Got a Real-World Weapon or Armor Question? Mk. IV [Archive] - Page 5

2007-01-27, 10:14 AM

And how long were the crusaders within range of Byzantine territory or friendly markets? These were a viable alternative to foraging only when present. The fact that in the absence of markets there was no option but to pillage and forcibly requisition from the populace merely illustrates my point that logistics was not an art that the Europeans were familiar with. The concept of establishing a logistical line to supply and equip armies far from home was simply impractical at the time.

If you look at the First Crusade you'll see that they relied almost entirely on pillaging and foraging expeditions during the march to Jerusalem. Indeed the primary motive behind Tancred's significant detour through Cilicia was in the securing of additional provisions. Similarly foraging missions were a constant occupation of the besiegers at Antioch.

If we look at Barbarossa's crusade, probably one of the largest medieval armies ever assembled, we see that he was highly dependent on the sacking of Konieh (I think that was the city) where a huge stockpile of supplies were captured. Again I stress that there was no logistical trail leading all the way back to Byzantium, or Germany. Indeed the nature of warfare at the time, and the Turks in particular, would have made such a logistical lifeline impossible to maintain. Even foraging was difficult in the harsh terrain of Anatolia with the Turks deliberately burning crops and food to starve the crusaders during the Second Crusade - that campaign being the ultimate example of a European campaign foiled by logistical failures.

Now I should have stressed in my above post that the purchase of supplies, from either locals or the Italians, was of course commonplace. In situations were the armies were deadlocked and immobile, such as Acre, this was the only way to maintain an army in the field. Nor does this preclude the idea that there were no baggage trains or other hangers on, the Second Crusade being notorious for the number of non-combatants present, but there is no indication that these baggage trains served the purpose of logistical units in today's armies.

Indeed to quote from that link you provided: Most medieval armies had nothing resembling a good logistics system. Medieval commanders who looked after logistical concerns were considered exceptions

Of course we also have to contend with the fact that the crusades themselves were exceptions. Medieval warfare typically revolved around relatively small bands of professional soldiers and mercenaries. The hosts of Conrad and Barbarossa would have dwarfed most armies operating within Europe at the time. Even with the rise of the nationstates in later centuries it would not be until the French Revolutionary Wars that such large numbers would be mustered.

If we look at the Battle of Breitenfeld, for example, during the Thirty Years War we see that neither side could muster more than 40K men. This was actually fairly large for the TYW with most armies no larger than 10-20k men. This is not signficantly greater than the army sizes during the HYW, and indeed the same size as the major French armies put together during that conflict.

Edmund

2007-01-27, 10:25 AM

Well, Matthew and Einstrauss have skillfully rebutted the majority of the logistics issue, so I won't dwell on that, but in regards to this

Well the crusades are really the only examples we have of major expeditions being launched far from home during the middle ages. Such was the nature of warfare during this era that logistics didn't really feature into the equation. Armies were typically small enough to live of the land and rarely had any base or supply routes to speak of.

I must disagree. Matthew has already cited Barbarossa's Italian campaigns, but more important is Frederick II's papal campaign, which also required a complex logistical structure, and was relatively 'far from home'.

As for expeditions launched 'far from home', why would you go looking for enemies across the sea when your bigger concerns are your enemies right next to you? I think the lack of far reaching expansionism is a concern of security more than of inability.

As for army size and foraging, I have a sneaking suspicion that everyone is thinking of the Black Prince's chevauchees when they speak of this. It's important to acknowledge that these expeditions, effectively raiding parties, into French territory were solely to pillage and cause unrest. These armies were small by design, and so it's unfair to use them as a basis.

Sadly, the typical medieval army cannot be quantified. Armies of various sizes were raised depending upon what was available and what was needed. Crusader armies would often be larger, but this isn't always the case. Of course, in Orthodox countries the concept of crusade was anathema.

One moderately large non-crusader army was fielded by Pere (Peter) III of Aragon in an attempted expedition against Tunis of about 15,000 men, in 148 ships. I doubt this had a meagre logistical structure.

2007-01-27, 11:24 AM

I must disagree. Matthew has already cited Barbarossa's Italian campaigns, but more important is Frederick II's papal campaign, which also required a complex logistical structure, and was relatively 'far from home'.I'm not as familiar with Frederick's European campaigns but wasn't he technically King of Italy at the time of that campaign? Of course the medieval kingdom of Italy did not reach as far south as Rome but neither German king would have been overly removed from home.

Edit: Not to mention that he could rely on local supporters throughout Italy and was also King of Sicily

As for expeditions launched 'far from home', why would you go looking for enemies across the sea when your bigger concerns are your enemies right next to you? I think the lack of far reaching expansionism is a concern of security more than of inability.Which was why the crusades were unique in European medieval warfare. They simple do not represent the local conflicts that dominated the era.

As for army size and foraging, I have a sneaking suspicion that everyone is thinking of the Black Prince's chevauchees when they speak of this. It's important to acknowledge that these expeditions, effectively raiding parties, into French territory were solely to pillage and cause unrest. These armies were small by design, and so it's unfair to use them as a basis.Nope. Although it could of course be argued that medieval warfare was rarely waged on a scale greater than chevauchée

The real problem with medieval warfare is that it typically involves relatively small armies close to home and with nothing even resembling a front. While rivers or coastlines could be used to transfer supplies there was nothing resembling a logistical line to home.

Sadly, the typical medieval army cannot be quantified. Armies of various sizes were raised depending upon what was available and what was needed. Crusader armies would often be larger, but this isn't always the case. Of course, in Orthodox countries the concept of crusade was anathema.The crusades do tend to be the most well documented medieval campaigns, if only due to the extensive preparations required to transport them to the Levant, but that is not to suggest that we have no idea as to the composition of pre-crusade armies. Indeed the very comparison with the magnitude of the crusading host serves to illustrate the relative size of armies at the time.

One moderately large non-crusader army was fielded by Pere (Peter) III of Aragon in an attempted expedition against Tunis of about 15,000 men, in 148 ships. I doubt this had a meagre logistical structure.Tell that to Louis IX who died in Tunis after his army was decimated after consuming poor drinking water :smallwink:

Matthew

2007-01-27, 12:59 PM

Om, I believe we are talking at cross purposes.

As far as I can tell, your impression of good logistics is to have a supply line stretching back to one's home base. This is not what we are talking about. That definition clearly does not apply to crusades. However, crusading hosts were not reliant on raiding the countryside for supplies either. They were supplied by sea and by markets arranged ahead of time, supplemented by raiding in times of need and the successful ending of sieges. You can read about this in the Gesta Francorum (First Crusade), De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem (Second Crusade), Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi (Third Crusade).

Now, I'm not saying that raiding played no part in logistics, it was clearly part and parcel of campaigning, but it is not the case that there was no logistical planning beyond expectation of plunder.

If we are going to continue this discourse, though, I suggest we take it one campaign at a time and start citing primary and secondary sources, otherwise we are going to get nowhere.

Maybe we could start with William the Conqueror's invasion of England? We could go back further and discuss Charlemagne's logisitical power base, but I'm afraid my knowledge about that is much more limited.

Dervag

2007-01-27, 03:20 PM

I'm under the impression that reasonably-sized armies of later periods tried very hard to stick to those old Roman roads as much as possible for exactly those reasons.Absolutely, with the caveat that by, say, 1000 AD many of those roads had been overgrown or reduced to dirt paths because somebody had pulled up the paving stones to mark his fields.

Would ya'll be interested to find out what happens if I put the breastplate in front of the longbow at 300 yards, 200 yards, 100 yards, and 50 yards?I, for one, would be.

No matter how many times you do it, there will always be some special case that you haven't tested that will give the pro-weapon people a hole in your tests to dig into.Unless, of course, the arrow penetrates the armor, in which case it will be the pro-armor people digging into your tests.

I'm not as familiar with Frederick's European campaigns but wasn't he technically King of Italy at the time of that campaign? Of course the medieval kingdom of Italy did not reach as far south as Rome but neither German king would have been overly removed from home.His main supporters were in Germany. That's where Barbarossa got most of his troops, and so he'd definitely want a supply train running back to Germany. The Italians were shooting at him; relying on local Italian allies for supply and reinforcement would probably have worked as well for Barabarossa as it did for Hannibal.

Which was why the crusades were unique in European medieval warfare. They simple do not represent the local conflicts that dominated the era.Unique? What about William the Conqueror's invasion of England?

The real problem with medieval warfare is that it typically involves relatively small armies close to home and with nothing even resembling a front.OK, medieval warfare was mostly a war of points and not a war of lines (with linear 'fronts'). However, you can still have supply issues in a war of points. Look at the campaigns of Belisarius for an example.

Neon Knight

2007-01-27, 03:29 PM

I'd like to ask a simple question:

Does the extra barrel on a double barreled shotgun or rifle add a significant amount of weight to the weapon?

Thiel

2007-01-27, 04:54 PM

Not on an "old-style"* shotgun.
I weighed the four shotguns we have at home and the heaviest double barrelled (the barrels are arranged side-by-side) weighed only about 0,4kg more than the single-barrelled one. Obviously these are made for hunting not self-defence, law-enforcement or military purposes.

I don't know about semi-automatic and pump-action although I think they would be a little heavier relatively, since you not only has to ad an extra barrel but also an extra loading mechanism and magazine. Same goes for rifles.

*The ones were you have manually remove and reload the shells.

Fhaolan

2007-01-27, 07:06 PM

Unless, of course, the arrow penetrates the armor, in which case it will be the pro-armor people digging into your tests.

Well, true. :)

I've run into a lot of pro-weapon people in the years I've been doing this kind of thing, but I've only ever run into one pro-armor person. He was a member of my troupe, for several years before I joined, and he was absolutely convinced that when he put on his 16th century Gothic harness that he was completely invulnerable to harm. He was wrong. You have to use the right tool for the job, and swords are a poor tool against full plate armor. You want an impact weapon for cracking plates and distorting metal around joints. If your opponent can't move his elbows, he's pretty much defenseless.

In my opinion. Arrows *can* penetrate many types of plate. There are plates that *can* be proof against arrows. But more often than not, the arrows that kill the knights won't be the ones that hit dead straight onto the breastplate. They'll be the ones through the visors, armpits, and more importantly the inner thighs. I know the last one sounds weird, let me explain.

Here's a detail that most people don't realize. There is no armor on the inside of the thigh on most full plate harnesses. This is because most full plate harnesses are to be worn by horsemen. A plate of metal there will make it very, very hard to stay in your saddle, as that is the part of the leg that grips the side of the horse.

Arrows fired in battlefield conditions will be fired balistically, because that's how you get good range with a bow. This kind of target shooting was standard training for longbowmen. Now-a-days it's rare, but if you do it, it's called 'shooting the clout'. The clout is a cloth target lying flat on the ground. A balistic trajectory means the arrows will be coming down from above, at a slight angle.

The arrows coming down at a slight angle are perfect for hitting the thigh right where it contacts the horse. Where it's not armored. Where there is a major artery.

Wehrkind

2007-01-27, 08:49 PM

Fhaolan hits my point I was trying to make pretty well, which is nice to see upon my return.

Just because your breast plate stops arrows does not mean your entire body is surrounded by it. You have gaps and chinks so you can move, and since it isn't one archer shooting at you, but a few hundred shooting at a few hundred of your buddies, random shots are going to catch you. So while a unit of archers can decimate a unit of unarmored peasants relatively quickly, they are not going to do as much to armored knights, but they will still kill some.

That is why I tend to use percentages. No armor is 100% effective against anything. It is more useful to look at it as "80% of the time an arrow hits, it is not going to find a gap or punch through a plate" for say a full set of plate vs "50% of the time the arrow will be stopped" for a breast plate over mail for example.

No matter how many arrows your breast plate stops, there are always going to be ones that hit your armpits, or your neck, or some other less armored area. My evidence is simple: people die while wearing armor. Armor is a question of degrees of defense, not "no protection vs invulnerable to God".
Even less than perfect armor is helpful, and that is why we saw people wearing leather. It wouldn't stop a lot, but hey, the protection was worth the extra weight and cost. "Optimum" isn't always an option, and often people take what they can get. The insistance in one thing or another being "teh ubar winz!!!1" comes from the assumption that simply because something existed, it was available to everyone at it's highest form.
Perhaps there were top end "fit for a king" long bows that could blow through almost any armor. As likely as not, there were only a few of those in existence at any given time, and others made due with "fit for a commoner" bows of varying fitness. (Quality control is a very difficult aspect of production after all.)
Perhaps there were breastplates that stopped everything at any given time. These masterwork peices might be rare, and most armor was good, but not perfect. Even if most was very good protection, there are always gaps to be found.

archmagedrow

2007-01-27, 11:42 PM

The problem with using an arrow against an armored knight lies not primarily in the breastplate. It is against the layer of chainmail and padding classicaly worn underneath the plate. The plate protects aganst bludgeoning damage when assisted by the leather under armor, and the chain protects against piercing and slashing. The loses are due to arrows penetrating the mail, IE your armor failed., Or the eyeplate. The Gorget that many knights wore also reduces the impact of shots to the neck

Wehrkind

2007-01-28, 12:17 AM

It was always my understanding that chain mail is poor at stopping sharp pointy things with lots of energy.
In fact, I am fairly certain that is the case.

Viscount Einstrauss

2007-01-28, 12:22 AM

It is. In fact, in any case where the projectile moves especially quickly, it can turn those chain links into shrapnel. It's why they didn't try chainmail for bullet protection- while the chains did stop the entrance of the bullet by a bit, the back end of the chainmail had a nasty habit of shooting out tiny bits through the wearer, making the damage far worse then if the bullet hit you naked.

Wehrkind

2007-01-28, 01:07 AM

That is what I was thinking, as well as the fact that arrows with pointy tips (not cutting tips) are unlikely to be stopped by a ring so well as deflected off a plate. Having 1000's of little holes to hold the point still while the force of the arrow drives it in seems like a very poor idea.

Matthew

2007-01-28, 07:17 AM

It's heavily debated, though. The literary / historical depiction of Richard the Lionheart has him described as a Porcupine, so many arrows protruding from his armour, but himself unharmed. On the other hand there are many depictions and descriptions of arrows entering hauberks and killing the combatant. Mail isn't loads of little holes, waiting to be penetrated, but niether is it perfect protection.

Ryujin

2007-01-28, 07:19 AM

I don't know about semi-automatic and pump-action although I think they would be a little heavier relatively, since you not only has to ad an extra barrel but also an extra loading mechanism and magazine. Same goes for rifles.

Most modern civilian pump-action & semi-auto shotguns, empty, weigh about the same as a double-barreled shotgun, about 3 kg to 3.5 kg whereabouts. Not a significant difference unless you intend to hump it in the boonies and every extra ounce gets heavier with every mile.

...and then we have the more exotic stuff, like the USAS-12, DAO-12 & Saiga-12.

Edmund

2007-01-28, 08:15 AM

Well, while the mail itself might be pierced, it is my understanding that the gambeson or aketon beneath would quite often thwart the arrow. That's one of the reasons they wore such padding, after all. That, and blunt trauma.

Edit: I just realised we're on page 35. This discussion might be carried on into GaR-WWoAQ? Mk. V

Viscount Einstrauss

2007-01-28, 09:34 AM

archmagedrow

2007-01-28, 09:39 AM

the soft leathers cant actually help with direct shock. If you are wearing just soft leather when you get hit wih a hammer it doesnt help. The reason it is stacked with plate mail is that the plate redistributes the shock evenly around the body, which is weak enough that the leather helps.

Thiel

2007-01-28, 11:16 AM

...and then we have the more exotic stuff, like the USAS-12, DAO-12 & Saiga-12.
I didn't even know drum-fed shotguns existed.

I can see how you could make a double barrelled Saiga-12 (Saiga-12 + Saiga-12 + Duct Tape = Double-barrelled Saiga-12) but I cant imagine a double-barrelled DAO-12.

Adlan

2007-01-28, 11:26 AM

Mail isn't loads of little holes, waiting to be penetrated, but niether is it perfect protection.

The effectiveness of mail against an arrow is decided very strongly by the arrow head. As with Plate armour, the right head is needed for the right job.

A long needle nosed bodkin is designed to penetrate mail, and does so very well, but against plate armour the thin nose crumples. It works by having a thin end which slips between the links, then widens to split them as the arrow enter the target.

A broadhead is stopped much more effictivly by mail, as the point does not fit between the links, and it impacts over a larger area.

Matthew

2007-01-28, 12:43 PM

This is often said, but there is a counter school of thought that suggests the purpose of the Needle Nose Bodkin was not to penetrate Mail, but to increase shooting range. I can't remember off hand where I came across this assertion, but if I remember I will post it.

Out of interest, is there any literary or visual historical evidence for the Bodkin being intended to penetrate Mail? It has always struck me as somewhat odd that this simple design change should not have been implemented far earlier, given the widespread and lengthy use of Mail.

2007-01-28, 01:28 PM

As far as I can tell, your impression of good logistics is to have a supply line stretching back to one's home base. This is not what we are talking about. That definition clearly does not apply to crusades. However, crusading hosts were not reliant on raiding the countryside for supplies either. They were supplied by sea and by markets arranged ahead of time, supplemented by raiding in times of need and the successful ending of sieges. You're right in that we should clarify what we're talking about here. Logistics is of course an extremely broad term that covers a whole range of activities revolving around the transportation and supply of armies. For example foraging is in itself a logistical matter, albeit an extremely primitive one.

Therefore when I say logistics I am deliberately referring to the modern concept of military supply chain management - the planned practice of supplying an army through the use of a logistical supply route. It’s the difference between securing supplies on site, through purchase or coercion, and managing the supply of materials from a depot.

Now my assertion is that the latter form of supply was almost completely alien to medieval commanders. It simply was not a feature of pre-modern warfare. The very nature of the conflicts, with their lack of fronts, ensured this. Now wherever possible it was of course desirable to use rivers or coastlines as avenues through which additional supplies could be delivered, a practice that probably reached its peak with Richard I in the Levant, but this was hardly the standard for the rest of Europe. To contrast - the Second Crusade was almost entirely an overland affair and a failure to secure supplies doomed it. When Barbarossa repeated the Anatolia route he was able to successfully acquire enough supplies from the local environs to successfully cross the Turkish lands.

So we're talking degrees of logistical planning here. Now Richard's feat was extremely impressive at the time, and compares not unfavourably to the much later Crimean War effort, but how many similar well thought out and well planned efforts were there on anything like the same scale?

Now, I'm not saying that raiding played no part in logistics, it was clearly part and parcel of campaigning, but it is not the case that there was no logistical planning beyond expectation of plunder.What was the logistical plan of the First Crusade once they had passed beyond Byzantine territory? Supplies were purchased wherever possible but the principle method of supply was foraging expeditions which were a constant reality of life on the march.

Maybe we could start with William the Conqueror's invasion of England? We could go back further and discuss Charlemagne's logisitical power base, but I'm afraid my knowledge about that is much more limited.The Norman Conquest illustrates my earlier point regarding the size of medieval armies and the lack of need for complex logistical chains or planning in medieval warfare. William took how many men with him to England? Ten thousand tops?

Unique? What about William the Conqueror's invasion of England?Several thousand men across a few miles of the Channel does not compare to taking 70+ thousand soldiers to the other side of the known world.

Matthew

2007-01-28, 02:02 PM

Third Crusade

Preperations were on a huge scale, but there is nothing to suggest that logistics were foreign to Medieval Armies, rather the opposite.

Second Crusade

Supply problems during the Second Crusade apply mainly to the Germans and are part of their accusation of Byzantine betrayal, the same might be said for Odo and his complaints that they were cut off from their supplies by the Byzantines.

First Crusade

The Byzantine Emperor was supposed to be following the First Crusaders with additional men and supplies. He may also have been supplying them by sea. The fact is we dn't really know what their plans actually were, as the sources are sparse and very retroactively anti Byzantine.
The fact that 'our' ships are said to show up on the coast laden with supplies suggest some sort of logisitc management. The question is exactly how much this was chance and how much preplanning?

Conquest of England

We don't know how many men William had, but even 10,000 is a huge logistics excercise.

I think you are very mistaken with regard to numbers, though. Estimates for Crusader armies are notoriously difficult. 70,000 is almost certainly far too high.

Notes

Please let's try and keep this to one campaign at a time. Jumping about from one subject to another will do us no good. Can we settle on one campaign and discuss the logisitcs, citing sources.

A related question concerns the defining of logistics. Are the Romans aquainted with modern ideas of logistics? Are the Byzantines? I'm certainly not arguing for anything more advanced than what these were capable of, though I would argue that both used supply depots and had a good grasp of logistics.

Edmund

2007-01-28, 02:08 PM

Certainly, the softer leathers underneath were just as important as the plate on the outside. Metal doesn't absorb blunt trauma at all, really. And the chainmail is doing much the same job as the plate on the outside, albeit less well. The leathers absorb shock and catch anything that pierces through the armor instead of trying to deflect it, which is important in the case of any blow that the metal couldn't deflect in the first place.

I disagree in the extreme, and would also like to point out a few inaccuracies.

First and foremost, it would not be leather used in padding, but linen and fustian. Second, fine iron (which is what mail is often made out of) does absorb some blunt trauma. That's why it deforms when struck. If it didn't absorb any, it would just shatter, like glass, which wouldn't happen except with hardened shirts of high carbon steel (which were rather rare, if not altogether nonexistant, though I know of a few tempered shirts).

It's worth noting that mail doesn't deflect anything unless it's moving (it's one of those unfortunate characteristics of maille; it doesn't work as well when you're standing stock-still).

While broadly similar, mail isn't doing the same job as plate. Plate is providing a rigid surface for deflection, mail a semi-flexible and mobile one.

archmagedrow:
A good quilted gambeson actually helps quite a bit with a warhammer. It's basically the principle that if you have to use a significant amount of force crushing the fibres of the fabric and pushing them towards the body, less of that force is going into the body that wears said fabric.

It's the fundamental principle of padding.

Matthew:
I've also heard that theory from a fellow named Dan Howard. I'll have to look up the sources in more detail...

Ignoring the material evidence for the argument (complete lack of steel bodkins, but lots of hardened steel broadheads), from my understanding it goes something like this:

Needle-noses probably wouldn't be particularly effective. They'd have terrible problems going through padding, for which a razor-sharp broadhead would be much more suited (cutting the stuff rather than pushing it aside). And considering that not everyone on the battlefield would be wearing metal armour (I'd expect to see more padding than anything) a cutting edge would likely be more suited for heavy casualties, especially against things like horses.

Edit: Should add that Frederik I's army for the Third Crusade was estimated to be about 100,000 by contemporaries (which is obviously an exaggeration).

Jonathan Riley-Smith says this of that particular army

... the land route was again chosen. The Hugarians, Serbians, Greeks, and even the Turks of Konya told of the plans. The Greeks received the assurance that there would be peaceful passage through the empire and they in turn promised to provide guides and supplies ...
the estimates of 100,000 men made by contemporaries was certainly an exaggeration, but it must have been one of the largest crusading armies, if not the largest, ever to take the field. It was well organised and discipline was strictly maintained.The Byzantine Emperor changed his mind, however, after making a pact with Saladin, and the Germans found themselves harassed all the way to the Dardanelles, to the point that Frederik considered laying siege Constantinople.

Om:
I'm beginning to agree with you, although I do think that a well-stocked, travelling baggage train (effectively weapons-and-meals-on-wheels) counts as decent logistics, though obviously the amenities would have to be stocked *with* the train, which leads to great annoyances when journeying deep into enemy territory.

Matthew

2007-01-28, 02:50 PM

With regard to demographics, we have to draw a distinction between combatants and non combatants. Modern estimates for William's army (around 10,000) do not include Non Combatants, as far as I am aware.

Saint Louis' Crusade (which was exceptionally well organised and large) does not seem to have included more than 30,000 Combatants. The Fourth Crusade about a third of that number (though many more were intended).

100,000 is *very* high. I wouldn't be surprised if it was more in the order of 30,000, 50,000 absolute maximum. Hangers on are another story, but many servants doubled as combatants. It's the additional pilgrims that were the problem, but by the time of the Third Crusade, these were all but prohibited from accompanying crusades.

We must define logisitcs before any further progress can be made. Key to this discussion is whether the Romans are considered aquainted with modern ideas of logistics.

2007-01-28, 04:37 PM

Please let's try and keep this to one campaign at a time. Jumping about from one subject to another will do us no good. Can we settle on one campaign and discuss the logisitcs, citing sources.How do you want to do this then? Pick an expedition and we'll go. Unfortunately I'll not have access to my primary source of crusade knowledge (Tyerman's excellent work) until Monday week. I'll do what I can in the meantime though.

Of course you have to bear in mind that, as I mention above, the crusades were very much exceptions in terms of scale and distances from typical medieval warfare. This is pretty much self-evident.

A related question concerns the defining of logistics. Are the Romans aquainted with modern ideas of logistics? Are the Byzantines? I'm certainly not arguing for anything more advanced than what these were capable of, though I would argue that both used supply depots and had a good grasp of logistics.Honestly I don't know. Its not a field with which I'm familiar.

If I had to say, and this is in no way supported by any evidence on my part, then given the relatively centralised nature of both societies I'd consider it perfectly plausible that they would have more a more developed logistical infrastructure. You could argue that the same centralisation was a primary reason for the supreme organisation of Richard's crusade. Compare to the efforts and impotence of Philip of France.

Actually I like that theory a lot. It would make a great deal of sense if a centralised state was a prerequisite of the development of logistical structures and methods.

With regards the numbers: going from memory I believe that the figures recorded were 70k for the First Crusade (the Princes' Crusade at its peak) and both Conrad and Barbarossa mustered approx 100k men for the Second and Third crusades respectively. I can't recall the numbers mustered by Richard and Philip. Obviously due to both my poor memory and inaccuracies in the original accounts these figures should be taken with a pinch of salt and for now I merely use them as placemarkers.

Later crusades are harder to quantify however as the developing trade routes across the Mediterranean altered the pattern of crusading. Instead of embarking on crusade for months or years it would become fashionable to do a few weeks in Egypt before returning home. I recall that this was a serious gripe of the leaders of the Fifth Crusade and led to a significant breakdown on the cohesion of the crusaders - always a major strength.

I'm beginning to agree with you, although I do think that a well-stocked, travelling baggage train (effectively weapons-and-meals-on-wheels) counts as decent logistics, though obviously the amenities would have to be stocked *with* the train, which leads to great annoyances when journeying deep into enemy territory.As I say its a matter of degrees. Certainly the baggage trains, in conjunction with trade and foraging, fulfilled some basic logistical function but it is a world removed from what we would consider modern logistics... which is largely concerned with supply chain management.

Raum

2007-01-28, 04:48 PM

Therefore when I say logistics I am deliberately referring to the modern concept of military supply chain management - the planned practice of supplying an army through the use of a logistical supply route. It’s the difference between securing supplies on site, through purchase or coercion, and managing the supply of materials from a depot.
Are you saying medieval armies didn't use "modern" logistics or no armies used them prior the last few centuries?

If it's the latter, I'd point out Alexander the Great's campaigns...he took his army across more than 11,000 miles in eight years. Not something you can do without being an expert at logistics.

If you're just saying medieval europeans didn't use logistics, I'd have to agree with Matthew's request to discuss specific campaigns. Some commanders were far better than others, so taking examples from different campaigns can find evidence for both.

Adlan

2007-01-28, 05:39 PM

I've also heard that theory from a fellow named Dan Howard. I'll have to look up the sources in more detail...

Ignoring the material evidence for the argument (complete lack of steel bodkins, but lots of hardened steel broadheads), from my understanding it goes something like this:

Needle-noses probably wouldn't be particularly effective. They'd have terrible problems going through padding, for which a razor-sharp broadhead would be much more suited (cutting the stuff rather than pushing it aside). And considering that not everyone on the battlefield would be wearing metal armour (I'd expect to see more padding than anything) a cutting edge would likely be more suited for heavy casualties, especially against things like horses.

A Bodkin to me seems plenty sharp enough to penetrate a Gambision of Leather, or Linen. I do not actually know what the standard range of arrows carried by archers were, it would be interesting to see a list of the type, and ratio, but I doubt the means to find out exist.

As to the theory of a needle Nosed Bodkin flying Furthur, this seems a bit daft to me. Why should a longer point travel any furthur than a shorter one? It has no special properties, other than the increased mass at the end of the arrow, and while a few grains may effect it, it will effect far more an archers accuracy, than his range, I would not expect his range to be increaed by very much, If the increase in mass and corresponding increase in distance for cast were a viable reason, I would expect a better design of head, rather than the tapering bodkin.

(I can actually test this, next chance I get, I will test my 100gr and my 80gr heads on a clout shoot, and see if one gets further than the other.)

Matthew

2007-01-28, 05:56 PM

Those numbers are well beyond what I would consider credible. The thing about medieval demographics is that they follow the usual pattern of outrageous inflation and hyperbole. No credible figures were ever recorded. Many diverse figures were.

My contention is that Medieval Armies in general were better organised, equipped and supplied than is usually thought.

Let's take the First Crusade, as we both seem to be on familiar territory with it.

1) What are we aiming to show? What I am saying is that Medieval Armies did not simply subsist off the land, but made logistical plans. I am not saying that they had supply bases stretching back to the 'homeland', but I am saying that they made provisions, bougt supplies, carried supplies, stored supplies and were supplied by sea. We must define the terms of what we wish to show, as so far I do not really see what the problem is.

2) Demographics. Estimates for the Armies of the First Crusade (collectively) range from 30,000 to hundreds of thousands, dependng on what sources you use and believe. I don't believe the princes could have mustered any more than 50,000 and it would have been considerably less by the time they reached the Holy Land. If we don't have an agreement about demographics we cannot agree about logistics. Similarly, the ratio of Combatants to Non Combatants must be discussed in some way.

3) Primary Sources. We must have discussion of sources and critical assessment. Fortunately, we are well equipped for the First Crusade, as there are a great many sources available. The easiest thing is to use the Gesta Francorum and go through it passage by passage looking for evidence of logistics or lack of logistics. The Alexiad is also a handy Byzantine point of view. I'm always open to the use of other sources, but I don't have any others immediately to hand.

4) Secondary Sources. The books I have to hand are: Thomas Asbridge's The First Crusade (a quick a dirty, but recent, popular history), Riley Smith's The Crusades: A History (a recent general history), Mayer's The Crusades (an older general history), Tyerman's England and the Crusades (just since you mentioned him) and John France's paper 'Crusading Warfare' in Helen Nicholson's The Crusades. There are also a number of papers available in Jstor, that might be worth a look, if you have access.

5) Online Resources:

http://www.deremilitari.org/
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/medieval.html

If you indicate which works of Tyerman you are relying on, I will endeavour to get access to them, but you should be aware that some of his ideas run directly contrary to the mainstream study (not necessarily a bad thing).

If this is amiable to you we can begin to establish a dialogue. If you have any other resources to add, please do indicate.

