Got a Real-World Weapon or Armor Question? Mk. IV [Archive] - Page 8

Matthew

2007-05-05, 06:39 PM

Moved from Dervag's Thread on Phalanx Fighting
Originally posted by Kiero

The triarii rarely saw any actual fighting, the mainstay of the legion was the hastati and principes, both of whom were swordsmen. Earlier on the hastati were spearmen (which is where their name comes from - the hasta is a spear), but some time around the 3rd century BC that was dropped in favour of them being swordsmen alone.

Originally Posted by Matthew

Kiero, you have been grossly misinformed. The Triarii acted as a reserve, but they saw plenty of combat. As for Auxillaries, they constituted roughly half the man power of the Roman Army at any one time, so I think you would do well to consider them when discussing the Roman Army. Indeed, there is a school of thought that proposes that by Trajan's time the Auxillaries did all the hard fighting and the Legions hardly any.

Originally Posted by Kiero

Problem is, no one is able to verify exactly how the quincunx actually worked. But given their role in the reserve, and the phrase "down to the triarii" to describe a desparate venture, they only saw action when things were really bad.

Originally Posted by Matthew

Indeed, but absence of evidence means exactly that we cannot say one thing or another. On the other hand, we can examine particular battles to discover how the Triarii may or may not have been were used. At Zama, for instance, we can see Scipio using them as part of a single line to overwhelm Hannibal's forces. They were the Third Line and they were always deployed. they weren't the first line and they weren't always called into action, but to dismiss them as usually unused is dangerous.

Originally Posted by Matthew

As for Auxillaries, they constituted roughly half the man power of the Roman Army at any one time, so I think you would do well to consider them when discussing the Roman Army. Indeed, there is a school of thought that proposes that by Trajan's time the Auxillaries did all the hard fighting and the Legions hardly any.

Except they're not what I was talking about. Auxiliaries varied a great deal from one location to another, but there was something like consistency to the "Roman" core of a legion.

Sorry, but that appears to be exactly what you were talking about:

Originally Posted by Kiero

For most of the period in which they expanded and conquered others (circa 200BC to 200AD), the Romans' mainstay was the sword. Which was otherwise an exception to the norm that the sword was a backup weapon.

Romans built their force around their heavy infantry, so I don't think a consideration of the auxilia is relevant to my point.

The Roman Legion was only part of the Roman Army, even pre Marius it saw action with an equal or greater number of Italian allies. That the early Romans placed greater emphasis on the Sword and Shield than the Greeks or later Romans or Medievals is not in dispute. That it was the be all and end all of Roman combat certainly is. The strength of the Roman Army lay in its diversity, not in its specialisation. Similar things could be said about Greek and Hellenistic armies, depending on which ones you are looking at.

Fhaolan

2007-05-06, 12:49 AM

I'm curious. Can any of our archery experts comment on how hard it is to shoot bows while sitting down. I was reminded of a vague recollection of someone saying that a NZ paraplegic Archer was the only handicapped person to ever compete in the Olympics (correction: 1st Paraplegic), and it made me wonder just how much of a handicap it would be shooting from a wheelchair without the use of your legs.

You can loose a longbow from a sitting position. Technically, you can loose a longbow from a *prone* position, but I find it very difficult to hit anything like that.

Note though, that Olympic archery is done with very specific recurve bows that are actually called 'Olympic bows'. These are a bit larger than horsebows, but are still quite a bit shorter than longbows, so are easier to use when seated.

J_Muller

2007-05-06, 01:00 AM

A quick set of questions: How realistic is a flechette gun as a standard infantry weapon? Specifically, how effective would it be against advanced body armors (think DragonSkin here) and how well would it match up in combat against an opponent of matching skill with a conventional assault rifle? How about in null gravity and/or no atmosphere? Also, would a flechette gun be more effective in the hands of an infantryman on semiautomatic or fully automatic?

Dervag

2007-05-06, 01:10 AM

Since flechettes are essentially similar to buckshot or canister rounds in concept, I imagine that it would be kind of excessive to use them in automatic fire mode. At a certain point you're throwing way more sharp pointy stuff into a given volume than you need.

Kiero

2007-05-06, 05:45 AM

The Roman Legion was only part of the Roman Army, even pre Marius it saw action with an equal or greater number of Italian allies. That the early Romans placed greater emphasis on the Sword and Shield than the Greeks or later Romans or Medievals is not in dispute. That it was the be all and end all of Roman combat certainly is. The strength of the Roman Army lay in its diversity, not in its specialisation. Similar things could be said about Greek and Hellenistic armies, depending on which ones you are looking at.

Diversity in the ancillary parts of the force, yet consistency in the Roman core. Both pre and post-Marius the Roman, rather than allied part of the force was heavy swordsmen.

Again it's difficult to say anything is true for the socii, given Romans didn't write about their allies, or if they did none of those works have survived. We don't even know if the Italians fought in a similar fashion to their cousins or had distinctive styles of their own.

AMX

2007-05-06, 06:30 AM

Since flechettes are essentially similar to buckshot or canister rounds in concept,...
Careful with those blanket statements, Dervag :smallwink:
Flechettes are simply "little arrows", and while they are currently only used like buckshot, it's perfectly possible to use them "like bullets" (i.e., singly); in fact, that's the only way for them to compete with rifles in the range department.

Anyway, experience with prototypes of this approach seems to indicate the following:
Armor penetration: good to superior (I've seen claims of 35mm RHA at 600m distance)
Effect: debated (some sources claim the flechette will simply fly straight through the target, leaving only a minimal wound channel; others say it deforms, causing more damage than traditional ammunition)
Accuracy: iffy (high speed means a flatter trajectory and shorter flight time, both of which is good; however, the low weight makes the flechette sensitive to crosswinds, and the aerodynamic stabilisation requires very tight manufacturing tolerances, to keep the thing from flying a curve)

Anyway, considering that there have been repeated experiments, but no adoption, we can probably assume that with current technology, traditional rifles are a superior (or at least more cost-efficient) choice.

Regarding "unusual circumstances":
Flechette weapons have less recoil (due to lower projectile weight), which would be useful in low/zero g, but not vitally so.
"No atmosphere" is, once again, iffy - the accuracy problems are caused by atmospheric effects, so that'd be positive; however, there's nothing for the stabilising fins to act upon, so any disturbance will cause the flechette to do cartwheels - a slow rotation might be able to fix that, but don't quote me on this.

Regarding automatic or single fire, that depends mostly on how much effect the individual flechettes actually have - which is, as mentioned above, debated.

Matthew

2007-05-06, 07:42 AM

Diversity in the ancillary parts of the force, yet consistency in the Roman core. Both pre and post-Marius the Roman, rather than allied part of the force was heavy swordsmen.

Again it's difficult to say anything is true for the socii, given Romans didn't write about their allies, or if they did none of those works have survived. We don't even know if the Italians fought in a similar fashion to their cousins or had distinctive styles of their own.

Indeed, we know very little about the Socii, but we similarly know very little about how the Romans themselves fought, the nitty gritty of tactical combat is currently a lively field of debate. Primarily we rely on Polybius for a detailed description of the pre Marian Roman Army, but his discussion is almost as theoretical as Vegetius' famous work. A pre Marian Roman Legion numbers anywhere from 4,000 to 5,000 Men with a similar number of allies. A typical distribution, as far as can be discerned from Polybius would be:

1,200 Hastati
1,200 Principes
600 Triarii
1,200 Velites
300 Equites
4,000-5,000 Socii Foot
900 Socii Horse

We know from Polybius' and Livy's subsequent narration that this organisation is highly theoretical, but it looks like a fairly diverse force to me. We also know from these two same sources that Roman Allies included Sling Men, Bow Men and a variety of Horse Men (which could be inflated well beyond the limits of the above roster, as at Zama).
Truly, the Roman Army is famous for its Heavy Foot and deservedly moreso after the reforms of Marius, but the actual army was a diverse body with diverse enemies. Indeed, even the Gladius itself could vary in widely in length and form.

It's also worth noting that the Roman Legionary himself could serve in a number of different capacities and was not limited to only Heavy Infantry service, which was something that Caesar made good use of.

Kiero

2007-05-06, 07:53 AM

I don't disagree with any of those points. I still think though, at a time when the battlefield mainstay was a pikeman, the Roman model was a notable exception.

Dervag

2007-05-06, 11:01 AM

It's also worth noting that the Roman Legionary himself could serve in a number of different capacities and was not limited to only Heavy Infantry service, which was something that Caesar made good use of.Such as the time he converted the entire Tenth Legion into cavalry by taking his allies' horses and mounting legionnaires on them, since he had agreed to take only cavalry to a negotiation and he wanted a bodyguard he could trust.

In his defense, it should be pointed out that he ended up needing the entire Tenth Legion as a bodyguard, because the Germanic king he was negotiating with proved unable to restrain his cavalrymen from hurling weapons at the bodyguard detachment.

Wehrkind

2007-05-07, 02:43 AM

Matthew makes a great point about the Romans being skilled at using what ever works for the job at hand, using a more varied combined arms approach than it seems many other armies of the time did. (At least on purpose, as opposed to just having piles of stuff defined by whatever people felt like bringing.)

I do still think that the Romans were significantly different from the general Mediterrainian and Greek successor states' method of fighting at the time, specifically on how they outfitted their own troops, but not in their use of auxilaries.

Dervag

2007-05-07, 03:54 AM

Nobody duplicated the Roman's heavy infantry very well; whereas pretty much every type of Roman auxiliary could be found among some other people (often the people that the Romans were hiring said auxiliaries from).

Wehrkind

2007-05-07, 04:22 AM

Definitely not for lack of trying, that is correct. That is probably a good point to make, that what the Romans refered to as "auxilaries" were likely called "main line troops" everywhere else.

Kiero

2007-05-07, 06:14 AM

Definitely not for lack of trying, that is correct. That is probably a good point to make, that what the Romans refered to as "auxilaries" were likely called "main line troops" everywhere else.

They were arch-pragmatists when it came to warfare. Which is why they realised Romans made great heavy infantrymen, but absolutely shocking cavalry. Equites were seen less and less in actual battlefield roles as time went by, Romans choosing peoples better suited in the saddle to fulfil those roles for them.

It's worth noting that up until the 4th century BC or so, Romans fought just the way everyone else did - with pike and phalanx. What changed that was the nature of the enemies they fought. Gauls and Samnites practiced a fast-moving raiding style of fighting, which caused many embarrassing defeats. So the Romans adapted.

Dervag

2007-05-07, 09:39 AM

They were arch-pragmatists when it came to warfare. Which is why they realised Romans made great heavy infantrymen, but absolutely shocking cavalry.I assume that you don't mean "shocking" in a good sense as in "shock cavalry."

Kiero

2007-05-07, 11:02 AM

I assume that you don't mean "shocking" in a good sense as in "shock cavalry."

I mean shocking in that equites were shockingly bad cavalrymen.

Sundog

2007-05-07, 11:09 AM

I mean shocking in that equites were shockingly bad cavalrymen.

I'm afraid I can't agree with that. It's true that they weren't the finest horsemen on the planet at the time - that honour probably went to the Parthians. But nothing I've read says they were any worse than mediocre - and they trashed the Carthaginian Cavalry at the final battle of Carthage.

Matthew

2007-05-07, 11:27 AM

Have to agree with Sun Dog there. I cannot think of any primary sources that actually make this assertion, though I would be interested to hear of any that do. Roman Citizen Cavalry was proportionally small (the Cavalry at Zama was largely Non Roman, but there might have been a thousand or so Romans), but there is little to say it was poor beyond that fact that it was small. It was a matter of some prestige to own and be able to handle a horse.

Kiero

2007-05-07, 06:32 PM

I'm afraid I can't agree with that. It's true that they weren't the finest horsemen on the planet at the time - that honour probably went to the Parthians. But nothing I've read says they were any worse than mediocre - and they trashed the Carthaginian Cavalry at the final battle of Carthage.

The final battle at Carthage was an all-Numidian affair, as far as cavalry went.

It's no coincidence that they used other peoples for their cavalry as soon as they had access to them. And that Caesar, for example used Germans, Gauls and Numidians rather than Romans for his cavalry.

While they bred some half-decent horses on the rosea rura, they didn't have men who really knew their business in Rome.

Adlan

2007-05-08, 05:22 AM

Thats mainly because other civillisations had at least a segment of the population who spent their whole life managing a herd, or hunting from horseback, which is pretty much perfect training to be a calavry trooper. They have a skill born of a lifetime in the saddle, which the romans lacked, because their terrain and farming practices were different.

Matthew

2007-05-08, 07:38 AM

The final battle at Carthage was an all-Numidian affair, as far as cavalry went.

It's no coincidence that they used other peoples for their cavalry as soon as they had access to them. And that Caesar, for example used Germans, Gauls and Numidians rather than Romans for his cavalry.

While they bred some half-decent horses on the rosea rura, they didn't have men who really knew their business in Rome.
Not too sure about that. I don't have time to investigate the sources at the moment, but Wikipedia is coming up with 6,000 Numidian and 3,000 Roman (presumably three quarters Italian) Cavalry. Unlikely to be particularly accurate, but unless they're plucking the figures out of thin air (always possible) it doesn't look to be the case.
[Edit]
Polybius, Book 15.9:

1 After this conversation, which held out no hopes of reconciliation, the two generals parted from each other. 2 On the following morning at daybreak they led out their armies and opened the battle, the Carthaginians fighting for their own safety and the dominion of Africa, and the Romans for the empire of the world. 3 Is there anyone who can remain unmoved in reading the narrative of such an encounter? 4 For it would be impossible to find more valiant soldiers, or generals who had been more successful and were more thoroughly exercised in the art of war, nor indeed had Fortune ever offered to contending armies a more splendid prize of victory, since the conquerors would not be masters of Africa and Europe alone, but of all those parts of the world which now hold a place in history; as indeed they very shortly were. 6 Scipio drew up his army in the following fashion. 7 In front he placed the hastati with certain intervals between the maniples and behind them the principes, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants. 8 Last of all he placed the triarii. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and on the right wing Massanissa with the whole of his Numidians. 9 The intervals of the first maniples he filled up with the cohorts of velites, ordering them to open the action, 10 and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines.

Polybius, Book 15.12

1 When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. 2 When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. 3 The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies, 4 both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. 5 It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry 6 and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa. 7 In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position. 8 When the phalanxes were close to each other, Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice, 9 while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but "Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound, their names all various," as appears from the list of them I gave above.

Polybius, Book 15.13-14

1 As the whole battle was a hand-to‑hand affair [the men using neither spears nor swords], the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans, 2 but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms. 3 The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up, 4 so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them. 5 This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans, 6 and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy. 7 In this way they even threw the cohorts of the hastati into confusion, but the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist, 8 and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati. 9 Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force. 10 They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond.
1 The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. 2 For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard. 3 However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the principes and triarii close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. 5 When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the hastati the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. 6 As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, 7 and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment. 8 When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level. 9 More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners.

