing into Germany.

This is the key point that informs my views about the relative importance of the Western Front- with the Low Countries neutral, Germany would be facing France on a relatively narrow, prefortified border in rugged terrain- Alsace-Lorraine.

We can see historical evidence for that position (evidence not available to the General Staff) in the failure of the French 'Battles of the Frontier', in which they attempted to overwhelm only a small portion of the German strength (two German armies under Crown Prince Rupprecht) with the great bulk of their own strength (five French armies). They failed, and were slaughtered by thousands.

If the first mobilized French armies could be beaten badly enough, a German counterattack could most likely press them at least far enough back to keep them out of artillery range of the border, thus securing German territory- note that the German line was in France even in the area the French most strongly concentrated troops in at the beginning of the war.

If Belgium remained neutral, British entry into the war might well be delayed, and might very well be uncertain if/when it did finally occur. This would give time for the Germans to make gains in Russia, where they still had a fairly substantial ally, at least in terms of tying down Russians. The Russian state was known to be politically creaky even before the war.

France was not going to get much stronger once the initial surge of mobilization forces was called up. Their population and conscription pool were sharply limited compared to that of Germany, and without very strong and enthusiastic British support (vast volunteer or conscripted armies in France) they could not muster enough manpower to crack a German defense in Alsace-Lorraine, especially not if that defense were in depth and backed by strong prepared fortresses. Whereas the Russians would having trouble supplying and arming even their initial call-up of troops (historically, the Russian emergency practice of handing out rifles only to every other soldier and telling the other soldiers to pick up rifles from their fallen comrades began in this war).

To summarize, I am an 'easterner' rather than a 'westerner', to use the names that came out of the strategy disputes of that war. I am convinced that both sides had greater potential to stage successes with firmly prosecuted campaigns in the East (where the ratio of force to space was relatively low) than in the West (where it was relatively high).

It was certainly conceivable that Germany might topple France at a rush, but to do so would require considerable good fortune. In particular, the French would have to almost totally denude their northern frontier of troops. Historically this is what happened, but the Germans did not have evidence for this when they arrived at, planned, and executed the von Schlieffen Plan.

So I would argue that the possibility of overwhelming France in a hurry was not justified by the facts that:
a)It would bring the British into the war in a much swifter and more unified fashion,
b)It would give the initially mobilized Russian armies an opportunity to ravage Germany's eastern provinces, and
c)It would deny the Germans any opportunity to take the offensive against Russia until after the full mobilization of Russian forces had already occured, brining most of their readily equippable manpower into the field.

Remember that Germany was far more likely to conquer significant territory in the East than in the West, barring a total victory on all fronts. And a simple analysis of demographics would suggest that Germany did not have a good chance of total victory on all fronts against the combination of Britain, France, and Russia, barring some unforeseen factor working in their favor.


Of course, one could argue that I am not giving sufficient consideration to some of the reasonable concerns Germany faced, and that I am not able to fully divorce myself from hindsight. If so, then I can predict the other thing I might have done if I had my thinking cap on straight. And that would be to commit even more forces to the right wing of the Schlieffen Plan, and make every effort to strengthen it, unlike Moltke, who slightly weakened the right arm to provide more troops for the defense of Alsace-Lorraine and Prussia.

After all, according to the strategic logic you give, the von Schlieffen Plan was Germany's only chance of victory. If so, then the correct decision was to pursue it with all forces available, accepting even the loss or devastation of border provinces if that was what it took to subdue the French quickly.

[Raum]

To summarize, I am an 'easterner' rather than a 'westerner', to use the names that came out of the strategy disputes of that war. I am convinced that both sides had greater potential to stage successes with firmly prosecuted campaigns in the East (where the ratio of force to space was relatively low) than in the West (where it was relatively high).Pragmatically it may have made more sense to concentrate on the eastern front initially, but there are two things which prevented Germany from doing so - demographics and historical politics. A large portion of Germany's population and a larger portion of industry was concentrated just north of France in the Ruhr valley. Germany couldn't afford to cede territory there even temporarily. Planning a defensive front without the ability to trade territory for time risks defeat. You can't simply build a wall of forts, you need defense in depth. Germany had large areas of sparsely populated (relatively) territory in the east but not in the west. On the historical and political side, the Hohenzollerns had married into the Hapsburg family. So the assassinated archduke was a relative and his death arguably left the Kaiser as heir to the Holy Roman Empire. It had only dissolved a hundred years earlier...and it was a western empire.

[pendell]

Speaking with the benefit of hindsight, it seems to me that the invasion of Belgium, although a good idea in the military short term, was a bad idea from a moral and political standpoint.

Moral, because Germany had guaranteed Belgium's neutrality.

And political, because this moral violation brought England into the war. Because England was in the war, the US was brought into the war due to the submarine war waged against England, encroaching on the US' sacrosanct 'freedom of the seas'.

G.K. Chesterton summed up the British viewpoint admirably in his wartime book The Barbarism of Berlin (http://www.fullbooks.com/The-Barbarism-of-Berlin.html) :



Before we go on to the deeper things which make this war the most sincere
war of human history, it is as easy to answer the question of why England
came to be in it at all, as it is to ask how a man fell down a coal-hole,
or failed to keep an appointment. Facts are not the whole truth. But
facts are facts, and in this case the facts are few and simple. Prussia,
France, and England had all promised not to invade Belgium. Prussia
proposed to invade Belgium, because it was the safest way of invading
France. But Prussia promised that if she might break in, through her own
broken promise and ours, she would break in and not steal. In other words,
we were offered at the same instant a promise of faith in the future and
a proposal of perjury in the present.

...

Upon the immediate logical and legal origin of the English interest
there can be no rational debate. There are some things so simple that
one can almost prove them with plans and diagrams, as in Euclid. One
could make a kind of comic calendar of what would have happened to the
English diplomatist, if he had been silenced every time by Prussian
diplomacy. Suppose we arrange it in the form of a kind of diary:

July 24: Germany invades Belgium.

July 25: England declares war.

July 26: Germany promises not to annex Belgium.

July 27: England withdraws from the war.

July 28: Germany annexes Belgium, England declares war.

July 29: Germany promises not to annex France, England withdraws from the
war.

July 30: Germany annexes France, England declares war.

July 31: Germany promises not to annex England.

Aug. 1: England withdraws from the war. Germany invades England.

How long is anybody expected to go on with that sort of game; or keep peace
at that illimitable price? How long must we pursue a road in which promises
are all fetishes in front of us; and all fragments behind us? No; upon the
cold facts of the final negotiations, as told by any of the diplomatists in
any of the documents, there is no doubt about the story. And no doubt about
the villain of the story.

...

Anyone can see this well enough, merely by reading the last negotiations
between London and Berlin. The Prussians had made a new discovery in
international politics: that it may often be convenient to make a promise;
and yet curiously inconvenient to keep it. They were charmed, in their
simple way, with this scientific discovery, and desired to communicate it
to the world. They therefore promised England a promise, on condition that
she broke a promise, and on the implied condition that the new promise
might be broken as easily as the old one. To the profound astonishment of
Prussia, this reasonable offer was refused! I believe that the astonishment
of Prussia was quite sincere. That is what I mean when I say that the
Barbarian is trying to cut away that cord of honesty and clear record on
which hangs all that men have made.




Now, we see things differently from the perspective a nearly a hundred years on. After all, everyone knows the UK is such a paragon of virtue as far as keeping it's word, right? I'm sure there are some equally strong denunciations from the German side of the Allied cause, but I regrettably don't read German. Perhaps if one of the German speakers here would like to provide a link ..

... in any case, I make the argument that the invasion of Belgium carried a high political cost of bringing the UK and ultimately the US into the war. Therefore, it should have been foregone, even though it would have made actually fighting the war that much more difficult.

What would I have done?

1) Refused to buy the argument that 'mobilization means war' and ordered the armies to stop on the frontier, averting WWI entirely. Yes, it would have disrupted the civilian economy and left Germany temporarily vulnerable but ultimately the damage done to Germany by the war ... loss of the navy, loss of the air force, millions dead, the Kaiser fled, Germany in chaos for 20 years until Godwin's dictator could show up and really wreck the place ... was far, far greater than that caused by the temporary problems caused by mobilization.

2) If the war could not be averted, assume a defensive posture in both East and West. Fight the battle of Tannenberg on schedule, allow the French to break their teeth on the poor terrain in Alsace-Lorraine, then launch a counter-offensive. In essence this is a repeat of the strategy that won the earlier Franco-Prussian War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco_Prussian_War) . It will take a few years and would not give the lightning victory offered by the Schlieffen plan, but in the long run it would be a wiser choice than the four years' butchery that followed.

It also means we don't have to break our word.

Both these choices were not, of course, possible given the temperament of the people involved or the German military tradition which does not ... as I understand it .. have any more use for the defense than Patton did. It's not what would have happened or could have happened. But I'd like to think it's what SHOULD have happened.

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Om]

Please tell me, in a situation identical to that faced by German in 1914, what would you do? They can't just wait--their best chance to take a dominant position in a future war hinges on a quick defeat of France, and every year, the Russians lay more railroad, for faster deployment of their vast armies.Here's what I'd do - I'd not start a war with an alliance of three (later four) of the world's Great Powers with a combined industrial and manpower capabilities that dwarfed that of even Germany. That is, a war in which almost every advantage was stacked against me.

Of course if I were in charge I'd have made sure that I didn't become so hopelessly surrounded by enemies as Germany did. Tensions with France would always have existed but could have been eased by refusing to take the Alsation lands in 1871. There was absolutely no reason why the alliance with Russia should have been abandoned and Britain was hardly hostile to German interests until some fool decided to challenge naval supremacy in the North Sea. That's not even going into the subject of abandoning a policy of restraint in the Balkans and presenting Vienna with a blank cheque.

If war did happen to take place then I'd sit in my border fortresses safe in the knowledge that there was no possible way in which the French could achieve a breakthrough. The superiority of the defensive positioning had been known in Europe for over a century and there was no reason to doubt the integrity of the German defences. Which the majority of the army committed to holding France in check, it should be a trivial matter to crush the Russians and secure victory in the east. This would have secured the future of Austria-Hungary, shattered Russian hegemony of the Baltic, and secured the eastern frontier from future invasion. After that its a matter of simply waiting until the French get fed up feeding their men into the grinder and either sue for peace or go on the offensive with the full might of the German army.

[Storm Bringer]

Here's what I'd do - I'd not start a war with an alliance of three (later four) of the world's Great Powers with a combined industrial and manpower capabilities that dwarfed that of even Germany. That is, a war in which almost every advantage was stacked against me.


Argueably, the war was inevitable. The offical reason for the war, the actions of serbian extremists in the balkans, was pretty much an excuse.

What caused the war was the power poltics of the states, and the conclusions drawn form the franco prussain war in 1870. the former was the side effect of the pride and beliefs of the various nations (germans in thier army, britain in it's navy, france in it's own army's redemption, etc), with each beinging to believe it's own progaganda (the germans felt thier army was unbeatable, the birtish knew no one could challenge thier navy, etc).

The latter led generals to believe that an attack, carried out with sufficient vigor and valour by the troops, on the tactical and strategic level, would carry the day. Most armies of the time felt that "defensive mindedness" was a undesireable trait that sapped the mens will. they had several chances to apply the lessons of the minor wars they fought (the boer war, russo- japanese war, the fighting in the balkans, etc) but they repeatedly dismissed the lessons of these, beliving that those lessons didn't apply to 'real' war between major powers. Thus, all the major plans of the powers were based on a battlefield situation 40 years old, when cannon still fired at targets directly, and the machine gun was a weird thing no one knew how to use.

all in all, even if they hadn't fought in 1914, they'd have fought over something. They belived they could gain form a short, crushing victory over thier long standing rivals and re-set the balence of power in thier favour. avoiding this mindset would basically require a revolution in the societies of the day.