Wehrkind

2007-01-28, 07:29 PM

In regards to Roman logistics, I recall that in Caesar's Gallic Wars, he ends every campaign season requisitioning corn from the local allied/conquered Gallic villages. I don't remember any mention of supply wagons or the like from Rome itself, so it would seem that these local villages and towns were the main source of basic sustenance, with foraging and hunting probably making up the rest.

A more modern example of foraging and raiding for supplies would be Sherman's march to Atlanta in the Civil War (American). He had approximately 100K men, marched hundreds of miles and had no problems with supply. It should be noted he was marching largely unstopped and through large agrarian areas, however.

Edit: Forgot to talk about arrows.

Addressing arrows: It is MUCH harder to cut leather or cloth than to stick something pointy through it. Buy a peice of leather of reasonably thickness and try poking an awl through it vs a sharp knife. That's the whole point of awls in the first place.
The reason archers use sharp edged broad heads is to maximize the cutting damage done to an animal or person, neither of which come stock with armor. The idea is to do as much cutting as possible in an attempt to sever major blood vessels since arrows do not cause enough shock on hit to drop something by themselves. This is why most bow hunters have to track an animal they have already shot.
A pointy (needle like) is not going to cause as much wounding and trauma. The only reason to use it is to punch through tough material better (like an awl through leather.) The reason it was so slow in being developed is probably linked to the fact that in normal use (hunting) a Bodkin is quite inferior to a broad head. It probably never occured to anyone that an arrow head type that was a poor choice for killing deer would be much better than the other type for killing men in armor. It may also be that since full armor was relatively uncommon for a while (compared to the vast numbers of levies in lighter armor with shields) archers had no problems killing with broad heads while sort of giving heavily armored targets a miss (or shooting the less armored horse out from underneath them.)

To correct a point made earlier: Metal plate is excellent for distributing shock from blunt impact. Far superior to mail. Mail has very little ability to distribute the force over a larger area, instead relying on compression of itself and it's padding to dampen shock. Not too bad if you are only absorbing a sword shot (not very good though), but worthless for a mass weapon.

Dervag

2007-01-28, 07:47 PM

This is often said, but there is a counter school of thought that suggests the purpose of the Needle Nose Bodkin was not to penetrate Mail, but to increase shooting range.It could do both. It's not as if weapon modifications never have multiple benefits.

We don't know how many men William had, but even 10,000 is a huge logistics excercise.Yup. Especially without railroads and steamships.

It's worth noting that mail doesn't deflect anything unless it's moving (it's one of those unfortunate characteristics of maille; it doesn't work as well when you're standing stock-still).Why not?

Om:
I'm beginning to agree with you, although I do think that a well-stocked, travelling baggage train (effectively weapons-and-meals-on-wheels) counts as decent logistics, though obviously the amenities would have to be stocked *with* the train, which leads to great annoyances when journeying deep into enemy territory.Right. Having a proper baggage train is like having a supply depot that you can roll around behind the army. If your army is small enough that its 'supply depot' can feasibly be carted around this way, then that is actually a good solution.

In regards to Roman logistics, I recall that in Caesar's Gallic Wars, he ends every campaign season requisitioning corn from the local allied/conquered Gallic villages. I don't remember any mention of supply wagons or the like from Rome itself, so it would seem that these local villages and towns were the main source of basic sustenance, with foraging and hunting probably making up the rest.Corn/grain is heavy; carting it long distances is difficult. Extorting it from the local population is much easier. So if your army sets out to conquer a province and garrison it, then you might well plan in advance that food supplies will be drawn from the province. That doesn't work as well for armies marching off into desert country, of course.

Ryujin

2007-01-29, 01:43 AM

To correct a point made earlier: Metal plate is excellent for distributing shock from blunt impact. Far superior to mail. Mail has very little ability to distribute the force over a larger area, instead relying on compression of itself and it's padding to dampen shock. Not too bad if you are only absorbing a sword shot (not very good though), but worthless for a mass weapon.

Indeed; it's also the laws of conservation of momentum at work. The object which a missile strikes will acquire a velocity inversely proportional to its mass....and the individual mail links have little mass.

Wehrkind

2007-01-29, 03:35 AM

Not just a question of conservation of momentum, but also how force works. The amount of penetrating power of an object is force/area. That's why knives cut better than a yard stick.
When you strike a plate of armor with a surface area of 4x4 in with something, say a club with a striking surface of 2x2in, you are going from 4sq inches to 16. Hence, that rather small plate just dimished the strength of the blow by a factor of 4.

The momentum really comes into play in full sets where each peice is attached to another, as individual plates are not terribly heavy, not enough to really slow things down for the most part.

archmagedrow

2007-01-29, 01:46 PM

Wehrkind

2007-01-29, 08:30 PM

If it hits a plate, yes, it is likely to be deflected. Less likely than a broad head, but still likely.

If it hits mail, it needs to be stopped, since the tip will easily put itself into the holes in the chain and push in. A good bit more likely to go through. One has to hope the arrow hits at an angle and doesn't direct it's force efficiently, or hope that the ring doesn't burst and thus catches the arrow before it goes the whole way through. A leather jerkin and padding is not nearly enough to stop an arrow, of any sort.

Swordguy

2007-01-29, 08:39 PM

ah, yes but full plate mail layers the peices of plate of a layer of chainmail. The chainmail itself was placed over a soft leather jerkin. The jerkin was placed over a linined shirt as mentioned. Thus the protection for each type is stacked. Which is Why the needle nosed arrow would not be particularly effective.

Largely incorrect sir. Full Plate armor is worn over and is attacked to a padded linen aketon. This aketon very often has patches of chainmail, called gussets, sewn into it to fit precisely into the area where the plate cannot protect.

It IS correct that plates were worn over full chainmail hauberks (which had leather liners). This happened during the Transitional period of armor (ending about 1425-1450). However, this was when plate armor was evolving from individual plates (gutter greaves, elbow rondels) to a linked and articulated total protective system. Cherbourg plate(circa 1400, often seen with a hounskull helm), for example, is worn over more or less a full hauberk. Cherbourg plate is also not particuraly good for body coverage, and relies a lot on the mail to cover large gaps. However, once what we consider to be "Full" Plate developed, the use of whole-body chainmail hauberks under the plate fell by the wayside (largely a function of weight - 50 lbs for the hauberk plus 50 lbs for the plate results in too much weight to effectively fight in).

I reference you here:
http://www.paladin-online.com/thekeep/ArmingPages/armingpage.htm

This is a page that shows the arming-up process for a suit of Milanese plate (circa oh...1450ish). It also shows what goes UNDER the plate.

Wehrkind

2007-01-29, 09:20 PM

Wow, that was a great site. Makes me somewhat ashamed of my pretty, but comparatively less high tech suit of scale.

For those who said "armor was not terribly expensive"

It is almost impossible to fathom, but it was stated on the History Channel's "Arms in Action" that each knight outfitted in full plate armor by the crown was the modern cost equivalent of an M-1 Abrams tank. That is a multi-million dollar piece of machinery! It makes me smile to image a group of liberal, feminists picketing outside the Tower of London demanding cutbacks in military spending and more money for education and welfare!
Perhaps a bit of hyperbole, since the History channel just makes things up, but a good point. The long bit about how apprentices had to train for years to make the stuff demonstrates how exact it had to be, and each peice being made by different people and shops demonstrates just why it could take so long to make any big changes, as all involved would have to change what they did, and pass it by the guilds.

Swordguy

2007-01-29, 10:00 PM

Wow, that was a great site. Makes me somewhat ashamed of my pretty, but comparatively less high tech suit of scale.

I've had that site bookmarked for YEARS. It's been a massive help to me getting my plate together and showing me how it connects to the aketon. Basically, I've got 5 grand invested in my armor and a freaking homemade aketon (I SO want one from Historic Enterprises...but they're $500-ish) with no gussets because I don't have anyone around to show me how they work. (We didn't use gussets when I jousted...)

Wehrkind

2007-01-29, 10:20 PM

Yea, the expense and maintenance of plate is what puts me off of it. I fight in a lighter scale hauberk made of leather, with leather forearms and legs. Not much rust to deal with, and easier to assemble. A -lot- cheaper than 5K too :) Granted, my new helmet is going to kick it over ~1500$, so I am getting there...

Fhaolan

2007-01-29, 11:30 PM

Maintenance of plate is a pain, but I've actually found maille to be harder to maintain once it starts to go. Of course, I'm using modern chemicals to protect and clean the armor, because I'm my own squire. :smallsmile:

Weirdly enough, I've found silicone spray lubricant to be the best for protecting my plate. Other people in the group swear by duralube motor oil. As long as you clean it with a green scrubby pad and oil it after every day of use, it keeps quite well. Any rust from the day tends to be just surface and comes off nicely. Don't use WD-40, because that actually damages the oils in any leather straps and causes them to dry out faster.

Once maille starts rusting, I'm done. I've found *nothing* that will help. I've tried tumbling in barrels of sand, brass brushes on a hand-drill (not recommended unless you know *exactly* what you're doing), de-rusting chemicals, etc. The maille rings are just too thin. Once they start rusting, they weaken very, very quickly. Luckily, my wife weaves maille and made all my hauberks (as well as her own, and a dozen or so others), and will replace rings when they go bad.

Wehrkind

2007-01-29, 11:48 PM

Yea, those are a lot of the same problems I hear from people that have owned mail. I only know one guy who fights with it as standard armor, and the little bugger is quick, but still get good sized bruises. His might be something other than steel though, come to think on it. It never seemed rusty, but was a pretty dull, flat color... perhaps aluminum.

For my money, and distaste for maintenance, waxed leather is the way to go :)

Fhaolan

2007-01-30, 12:08 AM

Might be galvanized, which is what I like to deal with. Regular steel rusts too quickly. Stainless and aluminum just look wrong. Gun-bluing regular steel (both maille and plate) is interesting, and it lasts longer than normal steel, but it still rusts after awhile unless you're constantly renewing the coating. I've seen powder-coated armor, and that was just funny. The friction rubs the coating off *fast* and it rusts almost instantaneously after that.

Supposedly a lot of period plate was painted, although most suits in museums I've seen were plain. That would protect somewhat against rust, but it would still be a pain to maintain, just for different reasons.

Wehrkind

2007-01-30, 12:15 AM

is lacquer (sp) similar to paint in that regard? I am not terribly knowledgable when it comes to metal coatings.

Hehe I suppose one could get their plate nickel coated. Get a shield with spinnaz and pick up some wenches pimp stylin.

Fhaolan

2007-01-30, 12:54 AM

is lacquer (sp) similar to paint in that regard? I am not terribly knowledgable when it comes to metal coatings.

Given that I've switched back to talking about period armor, I don't know. Lacquer, enamel, paint... I honestly don't know what was available in, say the 15th century, and what was commonly used to decorate armor. It's not covered by any of the sources I have in my library. They say 'enamel', and don't go into detail as what precisely they mean by that term.

Hehe I suppose one could get their plate nickel coated. Get a shield with spinnaz and pick up some wenches pimp stylin.

Okay, *that* is a fun mental image. I'm also seeing the stupid large-brim hat with the feather sitting on top of the helm...

Wehrkind

2007-01-30, 01:07 AM

The hat's gotta be purple felt, with a big pink ostrich feather. Verily, forsooth.

Funny how they never bother to mention just what they enamel it with. I suppose at the time it was common knowledge.

I have seen people make little leather covers for their plate, though mostly the field marshal style harnesses. Whether that is to prevent rust or simply cover it up and make it a pretty color, I don't know.

Ryujin

2007-01-30, 01:26 AM

Speaking of rustproofing, how effective was the treatment done on sixteenth-century Black-&-White armours?

WhiteHarness

2007-01-30, 03:40 AM

(I SO want one from Historic Enterprises...but they're $500-ish) with no gussets because I don't have anyone around to show me how they work. (We didn't use gussets when I jousted...)

I can't say enough good things about my HE arming doublet and mail bits. Here is a photo of my friend Doug wearing my doublet and legharness, just prior to putting on the rest of the suit. The mail skirt isn't pictured. Please forgive the jeans.

http://www.dougconfere.com/images/000_0054_small.JPG

Here's the rest of the suit (though these pics were taken before I got ambitious and finally laced the voyders in) Forgive also the rust on the suit; it had seen heavy use that month:

http://www.mediumaevum.com/josh/Picture%20021.jpg

http://www.mediumaevum.com/josh/Picture%20039.jpg

I fancy that I'd be pretty safe in it from most threats on a medieval battlefield.

Wehrkind

2007-01-30, 04:48 AM

That's a nice suit. I particularly like the all around lower greaves. I technically don't need the backing bits, but I am thinking of adding a wrap around on my leather greaves since the way they sit now (just the front part) wears a hole in my leg if I don't have at least an Ace bandage wrapped around my calf.
The shoulders are also very nice (mine are pretty poor; I usually just wear a large metal gorget and forego shoulder point protection, a short term "solution").

How are the gauntlets constructed? It looks like the left is individually fingered, though I can't tell if the right is a full clamshell or not. (If they are both individually fingered, where did you get them, and what was the cost?)

Looking at the set, I can see how arrows, fired en masse, could really cause problems. The armpits are, out of necessity, very open, as are the inner thighs (as Fhaolin had mentioned.) Still, I would not want to have the choice of "Shoot this man with an arrow or die". Much rather have my poleaxe :)

2007-01-30, 08:52 AM

The First Crusade it is then.

What are we aiming to showMy contention here is twofold. Firstly that there was no logistical planning or organisation in the modern sense of the term - that is, that few if any long term preparations were made for supplying an army in the Levant. Secondly that the primary means of supply for the crusader host was through foraging and purchase of supplies on site where possible. Again the principle point is that the supplying of the army was a relatively impromptu affair in which local resources were dominant and almost wholly relied upon.

This runs contrary to all modern logistical theory and even that of Richard I. Really you can say that the basis of modern logistical units is to ensure that forces do not have to rely on local resources. In short I argue that the logistics of the First Crusade were rudimentary at best.

With regards demographics… well this is where I need my academic sources. Until then I'll not present a solid figure. That said I do consider a starting figure of 70k to be plausible with a core of 10-20k surviving until Ascalon. With regards the composition, I'd imagine that any "excess baggage" would not have lasted through Anatolia and the that army rapidly shrank during the summer months of 1097. I'm in no position to argue these however.

Primary sources: I rely heavily on Gesta below. He really is a fascinating read.

Secondary sources: The only work relating to the First Crusade that I currently have access to is Tyerman's rather general history God's War

Online Resources: I make extensive use of De Re Militari archive below, if only for access to Gesta's accounts, and would only really add http://san.beck.org/AB18-Crusaders.html as an online secondary source. Sadly its unsourced but after a quick skim it seems adequate enough.

----

I'll get things rolling with a brief explanation of why I don't consider the First Crusade to have little logistical depth and almost completely reliant on local conditions and supplies.

In the first case we can safely disregard the notion that the Prince's crusade carried or organised supplies over vast distances from their homelands. The crusaders stopped at number of markets en route to Constantinople and the bulk of the crusader armies negotiated market access with various parties, including the Hungarians and Byzantines, and relied upon these for sustenance. Where market access was unavailable, or relations with authorities broke down, the crusaders resorted to seizing foodstuff. Bohemund engaged in some of this [1] while Emicho saw his army gutted by the Hungarians.

However Byzantine influence in 1096 effectively ended at the Bosporus and one of the first acts of the crusaders was the seizure of Nicaea. While supplies were not an issue at this siege, due to the generosity of Bohemund and the proximity of Byzantium [2], on leaving for the march through Anatolia the crusaders would no longer be operating in friendly, if not exactly hostile, territory. As befitting an army that lived off the land the conditions of the marching army greatly varied according to the terrain and resources at hand. Gesta describes the scene:

Accordingly, we were following them through deserts, and dry and uninhabitable land, from which we scarcely escaped and came out alive. Hunger and thirst pinched us on all sides, and there was absolutely nothing for us to eat, unless, by chance, tearing and grinding grain with our hands, we continued to exist on such food as wretchedly as possible. There most of our cavalry ceased to exist, because (thereafter) many of these became foot-soldiers. For want of horses, our men used oxen in place of cavalry horses, and because of the very great need, goats, sheep, and dogs served as beasts of burden.

Meanwhile we began to enter the best land, filled with bodily nourishment, delicacies, and goods of all kinds, and then we approached Iconium. The inhabitants of that land persuaded and advised us to take along skins filled with water, because there is the greatest lack of water about one day's march from there. [3] It can be clearly seen that the fortunes and hardships of the crusaders changed with the terrain and richness of the land through which they marched. No supplies were forthcoming from the Byzantine territories to the rear while there was obviously no possibility of naval supplies. So as their own provisions ran out the Latins made use of the land to survive. This was a common thread throughout the march through Anatolia and Armenia [4]

Of course the lengthy siege of Antioch also required considerable supplies. The majority of these were secured by a joint foraging expedition, including up to 20,000 men, staged by Bohemund and Robert of Flanders.[5] This was how the crusaders survived at Antioch.

Now with regards supplies by sea, as far as I can see there were a total of three different arrivals to the crusader camp via sea. We have thirteen Genoese ships (arrived Antioch, October 1097), Edgar Atheling's fleet (Antioch, March 1098) and a Pisan raiding fleet (Latakia, after the fall of Jerusalem). There was an additional Byzantine fleet could not catch up with the army. [6]

None of these arrivals had been arranged by the crusader host themselves. They were themselves crusaders who had sailed from Europe to partake in the campaign to take Jerusalem but were not actually associated with the Princes. While their supplies and ships were useful, particularly those of Edgar Atheling, they cannot be said to have been called for or by the crusaders and were more a happy accident than anything else.

From the above I think its fairly straightforward to say that the survival of the crusade hinged on the acquisition of provisions from the immediate lands. It took the crusaders approx five months to cross Anatolia… an unpleasant journey during the height of summer. In these five months they had access to no supplies from Byzantium or any access to the Mediterranean. The only possible way to survive was living from the land and the procurement of supplies from settlements and cities that they encountered. This behaviour did not noticeably change at or after Antioch [7]

References:

[1] Gesta: There we solemnly celebrated Christmas. We remained there for several days and sought a market, but the people were unwilling to accord it to us, because they feared us greatly, thinking that we came not as pilgrims, but to devastate their land and to kill them. Wherefore we took their cattle, horses, asses, and everything that we found.
http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/sources/firstcrusade.htm

[2] Gesta: After the illustrious man, Bohemund, came, he ordered the greatest market to be brought by sea, and it came both ways at the same time, this by land and that by sea, and there was the greatest abundance in the whole army of Christ.

[3] Ibid

[4] Gesta: Then we came to a certain city, Coxon by name, in which there was the greatest abundance of all goods which we needed. Thereupon, the Christian inhabitants of that city surrendered immediately, and we remained there three days very well provided for, and our men were greatly refreshed.

[5] Gesta: Now grain and all food began to be excessively dear before the birthday of the Lord. We did not dare to go outside; we could find absolutely nothing to eat within the land of the Christians, and no one dared to enter the land of the Saracens without a great army. At last holding a council, our seignors decided how they might care for so many people. They concluded in the council that one part of our force should go out diligently to collect food

[6] http://san.beck.org/AB18-Crusaders.html

[7] Gesta: Accordingly, we left the fortified town and came toTripoli on the sixth day of the week on the thirteenth day of incoming May, and we stayed there for three days. At length, the King of Tripoli made an agreement with the leaders, and he straight‑ away loosed to them more than three hundred pilgrims who had been captured there and gave fifteen thousand besants and fifteen horses of great value; he likewise gave us a great market of horses, asses, and all goods, whence the whole army of Christ was greatly enriched.

Fhaolan

2007-01-30, 12:51 PM

How are the gauntlets constructed? It looks like the left is individually fingered, though I can't tell if the right is a full clamshell or not. (If they are both individually fingered, where did you get them, and what was the cost?)

Interestingly enough, that suit is almost identical to the one I have. :smallsmile: Not quite, but very, very close. Mine was made by a local armorer who doesn't do orders anymore, to my knowledge. His metalwork is very good, but the fitting wasn't that great, and you had to sit on him to make him do the work.

The gauntlets are a very interesting Italian design. On mine (which may be different from the above one), the individual finger plates are sewn to the leather gloves inside the clamshell gauntlet. Unlike other clamshells, however, the 'shell' part isn't fixed to the tips of the fingers. This gives a lot more flexibility than a pure clamshell gauntlet, and isn't as 'expensive' to make as a true fingered gauntlet.

Apparantly, the harness is supposed to have an exchange piece: an lockable full clamshell gauntlet for the rein hand. It's one of the pieces I don't have.

Oh, and just for completeness' sake, here I am in my harness.

http://www.seattleknights.com/gallery/gallerypicture.asp?Picture=1926

WhiteHarness

2007-01-30, 03:14 PM

My gauntlets are constructed just like Fhaolan's, in that the finger-scales are riveted to leather strips which are sewn to gloves, and then riveted inside the gauntlets. The left one is heavier and has only one articulation over the fingers, and the right one is lighter and more mobile; the pauldrons are likewise asymmetrical. I have a lance rest on the way. It will occupy the bare space on the upper right side of the breastplate. The gauntlet cuffs were made by Patrick Thaden, like most of the rest of the suit, but I made the remainder of the gauntlets myself, though with Thaden's advice and help.

My biggest worry with mass arrow-fire would be my legs, honestly. Most of the upper body is defended by at least two layers of steel, exceeding 3.5mm in thickness at some points, notably through the front of the helmet and cuirass--I put the suit together with jousting in mind. The legharness, however, are fairly thin by comparison, just like on a real suit. It weighs, altogether, around 70 pounds, inclusive of the mail and undergarments. It fits me well and I preserve a great deal of mobility in it. Here is a photo of me performing a cartwheel just to show off:

http://www.mediumaevum.com/josh/Picture%20008.jpg

Mike_G

2007-01-30, 03:27 PM

A further point about archery is that massed arrows would be more likely to hit the horses than riders, and barding is seldom as complete as these suits you guys are discussing. Dropping a horse or two can slow or disrupt a charge, and may well pin or injure the rider as the mount falls. I don't think a troop of longbowmen could stop a charge of plate armored knights if they were standing alone and unsupported in an open field, but that was never their role. Properly protected by pits, stakes or spearmen, they can inflict losses and break up a charge, dropping horses, lighly armored soldiers and getting the occaisional lucky hit on a knight.

I'm not sure of the proportion of fully plate armored men in a given army, but the longbow would have been quite deadly to anyone less well armored than that. In fact, driving the enemy missile support from the field by outshooting lightly armored crossbowmen, would give the English an advantage.

The use of the longbow in offese cannot be overlooked. Softening up an enemy infantry unit for a cavalry charge is a tried and true tactic, and could have changed the outcome of Bannockburn had Edward used his archers better. The fact that the Scots didn't win very many battles like that one indicates that the schiltron was not an invincible formation, and I doubt one would hold up long under a barrage of arrows.

Adlan

2007-01-30, 04:18 PM

Looking at the set, I can see how arrows, fired en masse, could really cause problems. The armpits are, out of necessity, very open, as are the inner thighs (as Fhaolin had mentioned.) Still, I would not want to have the choice of "Shoot this man with an arrow or die". Much rather have my poleaxe :)

I would Gladly stand behind you and soften up the foe (A Good yeoman am I, too poor for a plate suit). Combined arms is what wins battles.

If the french had used their missile support effectivly (or used an tactic other than get to the foe in a straightline, glory to the foremost, shame to the hindmost), then they would have stood a much better chance in battle against the english, particularly Agincourt.

Combined Arms, Mounted Knights, Light and Heavy infantry, and Artillary support (and 1/2 inch thick arrows are my idea of medival modible artillary.) The problem with combined arms and warfare is the chivalric ideas of nobles, who refuse to use their troops for purpose, and instead insist on say, charging a veritible hedgehog of spears across a narrow bridge, or straight into the field of fire of a few thousand anrgy bowmen.

Mike_G

2007-01-30, 05:59 PM

I would Gladly stand behind you and soften up the foe (A Good yeoman am I, too poor for a plate suit). Combined arms is what wins battles.

QFT.

Ooh-rah.

Matthew

2007-01-30, 08:08 PM

My contention here is twofold. Firstly that there was no logistical planning or organisation in the modern sense of the term - that is, that few if any long term preparations were made for supplying an army in the Levant. Secondly that the primary means of supply for the crusader host was through foraging and purchase of supplies on site where possible. Again the principle point is that the supplying of the army was a relatively impromptu affair in which local resources were dominant and almost wholly relied upon.

Nobody is suggesting that Medieval Armies in general or the First Crusade in particular had anything like the logistical planning that takes place in modern warfare. The technology of the time precludes it. Indeed, I have no problem with the idea that foraging and purchase were means of supplying the crusade. However, I would lay the emphasis the other way round, saying that the primary means of supply for the crusader host was through purchase (or gift from courted allies) and where necessary through seizure of goods. They were certainly also supplied by sea and made efforts to secure ports for exactly the purpose of receiving ships.

In short I argue that the logistics of the First Crusade were rudimentary at best.

Compared to modern standards, sure, but nobody is arguing this relative to modern standards, but rather to what was possible during this time period. The First Crusaders were at a logistical disadvantage, being far from Latin territory, but they were well acquainted with the necessities of logistical supply.

In the first case we can safely disregard the notion that the Prince's crusade carried or organised supplies over vast distances from their homelands. The crusaders stopped at number of markets en route to Constantinople and the bulk of the crusader armies negotiated market access with various parties, including the Hungarians and Byzantines, and relied upon these for sustenance. Where market access was unavailable, or relations with authorities broke down, the crusaders resorted to seizing foodstuff. Bohemund engaged in some of this [1] while Emicho saw his army gutted by the Hungarians.

Indeed, but they did bring a great deal of money with them. Whenever planned logistics failed, the Crusaders were driven to raid, but this is not the same thing as planning to raid. Also, it is worth bearing in mind that Bohemond had a very bad reputation with the Byzantines. The other armies that marched ahead of him had a better time of it on the march to Constantinople.

However Byzantine influence in 1096 effectively ended at the Bosporus and one of the first acts of the crusaders was the seizure of Nicaea. While supplies were not an issue at this siege, due to the generosity of Bohemund and the proximity of Byzantium [2], on leaving for the march through Anatolia the crusaders would no longer be operating in friendly, if not exactly hostile, territory. As befitting an army that lived off the land the conditions of the marching army greatly varied according to the terrain and resources at hand. Gesta describes the scene:

Indeed, as far as Nicea the Crusaders were well furnished with supplies. Asbridge has this to say:

Alexius also took steps to ensure that the crusaders had ready access to food and supplies. On his orders, the poorer Franks were given money and free provisions. Merchant ships were brought from across the Mediterranean to set up markets at the port of Civetot, where corn, meat, wine, barley and oil could be bought, while the traffic along the road back to Nicomedia must have been nearly constant. The Greeks were obviously committed to this complex web of logistical support, because in spite of the immense size of the crusader army, we hear few reports of severe shortages or starvation.

The First Crusade, p. 121.

The last clause probably refers to the assertion of the Gesta that a number of poor starved to death at the siege. The Gesta is talking up its hero, Bohemond.

It can be clearly seen that the fortunes and hardships of the crusaders changed with the terrain and richness of the land through which they marched. No supplies were forthcoming from the Byzantine territories to the rear while there was obviously no possibility of naval supplies. So as their own provisions ran out the Latins made use of the land to survive. This was a common thread throughout the march through Anatolia and Armenia [4]

The march through Anatolia is an interesting one, as from the end of June until the beginning of August they passed through lands that are sometimes described as the Anatolian desert. Either they were desolate to begin with or devastated by Kilij Arslan’s retreat. What is remarkable is that the Crusaders were carrying enough supplies to actually manage it. This sounds like a great logistical achievement, when one considers the difficulty involved.
Another thing worth considering is the context of the writing; the extent of the suffering endured during the Anatolian march may have been exaggerated in order to create a parallel with the Israelites time in the desert before reaching the Holy Land.
The arrival in Pisidia and progress to Iconium was, of course, a great relief, as it offered the Crusade a chance to replenish supplies. However, what is also noticeable is the actions taken at Herclea. The splitting off of Tancred and Baldwin is described by Asbridge as part of a plan:

In fact, the Franks were following a more carefully conceived policy. The crusade was now but a short distance from the great city of Antioch. It would have to be taken if the expedition was to have any hope of reaching Palestine, and the princes must have known that this might require a long and exhausting siege. The strategy that they pursued after Herclea was shaped by the need to prepare for this Antiochene campaign. By approaching Syria from two directions, in a pincer movement, the crusaders could establish contact with the Armenians of Cappadocia and Cilicia. The Franks might then aid their Christian brethren and establish and extremely useful network of alliances and foraging centres with which to supply the push into Syria. The princes were also expecting to be reinforced both by Byzantine troops and later waves of crusaders, and the Cilician expedition would serve to secure the fastest road to Antioch.

The First Crusade, pp. 141-142.

Indeed, the seizure of Tarsus opened access to a large and ancient port. Asbridge also says:

Antioch exercised so potent a stranglehold over northern Syria that it would have been virtually impossible for the crusaders to continue their pilgrimage in safety if it had remained in enemy hands. Had they bypassed the city, their lines of communication to the west would have been cut, their forces isolated and surrounded. With Antioch secured, the way would be open for resupply and reinforcement by further waves of European crusaders and the Byzantine army, upon which the Franks were depending.

The First Crusade, pp. 156-157.

Of course the lengthy siege of Antioch also required considerable supplies. The majority of these were secured by a joint foraging expedition, including up to 20,000 men, staged by Bohemund and Robert of Flanders.[5] This was how the crusaders survived at Antioch.

How the crusaders survived at Antioch and how they intended to survive are two separate things. Asbridge cites contrary evidence with regard to the foraging expedition you are referring to; Albert of Aachen and Muslim sources reveal a quite different account to that in the Gesta that together suggest that it was actually a spectacular failure.
He also has the following to say about preparations with regard to supplies beyond those seized or purchased from the surrounding area:

St Simeon was certainly in Latin hands by mid-November, and this opened the possibility of regular maritime contact with Greek-held Cyprus, and from there access to the rest of the Byzantine Empire and even western Europe. Around this time, the papal legate Adhemar made contact with the Greek patriarch of Jerusalem, now in exile on Cyprus, and together they drafted a letter of appeal to the West. In the months to come Adhemar’s policy of détente with the Byzantines bore fruit in the form of much-needed supplies

The First Crusade, p. 166.

and

In the past historians have argued that the crusaders suffered at Antioch because, through logistical incompetence, they had made no preparations for a prolonged winter siege. Recent research indicates, however, that they struggled in spite of their best efforts to organise efficient lines of supply. We have already seen that the Franks made some preparations even before the siee began, establishing a foraging centre in Cilicia and forging friendships with Armenian Christians during their march around the Amanus mountains. Once in the region of Antioch, they opened the possibility of maritime supply at St Simeon, and by the end of September they had gained access to the larger port of Latakia, which lay some sixty kilometres to the south and offered even better access to Cyprus. The crusaders probably occupied Latakia for a time, but, once gain, the details of crusader contact with the port are unclear. Even with these two ports, naval communication and supply were not always reliable through the winter months.