Now, maybe it's the case that there was no Roman Horse and only Italian in this case (I don't read Greek, so I can't say what words are being translated), but it is fairly clear that, according to Polybius, this was not primarily an affair of Numidian Cavalry. Exactly what the proportions are is hard to say, but the orders of magnitude couldn't have been too different. If we're looking at four Legions (and this is a subject of debate itself) then we may be looking at anywhere from a few hundred Roman cavalry to about a thousand [i.e. 4 x 300] (depending on casualties, reinforcement, limits of troop transport, etc...) and perhaps three times as many Italians (though obviously this is speculation based on Polybius' theoretical organisation).
It's important to recognise that Zama is being held up as the opposite of Cannae in Polybius' writing here, with Polybius emphasising the importance of having a strong Cavalry, as his comments following Cannae make clear:
Polybius, Book 3.17:

1 Such was the outcome of the battle at Cannae between the Romans and Carthaginians, a battle in which both the victors and the vanquished displayed conspicuous bravery, as was evinced by the facts. For of the six thousand cavalry, seventy escaped to Venusia with Terentius, and about three hundred of the allied horse reached different cities in scattered groups. Of the infantry about ten thousand were captured fighting but not in the actual battle, while only perhaps three thousand escaped from the field to neighbouring towns. All the rest, numbering about seventy thousand, died bravely. Both on this occasion and on former ones their numerous cavalry had contributed most to the victory of the Carthaginians, and it demonstrated to posterity that in times of war it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming force of cavalry than to be in all respects his equal. Of Hannibal's army there fell about four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans and two hundred cavalry.

However, demography is a very difficult subject with regards to Ancient Battles. There's a good Thread over on RomanArmyTalk about Zama which demonstrates exactly how little we know of the numbers and proportions for certain: Number of Legions at Zama (http://www.romanarmy.com/rat/viewtopic.php?t=3586)

Wehrkind

2007-05-09, 12:15 AM

As much as I hate to draw conversation away from the Romans, does anyone know a good source or link for pictures and general information on medieval English armor? I am thinking of getting my father a nice set for SCA combat, since he can't quite seem to shake his British fanboy issues (despite my persistant demonstration of just how good scutum and gladius styles work.)
I am hoping for some nice, recognizable armor lighter than full plate (cheaper too) and some historic info and pictures would really help, since I don't know a great deal about it. I was thinking later than the norman conquest, perhaps 100 years war. I don't really know when/if the English really had a distinctive look, so advice would be great.

Hurlbut

2007-05-09, 12:24 AM

Oh? You're a fan of scutum and gladius style?

Wehrkind

2007-05-09, 01:04 AM

Quite. I find I much prefer a shorter sword for single combat, and though I was trained on a heater, once I got used to not having corners on my shield, I really like my ovoid scutum. I have a rectangular blank I intend to get set up as a proper center hold shield (as opposed to strapped on the forearm as my ovoid is) and I am interested to see how that compares. I tell you though, if you don't mind being up close and personal, a shorter sword opens up all sorts of great windows, allowing lots of closer work without getting tangled. Oddly, I find it easier to get long wrap shots on people with a shorter sword.

In case of sarcasm: I know! I bet you would never have guessed had I not made mention!

Storm Bringer

2007-05-09, 02:30 AM

early medieval english armours? chain-mail in one form or another. If you've seen Kingdom of Heaven, then the guys in that are all wearing the sort of chain in use then.

Wehrkind

2007-05-09, 02:36 AM

Not so much chainmail, or necessarily early medieval. He is getting a little old, and needs something a little more solid. I am looking for something like a light plate. Kind of fishing here, but if anyone knows a look that says "British", or even just a site or book with lots of pictures to choose from, that would be great. I would honestly settle for a helmet style if the body armor was more generic.

Adlan

2007-05-09, 03:01 AM

Well, get him a longbow if he's into Medival Englands Armys, formed the killing core of the army from Edward the 1st to Henry the 8th.

However, if it's for Hand to hand, somthing Hundred Years era would be:
http://www.aemma.org/images/archetype2.jpg

Not quite fully articulated plate, but plate armour over a chainmail hawberk. Might that do?

Hurlbut

2007-05-09, 04:04 AM

Wehrkind

2007-05-09, 04:48 AM

Adlan: My wallet weeps, but I fear you are correct. I will have to see if I can find some less expensive versions of that. Anyone else have any ideas for partial plate?

Edit: And yes, for heavy weapons melee. The combat archery regs are kind of weak, and there is not a lot of opportunity to do so outside of Pennsic. I don't even know if one can get a 25 lb draw long bow...

Adlan

2007-05-09, 07:09 AM

Well, be a poor man then, not every knight could afford the best.

Chainmail Hauberk, Greeves, a Brestplate and There you are.

But This kind of armour will be hevier than either full plate or 'crusader' era chainmail suits. At least, I think so.

Sucks about the combat archery rules. You can get 25lb longbows, but there not as much to play with as big boys toys (got to play with an 85lb warbow this weekend, what a heft, such fun, and completly feths up the target).

de-trick

2007-05-10, 08:15 PM

i think the sword is what most people think to grab because there is a big varity of styles eg from tiny daggers to huge greatswords

also when compared to a axe there is at the most 2 damaging ends while the typical sword every part of the blade is sharp

Dhavaer

2007-05-12, 07:54 PM

Dervag

2007-05-12, 09:08 PM

Would anybody be able give me information on weaponised particle accelerators? i.e. the power requirements, recoil, appearance and destructive effect of acclerating an electron or other particle to 0.999c and hitting something with it.Off the top of my head, I'd say that the power requirements are huge, the recoil is negligible, the appearance would be nothing at all because any byproducts of the beam's interaction with the surrounding medium is too high-energy for the eye to see, and the destructive effect is potentiall catastrophic depending on how much energy you use and how much of it gets 'wasted' in the form of gamma rays produced by particle-medium interactions.

You have to use way more than one particle, though.

Norsesmithy

2007-05-13, 12:03 AM

Off the top of my head, I'd say that the power requirements are huge, the recoil is negligible, the appearance would be nothing at all because any byproducts of the beam's interaction with the surrounding medium is too high-energy for the eye to see, and the destructive effect is potentiall catastrophic depending on how much energy you use and how much of it gets 'wasted' in the form of gamma rays produced by particle-medium interactions.

You have to use way more than one particle, though.

Actually, the recoil on that thing would be ridiculous. Like ground warpingly powerful.

Sundog

2007-05-13, 10:45 AM

Actually, the recoil on that thing would be ridiculous. Like ground warpingly powerful.

Shouldn't be. You're projecting a lot of energy, but very little mass, and all in the form of subatomic particles, which have only virtual mass anyway. I don't have the math to describe it, but the mass effects of material at the wave/particle level is quite different from anything at the macro level.

In answer to Dhavaer's question:

Power requirements are going to be immense. Experiments with particle beam projection in the 1980's and 1990's (part of the SDI) showed that the same amount of energy that could produce a weaponized Laser or Linear Accelerator was far insufficient from that needed for a particle beam. We're talking multi-gigawatt requirements here.

The beam itself will be virtually invisible; you won't even get the plasma flux in the atmosphere that a high-powered laser can produce. Any solid object struck will simply flash into vapour pretty much instantly. The important part is that the beam will affect all areas along it's length equally, up to the point where particle spread diffuses the beam to uselessness. It does not have to burn through what's in front of it to affect what is behind that cover; cover and target are incinerated simultaneously.

Even the most powerful particle beams will have quite limited range. Atmospheric scattering is much greater with a p-beam than a laser, and even in space keeping the beam focussed will be very difficult beyond a relatively close range.

An object struck by the beam will develop a major case of large hole syndrome. It will probably also be deluged by high-energy particles, a side effect of the beam's interaction with more normal materials; at high enough power levels, we're probably talking x- or gamma-rays, i.e. ionizing radiation. Quite possibly enough to poison fatally anyone unfortunate enough to be close to the point of impact.

Dhavaer

2007-05-13, 05:57 PM

Shiny. I assume a p-beam's range would be much longer in space?

Dervag

2007-05-13, 09:32 PM

Actually, the recoil on that thing would be ridiculous. Like ground warpingly powerful.On the contrary.

The recoil of an projectile is equal to its momentum, which is proportionate to its speed.

The energy of a projectile is proportionate to its speed squared.

The higher the speed of the projectile, the more energy you put on target per unit of momentum and recoil. For particles traveling at near light-speed, you can get a lot of energy from a very small recoil. For the recoil of, say, a given artillery piece, you could get an impact something like a hundred thousand times as great as the impact from a solid shot fired from that same artillery piece.

Shouldn't be. You're projecting a lot of energy, but very little mass, and all in the form of subatomic particles, which have only virtual mass anyway. I don't have the math to describe it, but the mass effects of material at the wave/particle level is quite different from anything at the macro level.In essence, yes, but subatomic particles do have very real mass. I mean, what are the masses we see in our everyday lives made of, after all?

A stream of protons has mass every bit as real as that of a pile of rocks. However, a stream of protons traveling near the speed of light will pack way more punch than an equal mass of rocks traveling at speeds of, say, a few thousand miles per hour.

Power requirements are going to be immense. Experiments with particle beam projection in the 1980's and 1990's (part of the SDI) showed that the same amount of energy that could produce a weaponized Laser or Linear Accelerator was far insufficient from that needed for a particle beam. We're talking multi-gigawatt requirements here.Since a linear accelerator is a particle beam (for low numbers of particles), I'm not sure I follow your reasoning.

The beam itself will be virtually invisible; you won't even get the plasma flux in the atmosphere that a high-powered laser can produce. Any solid object struck will simply flash into vapour pretty much instantly.However, this is a spectacularly energetic process, what with the blinding flashes of light and the gamma rays and the secondary radiation and such.

The important part is that the beam will affect all areas along it's length equally, up to the point where particle spread diffuses the beam to uselessness. It does not have to burn through what's in front of it to affect what is behind that cover; cover and target are incinerated simultaneously.Well, it affects every particle along its path equally. Regions where particles are dense (like a brick wall) will get a lot more of the heat than regions where particles are sparse (like a volume of air).

Even the most powerful particle beams will have quite limited range. Atmospheric scattering is much greater with a p-beam than a laser, and even in space keeping the beam focussed will be very difficult beyond a relatively close range.Absolutely.

Shiny. I assume a p-beam's range would be much longer in space?Oh, dear God, yes.

In fact, a particle beam would be practically useless on the ground, because you can't reliably make all its destructive effects happen at the place you're pointing it at. That is one of the fundamental requirements for all weapons from the dawn of time. It's the reason why we never saw armies fighting with double-bladed swords, Darth Maul style. It's why nuclear warheads are a poor choice for infantry combat. And it's why nobody's ever going to be using particle beams on a planet unless they have way more in the way of protection than their enemies, in which case conventional weapons would do just as well.

Whenever a fast-moving particle hits something, its energy is absorbed. Sometimes, the particle is simply reflected off in a different direction, still carrying a lot of energy. Sometimes it is absorbed entirely and the energy is reradiated in the form of gamma rays, also in a random direction. Sometimes it knocks bits off the atoms it hits, creating sprays of secondary radiation (i.e. high-energy particles), also in a random direction.

Needless to say, the area directly along the path of the beam will catch the worst of all these effects. But everything in the vicinity will get hurt to one degree or another, mitigated only by whatever it has to protect it from the radiation.

In space, that isn't so much of a problem, because you're discharging the particles into a vacuum. Hardly any of them will be hitting anything anywhere near where you are, so you won't experience the nasty side effects and your target will.

However, collimating the beam (making sure all the particles go in the same direction) is still hard; the beam will disperse over distance until it is no more than a temporary upsurge on your enemy's Geiger counter.

Dhavaer

2007-05-13, 10:09 PM

However, collimating the beam (making sure all the particles go in the same direction) is still hard; the beam will disperse over distance until it is no more than a temporary upsurge on your enemy's Geiger counter.

This would be less of an issue at speeds near c, yes? At least enough to hit something within a few light seconds?

Dervag

2007-05-13, 10:58 PM

This would be less of an issue at speeds near c, yes? At least enough to hit something within a few light seconds?Actually, that doesn't help much. A few seconds is still plenty of time for coherence to break down. If nothing else, all those particles have the same electric charges. The net repulsion will tend to spread the beam outward in all directions quite rapidly for high particle densities.

Rasilak

2007-05-14, 01:42 AM

The net repulsion will tend to spread the beam outward in all directions quite rapidly for high particle densities.
Actually, that's not even the main issue here (unless we're talking about use in open space on targets some ls away, so here your point is somewhat valid), since, from our point of view, the particles might be even too fast to "know of each other" for quite a long way, whereas from the particles point of view, they travel a friggin big distance (well, actually the distance they have to travel is just a lot shorter) before any repulsion has a significant effect (think relativity). So you can limit incoherence by this source simply by increasing the speed.

The main problem is that its use in atmosphere is somewhat limited due to collisions with air, and is actually quite well absorbed by matter. Charged particles (electrons, protons, alpha-particles, ...) have a hard time punching through metal (like aluminium foil), and its quite difficult to accelerate uncharged particles (like neutrons).

Sundog

2007-05-14, 04:05 AM

Quote:
Power requirements are going to be immense. Experiments with particle beam projection in the 1980's and 1990's (part of the SDI) showed that the same amount of energy that could produce a weaponized Laser or Linear Accelerator was far insufficient from that needed for a particle beam. We're talking multi-gigawatt requirements here.

Since a linear accelerator is a particle beam (for low numbers of particles), I'm not sure I follow your reasoning.

Sorry, should have used a clearer term. I meant a coil or railgun, rather than a Particle Accelerator (all of which can be referred to as "Linear Accelerators").

Dervag

2007-05-14, 09:46 AM

Sorry, should have used a clearer term. I meant a coil or railgun, rather than a Particle Accelerator (all of which can be referred to as "Linear Accelerators").Neither of those is going to produce anything recognizable as a particle beam, though. You don't get relativistic speeds out of a railgun.

Sundog

2007-05-15, 05:57 AM

Neither of those is going to produce anything recognizable as a particle beam, though. You don't get relativistic speeds out of a railgun.

Er, not my point. I was comparing the power requirements for a Coil or Railgun weapon as opposed to the power requiremnts for a Particle Beam, the latter being significantly greater.

Dervag

2007-05-16, 04:06 AM

Sundog

2007-05-16, 04:54 AM

True. Of course, a bolt-action rifle requires even less external power (a trivial amount of mechanical energy).

It is always possible to compare essentially different weapon systems, but we must always keep in mind that we get different results depending on which kind of weapon we consider. A rail gun uses less power than a particle beam because it expends less energy per unit mass accelerating the projectile(s), because the projectile(s) come out much slower.

That, and the fact that you don't need to use extra energy simply to keep the "projectile" from dissipating.

This is one of the reasons I don't believe in manpack directed energy weapons. Projectile guns, whether powered by chemicles or magnetic fields, walk all over them in terms of energy efficiency.

Dervag

2007-05-16, 05:11 PM

They'll only be invented if we ever create technology such that we actually have the energy and need the results the energy can bring. For instance, laser weapons might have some advantages as a specialized infantry weapon; likewise particle beams.

But nobody's going to try to invent the powerpack just to build the gun; the gun isn't worth it. Energy weapons will be a spin-off technology if they exist at all.

Dhavaer

2007-05-18, 04:41 AM

An addendum to my previous question: how do p-beams damage things? Kinetic, thermal, or some other method?

Sundog

2007-05-18, 10:54 AM

An addendum to my previous question: how do p-beams damage things? Kinetic, thermal, or some other method?

That's...a little hard to explain. I'm pretty sure I don't entirely understand it myself, so if I make any gross errors I'll rely on somone to correct me.

As I understand it, the accelerated particles in the beam strike the atoms of whatever the beam encounters. The greater the density of the encountered substance, the more impacts occur, so there are few impacts in air, more in a liquid, and more still in a solid object. These impacts cause an energy transfer between the subatomic particles of the beam and the atoms/molecules struck. Aside from the energy splash effects (the ionizing radiation I alluded to a few posts back), this primarily manifests as a change of state; instead of acting like a solid, the energized particles begin acting as if a liquid, or a gas.

So the effect is very LIKE imposing massive quantities of heat on the target, without actually using infrared energy (heat) in any way. I hope that helps (heck, I hope it made sense...).