[Dervag]

Here's what I'd do - I'd not start a war with an alliance of three (later four) of the world's Great Powers with a combined industrial and manpower capabilities that dwarfed that of even Germany. That is, a war in which almost every advantage was stacked against me.In fairness, Germany was never fighting four powers at once; the Russian collapse was de facto complete before the Americans managed to land a single division in France. Their strategy was bad, but not quite that bad.


If war did happen to take place then I'd sit in my border fortresses safe in the knowledge that there was no possible way in which the French could achieve a breakthrough. The superiority of the defensive positioning had been known in Europe for over a century and there was no reason to doubt the integrity of the German defences. Which the majority of the army committed to holding France in check, it should be a trivial matter to crush the Russians and secure victory in the east.


This would have secured the future of Austria-Hungary, shattered Russian hegemony of the Baltic, and secured the eastern frontier from future invasion. After that its a matter of simply waiting until the French get fed up feeding their men into the grinder and either sue for peace or go on the offensive with the full might of the German army.Your strategy parallels my favorite, but I think you're a little too optimistic. To defeat the Russians quickly would not have been possible with anything less than a majority of the Germans' first-line armies. To stand off the French would probably have required a 'recoil-spring' counterattack of the sort the Germans proved so good at delivering on the tactical level, too; the key would have been to weather the initial impetuous French charge of Plan XVII and then seize territory in eastern France in the aftermath, much as during the Franco-Prussian War or as historically occured after the French failures in the Battle of the Frontiers in Alsace-Lorraine.

However, those are details; I think we both agree on the optimum strategy though it seems likely that neither of us would have believed the same things at the time.

[Winterking]

If war did happen to take place then I'd sit in my border fortresses safe in the knowledge that there was no possible way in which the French could achieve a breakthrough. The superiority of the defensive positioning had been known in Europe for over a century and there was no reason to doubt the integrity of the German defenses. Which the majority of the army committed to holding France in check, it should be a trivial matter to crush the Russians and secure victory in the east.

The superiority of the defensive was well known, you say? Was this the superiority of defensive positioning, that allowed the mighty and new border fortresses at Liege, Belgium to resist a German invasion for weeks? Oh wait, they didn't. If the Germans were confident that they had big enough guns to quickly smash some of Europe's best static fortifications in a matter of days, then it's fairly safe to say that they didn't believe in an invulnerable superiority of the defensive.

Additionally, even if the defensive position you have is nigh-invulnerable, it is not enough to sit there. You have to make the enemy attack you, and not at a leisurely pace, not sitting outside the wall and starving you out. You need to create a driving need for them to hurl their armies against you until they break. (Von Falkenhayn's strategy, which saw the French army break in 1917) You don't do that by holding to your own borders. You do that by seizing magnificent ground, strategically and culturally significant, on the other side of the border, so that your enemy's population insists that their armies charge valiantly and fruitlessly into your barbed wire and machine guns. As happened from late 1914 until 1918 and the Spring Offensives.


Here's what I'd do - I'd not start a war with an alliance of three (later four) of the world's Great Powers with a combined industrial and manpower capabilities that dwarfed that of even Germany. That is, a war in which almost every advantage was stacked against me.

Om, Germany's military-industrial capabilities were, surprisingly, not dwarfed by the Entente. Germany, in fact, had supplied most of the chemicals for German and French explosive shells, and both nations suffered extreme shell shortages until they could find substitutes (American-made). And with the Schlieffen-style offensive, Germany found itself firmly in possession of most of France's best and most productive industrial capability.

No attack against Russia at the start of the war could have done nearly so well, either in gaining industrial territory, in gaining defensive positioning, or in shattering the Belgian army. Moreover, the Germans had no way of knowing that the French army was, at best, severely impotent--the German Great General Staff would have been likely to assume that a French invasion of Germany would have been as successful as a German invasion of France; to sit back and wait for such an attack, while doing nothing to distract the attacking forces, would have been political suicide, and strategically stupid--once the French got to and across the Rhine, they would have had free rein to devastate the German homeland, and that would lose Germany the war very quickly.

The Schlieffen plan was the best option available to the Germans, given the political situation they found themselves in, and its effects were vital in producing almost 4 years of highly successful operations on the Western front.

[Dervag]

The superiority of the defensive was well known, you say? Was this the superiority of defensive positioning, that allowed the mighty and new border fortresses at Liege, Belgium to resist a German invasion for weeks? Oh wait, they didn't. If the Germans were confident that they had big enough guns to quickly smash some of Europe's best static fortifications in a matter of days, then it's fairly safe to say that they didn't believe in an invulnerable superiority of the defensive.They were, however, confident in their own ability to outnumber the Belgian army and to maneuver against the fortresses. Neither of those conditions could be reliably guaranteed for the French army attacking into Alsace-Lorraine.

A fortress is very different from a dug-in infantry division in terms of its ability to resist attack, and this was well known at the time.

Moreover, remember that the supposedly superior von Schlieffen plan left the 'essential' areas of the Ruhr and Alsace-Lorraine virtually naked before French attack for weeks, because it would take at least several weeks for the effects of the offensive through Belgium to penetrate into France and force them to pull troops out of any offensive on the German border. If it was so important that no inch of German soil be allowed to fall into enemy hands, and that the industrial areas of the Ruhr be safe from destruction by enemy troops, why did the Plan allot such a small fraction of Germany's military manpower to the defense of those vital areas?


Additionally, even if the defensive position you have is nigh-invulnerable, it is not enough to sit there. You have to make the enemy attack you, and not at a leisurely pace, not sitting outside the wall and starving you out. You need to create a driving need for them to hurl their armies against you until they break. (Von Falkenhayn's strategy, which saw the French army break in 1917) You don't do that by holding to your own borders. You do that by seizing magnificent ground, strategically and culturally significant, on the other side of the border, so that your enemy's population insists that their armies charge valiantly and fruitlessly into your barbed wire and machine guns. As happened from late 1914 until 1918 and the Spring Offensives.If they can't crack your defenses, and if you haven't actually done much of anything to hurt them, they are quite likely to agree to an armistice.

Remember that just as Germany was threatened by the rise of Russia, France was threatened by the rise of Germany. It was not necessary to defeat and humiliate France in order to make sure that the German Empire would dominate Europe. Simple economics and popuation statistics were already making France a smaller, weaker nation than Germany. So the Germans didn't have to conquer France; all they had to do was prove effectively impossible to conquer. And once troops returned from beating Russia, it might well be possible to break down the French army (possibly even using some variant of the Schlieffen Plan) and conquer France in turn, should France refuse to agree to the status quo ante bellum after being unable to crack the German border defenses and possibly even unable to keep them off French territory for a period of years.


Om, Germany's military-industrial capabilities were, surprisingly, not dwarfed by the Entente. Germany, in fact, had supplied most of the chemicals for German and French explosive shells, and both nations suffered extreme shell shortages until they could find substitutes (American-made). And with the Schlieffen-style offensive, Germany found itself firmly in possession of most of France's best and most productive industrial capability.Of course, it was now in exploded form, and thus not very useful for war production, unless I am sorely mistaken.


No attack against Russia at the start of the war could have done nearly so well, either in gaining industrial territory, in gaining defensive positioning, or in shattering the Belgian army. Moreover, the Germans had no way of knowing that the French army was, at best, severely impotent--the German Great General Staff would have been likely to assume that a French invasion of Germany would have been as successful as a German invasion of France;As in 1870, I take it?

Were I a German, I would likely believe that my nation had grown more powerful compared to France since 1870, as the statistics would indicate, and not less powerful. And since in 1870 a partially united Germany utterly defeated France's best efforts in a few months of campaigning, I would have a hard time believing that a more thoroughly united Germany could somehow fail to hold its own against the French when defending a well-fortified border zone with a large fraction of its army.

If you think I should not have thought so, then you must logically conclude that the General Staff was extremely rash in allotting only two armies (fewer than I would have) to the defense of Alsace-Lorraine against French attack. In which case the entire von Schlieffen plan was similarly rash, since the plan required exactly that.


The Schlieffen plan was the best option available to the Germans, given the political situation they found themselves in, and its effects were vital in producing almost 4 years of highly successful operations on the Western front.I must respectfully disagree with the first portion of your thesis, for the reasons I have stated above. I do, however, agree with the second part. The von Schlieffen plan came very close to working, and did indeed give the Germans an enormous strategic advantage. Unfortunately, the strategic advantage they gained in this way was offset by a grand strategic disadvantage (prolonged war against Russia, the rapid and united intervention of Britain, and the eventual intervention of the US due to the various measures required to wage war against Britain).

[Winterking]

As has been previously pointed out, the problems with simply holding the line against the French and seeking out the Russians include the following:

-To hold off France from a determined and all-out attack (as opposed to the abortive assault which was launched) would have required a large part of the German army to stand on the defensive.

-To defeat the Russian army seriously enough that it would leave the war would have required more German forces than could be spared, if France were to be ignored. John Keegan, in The Face of Battle, notes that the French, Russian, Italian, and British armies faced serious collapse only when the number of casualties they had suffered surpassed the mobilization strength of those forces. (Germany lasted longer, because its armies had been fed a steady diet of victory) It would take a long time to kill/wound that many Russians.

-Russia had room to maneuver, and plenty of it. Any German attack against Russia would run out of steam before it reached any significant location. (And to be fair, the attack against France ran out of steam before it reached Paris. Russia would have been worse, not better.)

-Britain, thanks to the naval rivalry, would not have sat still. They may not have landed troops on the Continent, but they would certainly have instituted a blockade, if only as a means of forcing Germany to "negotiate". And it was the blockade, rather than the British volunteers/cannon fodder which proved more instrumental against Germany.

-France wasn't going to agree to an armistice unless violently forced to one. War fever was running very high (true for all the countries involved, and a substantial if secondary reason that mobilization could not be halted once begun), and in France, vengeance was on everyone's mind. Just as 1940 Germany would not have easily signed an armistice if the blitzkrieg through France had failed, France in 1914 wanted to crush Germany, take back Alsace & Lorraine, and cripple her rival.


Also: Germany possessing France's best industrial areas was not principally important for what it gave to Germany. As you point out, most of the facilities would have been in exploded, damaged, or hard-to-salvage condition. The important thing about the industry is that those areas were taken away from France.

[pendell]

Quick comment.

WinterKing states that it is necessary to give the other side a reason to attack fortifications, such as ceasing strategic or culturally significant ground.

I point out that the Germans already had such territory at the beginning of the war -- Alsace/Lorraine. The fact that the French would make a grab for that territory was entirely predictable. I believe (but I could be mistaken) it was also reasonably good defensive terrain naturally.

Respectfully,

Brian P.

[Dervag]

-To defeat the Russian army seriously enough that it would leave the war would have required more German forces than could be spared, if France were to be ignored. John Keegan, in The Face of Battle, notes that the French, Russian, Italian, and British armies faced serious collapse only when the number of casualties they had suffered surpassed the mobilization strength of those forces. (Germany lasted longer, because its armies had been fed a steady diet of victory) It would take a long time to kill/wound that many Russians.

-Russia had room to maneuver, and plenty of it. Any German attack against Russia would run out of steam before it reached any significant location. (And to be fair, the attack against France ran out of steam before it reached Paris. Russia would have been worse, not better.)The Germans didn't have to march into St. Petersburg to defeat Russia. In real life they did no such thing and still beat the Russians.


-Britain, thanks to the naval rivalry, would not have sat still. They may not have landed troops on the Continent, but they would certainly have instituted a blockade, if only as a means of forcing Germany to "negotiate". And it was the blockade, rather than the British volunteers/cannon fodder which proved more instrumental against Germany.Without the strain of having to field troops against the British, the Germans wouldn't have been so short-handed on the Western Front. Consider the size of the army they ended up needing to field there historically, compared to the size of the army they needed to field in Russia. Common sense suggests that they would have needed fewer, not more, troops to hold the Western Front if they had only the French and not the British and Belgians to fight.

Now consider that they won in Russia anyway. Therefore, it seems likely that they could have won at least slightly faster if they'd had more men available.