The First Crusade, p. 169.

The long and short of it is that the crusaders were expecting to be supplied by sea and by land by the Byzantines. Tacitus and his Byzantine advance force were still with the crusaders until late in the siege and they were all expecting Alexius. That he did not come, was not a failure of logistical planning, but a failure on his part to honour his word. For more information on the importance of fleet supply during the First Crusade see John France, Victory in the East, pp. 188-220.

Now with regards supplies by sea, as far as I can see there were a total of three different arrivals to the crusader camp via sea. We have thirteen Genoese ships (arrived Antioch, October 1097), Edgar Atheling's fleet (Antioch, March 1098) and a Pisan raiding fleet (Latakia, after the fall of Jerusalem). There was an additional Byzantine fleet could not catch up with the army. [6]

You missed the Genoese ships that docked at Jaffa and provided much needed supplies to the siege of Jerusalem. These may have been the only fleets to arrive and they may not have been.

None of these arrivals had been arranged by the crusader host themselves. They were themselves crusaders who had sailed from Europe to partake in the campaign to take Jerusalem but were not actually associated with the Princes. While their supplies and ships were useful, particularly those of Edgar Atheling, they cannot be said to have been called for or by the crusaders and were more a happy accident than anything else.

Well, actually, what can’t be said with any certainty is whether the crusaders knew about them or not. They were certainly waiting on and expecting reinforcement, the particulars are a subject of debate. It seems odd the these crusading fleets would bring exactly the supplies that were needed for the task at hand spontaneously. Certainly, there was opportunity for them to learn about and react to the needs of the crusade.

From the above I think its fairly straightforward to say that the survival of the crusade hinged on the acquisition of provisions from the immediate lands. It took the crusaders approx five months to cross Anatolia… an unpleasant journey during the height of summer. In these five months they had access to no supplies from Byzantium or any access to the Mediterranean. The only possible way to survive was living from the land and the procurement of supplies from settlements and cities that they encountered. This behaviour did not noticeably change at or after Antioch [7]

Not quite. It is straight forward to say the crusaders were reliant on supplies and that they made every effort to procure them from whatever source available. From Nicea to Cilicia took 105 days, according to Riley-Smith, with fifteen rest days. The very crossing of Anatolia strikes me as a great logistical success, rather than a failure, especially when one considers what they then went on to achieve.

Now, to be clear, I am not suggesting that the First Crusade was logistically managed in a way that we might consider recognisably modern, but I am contending that it was not simply a bunch of armed thugs passing from province to province with no plans except to loot as much as possible. This was an organised and disciplined military force, held together by necessity and motivated by religious fervour. They employed strategies and tactics that were discussed with Alexius at Byzantium and they followed through with them. Alexius did not follow through with his own commitments, for whatever reason (Anna cites disturbances elsewhere). They were not always successful and they suffered deprivations, but such are the fortunes of war.

Adlan:
Typical Yeoman, blaming the knights...

Wehrkind

2007-01-30, 08:42 PM

So... much... text! Excellent information, both Om and Matthew.

Fhaolin: Isn't that always the way with armorers? Seems like if you are not hitting them with a stick, they can't get around to doing their chosen profession. My harness was 6 months late, my new gauntlets were 1.5 months (after 3 months lead time already). A local guy where I used to fight had friends of his, not just customers, friends waiting half a year for gear they paid for in advance. Needless to say, despite being the only game in town, he went under after convincing all of us we were better off doing our own work.

About gauntlets, I am now very nervous about any finger or thumb protection that is not made of plates riveted to other plates. I had my thumbs stoved very baddly a year and 6 months ago, and they were largely non-functional for a month after, and hurt like the devil for 9 months after that. All because the thumb plates were riveted to a leather strap, and so could compress lengthwise. The new ones don't have that problem, and I am excited to get the gloves in them and start beating on people with my poleaxe again :)

Dervag

2007-01-31, 12:24 AM

As for crusade logistics, the crusaders couldn't have what Om considers a 'logistics train'. True logistics trains are essentially a function of motorized transport, because muscle-powered transport is range limited with respect to food. For instance, an oxcart setting out to cross the 'Anatolian Desert' to supply crusaders on the far side would have to pack all its food and water. The food and water take up space in the cart. If the desert is wide enough, the weight of food and water make it impossible for the cart to carry any useful supplies other than the food and water required to make it across.

Similarly, oxcarts would have to pay tolls at various places, because there were multiple sovereign states on the land route between the crusaders' homes and the theater of operations. Tolls cost money. Eventually, the cost of shipping becomes prohibitively expensive and you're paying an ounce of gold for every pound of grain that makes it to the destination.

Ships avoid most of these problems, having effectively unlimited range on the scale of the crusaders' operations. However, the crusaders didn't have enough ships to keep up a continuous chain of supply, and couldn't afford to be completely tied to the coastline.

Finally, the crusaders couldn't hope to secure a long supply line of oxcarts or sailing ships against their enemies, many of whom were masters of light cavalry raiding tactics and formidable naval combatants.

It wasn't until the invention of motorized transport in the form of steamships and railroads that it became possible to keep an army in continuous supply from distant bases of operations. Until that point, armies almost invariably had to rely on local supplies for bulk commodities such as food and water.

So the crusaders didn't plan for a continuous logistics chain like the one Om is seeking for the same reason they didn't make plans to achieve air supremacy over the Levant. The technology to make such a development possible or relevant hadn't been invented yet.

WhiteHarness

2007-02-01, 09:10 AM

I don't know if it contributes anything to the discussion, but here is a video of me doing a few goofy things in my armour. I had been asked by a member of another forum I frequent to put together something demonstrating that a properly-fitted suit of plate doesn't necessarily make one clumsy, and my friend Doug was able to put this video together for me last week. We threw in a handful of other goofy stunts on a whim. FWIW, the armour weighs 61 pounds with the helmet off (71 with it on), which is the case for most of the video.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xm11yAXeegg

Swordguy

2007-02-01, 11:04 AM

The Jackass music was a nice touch.

I couldn't tell from the vid quality - were you doing pullups in harness?

Dervag

2007-02-01, 02:58 PM

The Jackass music was a nice touch.

I couldn't tell from the vid quality - were you doing pullups in harness?Now that would be impressive. Cartwheels are one thing; they're practically old hat. But pull-ups?

WhiteHarness

2007-02-01, 03:59 PM

Yes, pull-ups. It didn't work out so well, though, as the pull-up bar was too icy to hang onto. I can only do three of them in armour.

Swordguy

2007-02-01, 05:40 PM

Damn. Nice. Chin-ups in armor I can do. Pull-ups? Not so much.

Edmund

2007-02-01, 08:50 PM

Alright, all. In the university library there are at least three books on medieval logistics (though one deals with the problems of studying medieval logistics) I'll be spending the next few weeks reading through them in my spare time, and come back with an answer. Doubt I'll have time over the coming weeks to contribute much to the board, gearing up for a heavy workload.

Wehr: Our debate about the effectiveness of mail against arrows isn't over. I will sum up with my position so far.

Mail is nothing to be clucked at. It's very good armour, though certainly not as good as plate, though it does possess certain advantages. For example, it breathes better, and you can sleep in it.

Really good mail would be found with a 6mm inner ring diameter, rivetted rings, sometimes double layered. 'Munitions grade' would more likely be 8mm inner ring. Steel, tempered steel, or very fine iron. Flat or round-sectioned, depending on the time period/regional preference. Made of 1.6mm wire for 8mm i.r.d., 1mm for 6mm i.r.d. The aketon beneath would be five layers of fustian and seven of linen, probably thinner for the armpits and arms, from what I remember reading in a primary source (I'll get back to you on that). It could easily stop long-range, high-trajectory shots. Direct shots it would do less well against, but assuming the mail was in motion (as when running or atop a charging horse) one would be very hard pressed to pierce it, since the moving rings would affect the path of the arrow.

Even when standing still, killing someone through mail without getting to point blank range would be tricky though not really hard for a skilled archer (aim for where you think there aren't ribs!).

I'll probably be talking to Prof. Matthew Strickland some time next week, so I'll ask him what he thinks about it.

See you when I have my answers.

Matthew

2007-02-01, 09:16 PM

Which books did you pick up, Edmund? The real trick is making comparisons to Ancient Military Logistics, in my opinion, as those are the standard against which Medieval Military Logistics need to be judged.

Dervag

2007-02-02, 12:49 AM

Could someone explain to me why maille works better when it's in motion?

Fhaolan

2007-02-02, 09:53 AM

Could someone explain to me why maille works better when it's in motion?

This is the first time I've heard the idea of maille specifically in motion being better, so I'm not sure I can help with that.

The general concept of a target being in motion, being harder to hit, that just makes sense. Armor tends to make people believe that 'rooting' in one place is okay, because the armor will protect them. Being in motion always helps. If nothing else, it increases the chance of a deflection because the probablity of a dead-on shot decreases.

It's one of those things I picked up from my early days as a wargamer (Star Fleet Battles, specifically): Never stop your Dreadnought. Keep your heavy armor moving because once you've stopped, you're a sitting target that takes far too long to get moving again.

Swordguy

2007-02-02, 01:57 PM

This is a tough question to answer, but I'll assume you have a piece of chainmaille handy for a hands-on demo.

Breaking maille with a piercing weapon (arrow, spear, sword thrust) depends on opening links - getting the tip in there and forcing the ends of the link apart (incidentally, why riveted mail is the shizznit - to open the link you have to break the rivet, which is tough). When a piece of chainmaille just hangs there,, dead on to the incoming point, well, look at your test scrap. Hold it by the top corners.

Isn't there a whole lot of open space there? Lots of holes for a tip to get caught inside.

Now, put the scrap inside your elbow. Flex the elbow. See? The holes close up on each other, and form a more solid surface that can more easily deflect an incoming pointy thing.

What's more, when you move, the angles of the rings change. Some will be head on, but others will be at varying acute angles toward the incoming attack. This angular motion reduces the hole size relative to the incoming attack. (Gods this is a convoluted explanation). It's like when a goalie in ice hockey comes out of his crease to challenge the shooter. If he stays back in the net, there's lots of open space around him. As he skates forward toward the shooter, the space around him that goes into the net disappears. He's not getting bigger, he's just cutting down on the angles. As one side of the maille ring moves toward the attack, the relative size of the hole diminishes, thus making the maille more effective while moving than if it just hung there.

Confused? Good. :p

Dervag

2007-02-02, 04:14 PM

It's one of those things I picked up from my early days as a wargamer (Star Fleet Battles, specifically): Never stop your Dreadnought. Keep your heavy armor moving because once you've stopped, you're a sitting target that takes far too long to get moving again.Right. Most armorbusting tactics rely heavily on the assumption that you'll be free to line up your shots; anything that breaks that assumption makes it harder to bust your armor.

This is a tough question to answer, but I'll assume you have a piece of chainmaille handy for a hands-on demo.I don't, but I'm a physics major with a gift for visualization, which did the trick.

What's more, when you move, the angles of the rings change. Some will be head on, but others will be at varying acute angles toward the incoming attack. This angular motion reduces the hole size relative to the incoming attack. (Gods this is a convoluted explanation).Not compared to some of the stuff I have to deal with in class.

Confused? Good. :pSorry. Nope. That made perfect sense.

Swordguy

2007-02-02, 04:38 PM

Oh good. It's tough to explain stuff on an internet forum while you're supposed to be working and being heavily supervised...

It's one of those things I could have explained in 5 seconds if I was there in person and had the visual aid... ;)

Wehrkind

2007-02-04, 08:54 PM

I don't know how much benefit that moving really conveys. Considering your torso does not expand and contract much when not doing sit ups, I don't think that would really add a lot, probably only as much as operating in particularly hot or cold weather would impact the properties of the metal.
Perhaps it is best to say it doesn't benefit it more than movement benefits protection in general (as you said, movement is ALWAYS good to avoid being shot.)

I am not saying that mail is worse than say boiled leather at stopping arrows, I am just saying that it is much better suited to stopping blades than piercing things. It's performance suffers when faced with very sharp pointy things. Once the arrow breaks that rivet or pulls the ring open, it's over. Your only hope is that the rivet depleted enough energy to stop the arrow on your padding, or that you have multiple rings there, which good armor would. So, it isn't an instant lose situation, but it is hardly ideal, especially for the single layers of chain.

Adlan

2007-02-05, 05:41 AM

I was not aware that chain mail was worn in multiple layers? Not, at least all over the body, whats your source, if I may ask?

2007-02-05, 09:23 AM

Apologies for the delay. To put it mildly I have not had a good week. Even now I have little time and will limit myself to commenting on the march through Anatolia for the time being. I should be able to finish this by Wednesday or so.

Compared to modern standards, sure, but nobody is arguing this relative to modern standards, but rather to what was possible during this time period.Weren't we labouring under the assumption that the logistical preparations of the crusaders was largely representative of logistics during medieval times? I repeat that my primary assertion here is that these logistical measures were so crude by the standards of later logistical organisation as to be barely worthy of the term. Logistical organisation within medieval armies was basic.

What is remarkable is that the Crusaders were carrying enough supplies to actually manage it. This sounds like a great logistical achievement, when one considers the difficulty involved.That is something of an understatement. I would consider it to be a logistical feat without parallel in history if the crusaders had successfully managed to carry enough supplies with them to last the march through Anatolia. Frankly I doubt as to whether such a task (a division carrying enough supplies to sustain it for months on end in hostile lands) would be possible today.

While I do not doubt that some measure of supplies were carried by the crusaders, it does not seem possible that these were of the magnitude necessary to sustain the host for the duration of the march. It is of course possible, if unlikely, that the crusaders had enough supplies to last until Iconium (roughly two months from Dorylaeum) where they replenished their stocks but then that merely underlines my assertion that foraging and acquiring supplies on site formed the basis of the crusaders' logistical efforts.

@Dervag: Supply chain management certainly predates motorised transport. The premier example is of course Napoleon who undertook significant, if ultimately inadequate, preparations for his invasion of Russia. I believe, though am not certain, that the Romans also employed a more advanced logistical organisation than that seen in medieval armies.

The reason thus has little to do with technology, although that is obvious a factor, but rather the nature of warfare during the eras. In particular the scale of armies is crucial - both Napoleon and Rome fielded large armies that necessitated the use of additional organisation to supplement the acquisition of supplies on site. By contrast medieval warfare, with the exception of the Crusades, remained very much a local affair with signficantly smaller armies operating relatively close to bases of supply.

ericdraven88

2007-02-05, 09:46 AM

Cyborg Pirate

2007-02-05, 12:23 PM

Maille works better when moving because the general idea in combat is not to get hit. Therefore the maille works a hell of a lot better when you are not in the way of an attack. There is a downside.. maille is bloody heavy!! So there is a fine line between getting out of the way of attacks and dying of a heart attack.

"What's the best protection one can have against a sword, staff or arrow?"

"Absence from the point of impact I would assume..."

:smallbiggrin:

Question about more modern things for all you knowledgeable guys out here! I've been working around a little with a story and a setting, and although I want it to be a slightly (or very) fantastical setting, I'm also working hard to make it a plausible one. One thing I haven't been able to figure out:

How much harder or easier is it to manufacture shotgun shells (buckshot, slugs) compared to manufacturing normal bullets and casings? What general level of technological understanding would be required to easily or semi-easily manufacture shotgun shells?

I want to figure out whether it's plausible to have a world where most guns are just break-action weapons, where bolt-action guns (or maybe guns with revolving chambers) are the pinnacle of technology at the time, but where shells are the most common ammunition used for the potential versatility in a weapon.

Fhaolan

2007-02-05, 02:22 PM

Matthew

2007-02-05, 02:24 PM

Hey Om, sorry to hear you have had such a bad week; I hope it gets better.

I think the idea of using the First Crusade was to examine what appears to be the most logistically unorganised (yet also most successful) of the expeditions and discuss what level of logistics was involved. My primary aim is to show that the level of logistics was higher than is often thought (which is the way the academic wheel is turning at the moment) and my secondary aim to suggest that this was not exceptional, but rather that early medieval armies were in general better organised and supplied than is commonly believed.

I do think the First Crusade was the least well organised (with perhaps the exception of the fourth), but that is really the reason that it is such a good candidate for discussion.

Medieval historians have qualms about using logistics as a term to describe the supplying of medieval armies and I think it is not inappropriate either. I am not aiming, however, to show that medieval armies were as logistically organised as early modern armies, but that they had the same grasp of the importance of logistics as ancient armies did (we know they read and valued Vegetius, amongst other military 'how to' books of the Sun Tzu variety, so they at least had the opportunity to learn about the importance of logistics).

To say that Medieval logistics were simply basic is to make it impossible to discuss the degree of variance within medieval and ancient logistics. I do think we are talking at cross purposes, though, since you seem to be looking at the medieval period from the early modern, whilst I am looking at it from the ancient. I do not think that it is really possible for us to become reconciled in this way, as our base assumptions may be quite different with regard to what constitutes logistical organisation.

Now, if we were to look to the Gesta Francorum for an indication of how the First Crusaders expected and arranged to be supplied, then it is evident that they were relying on the Emperor Alexius (unsurprisingly, given the area in which they were operating):

Imperator quoque omnibus nostris fidem et securitatem dedit, iurauit etaim quia ueniret nobiscum pariter *** suo exercitu per terram et per mare; et nobis mercatum terra marique fideliter daret, ac omnia nostra perdita diligenter restauraret, insuper et neminem nostrorum peregrinorum conturbari uel contristari in uia Sancti Sepulchri uellet aut permitteret.
The emperor for his part guaranteed good faith and security to all our men, and swore also to come with us, bringing an army and a navy, and faithfully to supply us with provisions both by land and sea, and to take care to restore all those things which we had lost. Moreover he promised that he would not cause or permit anyone to trouble or vex our pilgrims on the way to the Holy Sepulchre.[1] (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/newreply.php?do=newreply&noquote=1&p=1959236#_ftn1)

Without doubt, this was their expectation. His failure to fulfill what he agreed to was the root of the diplomatic break down that followed. Indeed, evem Anna depicts Bohemond making this accusation against the emperor.

To fully understand the strategic situation of the Crusaders on their march through Anatolia, one has to realise that theirs were not the only significant military operations being carried out. At the same time they were marching directly through Iconium and into Cilicia, Armenia and on to Antioch, John Ducas marched south along the western coast as far as Ephesos, before turning inland and marching to meet the emperor at Philomelion (about half way between Nicea and the Cilician Gates), conquering numerous cities along the way. It was not unreasonable for them to expect the emperor to carry out his promise, especially considering their proximity to Cyprus and Rhodes by the time they reached Cilicia.

As for the march across Anatolia, it should not be generalised. Anna does not even mention it as a difficulty. Indeed, she passes from the battle of Doryleum to the combat at Herclea entirely without comment.

What happened then, you ask. Well, the Latins with the Roman army reached Antioch by what is called the ‘Quick Route’. They ignored the country on either side. Near the walls of the city a ditch was dug, in which the baggage was deposited and the siege of Antioch was begun. [2] (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/newreply.php?do=newreply&noquote=1&p=1959236#_ftn1)

A quick break down of the marc from Nicea to Antioch might look something like this:

26th of June - Crusaders set out from Nicea
1st of July - Battle of Dorylaeum
3rd of July - Crusaders set from Dorylaeum
Early August - Crusaders reach Psidia
Mid August - Crusaders reach Iconium
Late August - Crusaders reach Herclea
21st October - Crusaders reach Antioch

The time spent on the actual arid plains of Anatolia appears to have been about six weeks. A hard march, certainly, but a feat not unrivaled by other military forces. Another four weeks in the more prosperous Psidia saw them as far as Herclea. According to Ashbridge:

While Tancred and Baldwin of Boulogne crossed Cilicia, the remainder of the crusading army forged a route north to Caesarea in Cappadocia and then south east to reach Coxon in the first week of October. To this point the journey went well: Turkish garrisons fled as the host approached and no real resistance was encountered; friendly relations were established with the local Armenian population, which provided plentiful supplies; and the Franks’ role as servants of the Greek emperor ws fulfilled, as Byzantine representatives were installed in command of two towns, Assan and Comana. [3] (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/#_ftn1)

Once into Cilicia, the primary concern of the crusaders appears to have been to gain control of settlements and precure supplies from the local friendly Armenian Christian population for the siege of Antioch.

As far as I can see, the progress of the crusade from Constantinople to Antioch, can be broken down into four chunks. Up until the 26th of June there is no question that the crusade was well supplied and a logistic network (of whatever sophistication) existed. From the battle of Doryleum until reaching Psidia, they were no doubt reliant on their own resources in a land with little in the way of resources. From Psidia to Herculea they were in a better provisioned territory. From Herculea to Antioch they were essentially in friendly territory with access to the sea.

Whilst in landlocked enemy territory, the crusade relied on its own provisions and those they could sieze (or purchase, the Gesta refers to a dialogue with locals in the vicinity of Iconium who advise the crusaders to carry skins full of water, as was in short supply beyond Iconium), certainly. However, whilst in friendly territory they appear to have organised their method of supply from friendly settlements and ports, all the while anticipating the arrival of the armies and fleets of Alexius. If this does not qualify as logistical planning, well fair enough, but as far as I can tell it was entirely the practice of ancient and medieval armies in foreign territories and was a good deal more complicated than simply 'living off the land.'

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/newreply.php?do=newreply&noquote=1&p=1959236#_ftnref1) Annonymous, Gesta Francorum, ed. Rosalind Hill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 12.

[2] (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/newreply.php?do=newreply&noquote=1&p=1959236#_ftnref1) Anna Comnena, The Alexiad, trans. E. R. A. Sewter (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969) p. 342.

[3] (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/newreply.php?do=newreply&noquote=1&p=1959236#_ftnref1) Thomas Asbridge, The First Crusade: A New History (London: Free Press, 2004), pp. 147-148.

Swordguy

2007-02-05, 02:37 PM

How much harder or easier is it to manufacture shotgun shells (buckshot, slugs) compared to manufacturing normal bullets and casings? What general level of technological understanding would be required to easily or semi-easily manufacture shotgun shells?

Considerably easier.

I don't know how much you know about firearms. Please excuse any unintentional condesention in my explanation.

A bullet and a shotgun shell (shell) are quite similar, in that they both have a rigid casing containing a propellant, and have a primer (struck by a firing pin) that ignites the propellant. The tolerances are, however, much tighter in a bullet than they are in a shell. Part of this is the need to have the slug of the bullet engage in interact with the rifling in the barrel of the firearm. If the slug diameter is off even an extremely small amount, the slug will either not engage with the rifling (thus not spinning and become extremely inaccurate) or will plug the barrel and most likely burst the weapon (bad). The casing around the slug also has to be built to specific tolerances, because the casing is providing some measure of resistance against the propellant detonation; holding the slug inside the casing for a split second until it lets go and send the slug on its way.

On the other hand, a shotgun shell simply has the propellant and primer, and then a disc. On the other side of the disc are the pellets (I assume you wanted info about shot rounds, not shotgun slugs). The propellant explodes, pushing the disc forward (which also pushed the pellets forward), breaking the intentionally-weakened front (a "lid" is a good term) of the casing and pushing the whole shebang down the barrel, which is a smooth tube without rifling.

The casing of the bullet has to provide a specific amount of resistance, and not be more than a certain diameter so it can be levered into the chamber, but not be less than a certain diameter so it will plump up against the walls of the chamber and still hold the slug for a moment. It can't be too hard or brittle, or it will shatter in the chamber, and can't be so soft that it deforms overmuch upon firing.

The casing of a shotgun shell really just has to be stronger than the front, and not so weak as to disintegrate under the force of the propellant explosion.

Swordguy

2007-02-05, 02:40 PM

Forgot this part:

Assuming I have a serviceable primer and propellant, I can make a shotgun shell out of lead weights, glue, cardboard, and PVC pipe.

To make a modern jacketed round, assuming I have a serviceable primer and propellant, I have to have a machine shop.

That should pretty much sum it up.

Cyborg Pirate

2007-02-05, 03:16 PM

I don't know how much you know about firearms. Please excuse any unintentional condesention in my explanation.

No worries, I indeed know very little about firearms. It's hard to learn about them where I live. Thanks for all the info, is helps my world massively!

Swordguy

2007-02-05, 03:18 PM

No worries, I indeed know very little about firearms. It's hard to learn about them where I live. Thanks for all the info, is helps my world massively!

Learn about them? Access them, I can see. Shoot them, sure. But just learning about firearms? Where on earth ARE you? :smallconfused:

Cyborg Pirate

2007-02-05, 04:01 PM

Learn about them? Access them, I can see. Shoot them, sure. But just learning about firearms? Where on earth ARE you? :smallconfused:

Eh, my mistake :smalltongue: It's not so hard to learn about the basics of them here, but it's hard to find any deeper info, like firearms manufacturing and such, or to just find people with hands on experience with firearms. I'm mostly restricted to catalogue type books and internet, both often lacking in depth or credibility (I've grown weary of fire-arms reviewing sites)

I live in the Netherlands btw, might explain a little.

Wehrkind

2007-02-05, 10:43 PM

You poor Europeans; my heart goes out to you.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shotgun#Specialty_ammunition
That's a pretty good general information article on shot guns and their uses.

Cyborg Pirate

2007-02-07, 05:45 AM

You poor Europeans; my heart goes out to you.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shotgun#Specialty_ammunition
That's a pretty good general information article on shot guns and their uses.

Hey thanks!

Funny, I found that wiki article a long while ago, but now that I re-read it, I'm noticing I've missed some interesting tidbits of information.

Information gathering - all the good tidbits are always so tiny :smallbiggrin:

msgZ28

2007-02-09, 04:07 PM

Norsesmithy

2007-02-09, 04:36 PM

It seems to me that a Katana is a pretty average performing infantry sabre, but it was one of the last traditional swords ever used as a integral part of warfare.

This, coupled with decades of films that had no more research than that the prop man watched the Japanese propaganda movies where Imperial Japanese officers cut through all manner of unrealistic things, including captured American artillery pieces and machine guns. Never mind that the targets had been destroyed with a welding torch.

Combine this with anime characters and their tendency to run past some one, cut to a super-imposed red slash, and have the bad guy start laughing, only to fall to pieces, and you have a recipe for poorly informed people to put forth poorly thought out ideas, and to expose those abominable positions despite all opposition, and to push them as if they were the be all and end all of "expert positions" and that if you don't agree you are the uninformed one not them.

And yes, I am the Comma-Splice King.

And I haven't even started to talk about the trolls that will expose a similar, more extreme doctrine to get a rise out of the people who will go around enlightening Inuyasha fans.

Matthew

2007-02-09, 04:42 PM

I dunno. I would say it was probably above average, but yeah, it is the widespread view of the Katana's amazing far-and-away-beyond-all-other-swords power that tends to annoy.

Swordguy

2007-02-09, 04:43 PM

I've read through all of this thread, and ARMA is mentioned many times. I looked it up and it was quite interesting. Is anyone here a member? How good of a program is it? Also, once I get out, I will be going to a couple schools in Houston, so is anyone here part of either Houston group? I am very interested in joining while in Houson.

Go. Become a member. It's worth it. I got to work with some ARMA guys at several stage combat workshops and I freaking love their system. If there was anyone within 4 hours of Cincinnati that taught it, I'd gladly make the drive. Be warned, however, they have a very low tolerance for folks who walk in and proclaim their "l33t-ness". Their low tolerance is often expressed with blunt instruments. :smallbiggrin:

My second question concerns the katana. I noticed a lot of hate for it, or at least its fanboys. Why is this? Is the katana that inferior to its reputation? Or do the fanboys just have some crazy ideas about the abilities of the katana? I would like to hear some of these ideas they have, might be pretty funny.

Hoo boy.

Okay, the katana is a perfectly serviceable weapon, within the limitations of its design. It is, in essence, a very large fillet knife. The action of a katana is a slicing one, with the curve opening and deepening the initial cut. It is very, very efficient at cutting flesh.

What it is NOT, however, is the next best thing to a lightsabre. Basically, some time ago, there was a video taken of a Japanese gunso "cutting through a machine-gun barrel", taken for propaganda purposes as I recall. What they didn't tell you was that the actual barrel has been removed from the gun; what was left was the very thin (pop can thickness) sheet steel water jacket that surrounded the barrel.

The world record kabutowari cut with a katana was done by Toshishiro Obata was a mere 13cm-long split--not even deep enough to permit the blade to enter the helmet. This is the world record here.

NOTE: This argument assumes a reasonable quality in the plate armor. There are some cuirasses in museums with a 3kg combined weight. There are some with more than 15kg combined weight and are fully a 1/2 inch thick. Please understand that I discount extreme examples from both sides in my analysis.

A katana simply will not perform well against something like fully-developed European plate (say, circa 1450) because, well, for two reasons. First, it was never really encountered that sort of armor. Japanese armor is made of thin, laced plates of metal or leather that are heavily lacquered. There is also quite a bit of space on the body covered only by silk if you know what you're looking at. A katana, in any case, was never the primary battlefield weapon of the bushi. What was used on the battlefield was far more often a spear, or bow, or axe, or polearm, or no-dachi. A katana is better compared to a rapier, in that is was often carried unarmored in "civilian" life. Againt unarmored opponents, as mentioned, it's quite serviceable.

The second reason it will not perform well against a suit of, say, Milanese Cap a pie plate is because it is a slicing weapon. To get through any reasonable quantity of steel requires a concussive force (when combined with a sharp edge can overtax the metal's tensile strength). The katana, when used properly, delivers far less concussive force than, say, an axe.

Incidentally, we've forgotten far more than we know about european sword manufacture. We haven't forgotten so much about katana manufacture. This, when combined with relentless exposure of the weapon in popular media, is what gives rise to phrases like: "A katana can cut through a tank! No, really! I saw it on the internet somewhere!!!11one1"

In short, no common sword can reliably cut through plate armor. Some specialized swords (like the tuck/estoc) can pierce it, but cutting through armor in battlefield conditions is a statistical...uh, what the next step down from "impossibility"?

I'll leave you with an example you can try at home. Empty a soda can. Fill it full of sand, and seal it. Find a gently curved fillet knife, and drag the blade across the can's surface as you would cut a piece of fish (a slicing force). A scratch will result, perhaps a very small, shallow cut. Even taking the knife and bringing it straight down onto the can with a moderate amount of force (a concussive force) and then dragging it will more often than not only result in a smallish gash in the can. That's what a katana will do to plate armor.

I can answer at greater length if desired. :smallwink:

Fhaolan

2007-02-09, 11:26 PM

Anyone ever actually handle a tuck/estoc? I've always wanted to add one to my collection (along with a falx), but I've not seen a replica by a reputable swordsmith.

Norsesmithy

2007-02-09, 11:37 PM

I played with one once, the biggest suprise is how stiff the blade is.

Other than that, it handled pretty similar to any other sword its size and weight. You just couldn't cut very well with it.