Dervag

2007-05-19, 11:16 PM

As I understand it, the accelerated particles in the beam strike the atoms of whatever the beam encounters. The greater the density of the encountered substance, the more impacts occur, so there are few impacts in air, more in a liquid, and more still in a solid object.True, though the difference between a liquid and a gas (solid)* is more or less academic; their densities are on the same order of magnitude.

So the effect is very LIKE imposing massive quantities of heat on the target, without actually using infrared energy (heat) in any way. I hope that helps (heck, I hope it made sense...).The reason the terminology is so weird is that infrared radiation and heat are not the same thing at all.

'Heat' is a phenomenon that exists because the particles making up the hot object are rattling around and bumping into each other. Any object at any temperature will tend to radiate energy in the form of electromagnetic waves. The higher the temperature, the higher the frequency of the waves.

Objects with temperatures in the range we're used to (anything from an ice cube to a hot stove) will radiate almost all of that electromagnetic energy in the form of 'infrared' radiation: electromagnetic waves too long for us to see, but much shorter than radio waves or what are normally considered microwaves.

So we normally associate infrared light with heat, because hot objects give off more infrared. But infrared light is not itself a form of heat, because it isn't a bunch of atoms rattling around.

*I meant to say 'solid'. Thank Ryshan for pointing it out.

Ryshan Ynrith

2007-05-20, 12:18 AM

True, though the difference between a liquid and a gas is more or less academic; their densities are on the same order of magnitude.

*SNIP*

Ummm...what? Did you mean liquid and solid? Liquids are usually at least 2-3 orders of magnitude denser than their gas state.

Dervag

2007-05-20, 09:38 PM

Ummm...what? Did you mean liquid and solid? Liquids are usually at least 2-3 orders of magnitude denser than their gas state.OOPS. Yes, I meant "liquid and solid."

Sundog

2007-05-22, 03:29 AM

A historical question here:

I am aware of the Maxim and Gatling guns, of course, as being the first effective cartridge firing machine guns. However, I have also heard of rapid-fire organ guns of previous times, being flintlock action or even matchlocks. My question is, who used these, where, and how effective were they?

Storm Bringer

2007-05-22, 08:23 AM

Multiple barreled guns have been kicking around since at least the Wars of the Roses. they were very nasty at point blank (as you'd expect), but suffered form painfully long reload times (even compared to contempory gunpowder weapons with reload times expressed in minutes rather than seconds), due to the need to go though the slow and complex process of muzzle loading every barrel using loose powder and shot.

Hand held 'pepperbox' pistols were used infretquently for most of the gunpowerder era, which envloved into revolvers. I'm not aware of any musket sized weapons with more than two barrels.

A few 'organ guns', a dozen or so small cannon barrels on a single mount, existed in the earlier days of gunpowder. However, conventional, single barrel cannons could fire bags of musket balls (grapeshot or cannister), often doing more damage than a organ gun could, so they disappeared.

basically, until they could mass produce breech loaders, the extra barrels took too long to load to be worth the effort.

Hades

2007-05-22, 10:10 AM

I'm not aware of any musket sized weapons with more than two barrels.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nock_gun

Sharpe gets one in some of the Bernard Cornwell books, only reason I know of it.

The Great Skenardo

2007-05-22, 07:56 PM

A light mace, according to my limited sources, were made because they were simple to make and use.

My question is about sizing: about how long would a mace intended for one hand use be?

13_CBS

2007-05-23, 04:58 PM

A light mace, according to my limited sources, were made because they were simple to make and use.

My question is about sizing: about how long would a mace intended for one hand use be?

http://www.myarmoury.com/compare.html

Click on any of the maces listed on the left. The tool will then provide an image superimposed onto a measuring area that wil ltell you about how long the weapon was.

One of the maces seems to be 2 feet long.

Fhaolan

2007-05-23, 07:41 PM

13_CBS

2007-05-23, 07:57 PM

Most 1-handed 'impact weapons', like maces, hammers, axes, etc. wander around the 2' mark in length. Longer than that and most people start into having problems with the mass torquing around the pivot (your wrist).

Aye, and IIRC swords are balanced so that the weight is near the hand/hilt, allowing them to be longer without sacrificing "wieldiness", while for maces the weight is near the tip/away from the hand, thus making them harder to swing with one hand should they be too long.

Kuprin

2007-05-23, 09:48 PM

Yes, they are. Also, people generally overrate the thickness of swords: they're quite light and quick weapons for the most part. Those maces look pretty accurate, by the way.

Put it this way: I can feasibly wield a six-foot zweihander, but can't wield it effectively. Why? Not the weight, it's about a three-kilo sword (not a replica, a historical one - a lot of replicas are heavy) - it's the *length*. Even as a thrusting weapon, something that long takes a lot of strength to keep raised, and if you have to take a cut to break pikes or something? You need some serious muscle, boys. I'll be sticking to a halberd as my weapon of choice. (note: what little training I have comes from historical manuals, not SCA or similar, most of which were obtained from the ARMA libraries)

Matthew

2007-05-26, 08:13 PM

Heh, that MyArmoury link is great fun. I had forgotten all about it. Anywho, just to join in, yeah One Handed Impact Weapons generally fall into the 18"-30" range. I have seen some that were as long as 36", but it's questionable how suited they were for One Handed use (the Bastard Sword debate springs unbidden to mind...). As with Swords, they aren't likely to weigh more than about 4 lbs. In D&D terms, I usually think of 'Light' versions as being up to 24" and about 2-3 lbs, and the One Handed versions being 24"+ and 3-4 lbs, though obviously with some overlap...

Belkarseviltwin

2007-05-29, 09:37 AM

Sundog

2007-05-29, 10:27 AM

Time to raise this thread:
The F-22 Raptor. How good is it? I've heard it's the best fighter in service now, which is understandable as it's the newest, but I've also heard people claiming it can't even be compared with other current-gen fighters, which seems like fanboyism. The competitions at the moment is:
Eurofighter Typhoon (International)
Dassault Rafale-C (France)
HAL Tejas LCA (India)
Sukhoi Su-35 (Russia)
SAAB JAS-39 (Sweden)
Shenyang J-11 (China)

AFAIK, the J-11 is pretty outmoded already (it's a license-built Su-25), and the Tejas also looks like it's based on old technology. Are any of the others comparable to the Raptor? How about the F-35?

Well, I've heard the Eurofighter and the Rafale-C compared to the latest-model F-15 in terms of capability, and the F-22 has it all over the F-15 (Supercuise, advanced Stealth, and superior engine design). So, I would consider the F-22 to probably be better than either of those (frankly, the Eurofighter Typhoon should have been better than it is. Take a great idea, then ruin it in comittee...).

The JAS-39 is, as you would expect, an absolutely excellent aircraft (does SAAB make anything else that flies?). But it appears to have been constructed "off-the-shelf" - everything is mature technology. That makes for a fantastically reliable aircraft that will do eactly what it is designed to do supremely well, but not one that "pushes the envelope" in terms of performance or capability. So, the F-22 can probably do things the JAS-39 can't compete with. On the other hand, the JAS-39 probably spends twice as long in the air, actually doing it's job.

The Su-35 is a Sukhoi, so it instantly commands my respect (I have the same respect for SAAB and Lockheed). However, it's not a production plane, as I understand it. So, while it is more maneuverable and agile than an F-22 (though not as fast), it's hard to tell whether the production model will really be that effective.

The F-35 is designed as multi-role, not air superiority. From what little I've been able to glean about it, it should, quite frankly, kick ass. However, in the pure air-to-air role, the F-22 will be it's superior.

Belkarseviltwin

2007-05-29, 11:23 AM

Well, I've heard the Eurofighter and the Rafale-C compared to the latest-model F-15 in terms of capability, and the F-22 has it all over the F-15 (Supercuise, advanced Stealth, and superior engine design). So, I would consider the F-22 to probably be better than either of those (frankly, the Eurofighter Typhoon should have been better than it is. Take a great idea, then ruin it in comittee...).

The Rafale and Typhoon both supercruise and are stealthy- although not full-stealth like the Raptor. The Raptor is definitely better than both of those- but what I dispute is the people who go so far as to say that they're incomparable/ that a Typhoon or Rafale would have no chance against a Raptor. As far as the "F-15 comparison", all I've heard about that is a CASE WHITE exercise where a single Typhoon shot down 2 F-15s. That means it's probably better than the F-15.

EDIT: The DERA study of 4th and 5th generation fighters gave the following odds for various NATO/allied fighters against an Su-35.
F-22: 10.1:1
Typhoon: 4.5:1
Rafale-C: 1:1
F-15C: 0.8:1
F/A-18E: 0.4:1
F-16C: 0.3:1

This needs to be taken with a pinch of salt, as it uses simulator data from prototypes. However, it gives a rough idea of the following:
The F-22 is better than anything else by some margin (generally accepted as true).
The F-15 is aging and can be beaten by most modern fighters (probably true, it's never faced anything newer than a MiG-29)
The Typhoon is significantly better than the Rafale (unexpected, but the Typhoon is newer)

The other question is where the Lightning II fits in. I'd say above the Typhoon but below the Raptor, giving rise to the interesting situation where the Royal Navy are flying better fighters than the RAF in 10 years' time.

Edmund

2007-05-29, 11:50 AM

Hey everyone, afte a long hiatus I'm back. Miss me?

After a conversation with Professor Strickland, I learned some interesting bits. First and foremost: It would be uncommon for an arrow to pierce through properly padded mail, even at close range (and even less common to do so in a significant way).

Also: Medieval armies had some mercenary elements, but even as early as William o' Normandy you get what he referred to as 'stipendiaries', with explicit reference to Edward I's 'sergeants'. Basically, men who were paid a wage, but were not mercenaries as such. In other words, they did not belong to companies, and held fealty to a lord or king but were not self-funded like feudal levies. This is something I need to look more into and see how it was worked out in other nations, as well as what kind of pay was received and what proportion of the armies these stipendiaries made up.

Regarding logistics:
I've come to some answers, albeit ones that don't definitively answer any question due to the unfortunately subjective nature of warfare on a whole.

In 'Modelling Bohemond's March to Thessalonike' by John H. Pryor (from the book 'Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades', edited by John H. Pryor) he explains quite simply that a 'troop', that is a knight, his attendant/squire (both mounted on riding horses), a groom, four packhorses, the knight's warhorse (which would be towed by the squire and had its own equipment and feed) and three footmen 'could not march for more than 17-18 days without resupply'. This is assuming a number of other factors (the footmen carry 25 kg of food, two packhorses 100 kg (the other two would carry equipment and no food) and the squire and knight and groom carrying 40 kg each in their saddlebags.

Given the fact that the main method of transportation required some very heavy fuel, it's no surprise that Medieval logistics were much more efficient on the sea. Since boats could carry much more than their own food, and could use sails (and so had less need for bulky, energy-providing grains) they could transport more. I don't think that there was any huge disparity between the skill of Roman and Medieval logisticians, as they both seem pretty up-to-par given their available technologies and the climates of warfare. Specifically, in the Early Medieval west, the situation was such:
(Western Political Leaders) had to develop a logistic system to undergird a grand strategy which sought to maintain and control the earstwhile imperial fortifications which dominated the countryside, of which the urbes described above were only the most formidable, or see to it that these great piles of stone and mortar were rendered indefensible

Another important note that he makes in another essay, 'Crusader Logistcs: From victory at Nicaea to resupply at Dorylaion' is not immediately important to my argument, but is woth noting.

For most of the twentieth century historians regarded medieval armies as small, a doctrine for which the German military historian Hans Delbr(u with umlaut)ck was effectively responsible ... Delbruck's influence was such that for much of the twentieth century medievalists reflexively rejected sources that gave large numbers for military forces ... Furthermore, the primitive technology of early modern Europe did not keep armies of the sixteenth to eighteenth centures at absurdly small levels. Indeed, Vienna was besieged in 1529 by 125,000 men with far fewer logistical assets available than the Crusaders had enjoyed at Antioch.

Let me just put it this way: You need boats for sustainable, long range campaign without foreign-based resupply or foraging (which basically all pre-industrial armies had to resort to). Close-proximity military logistics, fortifications, close-range territorial expansion and the like, are more practically sustainable. I think Bernard S. Bachrach puts it best.

The efforts describe above, (King Chilperic's improvement of various Urbes to withstand siege, and other military construction projects, and Charlemagne's attempt at building a Rhine-Danube canal, which failed because of exceptionally heavy rain in 793 :smallfurious:, and other great building acts, as well as censuses and the like) and these, it must be emphasised are but a small fraction of what was done, should make it clear that the successor states of the Roman Empire in the West were not peopled by half-naked barbarians who some anthropologically-minded social scientists believed can be profitably compared with the non-literate natives of sub-Saharan Africa or of the North American continent. Nor is it useful to think of a so-called "feudal age", which often is alleged to have followed the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire, as dominated by illiterate bullies who built primitive wooden stockades atop earthen mounds and won their putative aristocratic life-style by brutally exploiting a thinly scattered population of lice-covered serfs.
The military culture of pre-Crusade Europe was firmly built within the conoturs, both physical and psychological, that had been established in the later Roman Empire. Early medieval government, in which the military played a substantial role, was thoroughly based on written documentation, and, in addition, those men in decision making capacities at the higher levels understood that one could learn from books how to gain advantage. More expliitly, the rulers of the period, like their Roman predecessors, were constantly gathering information, having inventories made and bringing them up to date...

And I'll leave my argument there. Thank you, gentlemen and ladies.

Bibliography:

Lynn, John A. (Editor) Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present Westerview Press Inc. 1993

Pryor, John H. (Editor) Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades Ashgate Publishing Limited. 2006

The latter book is really good, and didn't show up in the library until recently, so I haven't been able to read all the essays. One that particularly piques my interest is John E. Dotson's 'Ship types and fleet composition at Genoa and Venice in the early 13th century'

Now, on to less serious stuff.

Regarding hafted weapon length: 24" is about right for a single-handed axe.

I've got a question myself that might actually have practical application. What sort of laws should I expect to face for owning a sword in the United Kingdom? What qualifies as a sword? What about bayonets? (Mauser and SMLE bayos are hawt)

Norsesmithy

2007-05-29, 11:22 PM

First off,

Welcome Back Edmund!!!
Great post as always, very edifying.

Now on to the F-22.

The reason why many people compare the Typhoon and the Rafale to the Eagle is that they are only about as stealthy as a late model Eagle, and their electronics suit is only a few years ahead of the last Eagle upgrade. Now the Rafale is ahead of the Eurofighter in this regard, although I would expect a unit of either to come out ahead of a unit of Eagles, Unless one side had AWACS or similar support. With AWACS, I would expect the Eagles to come off even or better with a non supported Eurofighter or Rafale squadron. AWCAS allows the Eagle to fire his AMRAAMs without even turning on his radar, while being vectored by the AWACS to avoid the radar coverage of the enemy squadron.

So the first warning the Eurofighters/Rafales would get would be when the radar on the AMRAAM goes hot at about 6 miles and 6.7 seconds out (yes, it can be suppressed).

I don't know if you could expect a Rafale or a Eurofighter to have AWACS or equivilent support.

The F22 is hard to find even with an AWACS or Ageis radar, and can carry the new AIM-120D version of the AMRAAM, with an effective range in excess of 180 kilometers, a replacement for the Phoenix. Even if the Rafales or Eurofighters have AWACS equivilent support, the F-22 has the ability to kill them before they detect it.