Of course, this presumes a long war, and I'm using hindsight to justify my case, but I'm trying to justify it to you, not to Kaiser Bill (and your argument about the blockade is itself an argument from hindsight). The Germans were gambling very much when they tried a lightning campaign through Belgium at the risk of yanking (as opposed to drawing) Britain into the conflict.


-France wasn't going to agree to an armistice unless violently forced to one. War fever was running very high (true for all the countries involved, and a substantial if secondary reason that mobilization could not be halted once begun), and in France, vengeance was on everyone's mind. Just as 1940 Germany would not have easily signed an armistice if the blitzkrieg through France had failed, France in 1914 wanted to crush Germany, take back Alsace & Lorraine, and cripple her rival.Yes, but 1914 France wasn't up to the task.

Let's review the sequence of events. The main force of the French army made an initial, failed attempt to push into Alsace-Lorraine, using the prime of their initial mobilized strength. The battle lines ended up on French soil anyway, because those armies had to fall back before a German counterattack. Granted, if there had been no attack on the northern frontier the French could have reinforced those armies, but the reinforcements would have been confronted with a correspondingly larger German force. I suspect the front would have stabilized about where it did historically- in France, forcing the French to counterattack.


Quick comment.

WinterKing states that it is necessary to give the other side a reason to attack fortifications, such as ceasing strategic or culturally significant ground.

I point out that the Germans already had such territory at the beginning of the war -- Alsace/Lorraine. The fact that the French would make a grab for that territory was entirely predictable. I believe (but I could be mistaken) it was also reasonably good defensive terrain naturally.

Respectfully,

Brian P.It certainly was from the other direction; the Germans never stood a decent chance of penetrating the Maginot Line once the French got their chance to fortify that same ground against them. And Patton, coming from the same direction the French would have, banged his head against the fortifications in that area for some time before getting through, even with tanks and air supremacy. And on top of that we have the precedent of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, in which the French tried to advance into Prussian territory on the other side of Alsace-Lorraine, with it already in their hands. They were beaten in defensive battles, and the resulting counterattack destroyed their army.

[Winterking]

The Germans didn't have to march into St. Petersburg to defeat Russia. In real life they did no such thing and still beat the Russians.

Without the strain of having to field troops against the British, the Germans wouldn't have been so short-handed on the Western Front. Consider the size of the army they ended up needing to field there historically, compared to the size of the army they needed to field in Russia. Common sense suggests that they would have needed fewer, not more, troops to hold the Western Front if they had only the French and not the British and Belgians to fight.

Now consider that they won in Russia anyway. Therefore, it seems likely that they could have won at least slightly faster if they'd had more men available.

Of course, this presumes a long war, and I'm using hindsight to justify my case, but I'm trying to justify it to you, not to Kaiser Bill (and your argument about the blockade is itself an argument from hindsight). The Germans were gambling very much when they tried a lightning campaign through Belgium at the risk of yanking (as opposed to drawing) Britain into the conflict.


Well, I doubt either of us is going to persuade the other. Not surprising, really, since there's no way to know exactly what the German Great General Staff was thinking when they finalized their plans.

I do want to clarify something though; in the above-quoted section, I was not saying that the Germans would have to march into Moscow/St Petersburg to win at all, only if they wanted to win quickly. To win quickly you have to convince an enemy, who almost certainly is still able to fight, that there's no point in fighting. The best way to do that is to capture that foe's most important location--if they can't even protect that, the thinking goes, there's no way they can win and they might as well surrender. Paris was that kind of target, and so would have been the Russian capital/major city.
Otherwise, you have to physically maul the enemy army, beating them into the ground. That's what ended up happening in Russia, and what was starting to happen in 1917 to the French army before Petain started fixing some of the nonsense, and what happened to the Italian army at Caporetto. Trouble is, that kind of victory takes time, quite a bit of it.
If the Germans had pursued the Hindenburg-Ludendorff strategy from the beginning, it probably would not have 3 1/2 years, as historically happened to Russia, but I expect it would have been one at least. That's a long time to leave your flank vulnerable. And that's counting on your opponents to stay stupid. Now, as hindsight tells us, the French and British DID stay stupid until 1917 (France) or 1918 (Britain), but the Germans could not have known that. (And in fact, lost more heavily at the Somme & Passchendale because they didn't expect the British to keep flinging men at them)

[Dervag]

This is where I find myself unable to divorce my reasoning from hindsight entirely. I think it was a terrible mistake for the Germans, or anyone else in Europe, to plan for a short war. I know that all previous experience indicated that military campaigns would last a season, no more.

But I can't shake the feeling that the great powers should have been able to look at the ratio of force to space and realize that they now had enough men under arms to put several companies of infantry, a machine gun or two, and a few batteries of artillery on every mile of their frontiers. Colonial war experiences would indicate that an army of that size and strength cannot readily be dislodged from a defended position except by superior force (which was not available, since all the armies were of roughly comparable size), or by maneuver (which was not possible if these strongpoints or trench lines stretched for miles).

While the von Schlieffen Plan was a fairly good plan for engineering a short war, there were so many potential failure points. The French might assign more than one or two armies to cover Paris. The Belgian forts holding out for more than four weeks if the Germans had overestimated the quality of their siege guns- a mistake made many times. The logistics to the invasion force ran over a few available roads, and might well break down if the right wing had to fight many battles, even small ones, in quick succession. The British might commit sufficient force to the Continent to be a significant factor in army-scale battles (six divisions is not a negligible force in a battle between twenty or thirty divisions on each side). The Russians might mobilize faster than Germany predicted- as you allude to, Russian mobilization timetables got faster every year, and could well change significantly in the few years between when this plan was assembled and when it would eventually be put into action.

The Plan was a gamble, based on the assumption that it was possible for an offensive to strike far with the military technology of this era and all the advantages it gave to the defender. I, for one, would be highly reluctant to stake the fate of my nation entirely on a gamble that could fail so disastrously.

And if you say the Germans "had no choice" but to fight and therefore to gamble because the gamble was their only hope of victory, my reply is that Germany was under no obligation to adhere to an aggressive foreign policy. If they did not feel secure against the most probable combination of enemies they faced, then they should not have gone so far to antagonize those same enemies.

[ChocolateChtulu]

Ok, a general question for those knowledgeable in martial arts.

I have been considering learning a martial art, mostly as a way for keeping in shape and having fun.

The problem is, I am not really sure which one of the martial arts is more suited for me: do you have some advice about that?

As I said, I just want to have fun - I simply don't care about the self-defense potential, and I don't even really want to become much good at it (which would be kind of improbable anyway, since I am not very athletic to begin with).

Ah, and anything that involves significant risks of physical harm is right out - I am not a fan of broken bones, and while I understand that a little risk is unavoidable in any activity I will be damned if I don't try to minimize it.

So, do you have suggestions? I was thinking of Kendo, mostly on the basis that it looks cool :smallsmile:, but I know very little about martial arts in general.

[Fhaolan]

So, do you have suggestions? I was thinking of Kendo, mostly on the basis that it looks cool :smallsmile:, but I know very little about martial arts in general.

I haven't had any 'real' martial art training, so I can't comment much. However, if you're looking at Kendo as a possiblity, and you're looking at minimizing risk, I think you should also take a look at Stage Combat training.

Depending on the area you live in, there are groups that will teach many of the same movements and exercises as 'real' martial arts/oriental and occidental sword fighting, etc, usually with a special emphasis on safety, as well as performance, costuming, etc. It's one of those things that expands in many different directions depending on your actual interests.

You have to be careful when choosing a troupe to work with, however, as each troupe tends to focus more on some aspects than others, and those aspects may not be what interests you.

[Chadwick]

Ok, a general question for those knowledgeable in martial arts.

I have been considering learning a martial art, mostly as a way for keeping in shape and having fun.

The problem is, I am not really sure which one of the martial arts is more suited for me: do you have some advice about that?


Most Dojos will let you take a few classes for free to see if its what ya want. Just sample a few dojos and see which one you like.

[Raum]

I have been considering learning a martial art, mostly as a way for keeping in shape and having fun.

The problem is, I am not really sure which one of the martial arts is more suited for me: do you have some advice about that?Sit down and think about your priorities and limitations. Is fitness your only goal or do you want to learn something that "looks cool"? Do you want unarmed or armed training? High impact or low impact? Physical issues such as knees or back may prevent high impact sports & martial arts. How far are you willing to go for training? What are you willing to pay? Those last few questions may limit your options.


As I said, I just want to have fun - I simply don't care about the self-defense potential, and I don't even really want to become much good at it (which would be kind of improbable anyway, since I am not very athletic to begin with).What do you consider fun? Weapon sports such as fencing and kendo, grappling martial arts such as judo or jujitsu, striking arts such as karate, kempo, or tai kwan do, or non-contact arts such as tai chi? There are many more variations of course, those are just a few generalizations. Are you interested in any of the mental aspects?


Ah, and anything that involves significant risks of physical harm is right out - I am not a fan of broken bones, and while I understand that a little risk is unavoidable in any activity I will be damned if I don't try to minimize it.As you say, there will be some risk. The riskier martial arts tend to be those utilizing some form of sparring. Mostly because your partner can make mistakes... Beyond that I'd just pick high / low impact based on interest and any physical limitations.


So, do you have suggestions? I was thinking of Kendo, mostly on the basis that it looks cool :smallsmile:, but I know very little about martial arts in general.Interest is a big part of staying in any activity including martial arts. So if you're interested enough in kendo, can afford the equipment, and have training available...that's what I'll recommend. :)

[Swordguy]

Ok, a general question for those knowledgeable in martial arts.

I have been considering learning a martial art, mostly as a way for keeping in shape and having fun.

The problem is, I am not really sure which one of the martial arts is more suited for me: do you have some advice about that?

As I said, I just want to have fun - I simply don't care about the self-defense potential, and I don't even really want to become much good at it (which would be kind of improbable anyway, since I am not very athletic to begin with).

Ah, and anything that involves significant risks of physical harm is right out - I am not a fan of broken bones, and while I understand that a little risk is unavoidable in any activity I will be damned if I don't try to minimize it.

So, do you have suggestions? I was thinking of Kendo, mostly on the basis that it looks cool :smallsmile:, but I know very little about martial arts in general.


I second the response of "try a bunch out and see for yourself", but I'd like to recommend Tai'Chi Chuan. Its primary focus in most dojo's is self-improvement, discipline, and fitness. It's also much cheaper and easier to find a sensei than kendo.

It's not my cup of tea (if I'm not doing stage combat, I'm there to fight), but it sounds like it'd be good for you.

Or, if you want to play with weapons, you could look up Wushu. Focus on Taijiquan (similar in spirit to Tai'Chi) and you can exand your focus to weapon forms at your leisure, since wushu offers 12 different weapons ranging from Dao (Great Sword) to the Sanjiegun (3-section staff).

[Exarch]

Regretably, I don't have any first hand experience with kendo. However, my girlfriend takes naginata and they practice with kendo a lot at Illinois University. She's of the opinion that kendo is lame, since you repeatedly hit each other in the head while screaming, whereas naginata actually trains strikes.

That's as far as weapon-type martial arts go. I can tell you I enjoy muay thai, and am of the opinion that it's quite useful in a real life setting. Kick boxing would be a good one, same wiuth savat. I have a friend or two who takes ninjitsu, he says it involes a lot of joint locks and single strikes to short combos.

[Fhaolan]

Regretably, I don't have any first hand experience with kendo. However, my girlfriend takes naginata and they practice with kendo a lot at Illinois University. She's of the opinion that kendo is lame, since you repeatedly hit each other in the head while screaming, whereas naginata actually trains strikes.

That's as far as weapon-type martial arts go. I can tell you I enjoy muay thai, and am of the opinion that it's quite useful in a real life setting. Kick boxing would be a good one, same wiuth savat. I have a friend or two who takes ninjitsu, he says it involes a lot of joint locks and single strikes to short combos.

I took both Kendo and Fencing while in University, and have to say they are very similar in some ways. They are both highly ritualized and 'sportified' outgrowths of combat forms, and it takes some time before you're allowed to do the 'real' stuff.