Dervag

2007-02-10, 01:06 AM

What it is NOT, however, is the next best thing to a lightsabre. Basically, some time ago, there was a video taken of a Japanese gunso "cutting through a machine-gun barrel", taken for propaganda purposes as I recall. What they didn't tell you was that the actual barrel has been removed from the gun; what was left was the very thin (pop can thickness) sheet steel water jacket that surrounded the barrel.

The world record kabutowari cut with a katana was done by Toshishiro Obata was a mere 13cm-long split--not even deep enough to permit the blade to enter the helmet. This is the world record here.How do you think a katana-wielding bushi in full armor would stack up against a European warrior of roughly equivalent training level with broadsword, shield, and a maille hauberk?

Norsesmithy

2007-02-10, 01:15 AM

I would rate the European higher, if only for the shield. The typical Bushi will have very little experience fighting men with shields.

The later you have this comparison, the more disparate it gets (and IMOH the greater the lead the European has). Get to the 16th century, and a Landesknecht in full Maximilian with a 65+ inch two hander, and I think that the Swedish, Swiss, or German Mercenary so equipped would wipe the floor with a contemporary Japanese warrior.

Swordguy

2007-02-10, 02:00 AM

I would rate the European higher, if only for the shield. The typical Bushi will have very little experience fighting men with shields.

QFT. I'll elucidate later (it's 2 am here).

msgZ28

2007-02-10, 03:36 AM

Hmmm......Interesting stuff on the katana, and some rather absurd beliefs by their fanboys. I wonder why the Japanese never really got into shields.

I will join ARMA when I get out, but that will be in three more years. :smallfrown: In this enlistment, I will have three of the four years overseas. The rest of this year and all of next year, and they might send me to a fourth country for the last 9 months. Oh, and what do you you mean by this:

Be warned, however, they have a very low tolerance for folks who walk in and proclaim their "l33t-ness".

What the hell does l33t mean anyway? I suck at the interweb talk.

Ryujin

2007-02-10, 05:06 AM

'Damascus swords' also had that bit of wankery going for them. Does cutting through floating pieces of silk, European swords & solid rock without losing its edge sound familiar?

Fhaolan

2007-02-10, 12:01 PM

What the hell does l33t mean anyway? I suck at the interweb talk.

What he means is that ARMA, like nearly all similar groups, has no tolerance for people who walk in and proclaim themselves to be 'elite' for one reason or another, be it previous training or watching too many anime. [netspeak trivia: l33t -> leet -> elite]

Previous martial arts or medieval combat training means you can learn the techniques somewhat faster, because you have been through similar training before, but it doesn't give you an edge towards being a 'superior' fighter. ARMA, SAFD, SKSC, Gekiken/Kendo, Geomdo, Olympic Fencing, all have completely different systems because they are dealing with entirely different goals. Knowledge of one doesn't necessarily translate well into the others.

Swordguy

2007-02-10, 01:15 PM

Anyone ever actually handle a tuck/estoc? I've always wanted to add one to my collection (along with a falx), but I've not seen a replica by a reputable swordsmith.

It's extraordinarily similar to basic spear fighting (go figure). The "sword-fighter" in me wanted to hold it by the hilt and just thrust. The guy who kicked my ass with it used it pretty much just like a short spear (up to an including a liberal use of short-form 1/4-staff and half-swording techniques). No edge, you see.

As for who made it, it was a custom job by Badger Blades. I don't think anyone makes them at any quality on a regular basis.

Originally Posted by msgZ28 View Post
What the hell does l33t mean anyway? I suck at the interweb talk.

Yeah, sorry abut that. My sole use of leet-speak is to mock those who rely upon it.

'Damascus swords' also had that bit of wankery going for them. Does cutting through floating pieces of silk, European swords & solid rock without losing its edge sound familiar?

I think it's just another expression of the "the other guy's equipment is always cooler" syndrome.

Swordguy

2007-02-10, 01:20 PM

Hmmm......Interesting stuff on the katana, and some rather absurd beliefs by their fanboys. I wonder why the Japanese never really got into shields.

That's actually a really good question, and one I'm not at all qualified to discuss. They basically stole the idea for the katana from the Chinese, and developed it to hell and back. But the Chinese at the time had shields as well. Now that I think of it, I think that the Japanese are about the only culture that never really got into shields (that I can think of off-hand). Heck, they're a Stone Age technology.

Hmm...time for some research. And on my day off, too. :smallbiggrin:

EDIT: Just remembered: Central and Southern Amerindians (Maya, Inca, Aztec, Olmec) were pretty light on shield use too. They had them, but we've got a lot less evidence of thier widespread use than we do of, say, European or African shields.

Swordguy

2007-02-10, 01:36 PM

I swear, YouTube has video relevant to EVERY discussion!

msgZ28, take a look at these vids. On the samurai's website, it says that he was using a fully sharpened katana. The guy playing the knight couldn't swing back (because he didn't want to hurt the unarmored sammie), but take a look at the videos. Notice that the knight (especially in the second one) takes 5-7 blows directly to armored portions of the body with absolutely no ill effect. Not even visible scratches.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=xDV5fontZbc

http://youtube.com/watch?v=RWCh1fWh13Y

(Please don't hate the knight. I know he's using a POS Bud K shield. I doesn't change to point of the armor totally defeating the katana. Also amusingly, the straps on the knights right greave break in the second video, which is why I think he stops the fight. Everything from the poleyn down is just hanging freely.)

Mike_G

2007-02-10, 02:39 PM

I dunno. I would say it was probably above average, but yeah, it is the widespread view of the Katana's amazing far-and-away-beyond-all-other-swords power that tends to annoy.

Speaking of sabre comparisons, check out this video.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_mCNoqqK0k&NR

I like the way they make a point of showing the thrust with the sabre. Many people try to downplay the effectiveness of a curved blade in the thrust. Accounts from the Crimean War note the heavy, hairy Cossack coats resisting the slash of the British sabre, but yeilding to the points.

This would have been used at a point where armor was largely gone from the battle field, so comparison to a Katana is probably apt.

Matthew

2007-02-10, 03:02 PM

That is a pretty cool video. A great demonstration of the not so very great differences between single edged curved swords and double edged straight swords.

A very good reason to invest in armour too; I'm off to watch the Grosse Messer demonstration now...

Some Others (http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=dieaufopferung)

Norsesmithy

2007-02-10, 03:39 PM

I think that the Japanese lack of shields may have had something to do with the fact that all of their popular infantry weapons required two hands to use. They were big on spears and other larger polearms, not to mention bows.

Anyone else find the Greatsword cutting video totally awesome?

Thiel

2007-02-10, 03:41 PM

I think its cool when he punctured that car door. But I think he would have been skewered if it had been a real enemy.

Norsesmithy

2007-02-10, 03:51 PM

That was a hood, but yeah, his form wasn't exactly fighting form, but no test cutter cuts in a fighting form, test cutting forms are supposed to give you precision at the expence of all else.

Fighting forms tend to trade precision for defence and power.

I kinda wished they would have done the 10 (?) mat stack with the greatsword.

msgZ28

2007-02-10, 08:34 PM

Wow, I will admit, that before I was kind of a katana fan more than anything, but those videos definitely changed my mind. That grosse messer was IMPRESSIVE. I don't think they did enough with the zweihander though. :smallfrown:

WhiteHarness

2007-02-10, 09:27 PM

The knight vs. samurai videos made me angry. I absolutely refuse to believe that an unarmoured samurai would have stood a ghost of a chance against a trained man in full plate.

Wehrkind

2007-02-10, 10:45 PM

Well, the guy in armor obviously wasn't even trying to hit the guy with the katana, just going all defensive (granted, even then he need not have been withdrawing). It strikes me that he must have been extremely confident in his armor, to allow his buddy to take full power swings and thrusts at him with live steel. Personally, I would have wanted something to hit him back with... I am not terribly fond of "Ok, this man is going to beat on you... don't touch him" exercises.

Msg: If you can't find an ARMA group (I am somewhat in the same boat, though not ON a boat.) you might be able to find an SCA branch out that way. The fighting done in the SCA is not as harcore (for lack of a better word) as ARMA from what I can tell, having some rules and such that are made for safety more than accuracy, but it does allow a good frame work for learning the basics of some weapon use. Just a word of caution though: politics and a silly "that's a stupid way of doing it, and doesn't work" mentality finds a rest in some folks. My solution has always been "I don't care about anything else, I am here to fight" and I cleave to the folks who just love to fight, and try all sorts of things, rather than those who excel within the rules frame work alone. That has worked well for me. It has been rewarding for me at least, and I hope to stumble across some ARMA folks in the Allentown/Philadelphia PA region sooner or later.

The bit about not expecting experience to carry over is also very true. The easiest new comers to fight are those with previous martial arts experience, I find. They pick things up fast, but the differences are quite awkward, particularly getting used to using a shield it seems. Fighting with two swords or a pole arm seems to be easier, but new comers still seem to have issue with leaving themselves really open and not recovering after an attack that people who are fresh and untrained often don't have. So don't feel frustrated if you are not as good off the bat as you would hope. Playing tennis would be almost as applicable, experience wise :) Just remember Musashi's advice that "Everything is hard the first time."

Annarrkkii

2007-02-10, 10:55 PM

My favorite portrayal of a pair of knights in full plate fighting is found in T.H. White's "The Once and Future King," when young Worm gets to witness a duel in the woods—which I believe ultimately results in one knight sitting on the other. But yes, those battles seemed mildly unauthentic—what with the whole died-hair college kid as the samurai—and I don't think they'd be using fully sharpened swords. Then again, I don't know much about this sort of thing.

I really liked the saber video. I wasn't a fan of his sharpening of the reverse curve of the blade—seems to me to be untrue to the spirit of the thing—but otherwise impressive. And the zweihander videos were probably reasonably realistic, even if they were done in test form. Swords that big could and did double as polearms in their own right.

Mike_G

2007-02-10, 11:34 PM

I really liked the saber video. I wasn't a fan of his sharpening of the reverse curve of the blade—seems to me to be untrue to the spirit of the thing—but otherwise impressive. And the zweihander videos were probably reasonably realistic, even if they were done in test form. Swords that big could and did double as polearms in their own right.

Sharpening the first third of the reverse edge of a sabre was fairly common practice. Many old sabre guard positions are designed so you can make a defensive back cut at the arm of your attacker. Plenty of force to defelct the blow and give him a good wound.

The "hanging guard" with the hilt held higher than the point with the cutting edge up and outward and the point toward the enemy works well this way. This was primarily a cavalry weapon, and designed to be able to deliver cuts in passing. After a cut or parry, a quick backhanded flick with the back edge was often all you had time for before you were past the enemy, and, while it wouldn't cleave a man in two, could give a good wound.

Dervag

2007-02-10, 11:41 PM

http://youtube.com/watch?v=xDV5fontZbc

http://youtube.com/watch?v=RWCh1fWh13YYeah. If the knight had actually fought back, the samurai wouldn't have stood a chance in those. As it was, he just stood there and let the guy beat on him because, as you say, he couldn't take a swing without risking crippling the samurai.

Heck, the knight could probably have won that fight with a shield bash.

Wehrkind

2007-02-11, 12:05 AM

I suspect that sharpened back makes stabbing a little easier, though I have no real reason other than the notion that whatever makes your tool go through flesh easier helps.

It might also be handy for throwing wrap shots or the like, though the back hand attack he demonstrated in the film was nothing short of retarded. That, of everything in the videos, annoyed me the most.

Out of curiosity, someone had mentioned that the shield was of a particular type and was a POS. I didn't recognize why; is it a particular maker's shield that sucks, or a specific type? I didn't notice anything about it, other than it was a heater and painted.

Swordguy

2007-02-11, 12:36 PM

Out of curiosity, someone had mentioned that the shield was of a particular type and was a POS. I didn't recognize why; is it a particular maker's shield that sucks, or a specific type? I didn't notice anything about it, other than it was a heater and painted.

Because we had one exactly the same (embossed and painted) hanging in the sword shop in which I worked, and it's low quality sheet steel, with aluminum handles.

Please remember, the point of posting that Knight vs Samurai vid is that the knight took several hits (cuts and thrusts) directly to his armor, and didn't much care. The outcome doesn't matter so much as that point.

I look at them as a propaganda video.

Wehrkind

2007-02-11, 11:03 PM

Ahh ok. I didn't know if it was the brand or something funky like "Those types of shields, made in X year by Y armorer were inferior to another design." etc. You never know what people are going to bust out on this thread. One of the reasons I love it so. :)

Yea, that the "knight" was fine with taking shots like that said the katana user was screwed if he was actually fought against in that situation.

msgZ28

2007-02-12, 07:34 AM

Msg: If you can't find an ARMA group (I am somewhat in the same boat, though not ON a boat.) you might be able to find an SCA branch out that way. The fighting done in the SCA is not as harcore (for lack of a better word) as ARMA from what I can tell, having some rules and such that are made for safety more than accuracy, but it does allow a good frame work for learning the basics of some weapon use. Just a word of caution though: politics and a silly "that's a stupid way of doing it, and doesn't work" mentality finds a rest in some folks. My solution has always been "I don't care about anything else, I am here to fight" and I cleave to the folks who just love to fight, and try all sorts of things, rather than those who excel within the rules frame work alone. That has worked well for me. It has been rewarding for me at least, and I hope to stumble across some ARMA folks in the Allentown/Philadelphia PA region sooner or later.
There's no chance of finding ARMA or SCA where I am now, and probably not next year either. I am getting excited about getting to join ARMA when I move to Houston. Just out of curiosity, where do you guys reccomend buying swords and stuff from?

Fhaolan

2007-02-12, 12:06 PM

There's no chance of finding ARMA or SCA where I am now, and probably not next year either. I am getting excited about getting to join ARMA when I move to Houston. Just out of curiosity, where do you guys reccomend buying swords and stuff from?

Depends on the quality and price range you're looking for. Weapons and the like are really a 'you get what you pay for' market, as long as you avoid the ren-faire circut. Ren-fairies tend to skew things around a bit, just to confuse things. Also, if you deal with a ren-fairie craftsman, only buy what you see physically there in front of you. Don't commision. They might get around to it, some day, maybe... in the fullness of time...

Here are the top three places I look at for quality reproductions:

Museum Replias: http://www.museumreplicas.com/webstore/Home.aspx
Albion Swords: http://www.albion-swords.com/
Arms & Armor: http://www.armor.com/index.html

MuReps has a poor reputation from long, long ago, but Windlass Steelcrafts (their main weapon-makers) have improved in quality immeasurably over the last ten years. Albion and Arms & Armor are far more expensive, but the quality is excelent.

However, if you're looking for truely interesting pieces for reasonable prices, I recommend Therion Arms: http://therionarms.com/

Therion is a reseller, and a one-man-shop, but I've had nothing but good dealings with him. Talk to him before buying any particular piece, and he'll let you know all about the quality and condition of any of his pieces. He has a lot of actual antiques and reconditioned pieces pass through his shop, as well as good reproductions.

Paul Chen swords are also good for later period rapiers and the like. I don't know who's carrying them anymore though. I haven't been paying attention to that market for the last few years.

Swordguy

2007-02-12, 12:54 PM

I'd like to second all the manufacturers that Fhaolan mentioned. They're all excellent. Another good manufacturer is Del Tin. ( www.deltin.net/home1.htm )

If you want a 'starter sword' and you're on a budget, I'd also recommend going to www.starfireswords.com. They're the baseline of theatrical combat pieces (not often historically accurate, but they're durable as heck and pretty much everybody in the industry knows about them). You're looking at prices in the $150-$400 range (a few higher, a few lower).

Don't worry overmuch about dropping $900+ on your first sword. Folks will often give you the benefit of the doubt when they realize you're just getting into the hobby. It's us folks that have been doing it for a decade who have to spend craploads of cash on a blade, or else we start hearing it from people.

Finally, if you're going into ARMA, you're going to need a variety of weapons. Specifically, you'll want a fully-sharpened, accurate replica (go to Albion first, then Del Tin) for test-cutting. You'll want a dulled, reasonably accurate replica for light sparring and form work (Arms & Armor, Del Tin or Starfire). Finally, you'll want a source of disposable wooden wasters for armored sparring (which tends to be more or less full-contact). Good ones can be tough to find. Historic Enterprises (google it, the url is blocked at my workplace) often carries them.

Wehrkind

2007-02-12, 08:44 PM

How much time were you spending at "Historic Enterprises" at work that they blocked it? :)

There is a site, if you are looking for Roman era gear, called Deepeeka or something to that effect. I don't have the link at work here, but you can Google it. A lot of their stuff is questionable, being an Indian "we make it cheap" site, but if you go to some of the more serious Roman Reenacting groups (Legio ... something or other. I am braindead today.) they often have extensive information on proper gear, often down to individual items and reviews.

Very handy, if you are a fan of the time period.

Swordguy

2007-02-12, 09:28 PM

How much time were you spending at "Historic Enterprises" at work that they blocked it? :)

Our workplace filter is based on instances of the words sex and weapons. It looks for images with too much peach in them or pictures with letter combinations like "swor, gun, pist, rifl, iolen" and so forth in thier file name. If it detects too many, it blocks the site.

Or is any of those letter combos is in the site url...

boo.

Wehrkind

2007-02-12, 09:45 PM

Wow, that's... messed up.
Granted, I used to work for a Brazilian company in the States. We were not allowed to have our own desktop images, and they blocked ALL sorts of random crap. Needless to say by how often I post here, I no longer work there.

Rabiesbunny

2007-02-12, 10:54 PM

Norsesmithy

2007-02-12, 10:57 PM

Wehrkind

2007-02-12, 11:42 PM

My scale hauberk makes that muscle between my shoulder and neck ache pretty badly when I don't wear it for a while.
Other than that, just general stiffness from working muscles harder than normal, assuming the plate is designed well. If it isn't built to her specifications, she is going to get a lot of pinching and "armor bites" in wierd places, usually joints and the inside of her upper arms.

Swordguy

2007-02-13, 12:14 AM

I actually just have to interject a question about full-plate armor, if anyone's up for it. As said elsewhere I have a druid going into Talontar Blightlord, and she'll be wearing Fullplate soon. I'm wondering if anyone knows the kind of wear and tear learning to wear a metal suit like that would have on someone who's not overly 'wow' strong -- as in...where would it hurt most, and stuff?

Is she going to wear a belt to hang her cuisses upon? Then that belt is going to ride up into the small of the back and will seriously dig into the sides of her hips. It annoys me to no end that I've actually developed love handles from my cuisse belt (I've LOST weight but what little fat there was gets pulled down over time and...well...).

Get good inserts for her boots. Her feet will hurt.

She'll need someone who can "crack" her back vertically (pick-up-and-drop back-cracking). I find that armor tends to compress one's spine slightly. I lose about an inch off my height when I'm in armor for more than abour 4 hours (it stops there, thankfully).

If she's going to do pretty much ANYTHING in the plate, do lots of pushups. Seriously. The extra weight on the legs isn't so bad, but the arms and shoulders get really tired, really fast. Do "guy" pushups, too. She'll need the shoulder and lower back strength (and doing pushups from the knees doesn't give you that).

Where is the armor coming from? Is it piecemeal off ebay or various sites (most people's first harness is). If it's being bought in one piece from a single smith, you should be able to talk to the smith about any problem areas that particular style of armor is known for (since all armor is different).

Swordguy

2007-02-13, 12:15 AM

Just posting to second and third recomendations for the above suppliers and to add one that a few of my friends have had good experiences with, http://www.angustrimdirect.com/.

I like the handling of my buddy's 1563, rather similar to the blade I forged myself.

Awww...geez! I can't believe I forgot them!

Yes, AT blades are quite 'teh roxxors', as it were. I'd put them on the same level quality-wise as Del Tin (just a step below Albion).

Wehrkind

2007-02-13, 01:21 AM

Her DRUID is presumably buying it at a local blacksmith shop. I don't think eBay exists in her campaign world. :-P

Otherwise, good advice :) I am a little surprised your belt digs at you the way it does. Perhaps you need one a little wider. I use a weight lifter belt for both my sets of greaves (full leather, and half plate) and never have issues with that. The only problem I have is not really having "hips" per se, and so they slide down a bit if I am not careful to pull them tight.

Swordguy

2007-02-13, 01:44 AM

Her DRUID is presumably buying it at a local blacksmith shop. I don't think eBay exists in her campaign world. :-P

Er...crap. Note to self: read ALL of post before responding.

You don't know what kind of campaign it is anyway. She could be putting it together off the witchernet.

EDIT: And what kind of DRUID is wearing FULL PLATE from a blacksmith anyway?

Otherwise, good advice :) I am a little surprised your belt digs at you the way it does. Perhaps you need one a little wider. I use a weight lifter belt for both my sets of greaves (full leather, and half plate) and never have issues with that. The only problem I have is not really having "hips" per se, and so they slide down a bit if I am not careful to pull them tight.

Belt's about 2.5" wide. I keep thinking about a full weightlifter belt, but all the ones I've tried restict my mobility at the waist so much...

If yours fall down, try either military-issue LCE or plain workmen's suspenders. If you figure the spacing of the teeth out right, they work really well.

Wehrkind

2007-02-13, 02:25 AM

The kind that goes "into Talontar Blightlord, and she'll be wearing Fullplate soon." it would seem. I don't know *shrug*

And please, we all know you can't have any kind of intarwebz without Al Gore to invent them. Even with magic.

It doesn't fall so much as slip down a little. I have so much weight on my shoulders, and it is little enough of a problem , that I haven't bothered with it too much. I am surprised the thicker belt tangles with your mobility. I wouldn't think you would need to bend so far at the waist that it would be an issue, but then I don't wear a solid breast plate.

Thiel

2007-02-13, 02:33 AM

Talontar Blightlord is a anti-nature prestige class

Rabiesbunny

2007-02-13, 04:45 AM

Yeah, it lets me violate my druidic oath all I want. Anyway, yeah, thanks for the help. :)

WhiteHarness

2007-02-13, 05:46 AM

Wehrkind

2007-02-13, 06:07 AM

I just wrote a slightly long response before realizing you were not talking to me...

To focus on me some more, would a doublet be worth it if you just have the legs attached to it? Seems a bit of overkill to stop a minor belt slippage problem, instead of suspenders.

Edit: That is interesting on Historic Enterprises... hmmmm

Ow... just had an image of a "shin plate" garter belt go through my head...

Swordguy

2007-02-13, 08:39 AM

My advice is to ditch the legharness support belt and buy an arming doublet or a pourpoint from either Historic Enterprises or Revival Clothing. Trust me, you'll wonder why you didn't do it long ago. I suspended my legharness from a belt for years (not that they need much support, really. they stay up by themselves.), then bought an arming doublet and haven't regretted it for a moment.

What I can't figure out is how it works, or else I'd make one myself.

No, seriously. I had a very nice arming doublet I had bought some time ago in the SCA. As it was getting on, I decided to use it as a test sbuject before I made my new one. So, I punched some holes along the bottom and laced my cuisses up to them, then I put the whole shebang on, and raised my arms above my head.

I couldn't.

Raising one's arms, by definition, will lift one's shirt/doublet. Unfortunately, because I had cuisses strapped around my legs, the doublet was held down, preventing me from raising my arms. I'm not sure how to get around this problem.

Norsesmithy

2007-02-13, 12:43 PM

You need more fabric in the arm pits, so that you don't have to raise the doublet so far, I don't know how you would solve it through retrofiting.

Swordguy

2007-02-13, 12:50 PM

You need more fabric in the arm pits, so that you don't have to raise the doublet so far, I don't know how you would solve it through retrofiting.

Then how do avoid having "wings" when your arms are lowered?

Norsesmithy

2007-02-13, 12:56 PM

Clever sewing. What am I? A seamstress?:smallwink:

I am just saying I have seen it done right,and I have seen people with your problem, and their doublets tended to be too tight in the armpits.

WhiteHarness

2007-02-13, 01:05 PM

Norsesmithy is correct: clever tailoring will elminate the problem you describe. having a gusset (the cloth kind, not mail in this instance) in the armpit helps, too. My Historic Enterprises arming doublet is ingenious; it fits tightly up underneath the armpits so the body of the garment doesn't 'ride up' when you raise your arm.

If your legharness is the only thing you'd need the doublet for, then consider a pourpoint instead.

http://www.revivalclothing.com/catpages/cat_pour_civilian.htm

http://www.historicenterprises.com/cart.php?m=product_detail&p=494&c=79

Swordguy

2007-02-13, 01:13 PM

Frankmuddy

2007-02-13, 03:14 PM

How the dickens does anyone manage to hit something with a sling?

I'm given to understand that with a very considerable amount of practice you can get a very precise and predictable arc to the sling stone. Masses of slingers have been used in various armies since... Well, the earliest I can think of is biblical times, so 5000 years ago? There are stories of skilled slingers putting a bullet through a soldiers helmet at a hundred yards or more. And I think staff slings have been used as recently as WWII to hurl grenades great distances.

In response to the question about the girl in Kill Bill, I believe the weighted chain weapon is called a Meteor-hammer, and the girl who used it was supposedly chosen for the role because she was the only person the filmmakers could find who was actually trained with that weapon.

Frankmuddy

2007-02-13, 04:04 PM

If you want a 'starter sword' and you're on a budget, I'd also recommend going to www.starfireswords.com. They're the baseline of theatrical combat pieces (not often historically accurate, but they're durable as heck and pretty much everybody in the industry knows about them). You're looking at prices in the $150-$400 range (a few higher, a few lower).

A comment on Starfire. Some of their swords can be very heavy relative to their size. I reccomend Starfire for a first time sword buy. They're blunt, so you're not going to accidentally hurt youself, and they're durable beyond all reason. BUt if you want to get one consider going to a ren faire or somesuch and handling the model you're looking at first, just to get an idea of the weight. Oh, and also take the time to play with some of their great swords. They've usually got one at the Minnesota ren fest that's about six feet long and weighs more than ten pounds. It's fun just to look at.

The shop lady gets a bit cross with you when you try to fence with it, though... : (

Fhaolan

2007-02-13, 05:07 PM

A comment on Starfire. Some of their swords can be very heavy relative to their size. I reccomend Starfire for a first time sword buy. They're blunt, so you're not going to accidentally hurt youself, and they're durable beyond all reason. BUt if you want to get one consider going to a ren faire or somesuch and handling the model you're looking at first, just to get an idea of the weight. Oh, and also take the time to play with some of their great swords. They've usually got one at the Minnesota ren fest that's about six feet long and weighs more than ten pounds. It's fun just to look at.

The shop lady gets a bit cross with you when you try to fence with it, though... : (

My wife has a starfire dagger and it's amusingly robust. We joke about using it to open paint cans, pry up floorboards, keep the Imperial Trash Compactor from closing while we escape, etc...

Adlan

2007-02-13, 05:11 PM

I'm given to understand that with a very considerable amount of practice you can get a very precise and predictable arc to the sling stone..

Not that much practice actually, a friend of mine practiced for a week, several hours a day, and was hitting things 50 yards away with some force.

the trick is one whirl to build up momentum, then release. not masses of swings like you see in films, use the sling like an extension of your arm, like a spear thrower.

Dervag

2007-02-14, 01:48 AM

I've heard that the other trick is to sling underhand and not round and round the head.

As a general rule about weapons, it's much easier to adjust the elevation of your shot than to adjust the side-to-side angle of your shot, and when used as weapons, you're aiming at things that are taller than they are wide anyway. Therefore, if you must have accuracy problems in one direction, you want that direction to be up and down rather than side to side.

It's hard to aim a sling along the axis that lies in the plane of its swing. If you whirl the sling above your head, that plane is parallel to the ground and you will be hard pressed to control where your shots go to within better than a few degrees of arc. That's bad. So instead, swing underhand and release when you reach the correct angle to throw your projectile. That way, the projectile will be going in the right direction almost by default, even if it's too high or too low.

Wehrkind

2007-02-14, 02:08 AM

Man, I gotta say, fashion took a serious downturn between 300 AD and 1400. I just loath medieval clothing. I just had to say that.
I might look into the pourpoint. That looks fairly handy. If I change my armor harness to a lorica musculata and shin and knee greaves it would be redundant though.

Dervag: Nicely put.

2007-02-15, 12:33 PM

On the First Crusade & Logistics

Again I must apologise for the delay Matthew, its really been a comedy of errors on my side. One bonus of the delay has been my acquisition of Asbridge's work. Quite an entertaining and informative read. I'll start by finishing my response to your first response, before dealing with your last post. First though a timely and relevant quote from Asbridge:

"[Urban's overtures to the Italian city-states] seems to have been the extent of the Latin princes' logistical planning. They forsook complex logistical networks and the burden of long chains of supply. Rather than attempt to carry or bring in the vast quantity of food and equipment needed en route, they chose instead to survive through subsistence: in friendly territory, rely on markets and what little they could forage from nature; in enemy lands, turning to wholesale scavenging and rampant pillage."[1] :smallwink:

Now, to be clear, I am not suggesting that the First Crusade was logistically managed in a way that we might consider recognisably modern, but I am contending that it was not simply a bunch of armed thugs passing from province to province with no plans except to loot as much as possible.And I would fully agree with your assessment. The Princes certainly had a logistical awareness - that is the necessity of supplying and feeding themselves and their men, they were not idiots after all - but my emphasis is how they dealt with this challenge. When they did forage it was far from simple looting and plunder and often constituted deliberate and timely supply actions and expeditions.

We see much evidence regarding this logistical awareness. Asbridge gives us the march from Nicaea as an example - the crusading host deliberately split into two contingents, a policy that almost led to disaster at Dorylaeum, due to "the intense strain on local resources, given that the Franks intended to continue their practice of foraging for food as they went"[2]. It was particularly pronounced in the establishment of foraging centres during the siege of Antioch[3,4]. Again we note that the Crusaders did not simply blunder from city to city but rather saw foraging as a practical, necessary logistical measure. In all probability it was the only logistical setup with which the Princes were familiar with. In the above case of marching from Nicaea there was a calculated assessment of how the size of the army could affect drawing resources from the local surroundings and a resultant strategy shift to account for this.

Foraging, or "living off the land", is the most rudimentary of logistical models. Yet it has long been a staple of military campaigning and in 1095, and particularly the march through Anatolia, there was little alternative. Obviously I am calling this "rudimentary" from a modern perspective, logistics as a science is after all a modern concept, but then that has always been my charge. Without knowledge of Roman or Byzantine logistical organisations it would be foolish of me to make comparisons with these.

The Diversion of Baldwin and Tancred

The arrival in Pisidia and progress to Iconium was, of course, a great relief, as it offered the Crusade a chance to replenish supplies. However, what is also noticeable is the actions taken at Herclea. The splitting off of Tancred and Baldwin is described by Asbridge as part of a plan…Tyerman argues - and Asbridge appears, from that quote alone, to agree - that the approach on Antioch was driven by the twin necessities of strategic and logistic sense. In the case of the former the establishment of a friendly kingdom in Armenia Minor, as well as cutting Antioch off from the northern cities and safeguarding the southern flank of the main army, was a sound move. It makes perfect sense. I am not trying to imply that the Franks were in any way savage or mindless barbarians rampaging their way across Asia Minor - the Princes proved to have had a sound strategic grasp as they met a variety of challenges.