The Su-37 can carry missiles with over 250 kilometers range, designed to attack AWACS crafts, and may be equiped with "Plasma Stealth" which runs an electric current through the air around the aircraft to help disapate radar returns. Unfortunately, it makes your own radar less effective, is less than perfect at masking your own returns (it worked really good against the siple radars of the late 50s and early 60s, is less effective against a modern Phased array), and also makes you a huge IR target, as it heats the air. Some people speculate that the massive BaRs radar on the flanker migh have enough wattage to "Burn through" the F-22's stealth and detect it anyways. This is doubtful. It is my opinion that the Plasma Stealth will be abandoned in favor of American style "Candy coating" eventually.

As it stands now, the Flanker has an awesome airframe, a very good weapons system, a good radar, mediocre (Think F-15E) stealth, and too short a loiter time.

In comparison, the F-22 has a very good airframe, an excellent radar, Awesome stealth, excellent weapons system, and a good loiter time.

As for the F-35, it is a little less stealthy than the F-22, has a slightly weaker radar, is capable of carrying the same munitions, and is less of a dogfighter.

I think that I agree with Belkar's Evil Twin when he says that the Royal Navy will have a better fighter in the F-35 than the RAF will have in the Eurofighter, though the Jury is still out when it comes to comparin the F-35 to the Rafale.

Edit: the British and the French both have Awacs, however it seems that they have few of them, and that if they were in a shooting war, at home or abroad, they would have trouble keeping all sectors covered.

Edit 2: Edmund, the situation in the UK for owning anything that could be conceivably dangerous in the UK is deteriorating rapidly.

If I recall the conversation with my second cousin (from Leads) correctly, they have passed,or are trying to pass, legislation that requires you to only own swords that are suitible for Tamishgiri practice, and that they must be kept in a safe at a licenced Dojo. Bayonets might be good depending on length, but the bayonets you descibe are quite large, and may not be allowed.

The British Medical Journal recently published an article that called for the banning of KITCHEN KNIVES!: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4581871.stm) of all things. smalleek:

If you ask me, as an individual who dislikes a governmental monoply on force, the situation in the UK is rapidly becoming untenable, and I would emigrate if I lived there.

Kevlimin_Soulaxe

2007-05-30, 12:32 AM

Should we start a new topic soon?

Dervag

2007-05-30, 01:07 AM

As far as the "F-15 comparison", all I've heard about that is a CASE WHITE exercise where a single Typhoon shot down 2 F-15s. That means it's probably better than the F-15.One trial isn't enough.

First of all, there is an enormous difference of pilot quality, and we can't tell who was the best pilot in that CASE WHITE exercise. For instance, back when the US was phasing in the F-15 and the F-16, the regular Air Force had squadrons of those planes but the Air National Guard (effectively a militia/reserve force) was still flying the older F-4 and F-105s. However, in training exercises between the Air National Guard and the Air Force, the F-4 and F-105s were winning on a regular basis. Why? Not because the F-4 and F-105 were better planes, but because most Air National Guard pilots at the time were very experienced jet fighter pilots who had joined the Guard so that they could keep flying fighter jets after their term in the Air Force was up.

Therefore they had far more experience than most of the regular Air Force pilots, giving them a considerable advantage even though they were flying technically weaker planes.

Perhaps the pilot of the Typhoon was an 'ace' and the F-15 pilots weren't. or perhaps the Typhoon pilot just got lucky- statistically, if the Typhoon and F-15 were exactly equal in quality, and if the pilots were equal, you'd expect one Typhoon to shoot down two F-15s one quarter of the time.

EDIT: The DERA study of 4th and 5th generation fighters gave the following odds for various NATO/allied fighters against an Su-35.
F-22: 10.1:1Ten to one? That sounds kind of hard to believe.

The F22 is hard to find even with an AWACS or Ageis radar, and can carry the new AIM-120D version of the AMRAAM, with an effective range in excess of 180 kilometers, a replacement for the Phoenix. Even if the Rafales or Eurofighters have AWACS equivilent support, the F-22 has the ability to kill them before they detect it.OK, now that does not sound so hard to believe if the Su-35 is on a par with those aircraft.

How does the F-22 spot its targets to fire missiles at them without using radar of its own, which would presumably make it very detectable?

I think that I agree with Belkar's Evil Twin when he says that the Royal Navy will have a better fighter in the F-35 than the RAF will have in the Eurofighter, though the Jury is still out when it comes to comparin the F-35 to the Rafale.Perhaps the RAF should place its own orders of F-35s when they hit the production lines.

Edit 2: Edmund, the situation in the UK for owning anything that could be conceivably dangerous in the UK is deteriorating rapidly.

If I recall the conversation with my second cousin (from Leads) correctly, they have passed,or are trying to pass, legislation that requires you to only own swords that are suitible for Tamishgiri practice, and that they must be kept in a safe at a licenced Dojo. Bayonets might be good depending on length, but the bayonets you descibe are quite large, and may not be allowed.

The British Medical Journal recently published an article that called for the banning of KITCHEN KNIVES!: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4581871.stm) of all things. smalleek:Now that is getting bloody stupid.

On a more relevant note, if you can't own the rifle, what good is the bayonet? And can you own the rifle in the UK?

Should we start a new topic soon?Is it wrong for this thread to get arbitrarily long?

Norsesmithy

2007-05-30, 02:20 AM

Well the F-22 can crossload the radar data from an AWACS craft and use that data to create a fire solution for its missiles, allowing it to fire AMRAAMs at the Su-35 so long as it is within the detection range of the AWACS, and assuming the Su-35 is about as stealthy as a Eurofighter, the AWACS can detect it at 320 kilometers range.

Also the F-22 has what is called a low observable radar, that uses a wider frequency spectrum for its illumination beam, and uses a classified algorithm and fancy antenna array to allow greater detection at long range, using a hard to detect low power beam (and when it is detected, it is harder to vector). It is kinda freaky, and I don't know how it works, but some friends out in Cali say that it can lock on a candy coated jet (mild steath, like a F-15E or a Eurofighter) without tripping her RWR (radar warning receiver). Also the modern battle space is chock full of signals, so your RWR is chirping at you most of the time.

Basically because it can work with a weaker beam, it has a tremendous range when the juice is poured on, the range is classified, and whatever you hear is conservative by 50% minimum, so even though the enemy might get a sniff of it on his RWR, he either can't do anything about it because of range, or he can't do anything about it because his RWR can't tell him anything more than right or left.

Besides, if your little electronic box starts screaming "Holy God, we've been locked, Missile fired," and you don't have a lock of your own, you can't retaliate, you can only jynk hard, hit chaff, and hope you live.

Subotei

2007-05-30, 02:54 AM

The other question is where the Lightning II fits in. I'd say above the Typhoon but below the Raptor, giving rise to the interesting situation where the Royal Navy are flying better fighters than the RAF in 10 years' time.

I have to agree - and from what I've heard, at about 1/3 of the purchase price of a Eurofighter. The Eurofighter must be the most expensive monument to the Cold War ever built - should've been scrapped long ago.

On the F-22 - there was a bit of a glitch with the navigation avionics a few months back. A formation of 6 crossed the international dateline and suffered multiple system crashes leaving them without navigation. Luckily it was in good weather and they were able to follow their refuelling tankers back to base. Not something that would fill me with confidence if I were a pilot. Other concerns have been raise regarding teething problems being missed due to curtailing the testing programme because of financial constraints.

Norsesmithy

2007-05-30, 03:02 AM

On the F-22 - there was a bit of a glitch with the navigation avionics a few months back. A formation of 6 crossed the international dateline and suffered multiple system crashes leaving them without navigation. Luckily it was in good weather and they were able to follow their refuelling tankers back to base. Not something that would fill me with confidence if I were a pilot. Other concerns have been raise regarding teething problems being missed due to curtailing the testing programme because of financial constraints.

Thank goodness that that was just software and easily fixed.

I expect as the jet does things it hasn't done yet another bug or two may surface, but that is just the way it is with every new system.

Subotei

2007-05-30, 03:34 AM

Yes - it was quickly fixed, but I raised it as it may be just a warning of future problems.

After all the Y2K issues you'd think designers would be more on the ball - they were lucky with the weather in this case. Potentially loosing 6 pilots and nearly a billion dolllars worth of planes is what I would call a very bad day at the office for the person responsible.

2007-05-30, 06:00 AM

Also: Medieval armies had some mercenary elements, but even as early as William o' Normandy you get what he referred to as 'stipendiaries', with explicit reference to Edward I's 'sergeants'. Basically, men who were paid a wage, but were not mercenaries as such. In other words, they did not belong to companies, and held fealty to a lord or king but were not self-funded like feudal levies. This is something I need to look more into and see how it was worked out in other nations, as well as what kind of pay was received and what proportion of the armies these stipendiaries made up.I'm no expert on the era but I do believe that these soldiers, to differentiate them from feudal levies, came to slowly dominate European armies towards the end of the Middle Ages and reflected the growing role of the central state. In particular the French army at the end of the HYW was largely comprised of men in service paid directly by the Crown - a standing army.

Of course not knowing the context of the original question that may be completely irrelevant :smallsmile:

Very interesting info on the crusader logistics though. I assume that these essays are available, at a price, online?

If I recall the conversation with my second cousin (from Leads) correctly, they have passed,or are trying to pass, legislation that requires you to only own swords that are suitible for Tamishgiri practice, and that they must be kept in a safe at a licenced Dojo. Bayonets might be good depending on length, but the bayonets you descibe are quite large, and may not be allowed.In fairness there was that nutter a few years back who stabbed (killed?) a man on the motorway with some Japanese replica sword.

On the matter of the F-22, I remain highly sceptical of some of the claims. In particular I'd be very interested as to whether the designers have managed to minimised the trade off between stealth and manoeuvrable. Certainly I find it very hard to believe the DERA figures.

Matthew

2007-05-30, 06:20 AM

Welcome back Edmund. I take it you have reached the end of the academic year?

Arrows and Armour
Ah, the old debate. Yeah, whilst I tend to agree with this view, it is only a view, I think (unless Professor Strickland has access to yet unseen data that will convince Long Bow enthusiasts everywhere!).

Logistics
Yes, interesting quotes those. However, whilst I am in full agreement with the views of those historians, we also have to bear in mind that it's only one view of the debate. Eventually, I would be willing to bet, things will cycle round to the opposite view, but that's just my cynical voice speaking...

Owning Swords and stuff
Plenty of people own Swords in England (of varying quality), but owning a sharp sword is quite another matter. Transporting it back home would also be a red tape scenario.

Stephen_E

2007-05-30, 06:38 AM

Regarding the F22, it'll be interesting if all the hi-tech goodies actually means that aircraft quality is more important/overiding pilot quality. I've also run across several mentions where more experiaced pilots "beat" better planes.

Just putting modern electronics in a aircraft can produce big increases in performance. In NZ, until we recently scrapped them because the airframes were just getting to old, our Skyhawks kept performing well against other countries more modern forces simply through good pilots (at least the British seemed very keen to snap up our pilots when we ceased to have aircraft for them) and regular refitting of electronics.

As for AWACs, my impression of what air conflicts have occurred over the last few decades is that whomever has battlefield support electronics control, ussually througfh AWACs type craft, wins dogfights. Superior battlefield EWCM, especially from dedicated EWCM aircraft gives such an overpowering advantage that the inferior side will never know what hit them, regardless of what they're flying. Offhand the last air conflict involving a western country where neither side had clear battlefield EWCM control was Falklands.

All this talk of air combat has reminded me of something I ran across decades ago. It was a claimed reference to a Soviet (I did say decades) pilot tactic in skirmishes with the Chinese. If a heatseeker had lock on you and you didn't think you could lose it, kill your engine. You lose altitude quickly and also lose your heat signature. The idea been that after losing the missile you hopefully can restart your engine in midair.

I mentioned this to someone once and he reckoned no pilot would ever try this because the chance of restarting the engine would be so abysmal. Has anyone heard of this or can comment on the practicality of it.

Thanks
Stephen

Matthew

2007-05-30, 08:20 AM

For anybody interested in the papers Edmund was citing, here's an interesting link: Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ntMeWddadwAC&dq=Logistics+of+Warfare+in+the+Age+of+the+Crusades&pg=PP1&ots=1i3wNU-X3k&sig=xXMwcIzjpWTc16orY3vDNZ36WH0&prev=http://www.google.co.uk/search%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3DLogistics%2Bof%2BWarfare%2B in%2Bthe%2BAge%2Bof%2Bthe%2BCrusades%26meta%3D&sa=X&oi=print&ct=title#PPP1,M1). Quite a lot of previewed material.

Edmund

2007-05-30, 12:09 PM

Welcome back Edmund. I take it you have reached the end of the academic year?

Just about.

Arrows and Armour
Ah, the old debate. Yeah, whilst I tend to agree with this view, it is only a view, I think (unless Professor Strickland has access to yet unseen data that will convince Long Bow enthusiasts everywhere!).

I don't think so. Same contemporary accounts and modern tests as everyone else. *sigh*

Logistics
Yes, interesting quotes those. However, whilst I am in full agreement with the views of those historians, we also have to bear in mind that it's only one view of the debate. Eventually, I would be willing to bet, things will cycle round to the opposite view, but that's just my cynical voice speaking...

Eh, I don't really think so, then again, I'm pretty firmly entrenched in this view, so who knows?

Owning Swords and stuff
Plenty of people own Swords in England (of varying quality), but owning a sharp sword is quite another matter. Transporting it back home would also be a red tape scenario.

I live in Scotland, not England! :smallannoyed:

Also, I wasn't planning on keeping it here until I had some sort of idea of semi-permanent/permanent residence in one country or the other, it's just that if I decide to spend many more years in the UK I'd like to bring my sharp swords with me. Sadly, though, it looks like that's unlikely. Any idea where I can peek at the laws behind this, or is it just some nebulous, sharp-sword-hating illegality?

Matthew

2007-05-30, 12:16 PM

Hahah. Yes, nebulous old England intruding into my thoughts and imposing it's Britannic Imperialism on me. Britain or United Kingdom, I should have said, of course. Living in the North East, I can thoroughly sympathise with the distinction (This here's Northumbria, dammit).

The way things are heading:
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Nl1/Newsroom/DG_066629

Adlan

2007-05-30, 12:39 PM

The Laws concering so called 'Offensive Weapons' is Rediculous. They really are.

The Police can conviscate any offensive weapon found on your person, if you are carrying it in a public place. The Police have the power to search you if you have a reason to give them suspicion (Walking while Young for example).

And the definition of an offensive weapon? Anything they like, if they determine after the fact that you intended to use it as an offensive weapon. This automatically includes any blade with a length of more than 3 inchs.

However, on private property, or if you have a valid reason, then it's perfectly fine. If you are a sword collector or historical renactor, you have a perfectly valid reason to own a sword.

The Police are not out to get you, as much as I dislike the powers they have, I respect they have a hard job, and to be frank, conviscating a sword is far too much paperwork (So I've been told). A sword is considerd the same as anything over 3". You do have to be 18 to buy a sword, or any knife with a blade more than 3".

So if you carry your sword bare, or unsheated in your hand, or even sheathed on your belt, then expect to get it conviscated. However, ship it or bring it over in the hold of the plane, keep them in a locked box when you transport them, you should be fine.

However, if I were you, I'd talk to some experts on it, like the folks over at Albion Europe, they should know more than me.

You can indeed own a rifle in Britain.
Any Single Shot rifle, with I belive a limit of a 5 round magazine.
And any Single Shot rifle, or a multiple shot shotgun with a 2 round magazine, and a barrel of more than 20"
All Handguns are banned, excepting special designated historical interest pistols, and muzzle loading blackpowder pistols.

To Get a Shotgun, you need a shotgun license, which needs 2 references, an interview, and a dam good reason (Self defense isn't allowd). And it'll cost you £50 for every 5 years, the same for a firearms liscence.
And you need an exspolsives liscence for blackpowder.