Which makes sense as they *are* sports, and have as much to do with swordfighting as the luge does with cafeteria-tray-sledding. :smallbiggrin:

Muay thai, kick boxing, savat, ninjitsu might be a bit 'heavy' for what ChocolateChtulu is going for, going by his request post. I know a good number of kick boxers, and muay thai practitioners, and they all take it *very* seriously and are required to compete in order to continue to train at their dojos. It sounds like ChocolateChtulu wants something for exercise that he can mess around a bit with. Nothing serious, no competitions, no drama, just some exercise and a bit of fun.

[kamikasei]

Ok, a general question for those knowledgeable in martial arts.

I have been considering learning a martial art, mostly as a way for keeping in shape and having fun.

The problem is, I am not really sure which one of the martial arts is more suited for me: do you have some advice about that?

As I said, I just want to have fun - I simply don't care about the self-defense potential, and I don't even really want to become much good at it (which would be kind of improbable anyway, since I am not very athletic to begin with).

Ah, and anything that involves significant risks of physical harm is right out - I am not a fan of broken bones, and while I understand that a little risk is unavoidable in any activity I will be damned if I don't try to minimize it.

So, do you have suggestions? I was thinking of Kendo, mostly on the basis that it looks cool :smallsmile:, but I know very little about martial arts in general.

Since no one else has done so yet, I'll recommend Aikido. It's fairly easygoing and you don't have to be particularly fit, flexible or strong to get in to it, but it will improve all of those for you. It's primarily a pinning/throwing style like judo, but not at all competitive; you don't spar with an opponent, you practice a technique with a partner. It's supposed to have a lower rate of injury than most other martial arts for that reason. It'll help improve your balance, flexibility, and general coordination with a training regime that's more "pleasantly exhausting" than punishing. It's hard to feel tense or stressed once you've chucked your mates across the room a few times and been thrown yourself. Plus, training with a high-graded aikidoka is a little like having an extremely hands-on physiotherapist individually crack every joint in your body while smiling all the time.

Also, it actually grew out of jujitsu, so there's sword and staff training at higher levels.

[ChocolateChtulu]

Since no one else has done so yet, I'll recommend Aikido. It's fairly easygoing and you don't have to be particularly fit, flexible or strong to get in to it, but it will improve all of those for you. It's primarily a pinning/throwing style like judo, but not at all competitive; you don't spar with an opponent, you practice a technique with a partner. It's supposed to have a lower rate of injury than most other martial arts for that reason. It'll help improve your balance, flexibility, and general coordination with a training regime that's more "pleasantly exhausting" than punishing. It's hard to feel tense or stressed once you've chucked your mates across the room a few times and been thrown yourself. Plus, training with a high-graded aikidoka is a little like having an extremely hands-on physiotherapist individually crack every joint in your body while smiling all the time.

Sounds promising, I'll look into it.

Thanks very much for all the replies!
I will give some thought into them and then I will try to make some decision.

[BardicDuelist]

I reccomend fencing, as it is very physically rewarding and provides a great exercise (I used to run cross country, but I stopped when I realized fencing was a better workout). Most salles are not competition oriented, and many focus on simply teaching, which is wonderful. You do not have to be of any physical type to do well. Infact, many lower ranked fencers (but ranked none the less) are not increcibly athletic, because it is a very mental sport.

Think of it like a game of high speed chess with a similar object as in tag. Only you get swords.

It is also one of the safest sports around. You wear protective equipment, so the most you'll get is a bruise or a welt that will go away in a few days. Modern weapons are even specially tempered so as to avoid sharp points if the weapon breaks.

[Rasilak]

@Aikido: I do JuJutsu (a mix of Judo, Aikido, Karate and Jiu-Jitsu, designed for self-defence and police use), and everytime we practice techniques borrowed from Aikido (usually locks and lock-based throws) some joints (usually wrists and elbows) hurt *badly*. So maybe Aikido is not exactly what you want.
You could also look into Judo, as it uses much less locks, and more "round" throws. However, some groups are very tournament-oriented (that's one of the reasons I don't do it anymore).
The other ones I know (Kickboxing and Escrima) tend to provoke injuries, so so that might be a bad idea for you.
You might also want to look into WingChun. I know some people who do it, and according to them it's quite fun, and you usually don't end up with serious injuries and don't need to be exceptionally strong to do it efficiently. (And as a plus, it's one of the more effective martial arts for self-defence, which might not be your primary concern, but can't hurt, either). On the downside, the classes tend to be quite expensive.

[Swordguy]

@Aikido: I do JuJutsu (a mix of Judo, Aikido, Karate and Jiu-Jitsu, designed for self-defence and police use), and everytime we practice techniques borrowed from Aikido (usually locks and lock-based throws) some joints (usually wrists and elbows) hurt *badly*. So maybe Aikido is not exactly what you want.
You could also look into Judo, as it uses much less locks, and more "round" throws. However, some groups are very tournament-oriented (that's one of the reasons I don't do it anymore).
The other ones I know (Kickboxing and Escrima) tend to provoke injuries, so so that might be a bad idea for you.
You might also want to look into WingChun. I know some people who do it, and according to them it's quite fun, and you usually don't end up with serious injuries and don't need to be exceptionally strong to do it efficiently. (And as a plus, it's one of the more effective martial arts for self-defence, which might not be your primary concern, but can't hurt, either). On the downside, the classes tend to be quite expensive.

The thing with Aikido is that you don't follow thorough on the lock - judo does the same thing. It's all about learning self-discipline and not hurting your uki (partner). Practically all eastern martial arts have stuff like that.

To the OP: do you want a system in which there is no sparring at all? That'll narrow your choices significantly.

[ChocolateChtulu]

To the OP: do you want a system in which there is no sparring at all? That'll narrow your choices significantly.


Sparring would be OK - even possibly fun, I suppose! -, provided that

It is not excessively violent: I am not into getting kicked in the face, and as my purpose is not self-defense I do not care about "being prepared for a real fight" anyway.
A few possible bruises do not worry me too much, but I'd rather avoid anything more than that.
It is simply meant as a learning exercise, and the focus of the discipline is not on training in order to win tournaments.
I deal with far too much drama and pointless competition in my profession as it is, and what I am looking for is just a way to relax, amuse myself and stay healthy.

[Dervag]

Fencing may be for you if you can find a place that isn't tournament-oriented (and you almost certainly can). Assuming your knees are up to it, it's a decent workout and it's virtually impossible to suffer serious injury.

[Crow]

Sparring would be OK - even possibly fun, I suppose! -, provided that

It is not excessively violent: I am not into getting kicked in the face, and as my purpose is not self-defense I do not care about "being prepared for a real fight" anyway.
A few possible bruises do not worry me too much, but I'd rather avoid anything more than that.
It is simply meant as a learning exercise, and the focus of the discipline is not on training in order to win tournaments.
I deal with far too much drama and pointless competition in my profession as it is, and what I am looking for is just a way to relax, amuse myself and stay healthy.


Tai Chi (or however it's spelled)?

[Swordguy]

Sparring would be OK - even possibly fun, I suppose! -, provided that

It is not excessively violent: I am not into getting kicked in the face, and as my purpose is not self-defense I do not care about "being prepared for a real fight" anyway.
A few possible bruises do not worry me too much, but I'd rather avoid anything more than that.
It is simply meant as a learning exercise, and the focus of the discipline is not on training in order to win tournaments.
I deal with far too much drama and pointless competition in my profession as it is, and what I am looking for is just a way to relax, amuse myself and stay healthy.


Again, I recommend Tai'Chi Chuan. Assuming you aren't locked into wanting to play with weapons, it fits the above criteria exactly.

[Crow]

If you are just looking to stay in shape, you can try Crossfit (http://www.crossfit.com). While it's not a martial art, some of the exercises are very technical, and the workouts don't take long to complete. An excellent "learning exercise".

[Mr. Mud]

Sparring would be OK - even possibly fun, I suppose! -, provided that

It is not excessively violent: I am not into getting kicked in the face, and as my purpose is not self-defense I do not care about "being prepared for a real fight" anyway.
A few possible bruises do not worry me too much, but I'd rather avoid anything more than that.
It is simply meant as a learning exercise, and the focus of the discipline is not on training in order to win tournaments.
I deal with far too much drama and pointless competition in my profession as it is, and what I am looking for is just a way to relax, amuse myself and stay healthy.


Well, from the recreation aspect, I'd try JuJitsu.

Also, I took classes in Wing Chun (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wing_Chun), Which doens't require being "totally ripped" to be good at. Though if you really read into the Wiki on it, and from my expirence, it breaks rule #1, if not a few ribs. :smallfrown:

[Dhavaer]

Would a nine millimetre pistol benefit from depleted uranium ammunition?

[Mike_G]

Would a nine millimetre pistol benefit from depleted uranium ammunition?

The round would have much more mass, and would need more propellant for the same velocity, and would produce more recoil, requiring the frame of the gun be stronger and probably heavier. Unless you plan a smaller, sabot-discarding pistol round. That said, I imagine it would penetrate better, thus be better against armored targets, but no better against soft targets, since it would deform less, make a narrower wound channel, and overpenetrate. Once it goes out the guy's back, any further momentum is irrelevant to him, if not any bystanders.

[Swordguy]

Would a nine millimetre pistol benefit from depleted uranium ammunition?

Why on earth would you want DU ammo for a pistol?

Okay, since I don't know how much you know about firearms, I'll be simple. The extra density granted by the DU gives the round extra penetrating power, allowing it to punch through armor more easily. The bigger the round, the more extra mass it gains - which is why most DU rounds are tank rounds.

The extra mass gained from making a cartridge that size out of DU is negligible. Theoretically, it would be slightly more effective at penetrating armor vests or hard cover. Instead of needing a Type II or II-A vest to stop it you'd want a Type III or so, maybe even a IV (ceramic) if you're firing it especially hot (1500 fps or more). Practically, it'd bring it up to about the level of a 10mm. In which case, you'd just want to carry the larger caliber and not have to worry about the health hazards and expense.

So, yes. It would benefit. It would be a tiny and non-cost-effective benefit,and there'd be other issues introduced, but there would be some benefit.

Now, if you went the tank round route and used a subcaliber DU rod as a penetrator, than you could probably punch through any given vest on a regular basis - but I'm not sure how much good it would do, since you'd basically be looking at a needle's diameter. You'd wound people pretty good, and maybe give them low-grade cancer in 10 years if it wasn't removed, but I can't imagine it having a high lethality in a battlefield environment.

[Crow]

If you made the entire round out of DU, you could signifigantly decrease the velocity of the round. This has the potential of reducing the amount of energy the round dumps into the target on impact. Whether it would be made up for by the extra mass, I am not smart enough to know. Either way, you'll probably be loading a heavier powder charge to compensate for the bullet's weight.

As a side not, heavier bullets have signifigantly better performance when used in sub-sonic charges, which is why these rounds use heavier grain bullets.

As a penetrator, DU would be very effective, but not so much so that it would justify the extra cost. You'd be better off sticking with traditional penetrator materials as long as we're talking about using the round for it's intended purpose.

[Storm Bringer]

quick question for those with some knowledge in the area:

how effective were slings at penatrating armour?

I have heard/read in roman era works that they often did more damage to armoured warriors than the bows of the time could, and am intrested in working out how.

[Dervag]

Now, if you went the tank round route and used a subcaliber DU rod as a penetrator, than you could probably punch through any given vest on a regular basis - but I'm not sure how much good it would do, since you'd basically be looking at a needle's diameter. You'd wound people pretty good, and maybe give them low-grade cancer in 10 years if it wasn't removed, but I can't imagine it having a high lethality in a battlefield environment.I don't think you could even count on the cancer. There's been a lot of debate about whether or not DU is actually a significant health risk. It's about as unradioactive as anything this side of a pile of concrete; indeed it is less radioactive than naturally occuring uranium because some of the 'high' activity isotope has been pulled out. Chemically it's a heavy metal and can deliver heavy metal poisoning, of course. But so can lead, and many people have led long lives with lead bullets stuck in their bodies.