But I digress. This is an argument regarding logistics. Here I will quote from the same passage: "The Franks might then aid their Christian brethren and establish and extremely useful network of alliances and foraging centres with which to supply the push into Syria.". Again the emphasis is almost entirely on supplying the army from local reserves. The key to the Crusader logistical effort was replenishing supplies in such local fertile lands. This was true in Cilicia and cities such as Iconium and Marash.

The Significance of Antioch:

Where I do disagree with Asbridge, from that quote at least, is in the logistical significance of Antioch. I'd agree with Tyerman when he asserts that the importance of Antioch was primarily political in nature and of particular significance to the Greeks seeking to re-establish the boundaries of the Empire[5]. Asbridge appears to lend weight to this theory when he states that the Princes had decided upon taking Antioch immediately following the siege of Nicaea [6], and notes that Antioch was on the top of Alexius' "wish-list"[12]. The immense religious aspect of the city, second only to Jerusalem and Rome in the Christian world, may also have been a contributing factor.

Now I'd have no problem in accepting that Antioch was a strategic target but the issue of using it as a channel for supplies strikes me as odd. In that regard the ports of Alexandretta, St Symeon and Lattakiah were significantly more important. The use of force against the city is also jarring from this perspective given that diplomacy was the preferred tool while passing other cities on the march along the coast.

But that's not exactly central to this discussion.

Logistics at Antioch

I'll deal with the issue of naval supplies below but for now I want to comment on the hardships endured while the Crusaders camped outside Antioch. Almost every account of the crusade goes into detail on the starvation that afflicted the Crusader camp during these months [7]. While initially some degree of bounty could be obtained from the immediate surroundings[8], Muslim resistance and raids would come to "hamper the increasingly important task of foraging for supplies"[9]. The Franks had to travel further and further to forage [10] and came to increasingly rely on local the local population to supplant their foraging efforts, often paying exorbitant prices for foodstuffs [7].

It was only with the construction of La Mahomerie that the Crusaders were able to limit the garrison forays and forage in safety [11]. Indeed the completion of the siege raised new logistical challenges as the surrounding lands could not longer be foraged as extensively [3]

This does not sound to me like a campaign with a well organised supply chain. The Crusaders survived but barely. Indeed logistical troubles would continue to plague the expedition [13,14, 15] and it was only with the slow advance south that the threat of hunger began to recede [16].

Naval Supplies

We can say two things with certainty regarding the supplies received by sea:

1) There were some
2) They were wholly inadequate in meeting the needs of the Crusaders. That much is obvious from the accounts from Antioch above.

Unfortunately this does not tell us a lot and leaves open to key questions:

1) How much supplies were received?
2) Was there any co-ordination or planning with the Crusader army?

Now the simple answer to these questions is that we don't know. Asbridge certainly doesn't [17]. However I think its possible to make an educated guess regarding both questions.

In the first place all that we can really say is that whatever cargo was received was inadequate to sustain the Latin host. It may have alleviated the hunger being felt but the emphasis of the Frankish logistical effort at Antioch remained fixated on foraging and surviving from the land. I hope at least that I have shown this above. We can therefore conclude that, with the exception of specialist skills and materials, the fleets made little contribution, to the degree that its contents was not specifically noted, to the supplying of the crusade.

What foodstuff and equipment did arrive from overseas would have largely originated from Cyprus and, as you point out, this required the efforts of Bishop le Puy to secure. Hardly a detailed and pre-prepared arrangement. However it does establish some degree of co-ordination with the Byzantines. But what of the, arguably more important, European fleets that arrived? While their timing is fortuitous there is nothing to suggest that their arrival or cargoes were timed or planned in advance.

In this regard it is useful to recall that the crusade was not some monolithic entity. It was a mass movement that gave birth to several waves of crusaders. Indeed the Princes' Crusade was often bolstered by fresh recruits arriving from Europe. I see no reason why the Italians would be different or immune to crusading fervour. We know that both the Genoese and Pisans had been approached and encouraged to crusade by Urban II [1] but it is far more likely that they undertook the crusade in general, rather than agreeing to a specific logistical role. Indeed the fleet of Pisa did not reach the Levant until after the fall of Jerusalem, due to a leisurely voyage that largely consisted of raiding Byzantine territories.

So while there was obviously naval aid this was either both badly inadequate and planned, or extremely valuable and yet unplanned and spontaneous. Either way I think its safe to say that the importance of naval supply, from a logistical perspective, pales when compared to the importance and benefits of the Crusaders' foraging policies.

Alexius did not follow through with his own commitments, for whatever reason (Anna cites disturbances elsewhere).Just to note that I consider Anna to be a most unreliable source. Obviously all sources from the time have to be taken with a pinch of salt but Anna's Alexiad is notable in that it was written some decades after events and with the specific aim of exonerating her father from the subsequent accusations of treachery. It’s a pity that the only Byzantine record of accounts is so one sided.

Yikes. That took longer than anticipated. Still I think it covers most points. Let me know if I've missed anything major.

References:

[1] Asbridge, T., (2004), The First Crusade: A New History, Free Press, (Paperback Edition), pp. 90-91

[2] Ibid p.133

[3] Ibid p.247

[4] Ibid p.170

[5] Antioch was the "cornerstone of the Byzantine world, the lynchpin of the Empire's eastern frontier", Tyerman, C., "God's War: A New History of the Crusades", 2006, Allen Lane, (Hardback Edition), p. 154

[6] Asbridge, p.132

[7] Asbridge quotes Fulcher of Chartes in painting a grim picture of life in the crusader camp: "At that time, the famished ate the shoots of beanseeds growing in the fields and many kinds of herbs unseasoned with salt; also thistles, which, being not well cooked because of the deficiency of firewood, pricked the tongues of those eating them; also horses, asses, camel, dogs and rats. The poorer ones even ate the skins of beasts and seeds of grain found in manure.", Asbridge, p.175

[8]Quoting Peter Tudebode, Ibid, p. 163

[9] Ibid, p. 167

[10] Ibid, p.222

[11] Ibid, pp.196-198

[12] Ibid, p. 242

[13] Ibid, p. 264

[14] Ibid, p.271

[15] Ibid, p.276

[16] Ibid, p.280

Matthew

2007-02-15, 02:43 PM

No problem, Om. I am glad that you found the time to write back and that you got the opportunity to read Asbridge.

I was going to bring it up that passage of Asbridge's earlier, but it seemed pointless at the time. The key to understanding what Asbridge is saying here is in the word 'seems', I think, as he does little to reinforce this perception elsewhere in the book.

It is worth noting that Asbridge does not consider foraging the only method the Princes were familiar with, but rather that it was a deliberate policy, as indicated in the same earlier passage.

Yes, it is in the use of the word 'rudimentry' or equivalents, that we appear to have gotten our wires crossed. From a modern perspective these logistical measures were rudimentry, but from an Ancient and Medieval viewpoint the logistical arrangements were not; local supply bases or foraging centres were the principle method of supporting an army in friendly or occupied territory.

The Significance of Antioch

The strategic importance of Antioch was linked its logistical role. If it and its ancillary dependents could not be captured or subdued, then it would interfere with any attempts to supply the crusaders by land or sea. We must not forget that expectations were of Alexius turning up at some point during the siege. There were many reasons to take Antioch and one of them was logistical. The capture of Antioch meant the securing of the ports.

Logistics at Antioch

The crusaders suffered deprevation at Antioch, there's no two ways about it. The siege was long and they do not seem to have received the supplies by sea that they expected, and they did expect them. However, we must bear in mind the context of crusade texts when we hear about the suffering of the combatants. All crusade texts describe suffering and make a great deal about how they suffered through illness, heat, starvation and other hardships, most of which is elaborated on in the retelling (especially William of Tyre).
The context of a crusade, though, is as a pilgrimage. The suffering during the performance of the the pilgrimage is extremely important, moreso, perhaps, than even success. Reading any crusading account of suffering during the first crusade is baffling if taken literally, as the degree to which they appear to have suffered is so great that their military success is inexplicable. I am not saying they did not suffer (war is hardship, after all), but I do think that there is reason to believe that things were not quite as bad as they sound.
On the other hand, I am not suggesting that the crusaders were well supplied at Antioch, but that they expected to be better supplied. The principle accusation levelled at Alexius following this siege is that he betrayed the Franks by not turning up and not supplying them as agreed. What actually transpired and what was planned are not quite the same things.

Naval Supplies

This is the contention point, I think, as if the crusaders had been sufficiently supplied, it would have been by sea. They did receive some supplies, as we have agreed, but short of 'not enough' we don't know exactly how much or how many reinforcements arrived.
From what I can gather, there was conflict between the Byzantine Navy and a number of 'Frankish' expeditions. The amount of aid that was expected fell a great deal short of what actually arrived. My position is that a great deal of Naval support was arranged, but that the majority of it failed to arrive, for one reason or another.

In any case, I do agree that the logistics of the first crusade did not approach modern standards. However, it seems to me that what logistical failure there was (and there was plenty) was not a result of lack of planning, but of conflict between Greeks and the Latins during the execution of those plans.

However, it is interesting to note that even with these logistical failures, the campaign was staggeringly successful.

Dervag

2007-02-15, 10:54 PM

Remember, the only way to produce Om's idea of a 'real' logistics system using medieval technology was by seaborne supply. Land supply chains couldn't handle the required loads or anything like them; animal transport simply was not efficient enough or available in sufficient quantities to carry food for an army over long distances.

So if the Crusaders' logistics were primitive, it was because their technology was limited. Supplies from the homeland could only come by sea; and seaborne transportation was subject to interdiction because of the political and strategic problems the Crusaders faced.

So to say that Crusader logistics were 'primitive' is a bit like condemning them for not paying enough attention to the problem of obtaining air superiority over the Levant. The technology to make a modern-style logistics chain possible simply did not exist in their case.

2007-02-16, 07:30 AM

No delay. Yay!

Yes, it is in the use of the word 'rudimentry' or equivalents, that we appear to have gotten our wires crossed. From a modern perspective these logistical measures were rudimentry, but from an Ancient and Medieval viewpoint the logistical arrangements were not; local supply bases or foraging centres were the principle method of supporting an army in friendly or occupied territory.And it would remain so for centuries. The more we discuss this the more I feel that we are simply approaching the same issue from different directions.

My principal point here has always been to show that logistical science is a modern concept.

Importance of Antioch

I think we can both agree that there were a variety of factors involved in the Latin decision to besiege Antioch. Whether the logistical importance was of equal or greater to the political and religious aspect… well its probably impossible to say for certain.

What I will say is that given the agreements reached by the Crusaders on the march south towards Jerusalem, and the initial null may have signified a willingness of Yaghi-Siyan to negotiate, there must have been more to it than simply logistics. There was no similar effort made to conquer other major cities such as Homs, Damascus or Tripoli.

Logistics at Antioch

Byzantines

Its important to note when considering Crusader expectations of Byzantine relief at Antioch - and the impact, if any, that this had on their logistical situation – that Alexius did not abandon the Franks until after the city had fallen. Until then we have no indication that Alexius did not intend to support the Crusaders. So it would be erroneous to subscribe any shortfall of supplies to failed expectations of the Byzantines.

Of course it may be that the Byzantines were simply unable to supply the Latins. This theory would be supported by the Taticius' excuse of heading north to secure further supplies as he left the Crusader camp. Which then raises the question as to why such aid was expected in the first place – Alexius' advice had been solid on other issues, did he tell the Princes that he could supply them?

It also merits consideration of the prior strategy and routes chosen by the Franks. We both agree that the division of the army while approaching army was, in part at least, determined by logistical planning. Would this dangerous expedition been launched if it was expected that the Byzantines would take measures to supply the amry?

Suffering of the Franks

The considerable suffering and starvation is something confirmed by every account of the siege. Cross-referencing the accounts does not reveal any discrepancies in this regard. Of course its possible that every account is exaggerated… but that defeats the purpose of relying on primary accounts. Unless there is a good reason not to accept them of course.

Furthermore the attention paid to the horses of the Crusaders is very revealing. The cavalry was of immense importance to the Frankish knights and all accounts also note the hardships of acquiring new horses as well as keeping them alive. This is a telling sign, perhaps more so than the suffering of the peasants, of the hardships endured outside the walls of Antioch.

Naval Supplies

From what I can gather, there was conflict between the Byzantine Navy and a number of 'Frankish' expeditions. The amount of aid that was expected fell a great deal short of what actually arrived. My position is that a great deal of Naval support was arranged, but that the majority of it failed to arrive, for one reason or another.This I find hard to understand. What do you base this argument on?

For what I can see, we know little about the preparations of the Italian city states. We know that both Genoese and Pisan expeditions arrived, plus a possible Anglo-Norman fleet of uncertain origins, but I fail to see how the Byzantine Navy interfered. Admittedly, as I mentioned above, the Pisans were more interested in raiding Byzantine ports than reaching the Holy Land but that's hardly the fault of Byzantium.

I say again that there seems to be little or no evidence to suggest that the arrival Italian fleets was planned or co-ordinated by the Crusaders, while in Europe or Outremer. Certainly I think its safe to disregard the notion that the naval arrivals were planned long in advance, such as before the departure from Constantinople.

However, it is interesting to note that even with these logistical failures, the campaign was staggeringly successful.Against some equally staggering odds. The Crusade wasn't as ramshackle as some historians had previously thought but there was still a very healthy measure of luck involved in its success :smallwink:

Dervag

I address this argument in this post (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/showthread.php?t=18302&page=73). There are a whole host of reasons why the Crusader logistics were basic... but this does not change the fact that this is what they were.

Raum

2007-02-16, 09:20 AM

My principal point here has always been to show that logistical science is a modern concept.I have to disagree with this statement. Regardless of what happened during the crusades, logistics has been an integral part of military knowledge since the time of Alexander the Great if not earlier.
"...to a large degree, logistics concerns shaped Alexander's strategy and tactics. From the time of his initial defeat of Darius at Issus, through his campaign into Egypt, and his final defeat of Darius at Gangemela Alexander displayed an acute awareness of the logistical requirements of his army. Alexander considered the logistics implications of every aspect of his campaign, from the route he took to the allies he courted, in successfully moving the Macedonian army across the relatively barren deserts of Asia Minor."
- The Logistics of War, a historical perspective editors Beth F. Scott, Lt Col James C. Rainey, and Captain Andrew W. Hunt.

In fact I'd even postulate the relative ease of modern transportation has made logistics less important than in times past. Today's concept of war is a material war, fought by throwing more resources at the problem. It worked for Montgomery in North Africa. But did it really require a better grasp of logistics? Or maybe just an industrial society...

Incidentally, Alexander is credited with initiating the notion of a single point of contact for logistical issues.

Joran

2007-02-16, 12:51 PM

Great links for the weapon buying.

However, if I wanted to buy a good Japanese Katana or a Chinese jian, where should I go?

Thanks.

Adlan

2007-02-16, 01:27 PM

A really, really good one? Japan.

There are some japanese smiths around that have a continous link to the old sword masters.

Unfortunetly I have no link to them.

Swordguy

2007-02-16, 02:11 PM

Great links for the weapon buying.

However, if I wanted to buy a good Japanese Katana or a Chinese jian, where should I go?

Thanks.

Bugei Trading company:

www.bugei.com

Paul Chen makes some nice katanas

http://www.swordsdirect.com/paul_chen_professional.html

Srcoll down for the better stuff, but the Practical Katana is certainly not bad. I use it for iaijutsu katas. They also make some Chinese weaons, but I have no personal experience with those, and don't feel qualified to comment.

Matthew

2007-02-16, 04:56 PM

Nobody disagrees that modern logistics do not apply to the operations of the crusaders. However, that was not part of my original contention, which was that by and large Medieval armies were well organised and that defeat was rarely a result of a failure of logistical planning, which was in response to Dervag saying "Medieval armies were not famous for having well-organized logistics" and that there was no "supply line" [Post #991]. Supply lines were used and medieval armies did organise with logistics in mind. That is not the same thing as having a logistical organisation equivalent to that of modern or early modern armies.

You have to remember that there was a break at Antioch between the Latins and Greeks. Just prior to the fall of Antioch, the Greeks left the Latins and the Byzantine Emperor was informed that the expedition had failed. From Antioch onwards, there was a significant change in their relationship, as well as between the leaders. Most of the leaders appear to have wished to consolidate their position, but the army wanted to go on to Jerusalem (according to Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, pp. 41-42), which resulted in a swift march.
The strategy of the crusaders after Antioch no longer relied on the Greeks, the Genoese Fleet seems to have brought supplies down the coast to supply them at Triploi, as they put in at Saint Simeon. The crusaders did at first attempt to capture nearby cities, such as Marra, Gibel, Laodicea, Arqa, Kephalia and a number of unamed settlements / castles (Gesta pp. 77-84), but overall seem to have settled for taking tribute from foreign princes (Tripoli is a case in point, as according to the Gesta, after sending tribute, the King of Tripoli agreed to be christened and hold his land from the Franks if they took Jerusalem and defeated the Egyptians). Shaizar, Homs and Marakia also sent tribute and sought treaties of peace (Gesta pp. 81-84).
The political situation after the fall of Antioch and complete defeat of the allied Muslim forces on the battlefield radically altered the position of the Latins and facilitated their march on Jerusalem.

Logisitcs at Antioch

The reasons for the failure of the Byzantines to supply the crusaders by sea are complex and shadowy. Alexius had agreed to supply the crusaders all the way to Jerusalem, according to the Gesta, but he obviously did not do so sufficienctly. Anna claims that there was conflict between the Greek and Latin fleets at sea, caused by the Latins raiding Byzantine lands. Regardless of whether the accusation is true or not, Alexius stopped fulfilling his end of the bargain (whether by design or by inability) long before the fall of Antioch. That is Bohemond's principle reason cited for not handing over Antioch to the Byzantine Emperor:

Alexiad, p. 358.

'I myself,' he wrote, 'am not responsible for these things, but you. You promised to follow us with a strong force, but you were unwilling to back your pledges by strong action. As for us, after our arrival at Antioch, for three months with great suffering we contended with the enemy and with a famine unsurpassed in living memory, so bad that most of us were even reduced to eating meats forbidden by the law. Nevertheless, we held on as best we could, and whilst we were doing that, Your Majesty's most faithful servant Taticius, who had been appointed to help, abandoned us in our peril and went away. Contrary to expectation we did take the city and routed the forces which came from Chorosan to aid the men of Antioch. How, tell me, can it be right for us so lightly to renounce what we have won by our own sweat and toil?'

He did indeed tel the princes he could and would supply them, as well as follow them. He was supposed to supply them not only with goods, but with men. The capture of ports was by design and intended for purposes of resupply, both of men and means. The purpose of the expedition up until the fall of Antioch was the reconquest of Byzantine territories, as well as the capture of Jerusalem. The division of the army was not a straight division, we're only talking about a few thousand (maximum) men heading off under Baldwin and Tancred to secure the loyalties of Cilician Christians.

Suffering of the Franks

One has to remember that most of the accounts were based on the Gesta and written after it had been circulated. Suffering is everywhere in all crusade texts. It's part of the genre and the tendency is to increase the degree every time the stories are retold.
The appearance and disappearance of horses are an interesting part of the Gesta. They first seem to lose a significant number on the march through Anatolia, though many other animals survive (Oxen, Goats, Sheep and Dogs, p. 23). Crossing the Anti-Taurus, they also lose horses and beasts (p. 27), as being so fearful that they sold arms and armour or threw them away(strange to say the least). They capture a great many horses and animals outside of Antioch (p. 28) as they arrive and just as prices are increasing (p. 31). During the famine and just before Tatikios' departure, the Gesta indicates that "in the whole camp you culd not find a thousand knights who had managed to keep their horses in really good condition" (p. 34). At that point Takitios says:

"Gentlemen and most gallant knights, you see that we are here in great distress, and that no reinforcements can reach us from any direction. Let me therefore go back into the country of Rum, and I will guarantee without delay to send by sea many ships, laden with corn, wine barley, meat, flour, cheese and all sorts of provisions which we need; I will also have horses brought here to sell, and will cause goods to be brought hither by land under the emperor's safe conduct."

Intending, presumably, to fulfil in person the promises made by Alexius back on page 12.
After Taktios' departure, the crusaders fight yet another battle and capture more horses (p. 37). During the building of a castle they fight the Turks again and again gain provisions and horses (p. 41). After the capture of the city and a lengthy detour to discuss the activities of the enemy, the crusaders are described within Anitoch as being so short of food that they were eating their horses (p. 57 and p. 62), followed by a these are the things 'we suffered for the Name of Christ and to set free the road to the Holy Sepulchre.' When the crusaders finally sally out and defeat their enemies, they once again capture many provisions, including horses.
Indeed, the way it occurs and presented is formulaic. They are always 'badly in need' of the provisions and horses they capture after any conflict near Antioch, and yet, they do not seem to suffer any tactical set backs because of this lack; it's all relative, I suspect, and difficult to quantify. There was no doubt hardship and suffering at Antioch, but their very success is cause to wonder what degree literary topoi are playing here, especially given the more fanciful episodes within the text.
Of course, Frankish knights preferred to fight on horseback and gained prestige from doing so, but they were formidable foot soldiers as well, so it may not be any wonder that they were still a tactically effective force with horses or without. The prevailence of siege actions made such skills a necessity.

Naval Supplies

We hear about the conflict between Greek and Latin fleets from Anna. There's no reason to doubt what she is saying, though it would be interesting if we had any. I don't think it is really safe to disregard any planning between the crusaders and naval fleets. We know they communicated with Western Europe during the siege of Antioch, requesting additional men and means. There is no reason to suppose that fleets were not outfitted and sent as part of the Papal initiative. That these fleets were involved in raiding Byzantine territories suggests that they may have arrived 'early' and were waiting on the crusaders.
A lot depends on what we interpret as planning. A ship or fleet could sail from England with the intention of joining the crusade. Spend time fighting in Spain before sailing on to Italy and then on to Greece (or a dependency such a Cyprus or whatever) before finally putting in at the Holy Land. Anytime during that journey they could learn of what the crusaders were doing or in need of at any given time. Certainly, there was sufficient time spent at Antioch for news to reach the Pope and supplies to be sent.
However, it is not the Latin West that is of import. The Franks seized ports and expected to receive supplies through them. The supplies they were expecting were to come from all quarters, but especially from Alexius, as agreed before leaving Constantinople.
This is the mythos of the First Crusade, as portrayed by the crusaders. (paraphrasing) "Against all the odds and betrayal by the Greeks the crusaders succeeded because it was the will of God and because they were willing to suffer for love of him." The temptation is to substitute "good fortune and dogged determination" for this, as it seems to best fit the texts we have, but this is a modern reaction to a medieval text, trying to make sense of some pretty strange, unbelieveable and contradictory events.
To me it makes infinitely more sense, in the context of crusade, to see their success as a result of good fortune in combination with having sufficient resources (and good management of those resources) to succeed.

Norsesmithy

2007-02-16, 09:05 PM

Paul Chen makes some nice katanas

http://www.swordsdirect.com/paul_chen_professional.html

Srcoll down for the better stuff, but the Practical Katana is certainly not bad. I use it for iaijutsu katas. They also make some Chinese weaons, but I have no personal experience with those, and don't feel qualified to comment.
Word of caution, it seems that Paul Chen's Practical and Pratical Plus Katana occasionally have durability issues, and that not all of them are tempered to the same level, so that while most are probably pretty good, there are some lemons in the bunch

Neon Knight

2007-02-17, 12:25 PM

Does firing a crossbow from a crouching or prone position improve one's accuracy with the weapon like it does with firearms?

msgZ28

2007-02-17, 12:57 PM

Does firing a crossbow from a crouching or prone position improve one's accuracy with the weapon like it does with firearms?

I honestly don't see why it wouldn't. By kneeling or going into the prone, you have a much more stable firing position. It might make it harder to reload though, especially from the prone.

Adlan

2007-02-17, 03:53 PM

Like msgZ28 says, just a more stable firing position is all that helps, so yes, exactly like shooting with a firearm, it will make you more accurate (it firing prone makes the shooter more accurate, not the weapon AFAIK). But again, as msg says, it is very, very hard to reload a corssbow of any useful weight when prone.

Dervag

2007-02-18, 02:17 AM

Dervag
I address this argument in this post (http://www.giantitp.com/forums/showthread.php?t=18302&page=73). There are a whole host of reasons why the Crusader logistics were basic... but this does not change the fact that this is what they were.

Yes, but their logistics were basic for the same reasons that their air-defense precautions were lax. The fact that the Crusaders made themselves sitting ducks for air attack goes unremarked upon, because it's extremely obvious why they were oblivious to the possibility of air attack. After all, there wasn't any possibility of such an attack in the first place.

The Crusaders could not realistically hope to completely supply their army by shipping food (their main logistical need) from a distant base. They didn't even try. In fact, it probably didn't even occur to them to try, because nobody else had ever been able to do it either.

Therefore, if one is going to apply a word like 'basic' or 'simple' to Crusader logistics, one should be considering the limits of available technology. By those standards, their logistics were pretty good.

To give a similar example, the Mongol armies communicated using fast courier relays, colored flags, and lanterns for night marches. Their communications were among the best in the world at the time. But by modern standards, their methods were ridiculous makeshifts; no modern army would rely on them exclusively as the Mongols did.

Does that mean that Mongol communications were 'basic'?

No, it does not. The Mongols could communicate extremely well relative to the available technology and resources. By the same standard, the Crusaders' logistics were by no means crude. They used the technologies they had quite well.

Darke

2007-02-18, 05:29 AM

are there D&D rules for a zanbato?

did the zanbato really exist? by this i mean the anime/manga one, 2 metres long?

Norsesmithy

2007-02-18, 10:28 AM

Not really, the Zanbato is a fictional weapon, thought to be inspired by the Chinese Pudao.

The concept is rather silly anyways. It would be unweildy to to the point of comedy. Perhaps a Glaive could be used for the crunch, that is how, I think, most people would classify a Pudao.

Alternitively, it could be a representation of a Zhanmadao (approximately 44 inch blade), and that I would stat as a falchion , or perhaps a step higher (ie the relationship a longsword has to a bastard sword) with the curved blade and thus the high crit range

Grey Robe

2007-02-18, 07:28 PM

Generally speaking what would be the the most effective weapons for extremely tall or short people to use? I recently finished a Jack Whyte novel in which an extremely short individual (height never explicitly stated) said that bladed stabbing instrument (paraphrasing long description) helped make up for his short stature.

I was thinking of applying this to the stock fantasy races for a homebrewed world but thought I'd get an opinion on real world facts first.

Matthew

2007-02-18, 07:36 PM

Depends on many things. Certainly there is no absolute rule that short people should use long bladed stabbing weapons. The Romans, for instance, were on average shorter than their Gallic opponents, but used relatively short bladed weapons very successully against them.

Hurlbut

2007-02-19, 11:19 PM

are there D&D rules for a zanbato?

did the zanbato really exist? by this i mean the anime/manga one, 2 metres long?
Closest is Fullblade from Arms & Equipment guide.

Wehrkind

2007-02-19, 11:42 PM

Yea, in my experience size doesn't make a lot of difference when it comes to weapons choice. I have had my butt handed to me by 5'3" girls with sword and shield and 6'10" guys with sword and shield equally well. If you were extremely short, you might have some angles of attack cut off (I hate trying to hit that 6'10" guy in the head or shoulders), so I suppose something more up close like a short sword or dagger might help you with close in work, since shorter arms might put you at a disadvantage farther out. A polearm might help the situation with range.

Really, it depends a lot more on how you want to fight than how large you are. I don't think the physical size differences factor in as much as personality or fighting style really.

Mike_G

2007-02-20, 12:01 AM

From the fighting and fencing I've done, I find the opposite. I'm quite short, my best buddy who went through fencing from beginners classes to national meets is very tall. He excells at Epee, which is a point only, whole body target weapon that favors reach. All good epee fencers are tall and skinny.

Short quick people shouldn't try to win the reach game, since you start at such a handicap, but should try to get inside the tall guy's guard and take advantage that way. Short, quick weapons workd better for that, with an edge so even if you are too close to use the point well you can slice, cut and saw at him. Plus headbutting. If your forehead lines up with your enemy's nose, headbutt it out the back of his skull.

And no mater how big he is, you can alwasy reach his knees or genitals, and if you hit either of thsoe hard enough, people drop.

Very little of this helps in sport type combat, like fencing or SCA matches, since they have rules. Tall people with reach will always have the advantage in a fight with safety rules. Infighting is dirty, unsafe and a little guy's best friend.

Wehrkind

2007-02-20, 12:55 AM

tiaxrulesall

2007-02-20, 02:15 AM

Fhaolan

2007-02-20, 02:49 AM

I was under the impression that the Romans and Medieval peoples actually *did* make good use of pike/long spears. It just isn't a romantic/dramatic image and so gets glossed over a lot. I could be wrong on this, of course.

Wehrkind

2007-02-20, 04:33 AM

The problem with tight pike formations is that they need both training and cohesion to be effective, and their mobility and flexibility is limited. Training helps with cohesion and the mobility of the unit, but rough terrain causes a great deal of trouble, and you still are never going to move as fast as a unit of other infantry while maintaining your wall of spear points necessary to survival. Essentially the Romans out did the Greeks by forcing them to face one maniple while another attacked the flanks, all while shooting arrows and hurling javelins at them. Even as early as the Peloponesian war the improved mobility of light infantry was becoming obviously overpowering compared to the previously all mighty hoplite. (See Victor Davis Hanson's "A War Like No Other" for piles of info on this.)

Spearmen existed contemporaneously with pretty much every army up until.... well... I know I have heard of freed slaves being given spears to fight with in the American Civil War, though that hardly counts. It's just that without large numbers and training, as well as favorable ground, very long spears are not too great. Shorter spears are useless without shields or armor heavy enough to block projectiles, and spear and shield is inferior to sword and shield due to the limited attack angles of spears. Spearmen still saw use against horsemen though, as even shorter spears are pretty good at stopping a horse when used en masse.

Pikes saw use a lot in the late middle ages I believe largely because melee weapons ceased to be the big killers in favor of firearms, instead becoming the bulwark behind which gunners could opperate with impunity. While a phalanx is really awkward in the attack, moving with the speed of erosion, when you just have to sit back and let your buddies with guns tear the enemy to peices while you hold them at pikes length, it's a very good deal.
That's my take on it at least. I understand a lot more of the anchient overshadowing of the pike than the resurgence though. Spears and pikes have been around in one form or another forever though; a gun with a bayonet is essentially a short spear.

Matthew

2007-02-20, 04:26 PM

-what is responsible for the long disapearance of the pike or long spear from the field of battle in the first millenium?

-they seem to have been very popular and effective in ancient greek and persian warfare, and were the dominant factor of renaissance warfare from the 15th to 17th centuries, but for some reason roman and medival armies rejected them. What factor of warfare from these periods made what apears to be an extremely effective weapon, the spear formation, innefective?