Air Rifles are sold to over 18's only (technically over 17's only, but every shop I've seens sells over 18 only). And they usually take your name and adress as well.

It's all a bit rediculous, as our olympic pistol team can't train on the mainland.

Belkarseviltwin

2007-05-30, 01:40 PM

I think Scotland's rules on swords might be a bit more relaxed due to Highland dress (walking around with a dagger in your sock is perfectly accepted).

Wehrkind

2007-05-30, 03:25 PM

I can not express how happy I am my ancestors (some of them at least) emmigrated from England/Europe oh so many years ago. Is the next step a bill requiring everyone to pad their hands and feet, or perhaps making all objects that can be lifted and swung/thrown at someone illegal?

Funny how we Americans manage to avoid killing each other off over the 4th of July weekend with all these guns, swords and kitchen knives around...

Adlan

2007-05-30, 03:28 PM

The Same Laws apply, it's just a case of the Peelers chosing to let it ride, and wearing highland national dress justify's the presence of a skien du, walking around in trousers and a jacket with a 6' dagger in your socks would be fround upon, even if it was the same skien du you wore in exactly the same way with the kilt.

So long as you have a reason for possesion, you'll be fine. Just don't do stupid stuff like flash a shiv around in the street.

Storm Bringer

2007-05-31, 02:59 AM

The trick is not to get thier attention.

I fence, and have done the half-hour walk to the fencing culb many times with a foil over my back in a long black bag. passed right by cops with no hassle at all. why? as far as i can tell, they don't think it's a got anything other than a golf club or hockey stick in it. If a 19 year old like me can walk down the street without getting hassled, i'm sure everyone else here can. I'd aggree that keeping out of sight is the simplest way to transport it.

Stephen_E

2007-05-31, 04:03 AM

Funny how we Americans manage to avoid killing each other off over the 4th of July weekend with all these guns, swords and kitchen knives around...

<cough>
You do realise that a awful lot of Americans shoot people, often fatally. Just in domestic disputes a hell of a lot of people get shot. In domestic disputes whatever handy gets grabbed and used. If a gun rather than a carving knife is grabbed then it's far more likely that someone will get killed, and hugely more likely that serious collateral damage will get done (missing with a knife stroke won't kill the person 20' away).

I'd also note that Pistols main use is to kill people in non-combat conditions, and to be fairly easy to manuver in confined spaces and relative concealable. Probably not the best reasons for making generally available.

I'm no big fan of "ban all the weapons" brigades, but it isn't such a simple cut and dried issue. In NZ IIRC to own a working pistol you have to be a registraed member of a pistol shooting club and have a valid Firearms liciense (I suspect getting one is imiliar to the UK, but I know the Police have had refusals by them overturned by the courts). Automatic weapons were banned after an incident a couple of decades ago where someone went nuts with several rifles killing over a dozen people. He used an AK for keeping everyones heads down while doing most of his killing with a .303, so they used it as an excuse to ban automatic weapons like assualt rifles. Typical daft logic.

Stephen

Sundog

2007-05-31, 08:50 AM

Belkarseviltwin

2007-05-31, 10:40 AM

Sundog:
Even if you have to eject, switching off the engine means you won't get caught in the explosion of the missile. I'd imagine that the pilot would switch off the engine, fall a few thousand feet, and then eject.

Also, wouldn't the engine's turbines be turning even if it was switched off? Surely that would make it easier to start? Also, isn't that what a ram-air turbine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram_air_turbine) is for?

Thiel

2007-05-31, 10:44 AM

Talked to a friend about this. He used to fly transports for the RAAF, and now works for one of our domestic air services.

Apparently, fighters are basically incapable of starting their own engines. Those little carts you see ground crew using are power sources; without them, most jet fighters CANNOT ignite their engines.

This is why most modern fighters are twin-engined. If one engine flares out, power from the other can be used to restart the deactivated engine.

However, if both go, my friend tells me that RAAF fighter pilots are trained not to try to save the plane. They go straight for the eject handle.

Apparently that depends on the type of fighter. I talked to one of my friends' dad, who's an aircraft mechanic at the local airbase, and according to him the F-16 Fighting Falcon is capable of restarting it's engine, although the pilot only has one chance to do so.

Sundog

2007-05-31, 11:06 AM

Apparently that depends on the type of fighter. I talked to one of my friends' dad, who's an aircraft mechanic at the local airbase, and according to him the F-16 Fighting Falcon is capable of restarting it's engine, although the pilot only has one chance to do so.

That makes sense. The F-16 only has one engine, so building in a restart sequence would be the smart thing to do.

Sundog:
Even if you have to eject, switching off the engine means you won't get caught in the explosion of the missile. I'd imagine that the pilot would switch off the engine, fall a few thousand feet, and then eject.

Also, wouldn't the engine's turbines be turning even if it was switched off? Surely that would make it easier to start? Also, isn't that what a ram-air turbine is for?

Sure - if A) the aircraft is still moving forward sufficiently to keep the turbines spinning and B) you still have sufficient power to the avionics, and thus can order the engines to restart.

A) is unlikely, as modern jets are inherently unstable - if you lose control, you tumble. B), frankly, I simply don't know - but I have my doubts, as fighter jets try to minimise weight, and batteries are heavy.

Also: heat-seekers are close range weapons. At mdium and long range we use radar-guideds. So turning off your engine probably won't cool you down in time to stop an incoming heat-seeker; at the ranges they are used, you don't have time to cool down before the missile hits.

Stephen_E

2007-05-31, 06:12 PM

I'm remined of a short story where a US/NATO Jet fighter pops through time to WW1 and tries to assist the Allies. Finding battiers to restart him isn't that much of a problem, and in the shortterm he can use some of their fuel (all though it'll kill his engine in the medium term) but his weapons systems are basically useless. He can't get lock because the WW1 planes have no real radar or heat signature, and fly to slow for him to effectively engage in dogfights. In the end he's reduced to simply flying at supersonic speeds close by and knocking them out of the sky with his shockwave. :smallbiggrin:

Fun short story.

Stephen

Norsesmithy

2007-05-31, 09:45 PM

<cough>
You do realise that a awful lot of Americans shoot people, often fatally. Just in domestic disputes a hell of a lot of people get shot. In domestic disputes whatever handy gets grabbed and used. If a gun rather than a carving knife is grabbed then it's far more likely that someone will get killed, and hugely more likely that serious collateral damage will get done (missing with a knife stroke won't kill the person 20' away).

I'd also note that Pistols main use is to kill people in non-combat conditions, and to be fairly easy to manuver in confined spaces and relative concealable. Probably not the best reasons for making generally available.

I'm no big fan of "ban all the weapons" brigades, but it isn't such a simple cut and dried issue. In NZ IIRC to own a working pistol you have to be a registraed member of a pistol shooting club and have a valid Firearms liciense (I suspect getting one is imiliar to the UK, but I know the Police have had refusals by them overturned by the courts). Automatic weapons were banned after an incident a couple of decades ago where someone went nuts with several rifles killing over a dozen people. He used an AK for keeping everyones heads down while doing most of his killing with a .303, so they used it as an excuse to ban automatic weapons like assualt rifles. Typical daft logic.

Stephen

My favorite Quote regarding the issue of weapons possession comes from the Article Guns, Murders, and the Constitution (http://www.guncite.com/journals/gun_control_katesreal.html).

"Sure Americans kill more people per 1000 people with guns every year than the people in the UK, but they also kill more people per 1000 people per year in beatings. Do Americans have more hands and feet per person than people in the UK?"

Or something like that.

As for the question of gunviolence in domestic disputes, in 2004 (the last year I could find data for), more guns were used to prevent violence in domestic disputes, or were used in defence by the victims of domestic disputes, than were used by the aggressors in domestic disputes.

In fairness there was that nutter a few years back who stabbed (killed?) a man on the motorway with some Japanese replica sword.
That is not in all fairness. In Minnesota, a few years back, a man killed a fellow motorist in a roadrage incident with a 24 oz framing hammer.
Is that sufficient reason to regulate hammers?

No, It isn't.

Neither is it sufficient reason to regulate swords, guns, or what ever.

Another good quote I remember on the subject weapons regulations is
"Gun Control is not about Guns. It is about Control."

I don't have the source for that one.

Akennedy

2007-05-31, 09:50 PM

Mike_G

2007-05-31, 11:06 PM

Fhaolan

2007-06-01, 12:40 AM

(A little off topic, but just curious, and it may have already been asked)

According to the list of weapons of the PhB, what would be the most effective weapon in a real one-on-one AND multiple foe fights? The in the middle weapon for all combats, if you will...

Too many variables. Armor, terrain, etc. Each weapon is really suited to one style and usage. There really isn't an all-around-good weapon.

If *I* had to choose one weapon, and one weapon alone, to survive in a series of battles, one on one, multiple foes, etc., and I had no idea of the armor or weapons of the opponents ahead of time... I'd take a one-handed battleaxe.

If I could take three weapons, it would be a spear, a battleaxe, and a short sword/long knife. The spear is the best if the terrain is clear and the armor is reasonably light. The battleaxe is for heavy armor. Confined quarters, however, and you'll be wanting that long knife.

my_evil_twin

2007-06-01, 01:21 AM

(A little off topic, but just curious, and it may have already been asked)

According to the list of weapons of the PhB, what would be the most effective weapon in a real one-on-one AND multiple foe fights? The in the middle weapon for all combats, if you will...A longsword or a bastard sword. The sword is, to my knowledge, the first tool designed specifically for killing people. It's better in some situations than others, to be sure, but there's a lot of versatility.

A sword can use a lot of different angles, which makes it harder to avoid/easier to get around someone's defense. Most swords can be used both to thrust and cut, allowing you to adapt to different types of armor you might be up against, and letting you attack at slightly different ranges.

Dervag

2007-06-01, 02:39 AM

Thank goodness that that was just software and easily fixed.

I expect as the jet does things it hasn't done yet another bug or two may surface, but that is just the way it is with every new system.I suspect that the code for the F-22 is so complex that nothing in it is easy to fix, though I can't prove that.

The problem with 'undiscovered bugs' is that these things are practically irreplaceable. We cannot afford to spend a billion dollars replacing a squadron of Raptors every time we find a software bug. It's ridiculous.

Since we can't make the planes perfect, we'd better learn to make them cheaper.

In fairness there was that nutter a few years back who stabbed (killed?) a man on the motorway with some Japanese replica sword.Yes, but you can beat someone to death with a rock, too. Should they outlaw rocks in Britain?

Regarding the F22, it'll be interesting if all the hi-tech goodies actually means that aircraft quality is more important/overiding pilot quality. I've also run across several mentions where more experiaced pilots "beat" better planes.I doubt that aircraft quality gets dramatically more important than pilot quality.

At a certain point, pilot quality will stop mattering. No four men with bolt action rifles, no matter how skilled, no matter how good they are as marksmen, can defeat four men inside an Abrams tank. You can be the Red Baron and it won't matter; if you take a Fokker triplane up against an F-16 you will lose.

But unless the aircraft difference is that important, the pilot experience still counts for a lot. Most of the things that make modern aircraft effective lie in the electronics and the missiles. As the Royal New Zealand Air Force knows, you can graft new electronics and missiles onto old airframes for quite some time and get most of the advantages of the new equipment. Eventually, however, you hit a limit (you can't add stealth technology to a Skyhawk, because the stealthiness is integral to the airframe).

The F-22 is on the far side of that limit compared to most pre-millenial fighter jets. In and of itself it isn't a revolution in air warfare; many of the things it does could be done by a less advanced airframe armed with the same missiles or radar. But the cumulative effect is to create a fighter with capabilities that cannot be matched in an earlier plane.

At that point, pilot quality does start to become less important, until both sides have aircraft that exceed the limit. For instance, German jet fighters could cut Allied piston-engine fighters to ribbons during World War Two. It took an extremely good piston-engine pilot to offset the jet's superior speed; historically, most of the kills scored against jets came from situations where the jets were caught unable to use their speed (such as when they were coming in for a landing to refuel).

But if the war had gone on for a few more years, the Americans would have been flying P-80 Shooting Stars of their own, and the gap would have closed to the point where pilot skill became the decisive factor. Likewise, even an ordinary pilot in a plane that uses the F-22's technology has a very good chance of shooting down an ace in a Cold War-era fighter; in ten or twenty years that will no longer be true.

[/quote]All this talk of air combat has reminded me of something I ran across decades ago. It was a claimed reference to a Soviet (I did say decades) pilot tactic in skirmishes with the Chinese. If a heatseeker had lock on you and you didn't think you could lose it, kill your engine. You lose altitude quickly and also lose your heat signature. The idea been that after losing the missile you hopefully can restart your engine in midair.[/quote]Speaking for myself, I would prefer it to taking a Sidewinder missile up the tailpipe. I'm not actually an expert on jet engines, so I don't know if it would work or not. I would definitely not recommend it as a standard tactic; flares are better.

The Laws concering so called 'Offensive Weapons' is Rediculous. They really are.As demonstrated by Britons' tendency to ridicule them.

So, out of curiosity, why is it that they haven't been repealed?
You can indeed own a rifle in Britain.
Any Single Shot rifle, with I belive a limit of a 5 round magazine.
And any Single Shot rifle, or a multiple shot shotgun with a 2 round magazine, and a barrel of more than 20"Single Shot rifle with a limit of a 5 round magazine.

So the Mauser is permitted, but the SMLE (Short Magazine Lee Enfield, used by British troops during both World Wars) is not.

I find this profoundly ironic.

Or would both be prohibited on the grounds that they have barrels longer than 20 inches? Or have I misunderstood the last sentence there?

<cough>
You do realise that a awful lot of Americans shoot people, often fatally. Just in domestic disputes a hell of a lot of people get shot. In domestic disputes whatever handy gets grabbed and used. If a gun rather than a carving knife is grabbed then it's far more likely that someone will get killed, and hugely more likely that serious collateral damage will get done (missing with a knife stroke won't kill the person 20' away).However, the statistics are clear: if you have two neighbors, one with a gun and one with a swimming pool, your child is far safer playing in the home with the gun. There are quite a lot of possessions that are more likely to kill someone in a given year than a firearm is.

Automatic weapons were banned after an incident a couple of decades ago where someone went nuts with several rifles killing over a dozen people. He used an AK for keeping everyones heads down while doing most of his killing with a .303, so they used it as an excuse to ban automatic weapons like assualt rifles. Typical daft logic.

StephenAutomatic weapons are nearly banned in the US, too (they fall under the 'damn good reason' requirement, and there are very few good enough reasons.

Shotguns, however, are not. Since they are arguably the best possible home defense weapon, and some of the least useful weapons for crimes (being neither concealable, nor reliably lethal at long range, nor reliably lethal through cover such as a wall), I'm not clear on why they're Banned in Britain (or, rather, nearly banned).

Talked to a friend about this. He used to fly transports for the RAAF, and now works for one of our domestic air services.

Apparently, fighters are basically incapable of starting their own engines. Those little carts you see ground crew using are power sources; without them, most jet fighters CANNOT ignite their engines.Ah-ha.

Is it possible that the Soviet-designed jets of that era could start their own engines, or has this been a constant of jet fighter design since the beginning?

I'm remined of a short story where a US/NATO Jet fighter pops through time to WW1 and tries to assist the Allies. Finding battiers to restart him isn't that much of a problem, and in the shortterm he can use some of their fuel (all though it'll kill his engine in the medium term) but his weapons systems are basically useless. He can't get lock because the WW1 planes have no real radar or heat signature, and fly to slow for him to effectively engage in dogfights. In the end he's reduced to simply flying at supersonic speeds close by and knocking them out of the sky with his shockwave. :smallbiggrin:

Fun short story.