[Crow]

quick question for those with some knowledge in the area:

how effective were slings at penatrating armour?

I have heard/read in roman era works that they often did more damage to armoured warriors than the bows of the time could, and am intrested in working out how.

Slings were very effective and very acccurate. They didn't inflict their damage via penetration, but rather blunt force trauma. Your average sling projectile was heavy, and about the size of a pecan or golf ball. Upon impact it could transmit a lot of energy even through relatively heavy armor used in that time period. This was enough energy to easily break bone. A warrior struck in the chest, even through armor sustained grievious blunt trauma, often enough to kill them outright. They also had signifigant range for a low-trajectory weapon. Often greater than most bows used at the time.

When David and Goliath faced off, Goliath didn't really stand a chance.

[Swordguy]

quick question for those with some knowledge in the area:

how effective were slings at penatrating armour?

I have heard/read in roman era works that they often did more damage to armoured warriors than the bows of the time could, and am intrested in working out how.

Penetrating armor?

Not.

They have a generally lower velocity and a worse penetrating shape than an arrow.

Blunt force trauma? Sure. Giving somebody a concussion through the helm? Sure. Actually punching holes through bronze or steel? Not so much.

I think we did this one about 20 pages back.

[Crow]

Here's some sling info to chew on. Also, I'm pretty sure the sling had a greater velocity than most bows used at the time.

THE SLING


The sling was one of the first projectile weapons, developed as early as 10,000 B.C. (Korfmann, 1973; Ferrill, 1985; Grunfeld, 1996). Slingers played an important part in the Persian, Greek, Roman, and various Mesopotamian armies, and were considered to be equal to or better than bowmen (Hawkins, 1847; Korfmann, 1973). Although used most extensively in Europe and the Near East, evidence of its usage can be found throughout the world, with the notable exception of Australia (Korfmann, 1973). There are several Pacific Island, Andean, and Mediterranean cultures which maintain strong slinging traditions to this day through contests and historical recreations.

The weapon was inexpensive and easy to make. Sinew, plant fibers, animal hide, hair, and many other materials could be used for the cords and pouch. Unlike a bow, which required specialist skill to produce, a sling could be made by anyone. The sling of the late Paleolithic is basically identical to the modern sling because the design is so simple. The major focus of innovation was the sling’s payload. Stones from riverbeds were popular as their polished, smooth exterior caused less air resistance than angular rocks, which improved accuracy and range. However, no matter how selectively these were collected, the shape of natural stones varied. This meant the slinger had to compensate for changing projectile weights, reducing overall accuracy. Near Eastern armies began supplying their slingers with uniform projectiles, made from baked-clay or carved stone, by the end of the 7th millennium B.C.. At first, these were spherical, but by 3000 B.C., biconical or ovoid projectiles were discovered to be superior. The latter two types would orient point first and spin through the air like a bullet or American football. (Hawkins, 1847; Korfmann, 1973; Ferrill, 1985; Carman, 1999) This improvement increased range dramatically, much as barrel rifling did for firearms. The point first orientation also increased penetration ability. By Hellenistic times, projectiles were being cast in lead, increasing the density more than eight times (Walker, 2004). Since the projectile was roughly the same size, air resistance remained the same. However the increased mass meant it suffered less from the effects of drag. These lead projectiles were also far cheaper than arrows or bolts, making slings cost effective (Wise, 1976). A good slinger could fire more than twelve rounds a minute.

Arrows (and crossbow bolts) have great penetration potential because the entire mass of the projectile is concentrated in a thin cylinder directly behind a sharp point, which has a small impact area of about 0.08cm. In contrast, early sling projectiles were roughly spherical, with no defined tip. The impact area was much larger, about 1.9cm, severely reducing the projectile’s ability to penetrate flesh or armor. (Gabriel, 1991) These projectiles typically weighed about the same as arrows, so the sling had no advantage in payload mass (Korfmann, 1973; Gabriel, 1991; Richardson, 1998a; Skobelev, 2000). However, it should be noted that projectiles as large as a fist, perhaps half a kilogram or more in mass were sometimes used in slings (Hawkins, 1847; Korfmann, 1973; Wise, 1976; Ferrill, 1985; Xenophon, Anabasis, 3.3.16).

Even with simple ammunition, the sling was surprisingly effective. Slingers could achieve faster “muzzle” velocities than archers, and their projectiles suffered less air resistance during flight than arrows, conserving more kinetic energy until impact. An experienced slinger could throw projectiles at speeds over 90m/s, while the longbow could fire arrows upwards of 60m/s (Gabriel, 1991; Richardson, 1998a). When projectile masses were equal, the 50% speed advantage of the sling equates to a 125% increase in kinetic energy (because the velocity value is squared). Despite this, the penetration of an arrow was still greater because the tip is roughly 24 times smaller than the side of a typical, spherical sling projectile. The impact force of a sling projectile was applied to a larger area during contact, making it unlikely to penetrate flesh, though the collision could cause internal bleeding and even crush bones (Ferrill, 1985; Grunfeld, 1996). Historical demonstrations of this power have crept into literature, providing unique, first-hand accounts of professional slingers in action. For example, during the Spanish conquest of the Aztec empire in the 15th century, an observer recorded that an Andean slinger could shatter Spanish swords or kill a horse in a single hit (Kormann, 1973; Wise, 1980). Vegetius, a Roman writer in the late 4th century, observed in his famous Epitoma Rei Militaris:

Soldiers, despite their defensive armor, are often more aggravated by the round stones from the sling than by all the arrows of the enemy. Stones kill without mangling the body, and the contusion is mortal without loss of blood.

A quote from Diodorus Siculus, a Greek historian from the 1st century A.D. is also revealing:

But when Hamilcar saw that his men were being overpowered and that the Greeks in constantly increasing number were making their way into the camp, he brought up his slingers, who came from the Balearic Islands and numbered at least a thousand. By hurling a shower of great stones, they wounded many and even killed not a few of those who were attacking, and they shattered the defensive armour of most of them. For these men, who are accustomed to sling stones weighing a mina [~0.6kg], contribute a great deal toward victory in battle [...] In this way they drove the Greeks from the camp and defeated them. (Book XIX. 109)

The more modern, biconical lead projectiles would impact point first, like an arrow, reducing their impact area to around 0.3cm. Although still larger than the tip of an arrow, this was a significant improvement over the previous spherical design. Penetration ability was increased tremendously, allowing sling projectiles to penetrate flesh more readily. (Grunfeld, 1996)

Contemporary figures confirm this, including Celsus, a Roman medical writer from the 1st century B.C.. He describes in his De Medicina that:

...there is a third type of [projectile] that sometimes needs to be removed, a leaden bullet or rock or something similar, which breaking through the skin lodges inside in one piece. In all of these cases, the wound needs to be opened a bit wider, and what is inside must be extracted with pincers along the same pathway by which it entered.

Reports of estimated range of the sling varies in recent literature. This may stem from the inability of historians to find individuals who can properly demonstrate the sling. The bow, crossbow and firearm, if operated correctly, will produce the same effect the weapon had hundreds of years ago. However, the sling requires tremendous skill, and only people who have had extensive training can claim to match the ability of ancient slingers. Existing literature quotes ranges as little as 150m to as much as 500m (Demmin, 1964; Hogg, 1968; Korfmann, 1973; Wise, 1976; Connolly, 1981; Ferrill, 1985; Richardson, 1998b). Larry Bray set the Guinness World Record for a stone cast with a sling in 1981, achieving an impressive range of 437m (Norris, 1985). In retrospect, Mr. Bray believes he could have surpassed 600m mark with a better sling and lead projectiles (Bray, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2004). Presumably, professional slingers of antiquity who trained from childhood and relied on the weapon in battle could achieve even greater distances, perhaps approaching 700m.

The accuracy of slingers was also remarkable. In Livy’s History of Rome, which was completed in 9 A.D., he states,

A hundred slingers were recruited from Aegium and Patrae and Dymae. These peoples were trained from boyhood [...] Having been trained to shoot through rings of moderate circumference from long distances, they would wound not merely the heads of their enemies but any part of the face at which they might have aimed.

Strabo, a Roman historian born in 64 B.C. commented on the famed Balearic slingers:

...their training in the use of slings used to be such, from childhood up, that [parents] would not so much as give bread to their children unless they first hit it with the sling.

Vegetius, Florus, and other classical writers confirm this Balearic tradition and their remarkable proficiency. The Bible also mentions another legendary group, the Benjamites, noting, “every one could sling stones at an hair breadth, and not miss.” (Judges 20.16)

The handgun is considered the greatest ranged weapon to have emerged during medieval times. However, the weapon did not eclipse the sling immediately. Handgun accuracy remained poor until the introduction of barrel rifling in the 1800s. This allowed the sling to continue to be used by some cultures effectively against firearm-equipped troops almost until modern times. One writer noted that the power of the sling in the hands of an Aztec warrior was “only slightly less than that [of a Spanish firearm]” (Korfmann, 1973). A scholar writing about the Tanala tribe of Madagascar explained “at 50 yards slings are as dangerous as firearms in native hands.” Also, an observer on a French archeological expedition in the 1900s recorded the details of a conflict with natives in Iran, noting that they had “poor-quality muskets, pistols, lances, and far more dangerous slings.” (Lindblom, 1940)

The sling was not limited to firing stones and man-made clay or lead projectiles. Indeed, anything that could be thrown by hand could be cast with a sling to much greater ranges. The sling would have been popular for early grenades.2 For example, bottles of quicklime were used in an early form of chemical warfare, as they created a cloud of choking and blinding dust upon impact. Pots with combustible liquids, like the infamous Greek Fire, were likely exchanged in naval and siege warfare with slings.3 (Wise, 1976) Another variety of sling, called a kestrosphendone, could fire arrows (Hawkins, 1847; Richardson, 1998b).

2] The staff-sling, which was little more than a sling on a pole, became an increasingly popular grenade launcher in medieval times. However, before the staff-sling, the traditional sling would have fulfilled this role equally well. The staff-sling’s simpler operation meant it was the favored weapon by medieval armies. It continued to be used well into the 17th century (Korfmann, 1973).

3] It seems the sling continued to be used in a naval role far longer than in land combat. Some suggest that the salty spray at sea made bows troublesome, as their strings would fail. The sling did not suffer from this problem (Hawkins, 1847; DeVries, 1956; Wise, 1976; Ferrill, 1985). There is also some debate about whether the sling’s gyroscopic properties gave it an edge in accuracy on the pitching deck of a ship.

[Subotei]

I don't think you could even count on the cancer. There's been a lot of debate about whether or not DU is actually a significant health risk. It's about as unradioactive as anything this side of a pile of concrete; indeed it is less radioactive than naturally occuring uranium because some of the 'high' activity isotope has been pulled out. Chemically it's a heavy metal and can deliver heavy metal poisoning, of course. But so can lead, and many people have led long lives with lead bullets stuck in their bodies.

"..for soluble uranium compounds, health consequences of exposure are primarily due to their chemical toxicity. For insoluble compounds of uranium, health consequences (e.g., fibrosis and/or carcinogenesis of the lung) are primarily due to irradiation of pulmonary tissues from inhaled respirable particles."

From http://sti.srs.gov/fulltext/tr2001331/tr2001331.html

DU rounds are less radioactive than 'uranium' above as they contain less U 235 - roughly a third of naturally occurring levels, but they are radioactive. Uranium burns well in air - fine particles are spontaneously combustible - so DU tank rounds I expect are largely converted into the insoluble oxide form due to the energy of impact. A DU bullet probably wouldn't be, so chemical effects inside the body would be the primary concern -well, other than the bullet hole, obviously. :smallwink:

[Neon Knight]

During WW2, how often, if at all, where flak cannons and other large AA guns used against ground targets, tanks in particular, and how effective where they at this impromptu role?