Depends what you mean. 'Long' Spears were used throughout the periods in question, if we're talking about weapons that run from about six to twelve feet, and were even used by mounted troops.
If you are talking about the highly specialised Pike formation, though, Wehrkind's answer seems a reasonable explanation to me.

Pikes have some significant disadvantages for the average combatant, mainly that they make shield use difficult, but also that you can't throw them very effectively. Also, it's worth noting that the use of this very long Pole Arm by the Macedonians is open to some debate (i.e. we don't know what the exact length was from period to period or during what period it reached twenty four feet). A Pike formation is also of limited tactical use, best suited to open battles, which were generally avoided during most of the 'medieval' period.

tiaxrulesall

2007-02-21, 03:55 AM

-my question was not specific to the german and swiss pikeman and the specific pike formation, as groups as diverse as the scottish, spanish, ancient greeks, and anchient macedonians seemed to have used such weapons

-it seems to me that the romans, who possessed a highly diverse, infantry based, and diciplined army, and who had significant problems with enemy cavalry, would have fielded pike units.

-Also, i thought that pikes were very difficult to flank, as the direction in which the spears are pointing can be changed very quickly by diciplined troops, and if nessesary they can make a hedgehog with spears pointing in all directions

Wehrkind

2007-02-21, 06:19 AM

Your first point is correct, that pikes/long spears were used by just about everyone at one point or another.
Your second point forgets that the main problem with Roman cavalry was the same as the Greek's problem: it was far too light. The reason for this is that Italy and Greece, and really much of Europe until you get to the Iberian peninsula, is poorly suited for horse raising, consisting of many hills and valleys that are heavily wooded. As such, Early Europe did not have the horse culture you see in the middle east and the asian steppes. It was estimated by the Greeks that 6 hoplites could be supported by the same land as 1 horse and rider. So there was a general concensus that heavy infantry provided a lot more bang for the buck, both in numbers, as well as staying power.
So, why didn't the Romans use long spears? Most likely because they got roundly stomped by the Celtic surrounding Rome in their early years. Much of the "classic" Roman kit, their helms, gladius hispanis and scutums, were copied from the tribes they warred with in their formative times. When you get down to it, a sword and shield beats a spear and shield, assuming two equally skilled combatants etc. They still used spearmen, but as the Roman military became more uniform they did so in lesser numbers, and never in the tight phalanxes that had largely been discredited in the Peloponesian war. Their later crushing successes/near losses against Pyrrus in the south of Italy drove home this fact.

On point three, the exact opposite is true. Imagine a block of troops shoulder to shoulder 15 wide and 4 deep. The spear tips of every man is horizontal and facing the enemy, which is good. All four ranks can attack, even if the back 2 are pretty much just poking blindly. Now, they need to face an enemy to their left. They must all raise their spears vertical, as if they just turn they will bump into their friends. After ALL are up (which must be done in concert), they turn to their left, then lower pikes. Now they have 4 men wide, 15 deep facing left, and have spent a number of seconds where they had no points facing anyone. The unused 11 rows can also move out to extend the line. (Compare to swordsmen just turning, then extending the line.) One unit on one, that works alright. In mass battles though, such maneuvers tend to break up your line's continuity, without which it you are worthless. This was the problem the Greeks faced: Since they were unable to move anywhere quickly and maintain formation as necessary, how to they deal with units of swordsmen moving all around their flanks? They could not just bend their line, as that would spread the tips of the pikes quite far apart at the outter ends, severely limiting their effectiveness. They could not hope to catch the swordsmen in formation, and out of formation they are easily cut down. Since they can not catch them, it is a simple matter for the enemies' slingers and archers to whittle them down. Essentially they can not force confrontation.
Now, forming a hedgehog pattern as you mention is called a scillitron (sp?). That is very handy for dealing with cavalry who can not find an open area to put their horses in. The problem with it is that it is also extremely immobile without breaking the formation. The basic scillitron is the basis for advanced techniques such as the British Square, the impressive formation they were famous for in the 1800's. However, they both share the same weakness: They are sitting targets. Even using shields, someone has their back to a missile unit at any given moment. The British of course could shoot back, something their predecessors were unable to achieve.
Again, that is not to say that spears fell out of use, simply out of favor. Plenty of Romans were using spears in battle, just not the "proper" troops, at least not after Marius (the triarii did use them, as they were mostly a defensive line to allow the other lines time to regroup.) The pike formation was used in many parts of the world, particularly those with heavy Greek influence. The Romans simply beat the tendancy out of most peoples. As the balance of warfare moved from aggressive maneuvers back to solid defensive formations with the rise of the gun, we see the spear taken back to it's logical extreme, the pike.

Edit:
I forgot to mention, in reference to ease of changing facing: long spears project nearly no power out to the sides, only directly in front. You can't kill someone swinging a spear sideways, and you can not injure them at all if they get within your point before you spin. To see what I mean, get a long stick or broom handle, stand in a tight hallway, and try to spin around without lifting it.

Matthew

2007-02-21, 12:42 PM

Just to elaborate a bit on the Horse culture thing. Though, it is obviously more expensive to support a Horse Man than a Foot Man, don't forget about Alexander's Companion Cavalry, nor that Thessaly and Thrace were famous for their Horse breeding in ancient times, not to mention Caesar's depiction of the Gauls as a nation of Horse Men. 'Civilised' Greece, though, was notoriously bad terrain for breeding and using Horses, which is why it made better sense to develop and use Foot Men.
The proportions of Horse to Foot amongst the Romans during the Third Century can be derived from Polybius. Essentially, although the Romans had around 3,000 Heavy Foot, 1,200 Light Foot and only 300 Horse to a Legion, they required their allies to bring a similar number of Foot, but three times as many Horse, for a total of 8,400 Foot to 1,200 Horse (Polybius, Book VI (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/polybius6.html)), which is a ratio of 7:1.

With regards to why the Romans didn't make use of the Spear or Pike Phalanx. Well, before the third century BC they did; as far as can be seen they operated in a very similar fashion to their Hellenic counterparts, which included the use of Light Foot and Horse. By the end of the third century BC the third line of the Roman Legion (Triarii) are still using Long Spears, and although they seem to have acted mainly as a reserve and 'falling back point' they still saw a good deal of action.
Polybius discusses the whys and wherefores of how the Roman Heavy Foot were able to defeat the Hellenic Heavy Foot and his conclusion appears to be that they were better suited to rough terrain, or to put it another way, they were a more flexible force (Polybius Book XVIII (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/polybius-maniple.html)).
Although the early Imperial Roman Legions did not conventionally use Spears, they cetainly had Auxillaries who did. These wouldn't qualify as Pikes, of course, but Long Spears perhaps.
Hellenic forces, it is also worth remembering, did use other Troop types to cover the flanks of their Phalanxes.

Dervag

2007-02-21, 04:03 PM

Right. The Hellenes gave most of the 'press coverage' to the phalanxes of hoplites, but they had plenty of light-armed troops of their own. Look at Xenophon's Anabasis for an example of this. Xenophon makes repeated mention of the 'light armed troops' in the retreat of the Ten Thousand.

Similarly medieval Europeans gave most of the coverage to armored knights on horseback, but they made extensive use of other troop types (such as spearmen and crossbowmen). However, in both cases there were cultural factors encouraging one troop type to be promoted over another in the written accounts.

A different effect changes our perception of the Roman Legions. We tend to imagine the Roman legionnaires as a homogeneous force of men armed with banded armor, heavy shield, short sword, and javelin. This is not correct. Even within the main infantry bodies that made up the legions, there were several different types of soldiers; and legions were routinely augmented with non-Roman auxiliary units that filled tactical roles that the legionnairy infantry couldn't handle.

Pretty much every army that has used infantry, from the dawn of history to the invention of automatic weapons, employed spears or spear-like weapons in some form.

Winterking

2007-02-21, 04:41 PM

Part of the perceived fading of pike use in Western Europe during the late dark ages/early middle ages was, like others have said, the relatively complex maneuvers needed to turn a pike formation (phalanx, schiltron, etc) to face another flank. At the same time, different cultures of war arose than the Roman/Greek 'mass combats'. Norse and Saxon warfare, for example, tended to focus more on individual glory and combat prowess--not something as feasible if the hero is simply Pikeman #426. Pikes are not particularly good unless they are in significant numbers. And shield walls did many of the same things that Pikes could do, with greater mobility--provide solid defense, keep out charging enemies*, and so on. Meanwhile, the Franks were adopting increasingly cavalry-based forces, and emphasized cavalry more than pikes as the battle-winner.
(*Before the advent of lance-wielding, heavily armored cavalry, a solid block of men who wouldn't run would be almost as hard to break with horsemen as a block of pikes. Horses won't run into a wall.)

In the East, however, pikes never went away. Byzantine military manuals from the 7th through 10th centuries all call for footmen armed with long spears to be key parts of the army. In the 10th century particularly, a point when Byzantine tactics hinged on heavily armored cavalry (kataphraktoi) to defeat the foe, the campaign army was still based on a foundation of pikemen. They even fielded super-heavy pikemen for the front ranks, to shield against enemy kataphraktoi.

So, pikes never really disappeared.

Grey Robe

2007-02-22, 01:08 AM

Dervag

2007-02-22, 03:05 AM

Were battle axes, or any kind of axes for that matter, ever used particularly effectively by mass formations? Swords and spears seem well suited to use by regiments or any scale of formation but axes would seem to require more room and independence to be used effectively.
The early Franks made throwing handaxes a routine part of their infantry tactics, and they fought in fairly dense groups; though not really in formation.

Winterking

2007-02-22, 10:23 AM

Vikings were fond of axes, and I believe that some Russian soldiers used axes. You're right that axes need more room to really work well, so they (especially big two-handed battleaxes) were more often used by cultures that fought in more open, individual combats. The main draw for axes was that they were a cheap and effective way to hurt people with relatively little training--it's far easier to make and use an axe well than to do the same with a sword.

Matthew

2007-02-22, 01:35 PM

Hmmn. The Axe is often perceived as more unwieldy than the Sword, but I have also heard that the difference is not too huge. Certainly, as a mounted weapon, it was effective and saw considerable use. As for its usefulness as an infantry weapon, as Dervag points out, the Francisca was a fairly prominent Frankish throwing weapon, probably used in conjunction with, or as an alternative to, Javelins. The Francisca and larger two handed Axes are depicted on the Baueux Tapestry being used in formation, but it's difficult to say how typical that might have been.
Richard Couer de Lion apparently used a Battle Axe whilst mounted. Hard to say what the reasons really were, though.
The relative cheapness of an Axe to a Sword can be exaggerated as well, since it is likely to vary by period and type. In general a Sword is more expensive to produce than an Axe, but (I think) pattern welded Axe heads are not entirely unknown and the more cheaply produced Saxe might have been a more common type of Sword available.

In short, Axes saw service in the Shield Wall, but to what degree, I would be hard pressed to say and I can't think of any other historical examples off hand (though I am sure there are some). On Trajan's Column you can see Double Edged and Single Edged Axe Heads as part of the Roman War Trophy, so presumably the Dacians were using them for something...

Below is a link to by far the best online Viking Age weapons resource I have ever come across:

http://www.hurstwic.org/history/articles/manufacturing/text/arms.htm

Belkarseviltwin

2007-02-22, 02:16 PM

My knowledge of axes in war:
At Hastings, Harold Godwineson's huscarls used the Danish battleaxe as their main weapon. I have no idea how it was used, though.
The most interesting example of a mass axe drill is the Russian berdysh, as used by these fellows (http://www.xenophon-mil.org/rushistory/medievalarmor/strel1a.htm). It was mainly used as a musket-rest, and I'm not sure how they used it when closing with the enemy.

Wehrkind

2007-02-24, 11:47 PM

One handed axes work a lot like swords when using them, in my experience. A little more tip heavy than a weapon I prefer, but no more unwieldy in mass combat.
Two handers, those require a bit more space to use, but not so much that you can't stand quite close to your buddies. I find with most two handed weapons and pole arms especially that huge, baseball bat swings are rarely useful, since they give the target all sorts of time to react. You can deliver surprisingly powerful shots without ever bringing the head of the weapon past your shoulder, which means your side to side distance is much smaller than it might seem to be.

Maxymiuk

2007-02-26, 03:40 PM

What was the purpose of ballistae (is that the correct plural?) in siege warfare? And were sieges the only time they were used?

Mike_G

2007-02-26, 03:53 PM

Perhaps I should have specified that I am 6' even, and then point out the "pwned by a 5'3" girl."
Sport fencing and SCA fighting are VERY different. When you are playing "touch wins", range is very important, as it is also very important when not using a shield. A man with a 6' spear likely will lose against a man with a 10' spear. Once different weapon types come into play, that all goes out the window. Getting in really close works quite well for some people in the SCA, and not so well for others.

Yes, it's different. I've done both, plus "real" unarmed combat training with knives and bayonets.

While SCA is less "touch" fighting than fencing is, there are still rules which favor the reach weapon. In a real fight, the guy with the six foot spear could grab the haft of the ten foot spear and then lunge in, one handing his short spear. That's illegal everywhere there are rules. Infighting always (in real life) involves knees, elbows, headbutts, punching your crossguard into the guy's solar plexus etc. This is all very illegal in SCA as well as Olympic style fencing, and thus, infighting is gimped. Making a long reach attack with the tip of your weapon is always legal and relatively safe, whether it's a fencing foil or a rattan "polearm." Ergo, safe fighting favors reach more thn it does infighting.

I'm 5'3", but very quick and fairly strong, and learned to beat bigger people (which includes almost everybody) and it's much easier for me to win a dirty fight than a clean one.

I do enjoy all the playfighting styles. I just don't really try to win the reach game.

Wehrkind

2007-02-26, 09:44 PM

Balista: Used by the Romans to fling rocks at walls, and in the field to fling rocks and bolts at troops.

Matthew: Actually, you can grab the haft of an enemy spear if you have a mailed hand. You can also grab sword and axe hafts, though they have to be stationary. At least in East Kingdom. Good luck grabbing a spear haft being thrust at you though. If it is fast enough to punch through leather or tougher armor, you are not fast enough to grab it, until it is too late anyway.

Now, again, just to be absolutely clear, I am not saying that infighting does not work well. It does. My dad grapples for a living (essentially) and pushing 60 he can still take me down if I don't manage to club him cleanly first. (Our house ruled SCA fighting is a little more loose, involving lots of head butting, tripping and basket hilt shots.)
Still, the fact remains that if you don't have a good way of getting in close relative to your opponants's good way of taking you down before you do, you are in trouble. Shields are great for that, though your opponant can still move out of the way.

It doesn't matter what sort of fighting you are doing, if you can't survive to get in close, you lose if that is your only plan. That's why long weapons exist.
A shorter person can use any manner of weapon, and they are going to use it slightly differently against opponants depending on what the situation demands, just like a taller person. It is only the likelihood of different situations coming up that changes.

Also, note: knife and bayonet fighting is very different from sword and shield. Knife fightis is VERY up close and personal, both because of the limited killing power of the weapon, and it's small size. As they say, no one wins a knife fight, you just die last. Killing someone with a knife before they get in close to you is a neat trick, since you have arm's length plus a few inches to do it in, and not much to work with. A pollaxe, on the other hand, is going to crush your opponant dead long before his knife gets to you.

Again, I want to point out that I think grappling is terribly powerful, but you can't focus on one to the exclusion of the other. It depends on what you are fighting with, and what your opponant has.

ldcnuke

2007-02-27, 07:50 PM

are there D&D rules for a zanbato?

did the zanbato really exist? by this i mean the anime/manga one, 2 metres long?

I unfortunately cannot site it, but I have read of zanbatoes existing. They were construced like heavy glaives. Their main use was to cut horse out from under a mounted warrior.

pleasant...

Fhaolan

2007-02-28, 12:53 AM

I unfortunately cannot site it, but I have read of zanbatoes existing. They were construced like heavy glaives. Their main use was to cut horse out from under a mounted warrior.

pleasant...

There is a weapon called a zanbato/zambato. It looks nothing like the anime zanbato, however, and may not even be historical itself. The RL zanbato looks much like a somewhat long katana blade on a very long handle. Basically, it's the japanese equivalent to the European glaive.

The anime zanbato, a super-sized broadsword on a short stick, is not physically possible to use as a weapon. The massive blade is far, far too heavy. Not for the person wielding it, but for the handle.

I'll let you in on a secret that a lot of repro-sword sellers don't want you to know. The blade on every steel sword is attached to the grip via the 'tang' of the blade. This is the piece of metal that extends down from the blade, through the grip all the way to the pommel. On good blades, this piece of metal is in fact a relatively narrow piece of the blade itself. On extremely tough swords, the tang is the full width of the grip and the grip is riveted to the tang instead of slipped over it. This is called a 'full tang'. The closer the width of the tang is to the width of the blade, the stronger the sword tends to be. On cheap blades, there is no tang as such. Instead there is what's called a 'rat's tail'. A long bolt that is simply welded to the base of the blade. The weld is covered by the crossguard. This weld is a weak point, and will inevitably snap if the sword is actually used. [I said steel sword, because bronze and copper swords work a bit differently, so I made the distinction.]

Repro-sword sellers do *not* want you to check for tang. It shows how cheap the sword actually is. Stainless blades are almost always rat-tailed, and are even more prone to breaking because stainless is harder to weld properly. [Also stainless steel is somewhat harder, and therefore more brittle, than a good sword-quality steel.]

No matter how it's made, the anime zanbato has a grip that is so narrow relative to the weight of the blade that it is the equivalent to a rat-tail tang. The first time you hit anything with that sword that has the slightest resistance, like bone, a wooden shield, or steel armor, the blade would snap off right at the base of the blade where the crossguard is. Much like cheap reproduction swords do.

Sorry, but it has nothing to do with the weilder's strength. You can be the strongest human in all of time and space, and it wouldn't make the anime zanbato a usuable weapon. It's just physics.

Swordguy

2007-02-28, 01:45 AM

Repro-sword sellers do *not* want you to check for tang. It shows how cheap the sword actually is. Stainless blades are almost always rat-tailed, and are even more prone to breaking because stainless is harder to weld properly. [Also stainless steel is somewhat harder, and therefore more brittle, than a good sword-quality steel.]

This is funny because it's true. Go to a flea market or a ren faire and ask to check the tang of a weapon. I've seen violent responses to this question.

The only funnier ones are asking for a flex test and tip durability test. :smallbiggrin:

Mike_G

2007-02-28, 04:45 PM

Actually, you can grab the haft of an enemy spear if you have a mailed hand. You can also grab sword and axe hafts, though they have to be stationary. At least in East Kingdom. Good luck grabbing a spear haft being thrust at you though. If it is fast enough to punch through leather or tougher armor, you are not fast enough to grab it, until it is too late anyway.

When I tried grabbing weapon hafts in SCA training bouts, I was told that it was illegal. I assumed that to be true, so I stopped doing it. Maybe I was misinofmed, but I see how it could easily be a safety concern, so as a rule it made sense to forbid it.

You can grab a spear haft as it is thrust at you, so long as you deflect it a bit first. Parry with your own spear, grab the haft below the blade with your left hand, then lunge with the spear in a choked up grip in your right. It works nicely and is qute a shock to you opponent, assuming you don't have nine marshalls jumping all over you yelling "foul." Or you can slap it downwards with your parry and step on it while closing, but that's generally illegal in any civillized sport/play/re-enactment fight as well.

Now, again, just to be absolutely clear, I am not saying that infighting does not work well. It does. My dad grapples for a living (essentially) and pushing 60 he can still take me down if I don't manage to club him cleanly first. (Our house ruled SCA fighting is a little more loose, involving lots of head butting, tripping and basket hilt shots.)
Still, the fact remains that if you don't have a good way of getting in close relative to your opponants's good way of taking you down before you do, you are in trouble. Shields are great for that, though your opponant can still move out of the way.

Absolutely. The tall person will always get to attack me first. I'm used to that. Surviving that attack and closing to where I'm at a comfortable distance and he is cramped in the first part of any successful short guy maneuver. Shields are the easiest way to do that, but so is using your off hand to trap or deflect or beat down his longer weapon. Any offhand weapon or an open hand can work for this if you practice the moves, and if you are short, you need to practice those moves.

It doesn't matter what sort of fighting you are doing, if you can't survive to get in close, you lose if that is your only plan. That's why long weapons exist.
A shorter person can use any manner of weapon, and they are going to use it slightly differently against opponants depending on what the situation demands, just like a taller person. It is only the likelihood of different situations coming up that changes.

Yes, but if you, being 6 feet tall, use a 3 foot sword, and I, at a mere 5'3", use a 3 foot sword, you still have the advantage of reach, and I don't have any more advantage up close, since if I do get really close, (like standing-on-your-toes-close), both weapons are poorly designed for that. In a real fight to the death, I prefer a 2 foot sword like a Katzbalger to your three foot sword. I still lose at reach, but that's a given, and if I survive your attack and close, then I have a huge advantage over your longer blade. I can still get the point in you, which I probably couldn't with a longer blade, and I can use the edge and guard as well as I could with a longer weapon.

Also, note: knife and bayonet fighting is very different from sword and shield. Knife fightis is VERY up close and personal, both because of the limited killing power of the weapon, and it's small size. As they say, no one wins a knife fight, you just die last.

Only sort of. I've trained a lot with knives, and seen quite a few knife fights while a Paramedic, and you can win easily. You just need to control the other guy's knife hand. Grabbing his sleeve or wrist or even the blade and taking a cut on the hand while slamming you own point into his spleen four or five time in rapid succession is winning. A knife is a good parrying weapon as well, since you often cut his attacking limb while fending it off. Letting him thrust at you and slashing his knife weilding forearm as he does is often a nice set up to a win. You'll always get bloody in a knife fight, but if you're really good, it might all be his blood.

Killing someone with a knife before they get in close to you is a neat trick, since you have arm's length plus a few inches to do it in, and not much to work with. A pollaxe, on the other hand, is going to crush your opponant dead long before his knife gets to you.

Very probably. I would not even attempt to go against a pollaxe with a knife. Unless your back were turned. A bayoneted rifle fights not unlike a polearm though. It's very underrated. In fact, British troops wiped out an Iraqi mahcine gun position with bayonets in the initial offensive in Gulf War Episode II. That wouldn't have been my first choice, but it's still useful when push comes to shove, or when you meet an enemy around a corner in a city and your assault rifle jams because somebody said "dirt" to it.

Again, I want to point out that I think grappling is terribly powerful, but you can't focus on one to the exclusion of the other. It depends on what you are fighting with, and what your opponant has.

I'm not saying ignore stabbing your enemy with the point of your weapon and grab him instead. I'm saying that you shouldn't play his game. If he's got reach, go for infighting. If he's short, go for reach.

The initial question was whether there are better weapons and tactics for differrent size fighters. I say there are, and you should maximize the advantages you have, not try to "make up" for nature with your weapon choice.

I have trained with, and sparred with all olympic style fencing weapons, SCA "rapier" style weapons and rules, heavy list rules, and USMC knife/bayonet/dirty tricks style, so I do understand the relative merits and differences. In none of these styles has it ever been worth my effort as the shortest guy in the room to try to trade shots at a distance. Defeating the inevitable first attack of the guy with reach, and getting inside to mess him up works much better for a short, quick person, and us wee folk should arm ourselves accordingly.

Unfortunatly, a lot of infighting is not very safe, and not very allowed in many organized sport fights, while reach is always legal, so using fencing or SCA tournaments isn't a good yardstick, as both favor the safer, long distance fighting.

2007-03-01, 12:52 PM

I'm sorry Matthew but this simply is not working. I'm finding it harder and harder to get time to sit down and go over these replies. Its absolutely pointless making you wait almost two weeks for a reply and my workload shows absolutely no sign of lightening to the point where I can contribute anything more than one liners. I've enjoyed this discussion, and Asbridge's work very much so, but I'll probably have to leave it at this last post.

The End Goal

Nobody disagrees that modern logistics do not apply to the operations of the crusaders. However, that was not part of my original contention, which was that by and large Medieval armies were well organised and that defeat was rarely a result of a failure of logistical planning, which was in response to Dervag saying "Medieval armies were not famous for having well-organized logistics" and that there was no "supply line" [Post #991]. Supply lines were used and medieval armies did organise with logistics in mind. That is not the same thing as having a logistical organisation equivalent to that of modern or early modern armies.I think I mentioned in one of the first posts that supply chain management is the most defining aspect, and core responsibility, of modern logistics. When I make the comparison with modern logistical science I am not talking about the failure of the Crusaders to establish traffic controls or keep on base vending machines stocked. Rather I contend that they failed to 1) consider logistics as an integral aspect of warfare that would require careful management and 2) to organise and maintain adequate lines of supply that would remove or reduce the need to rely on local resources for survival.

Note that while I use the term "failed", I do not consider this to be an actual failing of the Crusaders. Logistical management simply wasn't an overriding concern of this era, indeed this is the entire point of the discussion. I may as well berate the Franks for not coming prepared with medical supplies or a system of field hospitals. Logistics simply wasn't an issue of importance to the Crusaders because it was not a hallmark of medieval warfare. Later expeditions to the Levant, you mentioned Richard's earlier, would come to realise that foraging is simply not an efficient a method of supply for sustaining a large host far from home. Perhaps the tight focus on the First Crusade has obscured that point somewhat.

So my overriding point here has to be the question - what degree of sophistication did the Princes display in their logistical preparation. The short answer, and one that I feel that I've demonstrated in above posts, was that there was little to no advance preparation or use of supply chains. The most telling indicator of this, and one that its very much evident from Asbridge's history alone, is the extent to which the crusading armies relied upon foraging from local resources for survival. In so far as there was logistical planning it revolved around securing these foraging sites.

Sitting beside me I have Asbridge's work bristling with close to twenty bookmarks, the majority of which I would have used in my above post, marking references to the logistical efforts of the Crusaders. The vast majority of these revolve around their "survival through subsistence". I've laid all this out above and its clear in my mind that the Crusade's supply effort consisted almost entirely of foraging and generally living from the land. What supplies did arrive via sea, and keep in mind that we have no evidence that these were organised in advance, were either regular but insignificant (Byzantine) or timely but one-off occasions (Italian).

Antioch and the March to Jerusalem

You have to remember that there was a break at Antioch between the Latins and Greeks.My point above was that the break came at the end of the siege. The significance of this is that despite holding the strategically important ports, and apparently expecting Byzantine aid, the naval supplies that arrived from Constantinople were wholly inadequate to sustain the besiegers. Outside the walls of Antioch the Franks suffered extensive hunger and still relied extensively on foraging operations. This is despite the Byzantine aid.

The crusaders did at first attempt to capture nearby cities, such as Marra, Gibel, Laodicea, Arqa, Kephalia and a number of unamed settlements / castles (Gesta pp. 77-84), but overall seem to have settled for taking tribute from foreign princesCorrection: Raymond sought to extend his rule south and take cities. This was for reasons of ambition, although the need to replenish stocks via taking cities may also have been a motive. The other Princes did not move south until early spring 1099. For comparison; Raymond had moved out of Antioch and had laid siege to Albarra by around 25 Sept 1098 (Asbridge)

When the other Princes (minus Bohemund of course) did move south they instead chose to extort gold and supplies from the coastal cities. While this lends credence to the notion that the Princes relied upon local supplies, it deals, in my eyes, a rather large blow to the theory that strategic cities were required to protect a logistical route or supply chain. Aside from the failure to capture strategically important cities, the very speed of the march from Tripoli to Jerusalem (from May 16 to June 7 according to Asbridge) would prevent all but naval supplies for reaching the army.

If they were relying on naval supplies for this rapid march then it seems incredulous that they would not seek to secure a single port along this coast. Rather such was the reputation of the Franks that they could either negotiate for supplies or rely on that season's buoyant harvest (Asbridge p. 294)

Suffering at Antioch

As I said above we can either accept, as historians do, the validity of the primary sources, while of course maintaining a sceptical attitude, or they essentially become useless to us. All the accounts that we do have suggest that the Franks endured considerable hardship and hunger. That the horses are so regularly mentioned merely reinforces the importance that a knight placed on his mount and the status that it conferred.

Really we have a choice. We can either believe the Gesta, in which case your entire writing on the subject reinforces the importance of supply from local resources, or we can reject it… which leaves us where? Figures are often exaggerated but the suffering and starvation is simply too great a thread running through these accounts to ignore completely.

Naval Supplies

We hear about the conflict between Greek and Latin fleets from Anna. There's no reason to doubt what she is saying, though it would be interesting if we had any. I don't think it is really safe to disregard any planning between the crusaders and naval fleets.
I suppose that given what I've just said above I can't simply discount Anna's account ;)

I would continue to treat it as highly suspect though, given the time after which it was written and the clear Byzantine bias. It would be keeping in tone if Anna accredited the failure of Alexius to supply the Franks to the treachery of the Franks themselves.

The real problem with the naval situation however is that wee simply have no evidence one way or the other. We know that Urban solicited the support of Genoa and Pisa and we know that some fleets arrived… that's it. If the crusaders did specifically request aid from these parties then their requests have been lost to time.

More likely to my mind, if only because it was a regular occurrence in later expeditions to Outremer, is the situation that you describe where a "ship or fleet could sail from England with the intention of joining the crusade. Spend time fighting in Spain before sailing on to Italy and then on to Greece (or a dependency such a Cyprus or whatever) before finally putting in at the Holy Land". This would fit in with the decentralised nature of the crusade in general as well as the activities of the Italian fleets.

What I would tend to discount is the notion that either Urban or the crusaders specifically commissioned a relief fleet to set sail from Y and meet the army at port X on date Z.

To me it makes infinitely more sense, in the context of crusade, to see their success as a result of good fortune in combination with having sufficient resources (and good management of those resources) to succeed.Fully agreed. The Crusaders were far from the lucky fools that they are occasionally portrayed as. I think modern writing on the subject has generally laid that myth to rest.

What this does not necessarily mean however is that the Crusade conformed to modern expectations of what a successful campaign should look like. The Crusaders were after all products of their time - when it came to the matter of supplying the army medieval methods, which relied extensively on foraging, would dominate their plans. This does not mean that there were simply no plans.

Raum:

Alexander may well have been the exception - a pre-modern commander that considered logistics to be a key element of success. I can't speak on his campaigns with any authority. I would be very much surprised if his army did not considering foraging to be a major source of supplies though.

Note however that I was specifically talking about logistical science - a through and robust organisational structure that accounts for and manages the supply of materials and equipment from the rear to the frontline. As I noted in one of my past posts, even foraging can be considered a logistical measure, albeit a primitive one.

Where I would very much disagree is the concept that logistics has receded in importance as the technology advances. Today the US army maintains a huge logistical tail that would simply be unimaginable in previous centuries. If we take your example of Montgomery, probably the foremost general of material of that war, then we see that his success in Africa, over a general with a much superior grasp of mobile warfare, came about in large part due to the Allied ability to manage their lengthy supply chains while hindering and disrupting the Germans lines.