StephenThat doesn't work the way the author might think. Modern radar technology does not require an all-metal plane; it is quite capable of locking onto the several hundred pounds of metal in the machine guns and engine of a piston-engine biplane. 'Made out of wood' doesn't mean 'invisible to radar'; it just means 'harder to see'.

As for the heat signature, that's possible. A piston engine doesn't run as hot as a jet. But it does run rather hot; there are parts of a piston engine you can burn yourself on if you aren't careful. So I imagine it would still be much hotter than its surroundings and therefore a viable target for a Sidewinder.

A longsword or a bastard sword. The sword is, to my knowledge, the first tool designed specifically for killing people. It's better in some situations than others, to be sure, but there's a lot of versatility.Actually, the first tool for that purpose was probably the mace, if nothing else because maces are easier to make.

Belkarseviltwin

2007-06-01, 06:56 AM

Shotguns, however, are not. Since they are arguably the best possible home defense weapon, and some of the least useful weapons for crimes (being neither concealable, nor reliably lethal at long range, nor reliably lethal through cover such as a wall), I'm not clear on why they're Banned in Britain (or, rather, nearly banned).

Shotguns are not "nearly banned" in Britain. Anyone who lives in a rural area and doesn't have a criminal record can get a shotgun about as easily as they can get a car. It's just that self-defence is not a valid reason to own one (however, keeping rabbits off your garden is).

Also, a shotgun and a hacksaw can get you a weapon which is easily concealable, commonly used in crimes (where long-range lethality doesn't matter), and banned in the US.

Matthew

2007-06-01, 07:12 AM

(A little off topic, but just curious, and it may have already been asked)

According to the list of weapons of the PhB, what would be the most effective weapon in a real one-on-one AND multiple foe fights? The in the middle weapon for all combats, if you will...
As Mike says, probably a Spear, though if we're not talking Melee then maybe a Bow (as then I can stay well away from the enemy...). As Fhaolan says, though, different weapons are appropriate for different situations. Broadly speaking, you want a Spear, Sword and Dagger or some other similar combination. The type of Body Armour available and whether or not you employ a Shield also have a big impact on appropriate weaponry for any given combat.

Stephen_E

2007-06-01, 07:14 AM

Automatic weapons are nearly banned in the US, too (they fall under the 'damn good reason' requirement, and there are very few good enough reasons.

The funny thing is that as far as I can see the intent of the amendment covering the right to bear arms is that Assault Rifles, Sniper Rifles, RPGs, Mortars, Recoiless's and light AT weapons and SAMs should all be legal, but pisttols probably shouldn't. The intent is to be armed to protect the country against foreign forces and/or the US Govt. Pistols simply aren't useful for such things.

Shotguns, however, are not. Since they are arguably the best possible home defense weapon, and some of the least useful weapons for crimes (being neither concealable, nor reliably lethal at long range, nor reliably lethal through cover such as a wall), I'm not clear on why they're Banned in Britain (or, rather, nearly banned).

Sawn-off shotguns are a favourite with the criminal community in many countries. They're very concealable and very nasty inside a building, where most robberies occur. IIRC in Britain any Shotgun with its barrel reduced is instantly seriously illegal.

Ah-ha.

Is it possible that the Soviet-designed jets of that era could start their own engines, or has this been a constant of jet fighter design since the beginning?

I wouldn't be surprised. I remember running into numerous references that Soviet engineering was generally more "robust" than US. Not "better" per se, but that they tended to build on the principle that things would F--- up. The US tends to have much more faith in the brillance of their technology. :smallwink:

Stephen

Stephen_E

2007-06-01, 07:28 AM

Just to be different I'll take the Halbard. Gives you a bit of reach while still strong close up. Has good armour penetration. I would like a Short Sword or Long Knife for backup in real close in stuff.

For weapon I'd least want -
Spiked Chain or Orc Double Axe.
The Spiked Chain I'd be scared of killing myself with, but it does have the advantage that the enemy probably doesn't want to come to close to you either if you have it moving fast, and would rather wait for you to wrap it around yourself. The problem is that he'd probably get his wish.

The Double Axe just looks so brutally clumsy that your only hope looks to be that your enemy will pause to try and work out how you're actually going to use it, at which point you throw it at him and run.

Stephen

Sundog

2007-06-01, 11:35 AM

Ah-ha.

Is it possible that the Soviet-designed jets of that era could start their own engines, or has this been a constant of jet fighter design since the beginning?

No, early jets carried their own starters (This I know, my uncle flew SuperSabres in Korea). I believe the first US plane to require a Power Cart was the F-4 Phantom.

Mind you, the Sidewinder, which was the first effective heatseeker, wasn't ready until the mid-'50's. I think it missed Korea entirely.

Storm Bringer

2007-06-01, 01:42 PM

First combat use of sidewinders/heat-seekers was in the late 1958, when Taiwanese F-86 Sabres used them to great effect agianst Chinese MiG-15/17s in dogfights over the Taiwan straight.

the russians were able to reverse engineer the sidewinder shortly afterwards, as a sidewinder hit a Mig without exploding, and the pilot managed to make it back to base with the missle stuck in him, intact. they called thier version the K-13 (NATO ID:AA-2 'atoll')

Sundog

2007-06-01, 03:06 PM

Norsesmithy

2007-06-01, 03:26 PM

I bow to your superior missile knowledge.

Pretty amazing that a weapon we used in the 1950s is still with us. It's up to what, the "N" model now?

Actually we are up to the X model.

Automatic weapons are nearly banned in the US, too (they fall under the 'damn good reason' requirement, and there are very few good enough reasons.

Actually Automatic weapons are pretty easy to get in America if you are willing to fill out the paperwork and live in an area where local laws don't make it harder.

You have to apply for a tax stamp, which, if you pass a very thorough background check, cannot be legally denied you, and it takes about 2 hours to finish the paperwork, and costs $200. No where does it ask you to give a reason why you want to own the machine gun. So you get the tax stamp, after maybe a week if the processing agents are good people and about a month if they aren't, and then you can complete the transfer of ownership papers. Now you get a machine gun (or a short barreled rifle, or a short barreled shotgun, or a silenced weapon, or a grenade launcher).

Thing is, it hasn't been legal to register any new manufacture shotguns in America since 1986, so you have to get a Class 3 FFL licence and buy "Dealer Samples" if you want to own any machine gun newer than 1986. that is a lot more paperwork, and though you still don't have to say why, you will be looked at with suspicion by cops till the end of your days.

Which is all very funny to me, because all of this is unconstitutional:smallmad:

Mike_G

2007-06-01, 03:38 PM

Too many variables. Armor, terrain, etc. Each weapon is really suited to one style and usage. There really isn't an all-around-good weapon.

I agree. If I was only allow one though, I would take a spear, since it's generally a good weapon, if not always a great weapon.

Kind of like if you can only have one gun, it should be a shotgun. It's not as good long range as a rifle, or at insanely close range as a pistol, but is better than either is when out of their element.

An axe is generally pretty good, but you'd be at a disadvantage in a no armor, rapier style fight.

I do agree with your three weapon combo. That covers most bases nicely.

Storm Bringer

2007-06-01, 04:19 PM

I bow to your superior missile knowledge.

Pretty amazing that a weapon we used in the 1950s is still with us. It's up to what, the "N" model now?

bow to the Wiki. I'd heard of the fight before in a book on air combat, but had to look up the dates.

to be fair, we're still using 30+ year old F-15 airframes and 50+ year old B-52s. as has been said, to a fair deggree you can keep a old plane going by updating the electronics and such every so often.

historically, the claasic english Land Pattern musket (Brown Bess) was first made in 1722, and last recorded use was in the Indian Mutiny (1857). thats a service life of.....135 years.

Subotei

2007-06-01, 04:26 PM

Pretty amazing that a weapon we used in the 1950s is still with us. It's up to what, the "N" model now?

Well - if you can call it a weapon - the British Army is still rolling around Afghanistan and Iraq in Landrovers, which were first designed in the mid 1940's. I think there would rightly be an inquiry if the US army were still having to use Jeeps out there....

Adlan

2007-06-01, 05:00 PM

Single Shot rifle with a limit of a 5 round magazine.

So the Mauser is permitted, but the SMLE (Short Magazine Lee Enfield, used by British troops during both World Wars) is not.

I find this profoundly ironic.

Or would both be prohibited on the grounds that they have barrels longer than 20 inches? Or have I misunderstood the last sentence there?

Yes, as far as I'm aware all the Old Enfields still in Private hands have had a magazine modification, unless they are originals and are kept as items of historical interest by people with a special license and even stricter limits (they even tap your phone).

Yes, I badly worded that last sentance, to be legal the Gun must have a barrel of 20" minimum.

Shotguns, however, are not. Since they are arguably the best possible home defense weapon, and some of the least useful weapons for crimes (being neither concealable, nor reliably lethal at long range, nor reliably lethal through cover such as a wall), I'm not clear on why they're Banned in Britain (or, rather, nearly banned).

Because since the late 1940's Self Defense has no longer been a valid reason to own a Gun. We are Limited to the rediculous concept of Appropriate Force, which means if an Unarmed burgler brakes into my home, whether I'm aware he is armed or no, I pick up my hockey stick to defend myself, my familey and my property, and beat him round the head, I'm the felon. Shotguns are easily Obtainable to those who have no criminal record, and have a big enough garden to justify pest control and to avoid noise pollution laws (I belive 5 acres allows unrestricted use).
But like I said, these Shot Guns will have a maximum capacity of 3 rounds (2 in the magazine, 1 up the spout).

The Sad thing is, knowing the wrong people, It's really easy to get a gun. I could go out and get a pistol and a fistful of bullets for £100, with a few phonecalls to some dodgey old aquatinces. I can't garuntee the Pistol would fire, or that the bullets would match, but to the criminaly minded youth, the laws arn't a major problem.

Fortunately, most of the criminally minded youth are without a gun, though it is on the rise. because the population is unarmed, a knife, sharp screwdriver, or even just a fist is enough menace to get what they want. If britains Laws changed, and pistols became common concealed carry in peoples trousers, then the Criminals would soon arm up, so an immidate gun for all wouldn't work.

but Because more and more criminals and gangs have guns, other criminals and gangs want guns, causing a filterdown system, hand in hand with the drugs trade and sexslaves goes illegal firearms, I expect to see in my Lifetime regular gun and gang killings in norwich.

Dervag

2007-06-01, 10:46 PM

Shotguns are not "nearly banned" in Britain. Anyone who lives in a rural area and doesn't have a criminal record can get a shotgun about as easily as they can get a car. It's just that self-defence is not a valid reason to own one (however, keeping rabbits off your garden is).I think I misunderstood the restrictions on shotgun ownership.

Also, a shotgun and a hacksaw can get you a weapon which is easily concealable, commonly used in crimes (where long-range lethality doesn't matter), and banned in the US.Yes, I know, and I think it's very reasonable to ban sawed-off shotguns. But I don't think it's reasonable to ban non-sawed-off shotguns.

The funny thing is that as far as I can see the intent of the amendment covering the right to bear arms is that Assault Rifles, Sniper Rifles, RPGs, Mortars, Recoiless's and light AT weapons and SAMs should all be legal, but pisttols probably shouldn't. The intent is to be armed to protect the country against foreign forces and/or the US Govt. Pistols simply aren't useful for such things.There are actually a lot of arguments about what the Founders meant in talking about the right to bear arms. One rather logical school of thought points out that "to bear arms" is not a synonym for "to own weapons." Instead, it is a synonym for "to serve in the armed forces."

This school is backed up by some of the alternate texts considered for the Second Amendment. The alternate texts wouldn't make any sense if 'to bear arms' means 'to own weapons', but make a lot of sense if 'to bear arms' means 'to serve in the armed forces.'

I wouldn't be surprised. I remember running into numerous references that Soviet engineering was generally more "robust" than US. Not "better" per se, but that they tended to build on the principle that things would F--- up. The US tends to have much more faith in the brillance of their technology. :smallwink:
StephenA big part of the "robust" thing is a myth. Most Soviet military technology, with the notable exception of the AK-47, was actually unreliable and tended to fall apart or have enormous drawbacks. The T-34 tank's engine broke down about once every 16 hours; tanks would go into battle with entire replacement engine blocks strapped on the back because they knew they were going to lose a lot of tanks to breakdowns very quickly.

In later years, the T-62 had an autoloader for the main cannon that had a nasty tendency to tear the gunner's arm off and load it into the cannon. The T-72 has a wildly inaccurate cannon that wears out quickly, and the ammunition is stored inside the crew compartment so that the crew is almost guaranteed to go up in a fireball if anything hits the ammunition- whereas a fire that blows up the ammunition in an M-1 Abrams is very likely to leave the crew alive, because the ammunition is in a separate compartment that is designed to deflect the blast away from the crew.

The USSR lacked precision engineering capabilities. This made it harder for them to design technology that would work reliably. So the Soviets had to keep most of their massive arsenal in storage at any given time, because they couldn't afford the enormous maintainence bills that keeping their tanks and planes ready for action would take.

If 'rugged' means 'more resistant to failure', Soviet military equipment was very not 'rugged'. On the contrary, it would have to be called 'delicate', because it tended to fall apart even when people weren't shooting at it.

First combat use of sidewinders/heat-seekers was in the late 1958, when Taiwanese F-86 Sabres used them to great effect agianst Chinese MiG-15/17s in dogfights over the Taiwan straight.

the russians were able to reverse engineer the sidewinder shortly afterwards, as a sidewinder hit a Mig without exploding, and the pilot managed to make it back to base with the missle stuck in him, intact. they called thier version the K-13 (NATO ID:AA-2 'atoll')For a more elaborate version of the story, see How to unintentionally steal an air-to-air missile (http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1496150).

Actually Automatic weapons are pretty easy to get in America if you are willing to fill out the paperwork and live in an area where local laws don't make it harder.My mistake.

Thing is, it hasn't been legal to register any new manufacture shotguns in America since 1986, so you have to get a Class 3 FFL licence and buy "Dealer Samples" if you want to own any machine gun newer than 1986. that is a lot more paperwork, and though you still don't have to say why, you will be looked at with suspicion by cops till the end of your days.When you said 'shotguns' did you mean 'machine guns'?

Which is all very funny to me, because all of this is unconstitutional:smallmad:That depends very heavily on your reading of the Constitution. Personally, I don't know if gun bans are actually unconstitutional or not under the Second Amendment; all I know is that I dislike both government paternalism and the thought of somebody pulling a drive-by with a pintle mounted machine gun on their vehicle.

Stephen_E

2007-06-02, 12:25 AM

A big part of the "robust" thing is a myth. Most Soviet military technology, with the notable exception of the AK-47, was actually unreliable and tended to fall apart or have enormous drawbacks. The T-34 tank's engine broke down about once every 16 hours; tanks would go into battle with entire replacement engine blocks strapped on the back because they knew they were going to lose a lot of tanks to breakdowns very quickly.

In later years, the T-62 had an autoloader for the main cannon that had a nasty tendency to tear the gunner's arm off and load it into the cannon. The T-72 has a wildly inaccurate cannon that wears out quickly, and the ammunition is stored inside the crew compartment so that the crew is almost guaranteed to go up in a fireball if anything hits the ammunition- whereas a fire that blows up the ammunition in an M-1 Abrams is very likely to leave the crew alive, because the ammunition is in a separate compartment that is designed to deflect the blast away from the crew.

The USSR lacked precision engineering capabilities. This made it harder for them to design technology that would work reliably. So the Soviets had to keep most of their massive arsenal in storage at any given time, because they couldn't afford the enormous maintainence bills that keeping their tanks and planes ready for action would take.