[Norsesmithy]

The primary German and American heavy Anti tank guns of the war, the 88 and the 90 mm respectively, were originally designed as anti aircraft weapons. By the end of the war, both sides had put these guns in tanks, in addition to fielding them in dual purpose or dedicated anti tank mounts (primary difference is in range of elevation). I think that the Soviet 122mm installed in the Iosef Stalin II might have been an anti aircraft piece at first too, but don't know for sure.

So you could say that it was extremely commonplace.

And all of these guns were quite effective at destroying armour and motorized infantry.

[Om]

There is that great, if probably untrue, story of Wehrmacht forces under the command of Rommel coming under attack during the Battle of France. Despairing that the Panzer guns could not penetrate the thick armour of the Allied Matildas, the German engineers desperately reconfigured their FlaK 88s (designed as AA guns) to be capable of firing at the advancing Allied armour. The rest, as they say, is history.

I half recall that the first use of the 88s as AT weapons occurred during the Spanish Civil War but I do love that story anyway.

[Dervag]

The primary German and American heavy Anti tank guns of the war, the 88 and the 90 mm respectively, were originally designed as anti aircraft weapons. By the end of the war, both sides had put these guns in tanks, in addition to fielding them in dual purpose or dedicated anti tank mounts (primary difference is in range of elevation). I think that the Soviet 122mm installed in the Iosef Stalin II might have been an anti aircraft piece at first too, but don't know for sure.

So you could say that it was extremely commonplace.

And all of these guns were quite effective at destroying armour and motorized infantry.AA guns are optimized for quick fire and high muzzle velocity, because they need to be able to reach high into the sky fast enough that projectile drop isn't a huge issue and to shoot enough rounds at an airplane to stand a chance of hitting it before it zooms overhead.

Both those features are desirable in an antitank gun.


There is that great, if probably untrue, story of Wehrmacht forces under the command of Rommel coming under attack during the Battle of France. Despairing that the Panzer guns could not penetrate the thick armour of the Allied Matildas, the German engineers desperately reconfigured their FlaK 88s (designed as AA guns) to be capable of firing at the advancing Allied armour. The rest, as they say, is history.

I half recall that the first use of the 88s as AT weapons occurred during the Spanish Civil War but I do love that story anyway.I don't think the 88 could have broken Matildas reliably without a dedicated armor piercing shell. And they wouldn't have armor piercing rounds on hand for the guns if there hadn't already been some thought of using them as AT guns.

Now, with an armor-piercing round they would be devastating against a Matilda. The Matilda was only slightly better armored than the Sherman, really; it was just extraordinarily tough for a prewar tank design and so it did very well in 1939-41 before everybody got their high-caliber antitank guns into service.

Don't get me wrong, I love 'em to death, but even their armor, which was their best feature, wasn't all that impressive by mid-war and late-war standards.

P.S. I've actually seen a Matilda II that was killed by an 88mm round; it's at Aberdeen Ordnance Museum. Note (http://www.peachmountain.com/5Star/US_Army_Ordnance_Museum_Matilda_tanks.aspx) the hole high on the right side of the turret; I took a ruler to it. 88 millimeters.

[Storm Bringer]

what i heard in regard to the flak 88 was that a counterattack by the opponent (I think it was a french force during the fall of france, but it may have been spanish civil war) threaten to overrun a AA battery. the batter commander, having nothing to lose (he couldn't limber his guns before the tanks got him), ordered his men to fire thier HE rounds at the incoming tanks. the rest, as they say, is history,

[Dervag]

In the Spanish Civil War, I could see it; most of the tanks involved were relatively light. Or in France if the French tank unit in question was light. But based on what I've read, I strongly suspect that armor-piercing ammunition was available for the 88 even before the Spanish Civil War; the idea that the gun might find itself pressed into antitank duty had already occured to its designers.

Standard high explosive would have a lousy chance against any but a very light tank.

[Storm Bringer]

having wiki'd it, it is aprarant that they found out about it's effectiveness during the spanish civil war, where it was better as a light arty gun/at weapon than a aa gun, and subquently found itself used as such. by the battle of france the guns were being issued with prupose built AT shells, though prupose built at carridges were still a way off. anyway, back to the question asked


During WW2, how often, if at all, where flak cannons and other large AA guns used against ground targets, tanks in particular, and how effective where they at this impromptu role?

they were used by most of the armies at one point or another as AT weaponry, but were only really effective with proper AT shells to priece armour. as a light arty weapon, they could function fairly well with thier standard rounds provided the men used them correctly (somthing that is not a given, as they would be trained at shooting aircraft, not ground targets). Many of the russian large calibre At guns were AA guns slapped onto standard carridges (in some cases literally the same guns, taken off their big AA mounts and put on a lower, easier to hide mounts. The flak 88's large gun shield made it very hard to hide compared to the 75mil guns in use on either side at the same time.)

[Crow]

I've heard something to the effect of using HE rounds against infantry positions. Something about the shrapnel.

[Om]

In the Spanish Civil War, I could see it; most of the tanks involved were relatively light.Which was the crux of the problem. The appearance of the T-26 seriously spooked the Germans in Spain as their own Panzer I was decidedly outclassed and lacked any real penetrating power. I can easily see someone in the Condor Legion, either purposefully or in a crisis, adopting the FlaK 88 to serve as a countermeasure to the superior Soviet design.

[ThunderEagle]

Could a colt M1911 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colt_M1911) penetrate the spine of a human if fired by an untrained user and pressed against the stomach of the target?

[Swordguy]

Could a colt M1911 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colt_M1911) penetrate the spine of a human if fired by an untrained user and pressed against the stomach of the target?

If by penetrate you mean shatter or sever (deflection angles allowing), then sure.

[Deadmeat.GW]

Which was the crux of the problem. The appearance of the T-26 seriously spooked the Germans in Spain as their own Panzer I was decidedly outclassed and lacked any real penetrating power. I can easily see someone in the Condor Legion, either purposefully or in a crisis, adopting the FlaK 88 to serve as a countermeasure to the superior Soviet design.

Actually, from what I was told they had to rediscover this fact again at beginning of the second world war as the shells did exist but were not commonly distributed as deemed not necessary.
The fact that the engineers and the troops considered useful was not important to the planners...

As for the regular shells, if I remember correctly there were timer based versions, mass reactive ones and both got distributed.
However in all cases did the high velocity of the gun more then compensate for the he shells and there have been reported cases of shells knocking through armour on the lighter tanks before going off.

Also... the French tanks were at the beginning of the war equal or better then the German ones with the seriously outdated tactics causing their losses mostly.

The Char Bis for instance was a nightmare for the German panzers whom had to either mug them or ... use the 88's.

http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/1975/g_tnkfra.htm

[ThunderEagle]

based on my previous question, could said firer hit the head of a human target slowly advancing toward him inside a dodge sprinter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercedes-Benz_Sprinter), and deal sufficient damage to the target area, enough toremove about 55%+ of the brain, assuming it is a US-Spec Dodge Sprinter 2500, as shown in the picture on the wikipedia article?

(in case you are wondering, I'm running a freeform zombie apocalypse game, and one of my players is backed up in said car with a zombie advancing and about to attack him, and he has a single shot that he has aimed at the head of the zombie, and has to stop it with this shot.)

[Crow]

based on my previous question, could said firer hit the head of a human target slowly advancing toward him inside a dodge sprinter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercedes-Benz_Sprinter), and deal sufficient damage to the target area, enough toremove about 55%+ of the brain, assuming it is a US-Spec Dodge Sprinter 2500, as shown in the picture on the wikipedia article?

(in case you are wondering, I'm running a freeform zombie apocalypse game, and one of my players is backed up in said car with a zombie advancing and about to attack him, and he has a single shot that he has aimed at the head of the zombie, and has to stop it with this shot.)

It depends on how the bullet reacts when it hits the glass. Making a head shot on any target which is moving, even slowly, can be quite difficult beyond a few meters. This is made more difficult due to the small area of the had you need to hit to ensure maximum lethality (Think of it as a little rectangle that surrounds the eyes). Also, the vehicle isn't likely to stop immediately after the driver dies.

The .45 slug should be heavy enough to punch through the glass, but if he is standing on the ground, the angle of attack, angle of the windshield, and the toughness of a standard windshield (bear in mind while they are by no means ballistic-grade material, they are designed to be relatively tough), and the fact that the target is moving, means the shot he needs to make is going to be extremely difficult. While he may hit the head, the chances of the shot hitting in a location that will give the effect your player needs is extremely low.

[ThunderEagle]

a little clarification: the firer is standing inside the dodge with the target, having just backed in from the outside. he is firing down the length of the rear compartment, but not through the wind shield.

[Crow]

a little clarification: the firer is standing inside the dodge with the target, having just backed in from the outside. he is firing down the length of the rear compartment, but not through the wind shield.

Sorry, I misunderstood. I thought the zombie was driving somehow and the shooter was in front of the van. Sorry.

Yes, he could make that shot and achieve the desired effect. Assume he is aiming for the "rectangle" I mentioned earlier (about 1.5 inch x 4.5 inch, when determining the difficulty of the shot. I would rate the shot as "challenging", but not "difficult", as the range is very short, but the target may be bobbing verticly or horizontally, depend on how it walks. This is assuming the shooter is stationary, and not moving himself.

[ThunderEagle]

thanks for all the help in determining this little scenario. depending on how the game turns out, there may be more questions like this. who knows. anyway, thankyou for all the help.

[Mike_G]

based on my previous question, could said firer hit the head of a human target slowly advancing toward him inside a dodge sprinter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercedes-Benz_Sprinter), and deal sufficient damage to the target area, enough toremove about 55%+ of the brain, assuming it is a US-Spec Dodge Sprinter 2500, as shown in the picture on the wikipedia article?



That's very close range, and the head isn't all that small a target. I'd say he have reasonable chance to hit.

As for damage, the M1911 does plenty. It's a big, heavy round at close range. The brain would be pretty scrambled, and full of shattered bits o' skull, and a good deal of it would be spattered out the back of the head.

[Subotei]

Also... the French tanks were at the beginning of the war equal or better then the German ones with the seriously outdated tactics causing their losses mostly.

The Char Bis for instance was a nightmare for the German panzers whom had to either mug them or ... use the 88's.

http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/1975/g_tnkfra.htm

I don't think there was a great deal of difference between British, French and German tanks at the time - you've rightly pin-pointed the real difference in action - tactics. The Germans concentrated the tank striking force, and co-ordinated their actions very well with infantry, artillery and airforce. The French and British failed in this respect. The fact the Germans were also reading French military codes at the time also helped their attack.

Merry Xmas.

[Om]

I don't think there was a great deal of difference between British, French and German tanks at the timeWell Deadmeat is correct in that technically the Allies possessed superior tanks. The renowned Panzers really weren't all that impressive in '39. Individually the Panzer IV (not to mention the III) was probably inferior to both the Char B1 and the Matilda... lacking both firepower and armour in comparison with these heavier tanks.

Of course both yourself and Deadmeat are perfectly correct in that the real impact of the Panzers was their use in specialised armour formations. Which renders discussions about the superiority of individual tanks (both in this case and later Panther-T-34 scenarios) irrelevant. Really the French simply had the misfortune of, for the second time in a few decades, coming up against a German army operating off a completely new strategic model. Again, the lesson is that hardware really plays a minor role in warfare when compared to the way that it is used and the quality of the operators.

[Dervag]

I've heard something to the effect of using HE rounds against infantry positions. Something about the shrapnel.By all means. Shrapnel is the main reason why exploding shells revolutionized artillery. But it's largely ineffective against an armored target because it's fuzed to blow up as soon as it strikes a firm surface. Thus, the big explosion occurs outside the armor. A heavy enough artillery shell can certainly penetrate the armor by brute concussion, or spall fragments off the inside and kill the crew. But it's much less efficient, and it takes a much larger caliber piece to kill a tank with a standard high explosive shell than with a solid kinetic penetrator.