In this "material war" logistical management becomes the key nexus through which the vast resources of an industrial nation can be brought to bear on the battlefield. This was a situation that, obviously enough, medieval strategists did not have to contend with.

Dervag:

Well we have to establish a standard here. I have made no bones that I am comparing the Crusader logistics to modern organisations. Indeed the entire point of this discussion was to establish how primitive the medieval organisation of logistics were. I am not seeking to take the Franks to task for their logistical efforts; they were products of the time, and medieval warfare in general, and were probably best suited to the needs of that campaign in the end.

If we are to take a comparison with similar expeditions then the obvious one is Richard's crusade a century later. No doubt learning from previous ventures into the Levant, preparations for this crusade were far more through.

Grey Robe

2007-03-01, 01:54 PM

With the recent comments on reach and infighting, how effective are axes up close? Does a tip or haft spike help at all or just get in the way?

pendell

2007-03-01, 02:16 PM

Some very naive questions:

1) I note that right around the renaissance Europeans seem to start using curved weapons such as the cutlass and saber for serious work rather than straight weapons.

What is the advantage of a curved sword that the Ottomans, the Japanese, and pretty much else adopted it vis-a-vis the straight sword?

2) Why is it that very few cultures outside of stone age ones use poisoned weapons for warfare?

3) Re-reading Lord of the Rings, I notice in the story that the fictional witch-king stabbed frodo with a "morgul blade which remains in the wound" -- i.e. a knife deliberately designed to fragment when stabbed into something reasonably solid.

In the real world, has anyone ever designed such a weapon? Wouldn't it have to be extremely brittle? And how would one keep the knife from falling apart under the normal stress of being carried around, jostled, etc.?

4) What real-life analogues exist to the "monster fighting" encountered in fantasy games? Aren't the weapons used against, e.g., lions and mammoths hunting weapons rather than war weapons? Is hunting a closer analog to a fantasy adventure than a military patrol?

Respectfully,

Brian P.

Fhaolan

2007-03-01, 02:19 PM

With the recent comments on reach and infighting, how effective are axes up close? Does a tip or haft spike help at all or just get in the way?

To me, it depends on several factors. Infighting is all a matter of speed, really. Because the axe needs to be swung for full effect, and swings are slower than thrusts, the axe tends to be used defensively rather than offensively when infighting.

Fast axe manuevers are usually stop-blows where you're placing the axe where your opponent will hurt himself on the axe if he tries to complete an attack. Binds, hooks, and trips are fast, if the axe is a bearded axe or hooked axe, or something similar. In either case, you are trying for a grapple or using your off-hand for offense.

If you choke up on the axe, a tip-spike is a somewhat slow dagger.

Butt spikes are really only useful on long-hafted axes such as two-handed axes, halberds, pollaxes, etc., where swinging the butt-end around to make a secondary attack is part and parcel of how the axe moves. Shorter axes don't move that way, and so you need to reverse the axe to attack with the butt spike. Which puts the big axe blade right across your body or arms. Not the ideal situation. Very long-hafted axes (such as trying to put an axe blade on the end of a pike) are rare, clumsy, and somewhat absurd to use normally. Putting a butt-spike on one isn't going to help make the weapon effective.

Matthew

2007-03-01, 04:13 PM

I'm sorry Matthew but this simply is not working. I'm finding it harder and harder to get time to sit down and go over these replies. Its absolutely pointless making you wait almost two weeks for a reply and my workload shows absolutely no sign of lightening to the point where I can contribute anything more than one liners. I've enjoyed this discussion, and Asbridge's work very much so, but I'll probably have to leave it at this last post.

Fair enough. I have also enjoyed this discussion.

The End Goal

I think I mentioned in one of the first posts that supply chain management is the most defining aspect, and core responsibility, of modern logistics. When I make the comparison with modern logistical science I am not talking about the failure of the Crusaders to establish traffic controls or keep on base vending machines stocked. Rather I contend that they failed to 1) consider logistics as an integral aspect of warfare that would require careful management and 2) to organise and maintain adequate lines of supply that would remove or reduce the need to rely on local resources for survival.

Yes, I think we are rather coming at this from cross purposes, as I think we rather quickly established. 1) I assume that when you say they failed to "consider logistics as an integral aspect of warfare that would require careful logistical management", you are meaning in the sense that they were not able to severe their reliance on locally obtained supplies; that I can fully agree with, but I think that our differing definition of 'logistics' has always been the problem for this debate. If not, and you mean that they simply failed to consider the importance of planning for supply, then I cannot agree, but I suppose we shall have to leave it at that. 2) I would say that this was a failure, but one that must largely rest on the shoulders of Alexius, rather than the Crusaders themselves (unless we blame the crusaders for relying on him for this aspect of their supply).

Note that while I use the term "failed", I do not consider this to be an actual failing of the Crusaders. Logistical management simply wasn't an overriding concern of this era, indeed this is the entire point of the discussion. I may as well berate the Franks for not coming prepared with medical supplies or a system of field hospitals. Logistics simply wasn't an issue of importance to the Crusaders because it was not a hallmark of medieval warfare. Later expeditions to the Levant, you mentioned Richard's earlier, would come to realise that foraging is simply not an efficient a method of supply for sustaining a large host far from home. Perhaps the tight focus on the First Crusade has obscured that point somewhat.

Hmmn. Again, if we keep to your definition of logistics, then I think I would agree with this, but I would not accept that feeding and supplying themselves was not an overriding concern. Certainly, later crusades seem to have relied more heavily on naval supply, as you indicate. A rising Frankish dominance at sea and the possession of secure and friendly ports seems to have facilitated this.

So my overriding point here has to be the question - what degree of sophistication did the Princes display in their logistical preparation. The short answer, and one that I feel that I've demonstrated in above posts, was that there was little to no advance preparation or use of supply chains. The most telling indicator of this, and one that its very much evident from Asbridge's history alone, is the extent to which the crusading armies relied upon foraging from local resources for survival. In so far as there was logistical planning it revolved around securing these foraging sites.

Well, we still must bear in mind what the Gesta says Alexius agreed to on page 12, but I would agree that naval supply was secondary to securing local foraging sites and does not measure up to modern standards.

Sitting beside me I have Asbridge's work bristling with close to twenty bookmarks, the majority of which I would have used in my above post, marking references to the logistical efforts of the Crusaders. The vast majority of these revolve around their "survival through subsistence". I've laid all this out above and its clear in my mind that the Crusade's supply effort consisted almost entirely of foraging and generally living from the land. What supplies did arrive via sea, and keep in mind that we have no evidence that these were organised in advance, were either regular but insignificant (Byzantine) or timely but one-off occasions (Italian).

Yes, they chiefly used local resources to supply themselves and naval supply was thin on the ground. However, expected levels of naval supply were plainly much higher than what was received.

Antioch and the March to Jerusalem

My point above was that the break came at the end of the siege. The significance of this is that despite holding the strategically important ports, and apparently expecting Byzantine aid, the naval supplies that arrived from Constantinople were wholly inadequate to sustain the besiegers. Outside the walls of Antioch the Franks suffered extensive hunger and still relied extensively on foraging operations. This is despite the Byzantine aid.

Well, I would seek to argue that the Franks were in a bad position with regard to what they expected and what they received. They could not risk alienating the Byzantines because they were hoping to receive supplies from them. Once Antioch was taken, they could afford to break with the Byzantines and they did. That they were not receiving enough supplies is not evidence that they should not have been.

Correction: Raymond sought to extend his rule south and take cities. This was for reasons of ambition, although the need to replenish stocks via taking cities may also have been a motive. The other Princes did not move south until early spring 1099. For comparison; Raymond had moved out of Antioch and had laid siege to Albarra by around 25 Sept 1098 (Asbridge)

Well, Raymond was the prime mover prior to November. Certainly his activities were part of consolidating his position relative to the other Princes, especially Bohemond. Joint operations in Novemeber commenced against Marra, but after the fall of that city Bohemond once again fell out with Raymond and returned to Antioch, according to the Gesta. However, the Gesta also says that all the leaders went each to his own territory after the capture of Antioch (whatever that means).
As you say, though, it was March by the time any siege was made separate from Raymond's operations and that was at Gibel, which was accompanied as far as Laodicea by Bohemond, but afterwards abandoned.
There were clearly tensions between the crusade leaders at Antioch, but that does not mean that we should see these sieges and tribute takings as simply Raymond excercising his power to increase his standing amongst the Princes. To my mind, there is no reason to see this as separate from a strategy of consolidation and principality building or resource management related to exploiting the capture of Antioch.
It does not seem to be the case that Raymond laid siege to other places because of tensions with Bohemond, but rather that it was on account of this that Bohemond did not accompany him. It's possible to argue it a variety of ways, of course. Raymond of Agiles seems to have claimed that Raymond forced the hand of the other Princes by putting himself at the head of a 'poor pilgrim' uprising.

When the other Princes (minus Bohemund of course) did move south they instead chose to extort gold and supplies from the coastal cities. While this lends credence to the notion that the Princes relied upon local supplies, it deals, in my eyes, a rather large blow to the theory that strategic cities were required to protect a logistical route or supply chain. Aside from the failure to capture strategically important cities, the very speed of the march from Tripoli to Jerusalem (from May 16 to June 7 according to Asbridge) would prevent all but naval supplies for reaching the army.

As I said, the Princes do move forth with Bohemond at first and do besiege Gibel seriously (without Bohemond), according to the Gesta. It is Raymond who calls them away from that siege. After that, they join Raymond in the siege of Arqa, which lasted three months before the King of Triploi came to terms. After that, there appear to be no further sieges, presumably because a treaty of peace with the King of Tripoli and changing political situation made the march to Jerusalem possible.

If they were relying on naval supplies for this rapid march then it seems incredulous that they would not seek to secure a single port along this coast. Rather such was the reputation of the Franks that they could either negotiate for supplies or rely on that season's buoyant harvest (Asbridge p. 294)

Well now, this is interesting. We only know that they were supplied by sea at Arqa and Jaffa. The march from Tripoli to Jerusalem was astoundingly swift, lasting from (presumably) early May until June 6. Whether they were supplied by sea or not we hear absoutely nothing about it. From Caesarea to Ramleh there would have been no chance, but it is significant that Robert of Rouen and his household were installed at Ramleh, on the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem and a junction back to Caesarea.
Is this evidence of an intention to be supplied by sea during the siege of Jerusalem? No. Did the crusaders receive supplies by sea at Jerusalem? Yes. What were the Genoese doing sailing into Jaffa? Happy coincidence? Maybe, but why not simply sail to Caesarea and sell their goods there? Who knows. The extent to which the crusaders were supplied or expected to be supplied by sea during this march is unknown. However, a marching army would not necessarily have needed ports to receive supplies by sea; a port is only worthwhile seizing if you are going to continue to be in the neighbourood. On the other hand, they made no attempt to capture or hold the port of Jaffa, which suggests that there was no naval support at that stage of the march from Tripoli to Jerusalem, if there was any at all.
Suffice to say, I am not contending that they were relying on naval support during this march, only that there was some possibility of it. More likely, they carried, purchased and foraged for supplies.

Suffering at Antioch

As I said above we can either accept, as historians do, the validity of the primary sources, while of course maintaining a sceptical attitude, or they essentially become useless to us. All the accounts that we do have suggest that the Franks endured considerable hardship and hunger. That the horses are so regularly mentioned merely reinforces the importance that a knight placed on his mount and the status that it conferred.

Well, historians do not accept uncritically the information they are given via Primary Sources. Indeed, the basis of historical investigation is the questioning of these sources. To reiterate, I am not saying that there was no suffering, only that the extent may well be exaggerated, especially considering the context in which they are being written.

Really we have a choice. We can either believe the Gesta, in which case your entire writing on the subject reinforces the importance of supply from local resources, or we can reject it… which leaves us where? Figures are often exaggerated but the suffering and starvation is simply too great a thread running through these accounts to ignore completely.

I wouldn't agree with this at all. I would say the focus put on that thread is suggestive of its importance to the work, which leaves it open to question. There are many entirely fictionalised elements of the Gesta and many parts that disagree in detail with other accounts. There is no real choice as to whether we believe it or not, there are only questions to be asked of the sources as to what extent we accept what they say.

Naval Supplies

I suppose that given what I've just said above I can't simply discount Anna's account ;)

I would continue to treat it as highly suspect though, given the time after which it was written and the clear Byzantine bias. It would be keeping in tone if Anna accredited the failure of Alexius to supply the Franks to the treachery of the Franks themselves.

Well, that's a problem for any source we use. There is going to be bias no matter what. We ahve to look at which bits agree, which bits disagree and hypothesise as to the reasons. I treat all these texts as highly suspect. :smallwink: Anna has her own agenda, as does the writer of the Gesta.

The real problem with the naval situation however is that wee simply have no evidence one way or the other. We know that Urban solicited the support of Genoa and Pisa and we know that some fleets arrived… that's it. If the crusaders did specifically request aid from these parties then their requests have been lost to time.

Yes indeed, absence of evidence is always going to make any absolute conclusions impossible.

More likely to my mind, if only because it was a regular occurrence in later expeditions to Outremer, is the situation that you describe where a "ship or fleet could sail from England with the intention of joining the crusade. Spend time fighting in Spain before sailing on to Italy and then on to Greece (or a dependency such a Cyprus or whatever) before finally putting in at the Holy Land". This would fit in with the decentralised nature of the crusade in general as well as the activities of the Italian fleets.

What I would tend to discount is the notion that either Urban or the crusaders specifically commissioned a relief fleet to set sail from Y and meet the army at port X on date Z.

Yes, I think that is quite true. Any supplies sent by sea could only have had a very general purpose.

Fully agreed. The Crusaders were far from the lucky fools that they are occasionally portrayed as. I think modern writing on the subject has generally laid that myth to rest.

What this does not necessarily mean however is that the Crusade conformed to modern expectations of what a successful campaign should look like. The Crusaders were after all products of their time - when it came to the matter of supplying the army medieval methods, which relied extensively on foraging, would dominate their plans. This does not mean that there were simply no plans.

Well, on that note and with very few other points of disagreement, I think we can bring this to a relative close. I have enjoyed discussing this and am happy to continue if there is anything you strongly disagree with and wish to further discuss (workload allowing). A debate of this type is always welcome to me, especially if it gives me cause to reassess or reinvestigate my own views.

Matthew

2007-03-01, 04:23 PM

Hello Pendell,

I will do my best to answr some of your questions; I am sure that any mistakes will be picked up by others.

Some very naive questions:

1) I note that right around the renaissance Europeans seem to start using curved weapons such as the cutlass and saber for serious work rather than straight weapons.

What is the advantage of a curved sword that the Ottomans, the Japanese, and pretty much else adopted it vis-a-vis the straight sword?

Okay, this is a bit of a misperception. Single Edged Curved Swords get more press at this time, but prior to the renaissance they were available and used. This can be seen in contemporary artwork and one could argue that the medieval Seax and Falchion were blades of this type.

The advantage of a curved blade is that its cutting and chopping potential is increased, generally at the expense of its thrusting potential. The difference, however, is sometimes exaggerated.

2) Why is it that very few cultures outside of stone age ones use poisoned weapons for warfare?

Poison is of limited use, dangerous to the user and potentially difficult or expensive to obtain. Battle wounds were already often lethal.

3) Re-reading Lord of the Rings, I notice in the story that the fictional witch-king stabbed frodo with a "morgul blade which remains in the wound" -- i.e. a knife deliberately designed to fragment when stabbed into something reasonably solid.

In the real world, has anyone ever designed such a weapon? Wouldn't it have to be extremely brittle? And how would one keep the knife from falling apart under the normal stress of being carried around, jostled, etc.?

That was a 'magical' (and I use the term loosely with reference to Tolkien) blade. There is no real life version as far as I know.

4) What real-life analogues exist to the "monster fighting" encountered in fantasy games? Aren't the weapons used against, e.g., lions and mammoths hunting weapons rather than war weapons? Is hunting a closer analog to a fantasy adventure than a military patrol?

It depends on the foe, but pretty much all weapons used for hunting have been adapted to warfare. Weapons that kill animals will also kill humans. The Mace and Sword may be the only pre modern personal weapons exclusively designed to kill men with and even these may have their roots in the slaughtering of animals.

Raum

2007-03-01, 07:40 PM

Raum:

Alexander may well have been the exception - a pre-modern commander that considered logistics to be a key element of success. I can't speak on his campaigns with any authority. I would be very much surprised if his army did not considering foraging to be a major source of supplies though.From what I've read, foraging / subsistence was only a significant part of the logistics outside of the campaign seasons. "If an extended period in camp was required, Alexander would either select a locale where the food harvest could support his force, stay close to a port or river system, or disperse his troops for subsistence." (from Ancient and Medieval Warfare ed Thomas E Griess) As John Fuller points out relying on forage for supply would not be adequate for an army of 30,000+. (The Generalship of Alexander the Great)

Alexander limited the followers allowed to his army, forbade wagons for standard gear instead requiring his troops to carry their own arms, armor, utensils, and some provisions, and was able to carry 10 days of rations with the army. More importantly, he supplied forward bases by ship and then dismantled the ships and transported them overland to the next river. He also sent detachments forward of the main army to take surrenders (few cities opposed him, Tyre being an exception) and ensuring his army a secure rear.

Note however that I was specifically talking about logistical science - a through and robust organisational structure that accounts for and manages the supply of materials and equipment from the rear to the frontline. As I noted in one of my past posts, even foraging can be considered a logistical measure, albeit a primitive one.Alexander is generally credited with beginning the science of logistics, his model became the model for Napoleon and the armies of both world wars.

Where I would very much disagree is the concept that logistics has receded in importance as the technology advances. Today the US army maintains a huge logistical tail that would simply be unimaginable in previous centuries. If we take your example of Montgomery, probably the foremost general of material of that war, then we see that his success in Africa, over a general with a much superior grasp of mobile warfare, came about in large part due to the Allied ability to manage their lengthy supply chains while hindering and disrupting the Germans lines.I agree, logistics today are possibly more important than tactics. Montgomery pretty much proved that in Africa...though I don't agree about him being the foremost general of WW2. He miscalculated pretty badly with Market Garden.

My earlier statement regarding the importance of logistics was part hyperbole. It was meant to point out that transportation challenges are overcome much easier today. Alexander secured first the Greek coast, then the Mediterranean, and only afterwards did he begin extending into the interior, usually following waterways. The WW2 equivalent would have had the allies securing Italy and then expanding through Spain and France before getting anywhere near Germany.

In this "material war" logistical management becomes the key nexus through which the vast resources of an industrial nation can be brought to bear on the battlefield. This was a situation that, obviously enough, medieval strategists did not have to contend with.Yes, that illustrates my point a bit better than my hyperbole did...lacking the ability to easily transport supplies across adverse terrain forces any logistics conscious commander to build his strategy around the locations he can get supplies.

Dervag

2007-03-02, 01:06 AM

I agree, logistics today are possibly more important than tactics. Montgomery pretty much proved that in Africa...though I don't agree about him being the foremost general of WW2. He miscalculated pretty badly with Market Garden.Montgomery's victory at El Alamein proves that he was good, but not that he was remarkably good. After all, he did have an overwhelming logistics advantage (including superiority in numbers and air power). Most of the defensive preparations that allowed him to hold out until he could crush Rommel in the field were already in place under his predecessor; Churchill threw Auchinleck out without good reason. Auchinleck deserves a lot of the credit for the success in North Africa.

Combined with that, I think that Montgomery's failure to aggressively pursue Rommel and his later failure in Market Garden would make him a competent but unremarkable general.

The WW2 equivalent would have had the allies securing Italy and then expanding through Spain and France before getting anywhere near Germany.Well, maybe not Spain. Spain wasn't really relevant to the Allies' logistical problems in Europe anyway; it was already as 'secured' for the Allies as they needed it to be.

Thiel

2007-03-02, 02:27 AM

he Mace and Sword may be the only pre modern personal weapons exclusively designed to kill men with and even these may have their roots in the slaughtering of animals.

The mace was probably developed from the club and that one was certainly used for hunting.

This is only hearsay, but I believe that the sword was developed from some kind farming implement.

Dervag

2007-03-02, 04:59 AM

The mace was probably developed from the club and that one was certainly used for hunting.Yes, but maces aren't very effective hunting weapons in and of themselves. Animals are mostly built more heavily than human beings. Their skulls tend to be thicker, making it harder to stun or 'headshot' them. Since that's one of the most effective attacks you can make with a mace, the mace becomes a lot less useful as a hunting weapon.

This is only hearsay, but I believe that the sword was developed from some kind farming implement.Well, it seems plausible that a sword would be a martial application of some kind of machete-like brush knife or chopper.

On the other hand, it's just as plausible that somebody decided to make a knife long enough that they could fight with it and have a reasonable chance of not getting stabbed... and then start trying to work out ways to make the knife suitable for swinging at an opponent.

2007-03-02, 05:28 AM

Montgomery pretty much proved that in Africa...though I don't agree about him being the foremost general of WW2. He miscalculated pretty badly with Market Garden.Just to note that I called Monty the foremost general of material. That's very different from simply being the best general of the war and is about the only praise for the man that you can elicit from me :smallwink:

Fhaolan

2007-03-02, 03:17 PM

This is only hearsay, but I believe that the sword was developed from some kind farming implement.

It really depends on where you draw the line on the term 'sword'. There's the falx, the khopesh and the sickle-sword, all of which are very obviously derived from scythe-blades. Many experts would not call those 'swords', however, but put them in their own category. The gross messier, the falchion, the machete, and other single-edged chopping weapons are really just oversized knives. Are they swords? The earliest copper 'swords' are almost the same size as the average modern bowie knife. These are normally classed as 'swords', but are they really?

The term 'sword' is too broad to make this kind of claim, unfortunately. It's like a lot of the problems with classifications of medieval weaponry, the terminology will trip you up every time. Every expert has their own classification system, which doesn't properly mesh with any other experts.

Subotei

2007-03-02, 03:23 PM

Montgomery's victory at El Alamein proves that he was good, but not that he was remarkably good. After all, he did have an overwhelming logistics advantage (including superiority in numbers and air power). Most of the defensive preparations that allowed him to hold out until he could crush Rommel in the field were already in place under his predecessor; Churchill threw Auchinleck out without good reason. Auchinleck deserves a lot of the credit for the success in North Africa.

Combined with that, I think that Montgomery's failure to aggressively pursue Rommel and his later failure in Market Garden would make him a competent but unremarkable general.

Lets not forget the allies amazing advantage in intellegence. With Ultra and other lesser sources they pretty much had the Axis over a barrel. The question that should be asked is why, given the advantage of materiel and intellegence, did final victory take so long, if not for tactical blunders?

Thiel

2007-03-02, 03:39 PM

As I said it's only hearsay.

Mike_G

2007-03-02, 03:43 PM

Swordguy

2007-03-02, 04:01 PM

Lets not forget the allies amazing advantage in intellegence. With Ultra and other lesser sources they pretty much had the Axis over a barrel. The question that should be asked is why, given the advantage of materiel and intellegence, did final victory take so long, if not for tactical blunders?

Strategic blunders. For example, the whole business with the invasion of Italy was probably a strategic mistake, committed mainly to mollify the English who were getting rather miffed that the Allies hadn't counterattacked in Europe yet. In retrospect, a simple geography lesson would have proven why you don't want to attack Italy to get to Germany - there are a lot of big, easily defended mountains in the way.

Or the whole Market Garden campaign, which definitively cost the allies their opportunity (in fuel and ammunition stocks) to break through the German and end the war "by Christmas". Market Garden was a high-risk operation that failed. Things like that happen in war.

Overall, once the invasion of mainland Europe really got started (6/6/44), they ended the war pretty quick, considering the interior lines and prepared defenses of Nazi Germany. The US didn't really get on an economic war footing until mid 1942, and took 2 years to build up a sufficient stock of material that they were sure it would be enough to take the fight into Europe. It couldn't have been done much faster.

Dervag

2007-03-02, 04:05 PM

It took so long because even with supplies and intelligence, you still need to beat the enemy army. The German army was well trained, had lots of very experienced troops and leaders, at least until the last days when they had been decimated from years at war, and very good euipment. The Allies never fielded a tank a good as the Tiger or Panther, or a squad machine gun as good as the MG 42. The Allies had the advantage of better supply, and quicker replacement of losses, but the Germans still had an edge in most weapons systems throughout most of the war.To make matters worse, the Allies had to cope with profound disagreements among their own military theorists about how to proceed. Some people thought that a campaign striking up through the Mediterranean could hurt the Germans badly; others considered it an irrelevant sideshow. Some thought that bombers would be best employed at destroying the homes of German factory workers; others wanted to blow up specific industrial complexes and (in theory) bring the German war effort to a screeching halt. In almost every major aspect of the war, the Allies had to choose between multiple tactics or multiple paths. The result was frequently a compromise that did not achieve optimal results. This was not because the Allies were stupid or incompetent; it was because they honestly did not know the best way to use their own weapons.

Strategic blunders. For example, the whole business with the invasion of Italy was probably a strategic mistake, committed mainly to mollify the English who were getting rather miffed that the Allies hadn't counterattacked in Europe yet. In retrospect, a simple geography lesson would have proven why you don't want to attack Italy to get to Germany - there are a lot of big, easily defended mountains in the way.In fairness, if the Allies had been even a little less cautious and conservative in picking landing sites in Italy, they would probably have been able to roll up the Germans before they could dig in in Central Italy. As it was, the Germans had to scramble.

It's not clear that the campaign could have been decisive even then, but if nothing else it forced the Germans to commit resources and attention, which made their existing forces even thinner. Moreover, it denied the Germans access to Italian troops, which had been providing the Germans with a lot of their rear-area occupation forces.

Or the whole Market Garden campaign, which definitively cost the allies their opportunity (in fuel and ammunition stocks) to break through the German and end the war "by Christmas". Market Garden was a high-risk operation that failed. Things like that happen in war.The problem was that it was a very high risk operation, and it's not at all clear that the risks were adequately calculated in advance. Montgomery's plan relied on attacking along a single line of advance and punching through several well-defended lines of resistance. There was effectively no possibility of deception, and a hold-up at any point would dangerously delay the entire operation.

Montgomery was a master of the set-piece attack. Market Garden was his attempt to wage mobile warfare, and it failed miserably.

Swordguy

2007-03-02, 05:20 PM

To make matters worse, ..

...stuff that is correct...

... and it failed miserably.

I can argue with none of what you just said. In my defense, though, I was going for the short and simple version. :smallwink:

Swordguy

2007-03-02, 05:21 PM

Oh, side note:

Has there been a post in this thread about why the SCA doesn't represent "real" fighting yet? I don't want to re-tread one if there was already.

Neon Knight

2007-03-02, 08:10 PM

How does one use a Kukri? I'd think that the blade's odd angle would lessen its effectiveness using standard slashes.

Mike_G

2007-03-02, 09:09 PM

Oh, side note:

Has there been a post in this thread about why the SCA doesn't represent "real" fighting yet? I don't want to re-tread one if there was already.

I kinda-sorta made that point about halfway up the page, in regards to weapons and techniques for short or tall fighters.

No clue how to link a post, but the discussion statrted about a page ago between Wehrkind and myself.

Swordguy

2007-03-02, 11:13 PM

I kinda-sorta made that point about halfway up the page, in regards to weapons and techniques for short or tall fighters.

No clue how to link a post, but the discussion statrted about a page ago between Wehrkind and myself.

Ok. Sorry, have't been keeping up on thie thread recently. Thanks.

Fhaolan

2007-03-02, 11:49 PM

How does one use a Kukri? I'd think that the blade's odd angle would lessen its effectiveness using standard slashes.

The khukri, the falcatta, the kopis, the machiara, and the khopesh are all variants of the same shape blade. They are blade-heavy, with the point of impact ahead of the line of impulse... okay, that came out like technobabble. Let me try again...

It's not a slashing blade, it's a chopping blade. If you look at the shape of the blade and try to ignore that it's a knife/sword, you'll see that it has a lot in common with an axe. When you use it, it moves like an axe, it hits like an axe. It is, in fact, a funny-looking axe.

There is one woman in my stage combat troup who has a problem working against axes due to some horrible experiences she had with a guy who was pretending that he was a fight instructor. Not realizing this, a friend of mine went to work with her weilding a falcatta. The second the falcatta hit her shield it triggered her axe phobia. She worked through it, but it demonstrated to us how axe-like the falcatta is when used.

Sundog

2007-03-03, 10:16 AM

The khukri, the falcatta, the kopis, the machiara, and the khopesh are all variants of the same shape blade. They are blade-heavy, with the point of impact ahead of the line of impulse... okay, that came out like technobabble. Let me try again...

It's not a slashing blade, it's a chopping blade. If you look at the shape of the blade and try to ignore that it's a knife/sword, you'll see that it has a lot in common with an axe. When you use it, it moves like an axe, it hits like an axe. It is, in fact, a funny-looking axe.

There is one woman in my stage combat troup who has a problem working against axes due to some horrible experiences she had with a guy who was pretending that he was a fight instructor. Not realizing this, a friend of mine went to work with her weilding a falcatta. The second the falcatta hit her shield it triggered her axe phobia. She worked through it, but it demonstrated to us how axe-like the falcatta is when used.

There's a notable piece from the Indian Mutiny that covers the use of the Kukri:

"While resting in an abandoned building, our patrol was able to observe the approach of three mutineers. I chose to maintain our silence, in the hopes of capturing them, but as they passed the front of the house one took the opportunity to stick his head through the window and observe the situation inside. Immediately, the corporal, who was standing beside the window, drew his blade and brought it down on the neck of the mutineer, rather like a man with a hatchet hews through a piece of wood. The singular stroke removed the mutineer's head completely."

(For the record, the writer of the passage is unknown. He was clearly a British officer who served with the Gurkhas (other passages from the same missive make that clear), but the letter, which was being sent to someone back in England, was severely damaged in a fire. It, and a number of other soldiers' letters, are from the volume Letters from the Indian Mutiny, published 1938 from Down Press (which publisher, unfortunately, no longer exists). I have never encountered any further printings of the book.)

2007-03-03, 01:09 PM

The question that should be asked is why, given the advantage of materiel and intellegence, did final victory take so long, if not for tactical blunders?Because Montgomery was essentially a WWI general. While adapt at set piece battles and attritional engagements, he was completely unfamiliar with mobile warfare. El-Alamein saw the Afrika Corp decisively defeated... yet Montgomery failed to pursue and destroy the German forces. Contrast with the brilliance of O'Connor in the preceding years.

Thiel

2007-03-03, 06:47 PM

Most of the commanders during WWII had served in the trenches during WWI and many of them had never really left them. So they had to learn by trial and error.

Stephen_E

2007-03-03, 07:43 PM

Strategic blunders. For example, the whole business with the invasion of Italy was probably a strategic mistake, committed mainly to mollify the English who were getting rather miffed that the Allies hadn't counterattacked in Europe yet. In retrospect, a simple geography lesson would have proven why you don't want to attack Italy to get to Germany - there are a lot of big, easily defended mountains in the way. .