If 'rugged' means 'more resistant to failure', Soviet military equipment was very not 'rugged'. On the contrary, it would have to be called 'delicate', because it tended to fall apart even when people weren't shooting at it.

Rugged probably wasn't quite the right word. The point was that the Soviet knew their stuff would breakdown. As you said, carrying engine blocks on the back because they know they'll probably need it. Thus it would seem odd to put out jets with no selfstart capacity given that they know their equipment will fail.

The autoloader is immiently practical if it still works after it rips the gunners arm off. After all you can probably easily replace the semi-skilled gunner. If I seem cold, I'm simply replicating the patterns of thought that seemed to flow through the soviet military machine.

Interestly enough there equipment could perform very well/reliably if it some loving care and decent maintanance. Despite T34s in general having a high breakdown rate they also had ones that keptworking well for long periods of WW2 when they had crews with the knowledge and willingness to care for them. The Soviet military seemed to function on the planned obselesence/disposable model in a way that the US civilian industry is often accused off.

Stephen

Dervag

2007-06-02, 01:28 AM

Rugged probably wasn't quite the right word. The point was that the Soviet knew their stuff would breakdown. As you said, carrying engine blocks on the back because they know they'll probably need it. Thus it would seem odd to put out jets with no selfstart capacity given that they know their equipment will fail.Granted.

I agree, the feature you point out is a persistent theme in Soviet military history. They know most of their weapons are unreliable buckets of bolts that fall apart or break down or blow up if you look at them cross-eyed, so they make routine allowances for the fact. These allowances are known in engineering as 'kludges'. They work, but not well, and not nearly as well as actually designing the equipment not to break down or fall apart or blow up.

The autoloader is immiently practical if it still works after it rips the gunners arm off. After all you can probably easily replace the semi-skilled gunner. If I seem cold, I'm simply replicating the patterns of thought that seemed to flow through the soviet military machine. I don't criticize it for being cold; I criticize it for being an excellent example of a false economy. That kind of thought pattern is only true if gunners are easily replaceable, which is only true if you don't train the gunners extensively. Undertrained gunners are inaccurate gunners, which means that my tanks can pick off your tanks at long range while your gunners are afraid of having their right arm torn off every time they fire their weapon.

In war, training is key. You want to train technical personnel as long and as hard as you can afford, because that can give them an enormous advantage in using their weapons. Fighter pilots with thousands of hours in the air and hundreds of hours of realistic training exercise will make mincemeat out of pilots flying identical aircraft but with an order of magnitude less experience. Tank gunners who have fired hundreds or thousands of rounds in practice will hit far more often than gunners who have fired dozens of rounds. And so on.

By treating technical personnel as expendable and designing their weapon systems accordingly, the Soviets guaranteed that their military hardware would be junk compared to American hardware of the same generation. Even if the basic technologies that went into each weapon system were the same, the Soviet weapon system would break down more often, requiring more maintainence, which made training prohibitively expensive and dangerous, which meant that Soviet troops were not as well trained with their weapons, which further amplified their weaknesses in maintenance (which undertrained troops tend to neglect), and so on.

If it weren't for nuclear weapons, World War Three would likely have been a resounding victory for the US/NATO power bloc any time after the mid-to-late 1950s, for exactly this reason.

This is one of the reasons that Western and Western-equipped nations (such as the Israelis) tend to beat Third World countries like a drum in open warfare. Most of those Third World countries have armies configured essentially like those of the Cold War Soviets- lots of short-service enlisted personnel who can't be trained extensively on their weapons for budgetary reasons. The fact that many Third World armies have that kind of military encourages them to buy Soviet-vintage weapons, which are designed for that kind of military. Soviet weapons are designed to be kept in storage for years on end because their owner can't afford the constant stream of spare parts required to keep them running. They're designed to be able to survive the fact that the tank crew is going to be drinking the alcohol-based lubricants, leading to more wear and tear on the machinery when it is running.

And they're cheaper, which means you can buy more of them, which means that your army of 500 T-72s looks a lot more impressive on paper or on parade than your enemy's army.

And ever since World War Two, whenever a force that is equipped and trained to fight in this style goes up against a force equipped and trained to fight in the Western style, it gets beaten like a drum.

Interestly enough there equipment could perform very well/reliably if it some loving care and decent maintanance. Despite T34s in general having a high breakdown rate they also had ones that keptworking well for long periods of WW2 when they had crews with the knowledge and willingness to care for them. The Soviet military seemed to function on the planned obselesence/disposable model in a way that the US civilian industry is often accused off.

StephenAlmost any piece of machinery will work if it's given plenty of tender loving care by highly experienced operators, even if it was a pile of junk when they got it from the factory. But if the things break down all the time by default, then it's expensive to train the crews, and therefore you're very unlikely to see a crew that is experienced enough to care for it that well.

World War Two was the exception to this pattern because the Soviets had to train their people and supply enough spare parts to keep their weapons running whether they could afford it or not; the alternative was death. In that war, you did see tank crews who learned how to care for their machines by experience because the Red Army had almost as many spare parts as it could ask for.

But this was not the status quo during the Cold War.

Subotei

2007-06-02, 11:37 AM

If it weren't for nuclear weapons, World War Three would likely have been a resounding victory for the US/NATO power bloc any time after the mid-to-late 1950s, for exactly this reason.

Thats quite a claim - do you have anything to back it? Scenarios I've studied generally come down to the West having to resort to tac nuke strikes because they couldn't hold back the Soviets attack, with a general nuclear escalation resulting.

Stephen_E

2007-06-02, 01:43 PM

Thats quite a claim - do you have anything to back it? Scenarios I've studied generally come down to the West having to resort to tac nuke strikes because they couldn't hold back the Soviets attack, with a general nuclear escalation resulting.

While I might not agree with the claim, those scenarios ussually involved the BS data on the Soviet/Warsaw pact military which was deliberately created to convince Congress that they had to pour more money into the military.

Tricks like counting every Soviet/Warsaw pact AFV, even if it was 40 years old. Then you only count the frontline MBTs on Natos side. Suddenly the Soviets have a huge numerical advantage which is represented as been of equivalent quality.

I would point out that in WW2 the Soviets used the same disposable men model that they continued to use after the war. The Germans used the same quality model of the US (indeed they used it more than the US did at the time). The Germans lost. And before anyones points to lend/lease I'll point out that lend/lease was about 5% of the soviet war material. Useful? yes, decisive? I don't think so. That's leaving out that it didn't start till after the best chance of a German victory had already failed (41).

Stephen
Stephen

Mike_G

2007-06-02, 10:37 PM

While I might not agree with the claim, those scenarios ussually involved the BS data on the Soviet/Warsaw pact military which was deliberately created to convince Congress that they had to pour more money into the military.

Tricks like counting every Soviet/Warsaw pact AFV, even if it was 40 years old. Then you only count the frontline MBTs on Natos side. Suddenly the Soviets have a huge numerical advantage which is represented as been of equivalent quality.

I would point out that in WW2 the Soviets used the same disposable men model that they continued to use after the war. The Germans used the same quality model of the US (indeed they used it more than the US did at the time). The Germans lost. And before anyones points to lend/lease I'll point out that lend/lease was about 5% of the soviet war material. Useful? yes, decisive? I don't think so. That's leaving out that it didn't start till after the best chance of a German victory had already failed (41).

Stephen
Stephen

The Soviets, however, had home court advantage in WWII, versus a long stretched German supply line. The counteroffensive in 1945 was against an all but defeated Germany. A Soviet invasion of Western Europe would have been very different. In fact, the Soviet invasion of Finland in WWII fared very poorly, given relative numbers.

I think that any NATO/Warsaw Pact war would bog dwon with the advantage shifting to the defender. I wpouldn't want to invade Russia, as that never ends well, but I think we could have stopped them in Germany.

Stephen_E

2007-06-03, 01:07 AM

The Soviets, however, had home court advantage in WWII, versus a long stretched German supply line. The counteroffensive in 1945 was against an all but defeated Germany. A Soviet invasion of Western Europe would have been very different. In fact, the Soviet invasion of Finland in WWII fared very poorly, given relative numbers.

I think that any NATO/Warsaw Pact war would bog dwon with the advantage shifting to the defender. I wpouldn't want to invade Russia, as that never ends well, but I think we could have stopped them in Germany.

I tend to go with your view of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war myself.

I think your point about the Soviets defending against German is a crucial point. Quantity over quality does work when you don't play in such a way that quality doesn't get to use its edge to the full. Irregular war and defending one's home are the two situations that come to mind where I don't think you can take the "quality" victory as a given..

Just out of curiosity where do you fit the Korean war in this discussion. IIRC the Western forces were the ones getting beaten like a drum until they managed to use naval power to turn the Nth Koreans flank. Do you see the Nth Koreans of the time as "Quality" or "Quantity".

Stephen

Dervag

2007-06-03, 01:28 AM

Because since the late 1940's Self Defense has no longer been a valid reason to own a Gun. We are Limited to the rediculous concept of Appropriate Force, which means if an Unarmed burgler brakes into my home, whether I'm aware he is armed or no, I pick up my hockey stick to defend myself, my familey and my property, and beat him round the head, I'm the felon.And by 'Appropriate Force' you mean 'give the bloody burglar a sporting chance'.

Right.

Remind me again why these laws haven't been repealed by popular demand for violating the principles of common sense?

This is actually a serious question; I and many other Americans are perplexed by it.

Thats quite a claim - do you have anything to back it? Scenarios I've studied generally come down to the West having to resort to tac nuke strikes because they couldn't hold back the Soviets attack, with a general nuclear escalation resulting.OK, I admit, I went too far out on a limb there. However, the reason I did so was one I consider to be just. The Red Army was in fact a mess during the Cold War era. Once the technology advanced to the point where the massive surplus of WWII-vintage weapons was no longer relevant to the Red Army's effectiveness, they would have been very hard pressed to deal with their own weaknesses in mechanical reliability and training.

I would point out that in WW2 the Soviets used the same disposable men model that they continued to use after the war. The Germans used the same quality model of the US (indeed they used it more than the US did at the time). The Germans lost. And before anyones points to lend/lease I'll point out that lend/lease was about 5% of the soviet war material. Useful? yes, decisive? I don't think so. That's leaving out that it didn't start till after the best chance of a German victory had already failed (41).

Stephen
StephenFirst of all, the Germans came fairly close to winning and might have won had their military strategy been governed by the professional leaders of their armed forces rather than by a jumped-up corporal with no officer experience.

Secondly, the Germans' war effort was being greatly weakened by the actions of the British and Americans. Even before the strategic bombing raids became effective in 1944 and before the Normandy landings, the simple fact that Britain was in the war blockading Europe prevented the Germans from importing certain valuable resources such as rubber. Since NATO had naval superiority during the Cold War, NATO would most likely not suffer from this disadvantage.

Thirdly, NATO would be operating with a much larger manpower and industrial base than the Germans, having population comparable or greater than that of the USSR to draw from.

I shouldn't say that it would inevitably have been a resounding defeat for the Soviets, but it would have been very hard for them to win without revamping their armed forces. They might be able to not lose by defending their own territory successfully, but they wouldn't be able to completely conquer Europe in the face of the NATO forces present. Their weapons were technically clunky and their personnel were profoundly undertrained.

I tend to go with your view of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war myself.

I think your point about the Soviets defending against German is a crucial point. Quantity over quality does work when you don't play in such a way that quality doesn't get to use its edge to the full. Irregular war and defending one's home are the two situations that come to mind where I don't think you can take the "quality" victory as a given..

Just out of curiosity where do you fit the Korean war in this discussion. IIRC the Western forces were the ones getting beaten like a drum until they managed to use naval power to turn the Nth Koreans flank. Do you see the Nth Koreans of the time as "Quality" or "Quantity".

StephenThe Korean war was before the period I was thinking of. At the time of the Korean war, it is quite possible that the Soviets would have been able to overrun Western Europe much as the North Koreans overran South Korea.

However, even in the Korean war we must remember that the initial North Korean successes were due in large part to the fact that the North Koreans were amply supplied with enough military materiel for full mobilization, while South Korea and the US forces in South Korea were relatively smaller. Once UN forces had access to the full arsenals of a major nation as the North Koreans already had, they started winning and totally overran North Korea in turn.

Of course, then the Chinese got involved, but the Chinese were eventually stopped by quality over quantity.

Stephen_E

2007-06-03, 05:22 AM

And by 'Appropriate Force' you mean 'give the bloody burglar a sporting chance'.

Right.

Remind me again why these laws haven't been repealed by popular demand for violating the principles of common sense?

This is actually a serious question; I and many other Americans are perplexed by it.

Because everyone has their blindspots. Also there is a small but very vocal group who think they're fine, and most of the rest of the people don't care that much. Afterall how many people have been mugged by a burglar?

Much of the world can't understand how US citizens put up with their ridiculous gun laws. But much of the US feel everyone should have a gun and it's a massive political burden to go against the NRA.

The anti-Castro feud is another peice of longterm idoicy I can think of.

Their are people who think NZ's longterm anti nuclear stand is stupid (and elements of it are). When it comes down to it I figure everyones entitled to their bit of daft insanity so long as they don't force it on other countries.

First of all, the Germans came fairly close to winning and might have won had their military strategy been governed by the professional leaders of their armed forces rather than by a jumped-up corporal with no officer experience.

Sorry, but that's the old High Command "It wasn't our fault, and if we had decided to do it we would've done it so much better" stchick. By and large I don't buy it. A lot of those screwups were at the least supported by those professionals, if not actually their fault, and Hitler also pushed them into doing smart stuff that they wouldn't have tried without him. I'm pretty sure things like bypassing an undefended Leningrad wasn't Hitler inspired.

Secondly, the Germans' war effort was being greatly weakened by the actions of the British and Americans. Even before the strategic bombing raids became effective in 1944 and before the Normandy landings, the simple fact that Britain was in the war blockading Europe prevented the Germans from importing certain valuable resources such as rubber. Since NATO had naval superiority during the Cold War, NATO would most likely not suffer from this disadvantage.

Since it never happened we'll never know for sure, but while NATO had clear surface superiority, the Soviets had plenty of subs and it's been shown plenty of times thatstopping subs is a matter of luck as much as anything. It's quite possible that the subs on either side would turn the Atlantic into a desert for surface ships. This wouldn't hurt the Soviets much, but NATO was built on the assumption that lots of US stuff would be coming over.

Thirdly, NATO would be operating with a much larger manpower and industrial base than the Germans, having population comparable or greater than that of the USSR to draw from.

Really? If shipping across the Atlantic ran into problems NATO would actually have less manpower than the Germans. Industrial base is a trickier calculation, but much of the NATO industrill capacity, ignoring the US, is far to close to the frontline to be happy about.

And don't forget the one feature where the Soviets consistently outperformed the West. Intell, or to be more precise, spys. NATO and the West had only the vaguest ideas about the people they were dealing with. Between media coverage of the people in power, and multiple spy nets, the Soviets had much better ideas of who they were facing, and what they were facing.

Stephen

2007-06-03, 05:45 AM

First of all, the Germans came fairly close to winning and might have won had their military strategy been governed by the professional leaders of their armed forces rather than by a jumped-up corporal with no officer experience.Which is the impression one gets from reading the post-war memoirs of Wehrmacht generals. Today however its commonly accepted by historians that Barbarossa was an immensely ambitious and flawed operation and that the odds of Nazi Germany overcoming Soviet Russia's massive industrial base were close to nil.

The Anglo-American contribution, in either strategic bombing (over which there remains considerable controversy) or material aid, cannot explain away the failure of the Wehrmacht to make good its infantry deficit (from Sept '41) or to finally crush the Soviet Army. The Soviets won because they were bigger and they were able to learn from their early mistakes. Both of these qualities would play a decisive role in any NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict.