Which was the crux of the problem. The appearance of the T-26 seriously spooked the Germans in Spain as their own Panzer I was decidedly outclassed and lacked any real penetrating power. I can easily see someone in the Condor Legion, either purposefully or in a crisis, adopting the FlaK 88 to serve as a countermeasure to the superior Soviet design.The Panzer I had no cannon, only machine guns, and was therefore helpless against any enemy tank armed with a cannon. Including the Panzer II. The Germans knew this, and the job of killing armor was supposed to be taken by artillery and antitank guns. The 88 turned out to be extremely good at this, fortunately for them. I strongly suspect that the intention to use the 88 in those roles came before the Spanish Civil War, simply because the right kinds of ammunition for those guns had to be available before there would be any chance of using them effectively in those roles.


Could a colt M1911 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colt_M1911) penetrate the spine of a human if fired by an untrained user and pressed against the stomach of the target?Easily.

Training matters not in this case; velocity and direction matter. Training only helps you point the gun in the right direction.


based on my previous question, could said firer hit the head of a human target slowly advancing toward him inside a dodge sprinter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercedes-Benz_Sprinter), and deal sufficient damage to the target area, enough toremove about 55%+ of the brain, assuming it is a US-Spec Dodge Sprinter 2500, as shown in the picture on the wikipedia article?They'd have to get lucky. For a user without considerable experience in pistol marksmanship, scoring reliable hits on something the size of a human head at any but a very close range would be difficult. Especially since sitting in the cab of a truck is not a good posture for marksmanship.


a little clarification: the firer is standing inside the dodge with the target, having just backed in from the outside. he is firing down the length of the rear compartment, but not through the wind shield.Oh. In that case, yes, it would work. For that matter, even a non-headshot would likely knock the zombie down, enabling escape, assuming other circumstances allow escape.


I don't think there was a great deal of difference between British, French and German tanks at the time - you've rightly pin-pointed the real difference in action - tactics. The Germans concentrated the tank striking force, and co-ordinated their actions very well with infantry, artillery and airforce. The French and British failed in this respect. The fact the Germans were also reading French military codes at the time also helped their attack.

Merry Xmas.There was actually a fairly big difference. French and British tanks were designed as infantry support weapons. Hence the reasoning behind something like the Char B1 or the Matilda, both of which were big and slow and heavily armored. These tanks were designed for set-piece attacks against a fortified line, like the tank attacks of World War One.

Whereas all the German tanks were designed to be relatively mobile. The British and French had mobile designs too, but the Germans had no big slow bulky tanks.

[Cuddly]

Would the windshield of a civilian vehicle have any chance of deflecting a bullet? Maybe a .22 shot from very far away?

[Swordguy]

Would the windshield of a civilian vehicle have any chance of deflecting a bullet? Maybe a .22 shot from very far away?

It could deflect any given bullet, given the vagracies of chance. However, if you wanted it to be deflected, then yes - a light bullet with little velocity (such as a .22 Short fired from a long way away) would be your best bet.

[Irenaeus]

These six should get you started:

Sally Harvey, 'The Knight and the Knight's Fee in England' in Past and Present, No. 49. (Nov., 1970), pp. 3-43. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-2746%28197011%290%3A49%3C3%3ATKATKF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9)

Jean Scammell, 'The Formation of the English Social Structure: Freedom, Knights, and Gentry, 1066-1300' Speculum, Vol. 68, No. 3. (Jul., 1993), pp. 591-618. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-7134%28199307%2968%3A3%3C591%3ATFOTES%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23)

Peter Coss, 'Knights, Esquires and the Origins of Social Gradation in England' Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., Vol. 5. (1995), pp. 155-178. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4401%281995%296%3A5%3C155%3AKEATOO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R)

Michael Prestwich, 'Miles in Armis Strenuus: The Knight at War' in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., Vol. 5. (1995), pp. 201-220. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4401%281995%296%3A5%3C201%3AMIASTK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4)

John Gillingham, 'Thegns and Knights in Eleventh-Century England: Who Was Then the Gentleman?' in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., Vol. 5. (1995), pp. 129-153. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4401%281995%296%3A5%3C129%3ATAKIEE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O)

Kathryn Faulkner 'The Transformation of Knighthood in Early Thirteenth-Century England' The English Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 440. (Feb., 1996), pp. 1-23. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-8266%28199602%29111%3A440%3C1%3ATTOKIE%3E2.0.CO%3B 2-S)
I forgot to say thank you for these. I have really been enjoying them.

[Adlan]

Oh. In that case, yes, it would work. For that matter, even a non-headshot would likely knock the zombie down, enabling escape, assuming other circumstances allow escape.


No it wouldn't. There is no such thing as knock down power. The mass of a bullet, moving at the speed it does, is not sufficiant to knock over an object the size of a human.

Head shot or nothing

-message brought to you by a Certified Zombie Squad member, catering to all your non stationary cadaver removal needs.


As for shooting through a windscreen.

Buick'o'truth (http://www.theboxotruth.com/docs/thebuickotruth.htm) should prove enlightening. Though I'm not sure I under stand which way through the windscreen is in question, or I'd tawl through and look it up myself.

[Crow]

Buick'o'truth (http://www.theboxotruth.com/docs/thebuickotruth.htm) should prove enlightening. Though I'm not sure I under stand which way through the windscreen is in question, or I'd tawl through and look it up myself.

I misunderstood his question and thought he meant outside shooting in. On that van, with the shooter at ground level, even with a .45 he has an extremely low chance of making that shot.

But luckily it doesn't matter for him. He's trapped inside the van with the zombie! Much better! :smallwink:

[Norsesmithy]

No it wouldn't. There is no such thing as knock down power. The mass of a bullet, moving at the speed it does, is not sufficiant to knock over an object the size of a human.

Head shot or nothing

-message brought to you by a Certified Zombie Squad member, catering to all your non stationary cadaver removal needs.

What you forget is that a Zombie has connective tissue and muscle which it must be able to utilise to remain ambulatory, and a skeletal system that is needed to support said tissues, so a body shot, with any of the adequate self defence calibers would have a decent chance of reducing the ghoul's ability to shamble towards you.

Particularly if it struck the pelvis or thigh.

[Dervag]

No it wouldn't. There is no such thing as knock down power. The mass of a bullet, moving at the speed it does, is not sufficiant to knock over an object the size of a human.OK, I could easily be wrong about this. Can we get more references?

I'll grant that the momentum calculation doesn't look favorable- a few tens of grams of matter moving at several hundred meters per second doesn't actually carry much more impulse than a thrown stone. On the other hand, people have been known to lose their balance and fall over, or suffer serious brain damage, from a thrown stone.


Head shot or nothing

-message brought to you by a Certified Zombie Squad member, catering to all your non stationary cadaver removal needs.What about neck shots? I'd expect a spine shot to be almost as good, because it destroys the zombie's ability to communicate with its arms and legs.


What you forget is that a Zombie has connective tissue and muscle which it must be able to utilise to remain ambulatory, and a skeletal system that is needed to support said tissues, so a body shot, with any of the adequate self defence calibers would have a decent chance of reducing the ghoul's ability to shamble towards you.

Particularly if it struck the pelvis or thigh.After all, the adequate self defense calibers are defined as the ones that have a good chance of causing a physically incapacitating wound that will prevent an enemy from continuing to attack or threaten you regardless of how determined they are to keep fighting.

Zombies may have literally infinite reserves of determination, but a shattered leg bone is a shattered leg bone, and paraplegia will incapacitate a zombie just as badly as it will an ordinary human.

[Storm Bringer]

OK, I could easily be wrong about this. Can we get more references?

I'll grant that the momentum calculation doesn't look favorable- a few tens of grams of matter moving at several hundred meters per second doesn't actually carry much more impulse than a thrown stone. On the other hand, people have been known to lose their balance and fall over, or suffer serious brain damage, from a thrown stone.

What about neck shots? I'd expect a spine shot to be almost as good, because it destroys the zombie's ability to communicate with its arms and legs.

After all, the adequate self defense calibers are defined as the ones that have a good chance of causing a physically incapacitating wound that will prevent an enemy from continuing to attack or threaten you regardless of how determined they are to keep fighting.

Zombies may have literally infinite reserves of determination, but a shattered leg bone is a shattered leg bone, and paraplegia will incapacitate a zombie just as badly as it will an ordinary human.

a neck shot would HAVE to hit the spine to do anything, so the target area their is tiny, making a head-shot the logical choice.

[Om]

OK, I could easily be wrong about this. Can we get more references?

I'll grant that the momentum calculation doesn't look favorable- a few tens of grams of matter moving at several hundred meters per second doesn't actually carry much more impulse than a thrown stone. On the other hand, people have been known to lose their balance and fall over, or suffer serious brain damage, from a thrown stone.People will naturally recoil from having a stone thrown at them or become concussed from a blow to the head. However a bullet to the torso or chest will not produce nearly the force required to push/knock the body back. I saw this on MythBusters once but here's (http://www.springerlink.com/content/q47wtgw275238877/) a journal paper on the myth (you probably have to pay for the paper itself but the abstract is clear enough)

Its actually a fairly recent myth. Think back to the old Westerns or war flicks (right up to the 70s) and whenever there was a killing shot to the chest the victim simply collapsed/slumped where they stood. Its only from the 80s that you have bullets being portrayed as knocking people backwards or throwing them through windows.

[Raum]

OK, I could easily be wrong about this. Can we get more references?

I'll grant that the momentum calculation doesn't look favorable- a few tens of grams of matter moving at several hundred meters per second doesn't actually carry much more impulse than a thrown stone. On the other hand, people have been known to lose their balance and fall over, or suffer serious brain damage, from a thrown stone.From here (http://library.med.utah.edu/WebPath/TUTORIAL/GUNS/GUNBLST.html): "The maximum momentum transferred from different small arms projectiles, inluding large caliber rifles and shotguns, to an 80 kg body is only 0.01 to 0.18 m/s, negligible compared to the 1 to 2 m/s velocity of a pedestrian. (Karger and Knewbuehl, 1996)"

As Norsesmithy points out, the damage and shock may well drop you even though the kinetic energy transfer won't.

[Adlan]

As Norsesmithy points out, the damage and shock may well drop you even though the kinetic energy transfer won't.

Damage and Shock may Drop you. A broken leg will reduce you to limping, A broken spine to crawling, but only by destroying the lower brain can you kill a zombie (At least, thats the way I look at it).

[Norsesmithy]

But if your goal is escape and evasion, not extermination, taking out a Zed's motive ability is just fine.

Unless you have a nearby camp that you intend to stay in for a long stretch, ruining its leg and fleeing is just as good as blowing away and fleeing.

And in a stnd and fight scenario, turing a shambler into a crawler makes his final disposal easier, and safer with weapons that don't consume ammunition.

[Solo]

Question: How were medieval weapons like maces carried? It looks like it'd be hard to stick a morning star in a holster, and a little dangerous to have it hanging on someone's belt.

[Storm Bringer]

IMO, with a leather bag over the head. Or just carried loose, and put down when you needed two hands.

[Adlan]

But if your goal is escape and evasion, not extermination, taking out a Zed's motive ability is just fine.

Unless you have a nearby camp that you intend to stay in for a long stretch, ruining its leg and fleeing is just as good as blowing away and fleeing.

And in a stnd and fight scenario, turing a shambler into a crawler makes his final disposal easier, and safer with weapons that don't consume ammunition.

If your goal is escape, then why are you shooting at it anyway? If you don't need to kill a Zombie Don't shoot it. the noise will only attract more, and unwanted attention.

[Swordguy]

Question: How were medieval weapons like maces carried? It looks like it'd be hard to stick a morning star in a holster, and a little dangerous to have it hanging on someone's belt.

Have you seen a hammer frog at a local hardware store? It's a leather bit that attaches to the belt, and at a 90-degree angle there's about 2/3rds of a ring of steel. The hammer drops into that ring and the head is larger than the circumfrence of the ring, so the hammer doesn't fall through.

That's one way to do it. The other major way (besides just carrying it or putting it in a bag for long-distance travel) is via a belt lanyard. This is done most easily on horsemen, but foot maces have been found with lanyard loops.