I think you're misunderstanding the purpose of the Italian invasion. My understanding is that it wasn't intended to be the path to Germany, but was intended to pull German troops from France and also remove Italian troops from the equation, both of which it did well, despite the many blunders made. It also served as a good learning experiance for carrying out major invasions. I strongly suspect without Nth African and Italian invasion campaigns we would've seen most of the botchups that occurred there occurring instead at Normandy, where the stakes were much higher.

Overall, once the invasion of mainland Europe really got started (6/6/44), they ended the war pretty quick, considering the interior lines and prepared defenses of Nazi Germany. The US didn't really get on an economic war footing until mid 1942, and took 2 years to build up a sufficient stock of material that they were sure it would be enough to take the fight into Europe. It couldn't have been done much faster.

Several points here. The difference between the Post D-Day and Pre-Italian Campaign include the savaging of the German forces in Russia, as well as the draw down to hold Italy. Also it should be noted that while on surface interior lines of supply are better than exterior lines, those interior German lines were quite vunerable to air interdiction of rail transport, while the Allied exterior naval lines were, by 44, effectively untouchable (Axis Sub and air attacks had negligble effects compared to the amount of shipping). When added to the fact that the Allies (including the Russians) simply had more people, meant that the Allies gained significantly from each additional front that they opened.

Stephen

Stephen_E

2007-03-03, 08:30 PM

Because Montgomery was essentially a WWI general. While adapt at set piece battles and attritional engagements, he was completely unfamiliar with mobile warfare. El-Alamein saw the Afrika Corp decisively defeated... yet Montgomery failed to pursue and destroy the German forces. Contrast with the brilliance of O'Connor in the preceding years.

I think this is somewhat unfair to Montgomery. He was one of the better allied commanders in terms of understanding combined arms, and wasn't as unfamiliar with the concepts of mobile warfare as you suggest. Before Montgomery the Allied Armour and Infanty force tended to act as completely independant forces, with the Armour quite regularly hairing off and leaving the Infantry "up **** creek without a paddle". Montgomery came along and dumped Cavalry Officiers that wouldn't work with the Infantry. As for O'Conner, he wasn't fighting Rommel. He fought lousy Italian commanders (WW2 Italian troops have been unfairly defamed, their commanders weren't) Rommel was quite possibly the best and most brillant mobile warfare commander out there. Taking him on at his own game would frankly have been silly. Montegomery wasn't particuly brilliant but he was very competent, which when you have numbers and material advantage, is the best way to handle brilliance. Most brilliant gambits fail. The Good brilliant commanders are the ones that make plans that don't collapse when the gambit fails, but even the best "briiliant" commander needs his opponent to make mistakes that he can exploit. Against a solid commander with materail/numbers advantage the brilliant commander will lose. He'll lose with style, but he will lose. Against a "Brillant" commander with material/numbers advantage, he can win. It then comes down to whose gambit works best. Sure the commander with the material/numbers advantage has a edge, but gambits involve risks (see Market Garden, the one time Montegomery really tried the "Brillliant gambit" path) and when they fail they have the capacity to fail big. Sure, Montegomery won ugly, but he won, and he never looked like losing, and that was the important bit.

Stephen

Dervag

2007-03-04, 12:01 AM

Because Montgomery was essentially a WWI general. While adapt at set piece battles and attritional engagements, he was completely unfamiliar with mobile warfare. El-Alamein saw the Afrika Corp decisively defeated... yet Montgomery failed to pursue and destroy the German forces. Contrast with the brilliance of O'Connor in the preceding years.In fairness, Montgomery was a very good WWI general. And he was much better at the use of combined arms than most of his WWI predecessors. His weakness was a tendency to stop on the objective line of his offensives, rather than keep running past it.

Stephen_E:

True, O'Connor wasn't fighting Rommel. But O'Connor demonstrated that he knew how to pursue. Pursuit is one of the most important skills a commander can have, because it allows him to capitalize on a marginal victory and turn it into a decisive one. If O'Connor had been in charge of the pursuit of Rommel's forces into Libya and Tunisia, the Afrika Korps would have been cut to ribbons.

Now, it is entirely possible that O'Connor would not have been able to stop Rommel as neatly as Montgomery did. But since Montgomery's defensive preparations had actually been planned and constructed by his predecessor Auchinleck, it is not at all clear that Montgomery was uniquely good at that sort of thing.

Montgomery was successful in improving tank/infantry cooperation in North Africa, but that isn't all that big a success compared to the failure to pursue Rommel and the failure of Market Garden.

Monty was an adequate general. Within his limits he was even a good general. But he wasn't a great general, and he made several major tactical and operational blunders over the course of WWII that cost the Allies dearly.

Stephen_E

2007-03-04, 05:07 AM

Stephen_E:

True, O'Connor wasn't fighting Rommel. But O'Connor demonstrated that he knew how to pursue. Pursuit is one of the most important skills a commander can have, because it allows him to capitalize on a marginal victory and turn it into a decisive one. If O'Connor had been in charge of the pursuit of Rommel's forces into Libya and Tunisia, the Afrika Korps would have been cut to ribbons.

Now, it is entirely possible that O'Connor would not have been able to stop Rommel as neatly as Montgomery did. But since Montgomery's defensive preparations had actually been planned and constructed by his predecessor Auchinleck, it is not at all clear that Montgomery was uniquely good at that sort of thing.

Montgomery was successful in improving tank/infantry cooperation in North Africa, but that isn't all that big a success compared to the failure to pursue Rommel and the failure of Market Garden.

Monty was an adequate general. Within his limits he was even a good general. But he wasn't a great general, and he made several major tactical and operational blunders over the course of WWII that cost the Allies dearly.

I have some knowledge of O'Conners early work against the Italians but am not familiar with later operations by him. Frankly I think you understate the difficulties caused by the unwillingness of the armour to work with the Infantry. Unless you have some evidence that O'Conner had a solid grounding in Combined Arms (and Combined Arms WAS the lesson of WW2 Combat, even more than Mobility, so I'd say that Montgomery was very definitely a WW2 General) and had the capacity to shove combined arms down the armour commanders throats and make it stick, I'm less than convinced that the offensive at El-Almien would of worked, and any pursuit agianst Rommel
would probably have failed badly.

I agree that Montgomery wasn't a great general, but he was a very competent, fairly aggresive general, which was what was needed in Nth Africa at the time. His failures basically came in one general area, an arrogance that made him a sod to have under your command, and one specific, his attempt at Market Garden to be "Brilliant" failed, but as I've mentioned most brilliant Gambits by the best generals failed. IIRC the rate for the best is about 1 in 3 gambits suceed, so holding Market Garden as proof of anything a stretch.

Stephen

2007-03-04, 09:26 AM

Stephen: Montgomery may have changed the "cavalry" use of armour but to my eyes he did so in favour of the "infantry tank" approach. Certainly he did not view his armour assets in the same light as the more advanced German or Soviet commanders. When the opportunity came he did not release them to destroy the struggling and exposed German formations.

Now obviously the threat of a German counter-attack was a possibility after El-Alamein, as O'Connor had discovered. However the Afrika Korp was retreating in disarray and its destruction would have ended German ambitions in Africa. Montgomery's approach following the battle was cautious and plodding and effectively allowed Rommel to not only escape destruction but to fortify in Tunisia.

In Western Europe, the Ukrainian Steppes and N Africa (pre-Monty) there were generals practicing manoeuvre warfare with devastating effect. Despite holding all the aces (air superiority, numbers, supplies etc etc) Monty failed to emulate these more modern commanders and crush the Afrika Corp.

All this is not to say that Montgomery was a poor general. Given his success its obvious that he was at least very competent. But he was not a modern general in the mould of, for example, Rokossovskiy, Patton or von Manstein.

I would tend to agree with Dervag on the contrast with O'Connor.

Raum

2007-03-04, 08:05 PM

Auchinleck was replaced at least partially for the same behavior allowed to Montgomery, delaying to build up an overwhelming force. However, he did have issues controlling his generals. At one point Ritchie chose to spread his armored formations to cover infantry lines instead of concentrating an armored striking force as Auchinleck advised. Ritchie also threw away 200+ tanks in piecemeal (a brigade at a time) attacks against a Rommel strong point at Knightbridge. Auchinleck ended up relieving Ritchie and taking command personally, before digging in at El Alamein. His defenses there were certainly creditable, but he'd basically stepped down into a lower command slot when he took Ritchie's command. Makes me wonder if he'd been promoted beyond his ability.

Montgomery proceeded to set his standard by following Rommel's drive into Tunisia without pursuing hard enough to catch him. Frankly I doubt Montgomery would have held against Rommel without ULTRA...in spite of Rommel's supply issues. A better commander would have used the intelligence to mouse trap Rommel's attack at Medenine where Montgomery knew both the date of the attack and many of the operational details.

In any case, the entire North Africa campaign was a strategic mistake for Hitler. One which he compounded by adding a series of tactical mistakes with his "no retreat" instructions.

Market-Garden may have sprung from Montgomery's dual obsession with reaching the Ruhr and outshining Patton (though I'm not sure why Montgomery should feel the need for competition with a general who'd been passed over for promotion). It was exacerbated by intelligence failures (he expected light resistance even after hearing news of two panzer divisions in the area), the reliance on a single (extremely narrow) path of advance with only one major road, and Montgomery's inability to move troops quickly (they ended up days behind schedule). The result was a battle at Arnheim which cost more allied lives than D-Day and falling short of their objective.

Dervag

2007-03-04, 11:14 PM

I have some knowledge of O'Conners early work against the Italians but am not familiar with later operations by him. Frankly I think you understate the difficulties caused by the unwillingness of the armour to work with the Infantry.I'm not sure that I do. Part of the problem was that O'Connor only got to fight one campaign in North Africa, and in that campaign there was a fair degree of tank/armor cooperation... not least because a lot of the British tanks were Matildas that had been specifically designed to cooperate with infantry. The cooperation started to come apart when O'Connor sent out a mobile column to block the Italian retreat toward El Agheila, but since O'Connor was short on transport for his infantry anyway, that may have been inevitable.

(and Combined Arms WAS the lesson of WW2 Combat, even more than Mobility, so I'd say that Montgomery was very definitely a WW2 General)Debatable. First of all, some of the late WWI British and Commonwealth offensives were already displaying many of the traits of combined arms. Second of all, it's really hard to say that full combined arms and lack of mobility is better or more progressive than poor combined arms and good mobility.

I'm less than convinced that the offensive at El-Almien would of worked, and any pursuit agianst Rommel would probably have failed badly.Rommel was so desperately short on fuel that he had to abandon most of his army in place to have enough gas to get his German component back to Tripoli. He wouldn't have been able to make an effective stand against a firmly pressed British pursuit, especially with British air power continuing to hammer him as the British captured airfields further forward.

His failures basically came in one general area, an arrogance that made him a sod to have under your command, and one specific, his attempt at Market Garden to be "Brilliant" failed, but as I've mentioned most brilliant Gambits by the best generals failed. IIRC the rate for the best is about 1 in 3 gambits suceed, so holding Market Garden as proof of anything a stretch.All that Market Garden proves is that Montgomery was a set-piece commander who didn't know that he was a set-piece commander. He tried to do a deep penetration of enemy territory, which was very much not a part of his usual repertoire, and failed badly because he tried to plan his 'blitz' as carefully and tightly as he did his set-piece attacks, only with much less time to prepare and much less margin for error.

His defenses there were certainly creditable, but he'd basically stepped down into a lower command slot when he took Ritchie's command. Makes me wonder if he'd been promoted beyond his ability.I doubt it. If one of your chief subordinates is an idiot, then you may have to take over his job.

Auchinleck's choice to assume personal command reflects the fact that he was better at the job than his senior subordinates, and that there was nothing else going on at the time that required his attention urgently. If he had left the job of defense up to his subordinates, in this case the result could have been disastrous.

Montgomery proceeded to set his standard by following Rommel's drive into Tunisia without pursuing hard enough to catch him. Frankly I doubt Montgomery would have held against Rommel without ULTRA...in spite of Rommel's supply issues.Given that Rommel's supply problems were caused in large part by ULTRA, you probably have a point.

In any case, the entire North Africa campaign was a strategic mistake for Hitler. One which he compounded by adding a series of tactical mistakes with his "no retreat" instructions.Not necessarily. The resources he used there were not large enough to have been decisive in any other theater until the very end (after the tactical mistakes and 'no retreat' orders).

Stephen_E

2007-03-05, 06:07 AM

In any case, the entire North Africa campaign was a strategic mistake for Hitler. One which he compounded by adding a series of tactical mistakes with his "no retreat" instructions.

I'd agree with Dervag here. While the Nth African campaign was a big deal to the Western Allies but the German commitment was miniscule compared to the Eastern Front.

And lets face it, if the Suez canal had been lost it would've hurt.

Stephen

Dervag

2007-03-05, 08:32 AM

I'd agree with Dervag here. While the Nth African campaign was a big deal to the Western Allies but the German commitment was miniscule compared to the Eastern Front.

And lets face it, if the Suez canal had been lost it would've hurt.

StephenNot much, but enough to justify the use of a single Germany army corps for that purpose. And if it had been combined with operations that destabilized the British position in Arabia, it could have been a very big deal indeed.

The British didn't use the Suez Canal for much except the resupply of Egypt during the early phase of the war, because the Italian Navy and land-based aviation made moving anything through the Mediterranean very dangerous. While heavily armed convoys did make it through OK on several occasions, most goods that weren't absolutely critical were diverted around the Cape of Good Hope. That's where most of the supplies Montgomery had at El Alamein came from, for example.

However, as I said, taking the Suez Canal and dismantling the main British position in the Middle East would have been well worth the actual investment that Hitler made in North Africa through 1941 and mid-1942. It wasn't until after he started pouring masses of German reinforcements in to shore up a losing proposition in 1943 that the North Africa campaign began to cost him more than it was worth.

Raum

2007-03-05, 03:10 PM

I doubt it. If one of your chief subordinates is an idiot, then you may have to take over his job.

Auchinleck's choice to assume personal command reflects the fact that he was better at the job than his senior subordinates, and that there was nothing else going on at the time that required his attention urgently. If he had left the job of defense up to his subordinates, in this case the result could have been disastrous.Well, you only need to take over the position if you haven't groomed any other subordinates for responsibility. But that isn't the sole reason I wonder if he'd been promoted beyond his ability. Auchinleck's lack of supervisory control over Ritchie is more telling than his stepping down into a subordinate role.

But, my speculation on Auchinleck's capabilities is just that...speculation.

Not necessarily. The resources he used there were not large enough to have been decisive in any other theater until the very end (after the tactical mistakes and 'no retreat' orders).
I'd agree with Dervag here. While the Nth African campaign was a big deal to the Western Allies but the German commitment was miniscule compared to the Eastern Front.Well, the campaign cost the Axis about two thirds of Italy's merchant shipping in addition to the loss of troops and supplies actually used in North Africa. Additionally, the eventual loss of Italy allowed the allies to concentrate on Germany while Germany was still deeply involved in Russia.

I think the resources would have been more effective if they were used to fortify Italy against the Allies and, possibly, lauch raids against any accessible targets. If they had to strike towards Egypt, they certainly needed to take out Malta first.

Subotei

2007-03-05, 06:38 PM

I'd agree with Dervag here. While the Nth African campaign was a big deal to the Western Allies but the German commitment was miniscule compared to the Eastern Front.

And lets face it, if the Suez canal had been lost it would've hurt.

Stephen

There is a school of thought that has the opinion Hitler's best move would've been to concentrate on the middle east campaign, looking to gain oil reserves in Iraq (Hitler did encourage and aid the independence movement against British rule there), as the shortage of oil was the major weakness of the Axis and was one of the key aims of the Russian campaign. This would've potentially fatally weakened the British Empire.

Also, on the ability of Rommel, a lot of his success was down being passed the complete allied troop dispositions and plans following the Italians achievement of stealing the American 'Black Code' from the US embassy in Rome in August 1941. The British gave the US military Attache in Cairo access to high level intel (this was prior to America joining the war - I assume this info was offered by Churchill to try to encourage US assisstance). This was sent to Washington and duly intercepted by the Italians and passed within hours to Rommel. Much of his huge success was down to this information, rather than any innate superiority as a general. Once the code was realised to be compromised (ironically via an Ultra intercept) much of his success dried up. Another ironic twist to this huge security lapse was that Auchinlek's original replacement, General Gott, was assassinated whilst flying in to take command, shot down by enemy fighters, supposedly after a Black Code intercept, much like the American strike at Yamamoto later in the war. Monty was the second choice replacement.

Stephen_E

2007-03-05, 07:33 PM

Well, the campaign cost the Axis about two thirds of Italy's merchant shipping in addition to the loss of troops and supplies actually used in North Africa. Additionally, the eventual loss of Italy allowed the allies to concentrate on Germany while Germany was still deeply involved in Russia.

I think the resources would have been more effective if they were used to fortify Italy against the Allies and, possibly, lauch raids against any accessible targets. If they had to strike towards Egypt, they certainly needed to take out Malta first.

The Italian Merchant navy would've been lost whatever they were doing. unless they stayed at home, in which case they're useless.:smallconfused:

Re: fortifying Italy instead of trying to hold the Italian colonies:
If the colonies fell without the Germans trying to hold them I'm not sure Italy would've stayed in the war. If you join what you think is the winning side, and promptly lose all your territory outside of your home country, and your "winning allies" do nothing, there is a lot of weight suggesting you chose the wrong side, and a strong encouragement to drop out or even flip-sides while it is still early enough that the otherside will greet you with welcome arms.

Stephen

Wehrkind

2007-03-06, 02:59 AM

Re WW2: That's a pretty valid point Stephen. I think that the Axis might well have fallen apart if Italy was asked to give up it's colonies. Mussolini may have been little more than a thug in a convenient place, but that only makes it more likely in my estimation that he would take the easy way out if it looked like he could do so and stay in power. He most likely would have brokered either neutrality or tacit alliance with the Allies had he started to think he was going to lose before any real fighting happened. The problem with thuggery is that as soon as you lose the intimidation factor and are seen to back down, your position becomes very tenuous. (I am exhausted and can't spell for crap. My appologies.)

I still wonder how soon the war might have ended if Patton had been given the supplies he needed earlier, instead of getting the table scraps from butchers such as Montgomery and Bradley.

Stephen_E

2007-03-06, 05:31 AM

I still wonder how soon the war might have ended if Patton had been given the supplies he needed earlier, instead of getting the table scraps from butchers such as Montgomery and Bradley.

While I wouldn't claim to be an expert on Patton, the bits I have picked up on him indicate that he worked best if you had a really strong minded theartre general above him with a zap button linked to the stun collar around Pattons neck and a topnotch logistical setup.

The Stun collar is because my understanding is that Patton suffered badly from the same arrogance Montgomery had towards superior officiers. Thus when you give him orders and he decides (without your knowledge of what's going on elsewhere and what reinforcements are available to him) to ignore your orders you can hold down the stun button for a minute, and then remind him what his orders are.

The Logistical setup is because I also heard that he had a bad tendancy to assume that supplies/reinforcements would miracously appear when he needed them.

Both flaws are managable, but historically can and have lead to disasters with such commanders getting their commands way over their heads (Custer's last stand anyone).

Like I said I'm no Patton expert, and these faults may've been exaggerated, but....., I'm wary. I'd also note that Montgomery was a British General and I doubt Patton got much, if any, British scraps, I'm also dubious of Montgomery draining much US troops/supplies from Patton. My understanding is that they were generally reluctant to put British units under US commanders and visa versa.

Stephen

Wehrkind

2007-03-06, 05:50 AM

My understanding of the Montgomery/Patton problems mainly involved the Sicily expedition, where Montgomery was assigned the more direct road which his slow approach wasted, while Patton was given the over land route where his speed and aggression were largely halted by mountains instead of the enemy (who was not inclined to resist much.)
In the European theater, it seems to me that a lot of supplies were kept from Patton (mostly gas) who was ripping around the flank of the enemy, in favor of Monty/Bradly who were crawling along terribly slowly, and could have afforded to stop for a bit at their pace. The result seems to have been a lot of missed opportunities to capture Germans with less of a fight. I don't have the book in front of me, but Patton's division captured so many Germans that dealing with that "supply" was the second biggest issue behind gas for tanks.

From what I have read, it seems that Allied high command was too inclined to micro manage and approach the war from a beaurocratic view of extreme caution and adversion to risk, as opposed to the more dispersed, localized decision making that modern combat requires, and the willingness to take calculated risks to consolidate big gains and keep the enemy guessing that wars have always required. By taking an extremely slow and measured pace, Monty and Bradly gave the Wehrmacht ample time to regroup, dig in and prepare to fight anew, forcing a slew of new casualties, where as Patton tended to drive the Germans relentlessly and either capture large groups that go cut off, or keep the rest moving so long they never regained their balance. In the end, it would seem he saved far more lives than his "safer" peers.

Stephen_E

2007-03-06, 06:36 AM

From what I have read, it seems that Allied high command was too inclined to micro manage and approach the war from a beaurocratic view of extreme caution and adversion to risk, as opposed to the more dispersed, localized decision making that modern combat requires, and the willingness to take calculated risks to consolidate big gains and keep the enemy guessing that wars have always required. By taking an extremely slow and measured pace, Monty and Bradly gave the Wehrmacht ample time to regroup, dig in and prepare to fight anew, forcing a slew of new casualties, where as Patton tended to drive the Germans relentlessly and either capture large groups that go cut off, or keep the rest moving so long they never regained their balance. In the end, it would seem he saved far more lives than his "safer" peers.

Micromanaging from political superiors was a chronic problem with the British because Churchill had enough military experiance from previous wars to think he knew how things should be done, and not enough to know when to keep his nose out of operational affairs. Military icromanaging is one of the curses of modern technology. By WW2 communications technology had reached the point that the bigwigs back home could communicate with the frontline with sufficient speed that they could start to have actual imput on operational activities on the frontline. While this wasn't always a bad thing.........

The "safety" of slow-n-steady approach wasn't for keepin overall casulties down. It was for avoiding disasters. The Allies could assorb reasonable casulties for some time, so long as they weren't in large numbers at once in some spectacular ballsup. Daring do can give you fast advances with light casulties, so long as things work. If things go wrong it can be much worse than the slow and steady approach, and democracies have limited ability to handle that. Playing the good odds when victory is assured is seen as sensible behaviour (The Axis weren't immune to this approach either. Witness the hold order given during the invasion of France that allowed Dunkirk to occurr, because Hitler got nervous about getting the speed wobbles. Losing the entire expiditionary force would've been a brutal blow for the British).

Stephen

Raum

2007-03-06, 08:12 AM

I'd also note that Montgomery was a British General and I doubt Patton got much, if any, British scraps, I'm also dubious of Montgomery draining much US troops/supplies from Patton. My understanding is that they were generally reluctant to put British units under US commanders and visa versa.Some supplies, notably fuel, were common to the allied forces as a whole. As for commanders, from the time the US entered the war unified command became the norm. The overall commander was normally chosen from the country supplying the majority of the troops, but it was a joint command.

Patton with a stun collar is an amusing thought...and probably appropriate. He was a prima donna, but an effective one.

@ Wehrkind: Calling Bradley a butcher seems a bit much. He wasn't as aggressive as Patton (were any other generals?) but he was more aggressive than Montgomery. I'll have to double check sources after work, but wasn't he responsible for Overlord?

I do agree that allied command was over politicized, but that was probably as necessary to the allies as making an attempt to keep Italian colonies was to the Axis.

2007-03-06, 08:26 AM

There is a school of thought that has the opinion Hitler's best move would've been to concentrate on the middle east campaign, looking to gain oil reserves in Iraq (Hitler did encourage and aid the independence movement against British rule there), as the shortage of oil was the major weakness of the Axis and was one of the key aims of the Russian campaign. This would've potentially fatally weakened the British Empire.The problem with this is that it ignores Hitler's war aims. The invasion of Russia was both a strategic and ideological objective of the highest order for Hitler. In comparison he looked quite favourably on the British and had no real intentions of stripping them of their Empire.

Dervag

2007-03-06, 09:21 AM

Well, you only need to take over the position if you haven't groomed any other subordinates for responsibility. But that isn't the sole reason I wonder if he'd been promoted beyond his ability. Auchinleck's lack of supervisory control over Ritchie is more telling than his stepping down into a subordinate role.How long had Auchinleck been in command, again? I know it shouldn't make a difference, but it could.

Well, the campaign cost the Axis about two thirds of Italy's merchant shipping in addition to the loss of troops and supplies actually used in North Africa.But most of those losses were Italian, not German. Until the time when Hitler started throwing massive reinforcements at Tunisia, the German contingent in North Africa was still very small- small enough that they did not represent a significant chunk of the German war effort compared to the scale of operations on the Eastern Front.

I think the resources would have been more effective if they were used to fortify Italy against the Allies and, possibly, lauch raids against any accessible targets. If they had to strike towards Egypt, they certainly needed to take out Malta first.Hold it.

Your argument may be correct, but it ignores a lot of the strategic background. First of all, the Italians invaded Egypt on their own initiative; it was only after O'Connor demolished their first invasion army that the Germans sent Rommel and the (small) Afrika Korps to keep things from collapsing.

Second of all, remember that during this period Italy was a powerful enough nation that Hitler had to make allowances for its interests. He couldn't just say "OK, Italy, you're going to abandon your empire and dig in on your own coasts." So no one was in a position to force the Italians to withdraw rather than contest Libya by attempting to sieze Egypt.

As for taking Malta, that was seriously considered. However, at first Malta was a very weak base; it honestly wasn't very important and there weren't enough planes on Malta to be a major threat to the shipping lanes headed for North Africa. For a long time, the Germans refused to invade Malta, remembering the heavy casualties they took in the invasion of Crete.

It wasn't until later in the North Africa campaign that Malta became a powerful base for British air attacks on Italian shipping. At that point, the decision not to take Malta while it was vulnerable to attack became a bad one in hindsight.

Re WW2: That's a pretty valid point Stephen. I think that the Axis might well have fallen apart if Italy was asked to give up it's colonies. Mussolini may have been little more than a thug in a convenient place,The Italians also had a large army of individually competent soldiers. This made them an excellent choice for armies of occupation, even if they weren't up to the task of fighting anybody's varsity.

(I am exhausted and can't spell for crap. My appologies.)Actually, your spelling is quite good.

I still wonder how soon the war might have ended if Patton had been given the supplies he needed earlier, instead of getting the table scraps from butchers such as Montgomery and Bradley.Not a lot sooner, I think. First of all, Patton's love of pursuit could outrun any supply chain. Second of all, it's not clear that Patton could have broken through the obstacles in his path faster than other armies broke through their obstacles. Once Patton's army fetched up against the heavy fortifications around Metz, he pretty much got stuck and kept banging his head against the forts until something gave.

His reputation comes largely from his warlike personality and from his mastery at pursuit (in stark contrast to Montgomery, who couldn't pursue to save his army's life). It's not as clear that he could have done a good job of pushing an army through a line of fortresses or over a defended river line.

The problem with this is that it ignores Hitler's war aims. The invasion of Russia was both a strategic and ideological objective of the highest order for Hitler. In comparison he looked quite favourably on the British and had no real intentions of stripping them of their Empire.But as long as the British were at war with him, he needed to weaken them, even if he was planning to give back all the colonies he captured afterwards.

It's a given that Hitler was going to invade Russia, but it might have been smarter for him to put a little more resources into the North Africa push in hopes of securing Middle Eastern oil. That would have given him a fairly steady supply that he could have used as a cushion in the event that the campaign in Russia failed.

Of course, it might have helped him even more if he'd been able to choose an objective and stick to it in Russia, or if he hadn't messed with his army command structures during 1941-42, or if he hadn't gotten distracted by the invasion of the Balkans and wasted about two months of the spring/summer campaign season before his troops even entered Russia.

Stephen_E

2007-03-06, 05:01 PM

Some supplies, notably fuel, were common to the allied forces as a whole. As for commanders, from the time the US entered the war unified command became the norm. The overall commander was normally chosen from the country supplying the majority of the troops, but it was a joint command..

Theatre/High command was unified, but I was thinking of the frontline. i.e. British Commanders got British troops and weapons. I see your point about fuel ecetre.

@ Wehrkind: Calling Bradley a butcher seems a bit much. He wasn't as aggressive as Patton (were any other generals?) .

Rommel? I recall that at El Alemein, when Montgomery looked for a General to plan and carry out the counter offensive, he decided he had only two generals who were aggressive enough. An Australian General (apologies to Aussies but I don't know his name) and Freyberg, the NZ General. Freyberg got the nod because Montgomery wanted the Aussie for something else. Freyberg was the man who when asked by the point armoured commander (Currie) how many casulties he should be willing to take was told "100% if that's what it takes" (as it happens it did indeed take 90+% casulties and the opportunity for a major breakthrough was lost because the following armoured commander basically said "are you insane. I'm not following you over that ridge where your entire command just got destroyed".) Something that is often overlooked is that Commanders often stand and fall on those below them, and a relatively low level comander losing his bottle can make the difference between a savage pursuit and a staid advance. Montgomery was the commander for Nth Africa/Eastern Med, not just the Pursuit at El Alemein. Auchinleck was the commander for the entire Middle East/Persia. They could decide broadstroke strategy, but they simply didn't/shouldn't be operating at the tactical/field operations level, which is where pursuits largely occur.

As for taking Malta, that was seriously considered. However, at first Malta was a very weak base; it honestly wasn't very important and there weren't enough planes on Malta to be a major threat to the shipping lanes headed for North Africa. For a long time, the Germans refused to invade Malta, remembering the heavy casualties they took in the invasion of Crete.

It wasn't until later in the North Africa campaign that Malta became a powerful base for British air attacks on Italian shipping. At that point, the decision not to take Malta while it was vulnerable to attack became a bad one in hindsight.

It's a given that Hitler was going to invade Russia, but it might have been smarter for him to put a little more resources into the North Africa push in hopes of securing Middle Eastern oil. That would have given him a fairly steady supply that he could have used as a cushion in the event that the campaign in Russia failed.

Wars full of those "damn, if I'd only seen the importance of that possibility earlier" moments. For the Germans halting the advance after the disintergration of the French front and allowing the Dunkirk evacuation to occur, Not taking a weak Malta and bypassing a undefended Leningrad are some of the bigger"how did we let that happen" moments.

The earlier point I made about the importance of Suez is not because Suez was intrinsically important in itself, but because if Suez fell, then Britain's Eastern Med fleet posistion becomes basically unsupportabel, and without it the intediction of Italian shipping to Nth Africa becomes largely ineffective, while simaltaneously Britains ability to keep providing military supplies to ground forces in the Middle East is savaged, with the result that the Allied campaign there will be seriously hammered, and while it's unclear how effective the retrieval of Iraqi Oil would've been, it couldn't be worse than the attempts to retrieve Russian oil (no partisan/assassin teams for a start). It would also be another Allied defeat, and the political situation can't be overlooked. Churchill's political survival wasn't an absolute certainty.

Stephen