[Fhaolan]

Question: How were medieval weapons like maces carried? It looks like it'd be hard to stick a morning star in a holster, and a little dangerous to have it hanging on someone's belt.

Most medieval weapons, except for daggers and the 'smaller' swords, were carried in the hand, over the shoulder, or en-masse on carts. They were military weapons carried into battle, or onto the tournament field, not by people-about-town. :smallsmile:

Basically, there's no reason to 'holster' one. It's not like you're going to carry it very far without using it. You went into battle with your primary weapon, a lance, a flail, whatever, and had a sword in the scabbard as backup. You don't have a golf-bag worth of weapons strapped on you somewhere. :)

[Om]

You don't have a golf-bag worth of weapons strapped on you somewhere. :)Although the image of knights riding into battle on golf carts does have a certain allure...

[Hawriel]

Ive been trying to remember the name of a weapon for a long time now I hope some of you can help me.

Its not a weapon its self but an inovation/attachment. Aberigional Americans in Alaska and Canada have used it. Its a stick with a slightly curved handle and a (for lack of a better word) slot/cup that hold the butt end of a spear, harpoon or javlen. I know this devise gave the harpoon a greater range in the throw. Did it allow the harpoon, javelin to hit harder? What other cultures used such a devise?

[Storm Bringer]

Ive been trying to remember the name of a weapon for a long time now I hope some of you can help me.

Its not a weapon its self but an inovation/attachment. Aberigional Americans in Alaska and Canada have used it. Its a stick with a slightly curved handle and a (for lack of a better word) slot/cup that hold the butt end of a spear, harpoon or javlen. I know this devise gave the harpoon a greater range in the throw. Did it allow the harpoon, javelin to hit harder? What other cultures used such a devise?

the name of the device, at least according to wiki, is a Atlatl. the word Atlatl is form one of the native mexican tounges, the spanish being the frist modern western peoples to encounter Atlatl armed troops.

it works by effectivly extending the arms leverage during the throw, and allowing more muscle to be put behind it, thus generating the extra power.

The device was known to stone age europeans, but was replaced by the bow and arrow their. it was used by the new world natives in america and the Pacific islanders until european colonistion of the area.

it is recorded that the Atlatl could penatrate 15th century metal breastplates (or at least, those of the type worn by the Conquistadors), no mean feat, so the pentration was certainly improved.

[Gygaxphobia]

atalatl, and I believe the Incans used it too.

[Fhaolan]

Ive been trying to remember the name of a weapon for a long time now I hope some of you can help me.

Its not a weapon its self but an inovation/attachment. Aberigional Americans in Alaska and Canada have used it. Its a stick with a slightly curved handle and a (for lack of a better word) slot/cup that hold the butt end of a spear, harpoon or javlen. I know this devise gave the harpoon a greater range in the throw. Did it allow the harpoon, javelin to hit harder? What other cultures used such a devise?

It had many different names, as it was invented in many different places across the world. The word you're probably familar with is 'nugag' as I believe that is the Eskimo word for it. Most people in America are more familiar with the South American name 'atlatl', which is pretty much the same thing. The Australian/New Guinnea name for it is 'woomera'. The english term is simply 'spear thrower'. Other forms of the same concept show up in a lot of Pacific Islands, but I don't know all the names.

The idea is that the stick adds leverage to the throw. The spears, which usually are more like small javelins/large arrows, commonly called 'darts', are able to be thrown farther, and hit harder, because of the added leverage. However, it is somewhat tricky to learn how to use and takes quite a bit of practice to be reasonable accurate.

Other idea in the same lines is the string thrower, though I've found this to be not as effective as a solid stick. This supposedly allows you go continue adding impitus to the throw after you let go of the dart, because you are still pulling on the string that is hooked to the back of the dart. It also adds spin to the dart, because it's wrapped around the dart and spins it as it is pulled, making the dart on average more accurate. However, I still prefer the solid stick concept as I've never gotten the string thing to really work properly.

[Hawriel]

Cool thanks guys.

[WhiteHarness]

it is recorded that the Atlatl could penatrate 15th century metal breastplates (or at least, those of the type worn by the Conquistadors), no mean feat, so the pentration was certainly improved.

That record says it was mailcoats that were penetrated, not breastplates. Still impressive, but they couldn't drive through steel plate. Cortes writes in his Cartas de Relacion of his experience in conquering the Aztecs, that the armoured cavalry he brought with him were very resistant to the Aztecs' weapons (presumably including the hyped atlatl) precisely because they were well-armoured. Garcilaso de la Vega says that a man in a mailshirt was pierced through both sides. But no plate was penetrated. It is recorded elsewhere (De Soto, I think) that the natives' stone-tipped weapons were a nuisance to men in plate armour, as the points would shatter on impact with the plate and become so many nettlesome needle-like shards, but nothing like the nuclear all-powerful weapon that ignores all armour that is the stuff of modern armchair-archaeologists' wet dreams.

This is an issue that has been taken out of context and blown out of proportion by atlatl enthusiasts. To be fair, some of it is the fault of poor translations; what should be rendered as "mail" often gets translated as "armour" and atlatl aficionados get the wrong idea.

[Stephen_E]

It should be noted that the failure point Re:Atals vs Plate was the stone blade of the spear, rather than the penetrating capability of the weapon.

This leaves the theorectical capability of spear-chuckers to put a spear through plate firmly in the unknown. By the time Plate was been used in Europe I'm not aware of anyone still using spearchuckers. Note: The absense of use doesn't indicate eirher way the penetrative capabilitys of a spear thrown this way as there are many other issues that could be responsible for the dearth of use which have nothing to do with the raw penatrative power of a spearchucker thrown dart/spear.

Stephen

[Storm Bringer]

<rebuttal of my post>

To be fair, some of it is the fault of poor translations; what should be rendered as "mail" often gets translated as "armour" and atlatl aficionados get the wrong idea.

I think thats what happened here, with me misreading the wiki's use of "armour" as being "classic hollywood solid steel breastplate".


It should be noted that the failure point Re:Atals vs Plate was the stone blade of the spear, rather than the penetrating capability of the weapon.

This leaves the theorectical capability of spear-chuckers to put a spear through plate firmly in the unknown. By the time Plate was been used in Europe I'm not aware of anyone still using spearchuckers. Note: The absense of use doesn't indicate eirher way the penetrative capabilitys of a spear thrown this way as there are many other issues that could be responsible for the dearth of use which have nothing to do with the raw penatrative power of a spearchucker thrown dart/spear.

Stephen

according to the wiki, the atlatl was replaced by bows and arrows, which required less training to use well and gave as good or better range.

[WhiteHarness]

What evidence is available to us suggests that, contrary to the popular image of the conquistador in cuirass and morion, the Spanish actually used very little plate armour in the new world. What little they did employ was used by the cavalry, hence Cortes' mention of the armoured horsemen being able to ride through the Aztec ranks with relative impunity.

The vast majority of Spaniards--if they wore any body armour at all--stuck with mailcoats and brigandines, often abandoning even that for native-style padded cotton coats, particularly when presented with evidence that their mail was no better (and sometimes worse!) protection against Indian arrows than the local quilted cotton. At least one source (De Soto again, IIRC) suggests that only high-end, very expensive mail was so vulnerable, and it might be inferred that the older, heavier, and cheaper mailshirts still provided the expected protection. It is elsewhere asserted that no one was safe from the natives' arrows unless he had "plate of Milan" on him, suggesting that even lower grades of plate were insufficient protection, at least some of the time. But it is satisfying to note that good-quality plate did in fact defeat everything the natives threw at it.

For more, see Hammond Innes' "The Conquistadors." If you read Spanish, however, the primary source accounts by the Spanish explorers themselves really do make for a riveting read. There is also "The Broken Spears," which is a contemporary account from a native perspective.

[Subotei]

according to the wiki, the atlatl was replaced by bows and arrows, which required less training to use well and gave as good or better range.

Thats my understanding too - basically its (originally) a stone-age hunting weapon, and a bow and arrows are much superior hunting weapons, so it disappeared from most cultures once bows were sufficiently developed.

[Adlan]

There are a few video's of Atlatal Hunting Kills, which are pretty cool.

The Main advantage of a bow over an Atlatal, purely from my own Archery and Hunting experiance, is the amount of movement needed to let fly, a Bow needs mearly to be draw back, and loosed (hard enough on it's own within in earshot, nose scent and eye sight of deer), while an atlatal needs a faster, and more eye catching movement.

[CrazedGoblin]

what is the penetrating power of a musket ball?

for example which type of armour will it readily pierce, what will deflect it etc

[Dervag]

Half-inch steel should usually stop a musket ball. I think.

Anything less, I don't know. Literally don't know.

[Swordguy]

what is the penetrating power of a musket ball?

for example which type of armour will it readily pierce, what will deflect it etc

Define your musket better.

Caliber? Era? Action type? Barrel length? All these really, REALLY matter. Right now your question is simply too generic.

[Storm Bringer]

what is the penetrating power of a musket ball?

for example which type of armour will it readily pierce, what will deflect it etc

full blown mustket balls could pierce plate armour at very short range (maybe 20meters, maybe less), but beyound that you were fine. flintlock pistols would need to be less than a meter or two to have a chance against late plate armour (one manual says actauly touching the armour)

anything less than about 10-12 mil is unlikey to stop a musket ball, though. for reference, late medieval plate was useually less than 6mil thick. Later plate was thicker, but they had to decrease the coverage of the armour to stop it being too heavy to fight in. by the early 19th century, the only armour they bothered with was a helmet and breastplate.

the power of musket balls drops off much faster than with modern guns, due to the lower intial velocity and bigger, less aerodynamic bullet. Thus, long range fire form mustkets was very unlikey to hurt armoured troops.

[WhiteHarness]

what is the penetrating power of a musket ball?

for example which type of armour will it readily pierce, what will deflect it etc

See here:

http://www.geocities.com/ageraluon/breastplate/home.htm

This is a wonderful experiment that addresses this very question, performed by Sylvia Leever.

The thickness of heavier of the two breastplates (yes, she used genuine antiques for this) reaches 7mm+ in some places and it manages to stop at least a couple of balls at very short range.

[alexi]

from a long ago paper i seem to remember that often a buff coat was better at stopping musket fire then a breastplate. Also Hasterlings lobsters in the ECW had armour that would shop pistols even when the pistol was touching the armour.

[CrazedGoblin]

Define your musket better.

Caliber? Era? Action type? Barrel length? All these really, REALLY matter. Right now your question is simply too generic.

not to sure on the exact preferences of it, im mainly trying to convert it into a gaming sense or just get an idea how to rule it, but id say quite early design not very advanced, if it helps.

thanks for the info so far guys :smallbiggrin:

[horseboy]

Hmm, search seems to be down, as all I'm getting is white screens.

I was scribbling a portrait for a character, then when done realized my sword and boarder was a south paw. How effective could he do that? It seems like he'd be constantly having to reach across his own attack lanes to block with the shield. I went ahead and put a cleft in the top so he could use it for weapon catching, to give a pretext to having one, but, well I was wondering if it would be better to just go 2 handed or a fencing main gauche and calling it a shield.

[Hades]

It seems like he'd be constantly having to reach across his own attack lanes to block with the shield.

Check out the Hammaborg talhoffer adaptations to viking shield, like this (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8SRaa33otU) one, where there seems to be a lot of crossing the "attack lane", without too many ill effects.

If anything, your character should have an advantage, because he will be used to fighting righties, while most right-handed opponents will never have faced a left-handed adversary.

[Raum]

I was scribbling a portrait for a character, then when done realized my sword and boarder was a south paw. It's going to depend on the type of fighting - in a one on one foot duel I doubt there'd be any disadvantage, he may even have an advantage if his opponent hasn't practiced much against left handers. He'd likely get kicked out of any infantry formation though. It's possible an infantry formation might fit a left hander on the far right of a line, but normally he'd be expected to train & fight the same way everyone else does...and to guard the infantryman on his left as well as himself.