The most obvious advantage for the Soviets was the sheer size of the Soviet Army. There were six armies in the Western Group of Forces (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/warsawpact.html) alone! Yet you simply dismiss these formations as a "mess", perhaps based on post-Cold War bias, and contend that the much smaller (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/oob1989.html) NATO forces would have handily won? The massive US reserves and industrial base were located several thousand kilometres away.

The second major point is the lessons learned by the Soviets during the war with the Germans. Then there are the corresponding lessons that NATO failed to take to heart. The defence positions of the latter, arranged in a forward defence along the German border, harks back to the static lines WWI and denied them the depth required to manoeuvre. On the other hand the Soviets, obsessed with the mobile warfare learned at the hands of von Bock et al and coupled with their own elaborate operational instincts, had the theory and means to execute mass armoured breakthroughs on a broad front.

In my opinion, given the above and discounting the possibility of nuclear warfare, a Soviet invasion of Europe prior to 1989 would have reached the Bay of Biscay before stopping. The first blow, given any amount of strategic surprise, would have shattered NATO formations in Germany and, given the hopeless NATO strategic deployment, essentially opened the road to conquest of the continent. It would be over in weeks and long before the US could bring its full might to bear.

The reverse case, a NATO pre-emptive strike, would have seriously blunted any Soviet threat, and burned up the latter's precious stocks of modern equipment and personnel, but, in the vein of Napoleon and Hitler, an invasion of Russia would be hopeless. The conflict would degenerate into a war of attrition that would devastate Central/Eastern Europe and that Russia, with its superior stockpiles of weapons and men, would probably win.

Stephen_E

2007-06-03, 06:17 AM

Om, while I agree with a lot of your points, there is the problem that the Soviets didn't actually have that large a numerical advantage.

Even with the poor strategic NATO setup, the Soviets are going to bleed badly smashing through, as attackers do against serious defense. Barring a lot of luck I really don't see them blitzkreiging through to the Bay of Biscay. Between the heavy losses and mechanical breakdowns (and other small matters like few been able to read maps) I think they would've had little choice but to stop and pull themselves together, calling up the reserves. Now that stop may well be on the otherside of West Germany, but the French have managed before to put up a long bitter resistance on that border. I wouldn't like to bet too heavily against them doing it again.

What I don't see is NATO smashing them back to Russia's borders. To much of their cream would've been shredded in the initial assualt, and how much would be arriving from the US is up for grabs. If they're forced to fly it in, it won't be pretty.

As for a NATO attack. I can't see NATO having the political capacity to make a 1st strike attack, and their chances of catching the Soviets by surprise is vanishly small due to Soviet intell penetration.

Stephen

Dervag

2007-06-03, 06:25 AM

Because everyone has their blindspots.OK, so we're chalking it up as one of the British bits of national daftness, to match the national daftness of other countries.

Makes sense to me, though I find the specific sociological explanations for national daftness interesting. Knowing that Americans tend to be disproportionately attached to citizen gun ownership, and that Britons tend to be disproportionately opposed to it, is worth something.

Knowing why would be worth more, though.

Also there is a small but very vocal group who think they're fine, and most of the rest of the people don't care that much. Afterall how many people have been mugged by a burglar?And that's a pretty good explanation.

Sorry, but that's the old High Command "It wasn't our fault, and if we had decided to do it we would've done it so much better" stchick. By and large I don't buy it. A lot of those screwups were at the least supported by those professionals, if not actually their fault, and Hitler also pushed them into doing smart stuff that they wouldn't have tried without him. I'm pretty sure things like bypassing an undefended Leningrad wasn't Hitler inspired.Several people have brought this up; I'll address it once.

I'm not saying the generals would have done a dramatically better job than Hitler. All I'm saying is that they might have. That's very hard to prove or to disprove. I don't know if it's true or not. But it is not inconceivable that the Germans could have won against Russia; the Soviets were not an order of magnitude more powerful than they were. It might have been a historic and impressive victory, on par with Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire starting from a much smaller resource base. It might have been hard. It was certainly unlikely. But it was at least possible.

And there were a few key points where Hitler forced the generals to do things, or led the generals to do things that they wouldn't have done on their own, that did not help, things that probably offset the smart things that he forced the generals to do. For instance, the two-month delay in launching Barbarossa almost guaranteed that the Germans would not take Moscow in 1941 before the fall muddy season set in. That delay was the result of Hitler diverting a lot of resources to taking over Yugoslavia and Greece and shoring up the Italians in those theaters.

Perhaps the generals would have made the same mistakes. I wouldn't be surprised. Perhaps they would have made different mistakes that were just as bad. But I think that if Hitler had trusted his generals somewhat more, he might have gotten somewhat better results out of them, and that this might have made the difference. Instead, Hitler kept slapping down the same people who were giving him operational victories.

The 'somewhat better' results might not have made enough difference. But they would have helped.

Since it never happened we'll never know for sure, but while NATO had clear surface superiority, the Soviets had plenty of subs and it's been shown plenty of times thatstopping subs is a matter of luck as much as anything. It's quite possible that the subs on either side would turn the Atlantic into a desert for surface ships. This wouldn't hurt the Soviets much, but NATO was built on the assumption that lots of US stuff would be coming over.That's possible. However, I don't think the Russians were in a good position to flood the North Atlantic with submarines the way the Germans tried to do during World War Two, and the technology of antisubmarine warfare had progressed to the point where Soviet submarines might have had trouble dealing decisive damage to Allied convoys. Remember that once the US and Britain started cooperating on antisubmarine warfare, the Germans had very little success in keeping American cargo out of Europe. Unless the Soviets were in a much better relative position to use submarines than the Germans had been, they would not have been able to keep the Americans out of Europe.

And don't forget the one feature where the Soviets consistently outperformed the West. Intell, or to be more precise, spys. NATO and the West had only the vaguest ideas about the people they were dealing with. Between media coverage of the people in power, and multiple spy nets, the Soviets had much better ideas of who they were facing, and what they were facing.

StephenHowever, in many cases NATO overestimated what they were dealing with, assuming that the Red Army was better equipped and better trained than it really was. There were political reasons to do that, of course; but the effect would be that NATO would likely come into such a war loaded for bear regardless.

To borrow a phrase from Erfworld, sometimes having better intelligence than your opponent is as useful as knowing the exact weight and speed of the rhinoceros charging at you.

Today however its commonly accepted by historians that Barbarossa was an immensely ambitious and flawed operation and that the odds of Nazi Germany overcoming Soviet Russia's massive industrial base were close to nil.Barbarossa was immensely ambitious and flawed. However, I don't agree that there was effectively no chance that it would work. If the Germans had started a few months earlier (which they originally planned to), they would have made somewhat more progress against the Russians. They would most likely have brought Moscow within artillery range, greatly disrupting the functions of the Soviet government, even if they failed to capture the city outright. They would then have been in a more favorable position in 1942, dealing with a somewhat weaker Soviet opposition, and starting from somewhat more advanced positions for the spring campaign.

That might have been enough, especially if it were combined with something like a decision to mask Stalingrad by digging in around it rather than to enter the city and feed the entire Sixth Army into it.

The Germans would have needed to be somewhat lucky and considerably smarter than they were historically. In hindsight, it's much easier to pick out their biggest mistakes, but those mistakes were ones that they didn't have to make. And if they had not made those mistakes, then they could very well have won the war.

The Anglo-American contribution, in either strategic bombing (over which there remains considerable controversy) or material aid, cannot explain away the failure of the Wehrmacht to make good its infantry deficit (from Sept '41) or to finally crush the Soviet Army.Never said it did. The strategic bombing campaign did not become truly effective until 1944, when the Allies started targeting synthetic fuel plants. By that point, the Germans were already losing on the Eastern Front. Anglo-American material aid helped, certainly, and it probably increased the Red Army's ability to fight the Germans by several percent, but was by no means decisive. What I'm saying is that the factors that led the Soviets to win did not guarantee that they would win, nor did it guarantee that they would win a future conflict with a different enemy with different weapons in twenty or thirty years' time.

The most obvious advantage for the Soviets was the sheer size of the Soviet Army. There were six armies in the Western Group of Forces (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/warsawpact.html) alone! Yet you simply dismiss these formations as a "mess", perhaps based on post-Cold War bias, and contend that the much smaller (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/oob1989.html) NATO forces would have handily won? The massive US reserves and industrial base were located several thousand kilometres away.I think that if the Soviets attacked, they'd have gotten chewed up very badly due to mechanical problems with their equipment and due to the technical edge that NATO forces enjoyed in the '60s and beyond.

They would have needed their numerical superiority. They might have won, but I think they'd be at a big disadvantage. This is more or less the same view I hold about the Germans in Barbarossa. They could have won, but the odds were against them.

In the Germans' case, that was because their strategy was too heavily dependent on a small elite force of mechanized units that simply did not have the numbers to achieve their goals, and because they were not in a good position to replace casualties. In the Soviets' case, it was because their strategy was too heavily dependent on a mass of equipment that would have started to break down quickly and on large numbers of troops who were less trained than their NATO counterparts. Unless the Soviets could effectively destroy the NATO formations almost immediately, they would have had intolerable logistical problems keeping their very large army of high-maintenance, low-reliability equipment in the field.

The second major point is the lessons learned by the Soviets during the war with the Germans. Then there are the corresponding lessons that NATO failed to take to heart. The defence positions of the latter, arranged in a forward defence along the German border, harks back to the static lines WWI and denied them the depth required to manoeuvre. On the other hand the Soviets, obsessed with the mobile warfare learned at the hands of von Bock et al and coupled with their own elaborate operational instincts, had the theory and means to execute mass armoured breakthroughs on a broad front.Now this was probably their best chance. As you say and I admit, the Soviets had a real chance of breaking the NATO forces in a single battle in West Germany, before their logistic weaknesses hamstrung their offensive capability.

But that was their only chance, and I'm not sure they could have done it as readily as you suspect. In a long war they would have been in deep trouble.

Stephen_E

2007-06-03, 06:59 AM

That might have been enough, especially if it were combined with something like a decision to mask Stalingrad by digging in around it rather than to enter the city and feed the entire Sixth Army into it.

The funny thing is that was almost exactly what the German stratgy was. They weren't supposed to fight in Stalingrad. Basically things went wrong tactically and somehow they found themselves fighting in a city that they were ordered to isolate and bypass.

The preventable error was that Paulus had the choice to breakout or hold. He said he could hold if x supplies/day could be got to him (and he may well have been able to do so). Air Marshall whats-his-face said no problem. They didn't manage to fly even a 10th of what was promised, and 1/2 that ended up in Soviet hands. By the time it was obvious that the supply promises couldn't be kept it was to late, and the sixth army died.

Stephen

2007-06-03, 07:20 AM

Barbarossa was immensely ambitious and flawed. However, I don't agree that there was effectively no chance that it would work. Okay, no chance is something of an exaggeration but with hindsight we can see that it, and the whole Eastern campaign, depended on a number of very flawed assumptions. The most obvious ones were the belief that the Soviet resistance could be crushed within a matter of weeks (!) and a complete failure to plan for a prolonged campaign. As soon as the initial offensive failed to achieve its, ridiculously optimistic, objectives then the Germans were locked into a war that they could not win. This is something that no amount of tactical victories could have changed - as soon as the conflict shifted to an attritional contest, which tested the resources of both nations, then there could be only one winner.

Later excuses, such as the winter or logistical preparations, were proffered by German generals, who have had a huge impact on post-war evaluation, unable to accept that the invasion was deeply flawed and doomed on a fundamental level.

I think that if the Soviets attacked, they'd have gotten chewed up very badly due to mechanical problems with their equipment and due to the technical edge that NATO forces enjoyed in the '60s and beyond.To my mind you are focusing far too much on hardware issues. Soviet equipment may well have had reliability issues, though I don't believe they were nearly as bad as you make out, but to the extent that they would severely hinder or halt a division's manoeuvres or attack? I can't accept that at all.

Even if we take this analysis down to the level of individual tanks, Western armies may have maintained the edge in development but their Soviet counterparts were still very respectable fighting vehicles. Its true that the T-72* was considered a relatively cheap vehicle but the opposite approach was taken during the development of the T-64 and T-80. These were tanks that emphasised "quality over quantity" if you want to reduce it to such a simplistic form. Certainly I don't see how anyone could simply write off the T-80 as a "bucket of bolts".

However, we're not talking about hardware but rather operational capabilities. While I'll grant, for the sake of argument, that Western formations were of higher quality than their Eastern Bloc counterparts, this advantage would have to be of several magnitudes to compensate for their huge numerical disadvantage. Even if this was the case I do not believe that it could overcome the hopeless strategic deployment forced on NATO by political concerns. Unlike the Soviets during Barbarossa, there was no possibility of trading space for time.

In addition, Soviet plans for breakthrough fully accepted that losses would be heavy. That's not to say that they ascribed to the "human wave" doctrine, the opposite is the case, but it was known that the vanguard formations would be badly mauled during the initial breakthrough. This would open the front for the reserve divisions to race through and exploit the opportunity - its mobile warfare at its purest. It was merely assumed that this high price was worth obtaining a breakthrough in a mobile war and the destruction of NATO combat assets.

In the alternative, a war of attrition stemming from either a NATO invasion or failure of a Soviet offence, all bets are off.

*That's not to deign the T-72. It was a solid tank for its generation, easily comparable to the M60 or Leopard I, and its poor reputation today is almost entirely due to its performance against later generation tanks in mismatched scenarios. This would be a completely different vehicle as part of a Soviet armoured division circa 1980.

Wehrkind

2007-06-03, 07:53 AM

The funny thing is that as far as I can see the intent of the amendment covering the right to bear arms is that Assault Rifles, Sniper Rifles, RPGs, Mortars, Recoiless's and light AT weapons and SAMs should all be legal, but pisttols probably shouldn't. The intent is to be armed to protect the country against foreign forces and/or the US Govt. Pistols simply aren't useful for such things.
Au contraire. Every military uses side arms. The point is not to limit the weapons that are deemed useful in overthrowing tyrrany, but specifically to not limit the weapons held by law abiding citizens.

There are actually a lot of arguments about what the Founders meant in talking about the right to bear arms. One rather logical school of thought points out that "to bear arms" is not a synonym for "to own weapons." Instead, it is a synonym for "to serve in the armed forces."

You would be correct, if you did not forget the word "keep" as in "the right to keep and bear arms". While that school of thought is correct that "bear arms" does not mean "own arms", it fails the reading comprehension portion of the exam. Further, it would not use the term "militia" separate from "people" if by people it meant "soldiers" or "militia men".
Really, the whole thing is pretty clear. Having spent a few years throwing off an oppressive government using the weapons you had around and could capture tends to lead to the obvious decision that they should be kept handy.
The main shame that I can see was that every adult male was not required to own a weapon and be trained in it's use, as the British were back in the days of the long bow. That would be an imposition on the people, however, and I suspect the framers decided most everyone would do it anyway.

Now, had I need to pick one medieval weapon to use, presuming I could have a shield it would be a short sword or gladius. If no shield, probably a pollaxe.

Dervag

2007-06-03, 08:21 AM

The funny thing is that was almost exactly what the German stratgy was. They weren't supposed to fight in Stalingrad. Basically things went wrong tactically and somehow they found themselves fighting in a city that they were ordered to isolate and bypass.

The preventable error was that Paulus had the choice to breakout or hold...
StephenI was under the impression the entire battle might have been avoided by masking Stalingrad according to plan. Was there some reason why this was not possible? Why couldn't the Germans pull back and entrench around the city, relying on shelling and air attacks to disrupt the Soviet supply chain on the far side of the Volga?

Okay, no chance is something of an exaggeration but with hindsight we can see that it, and the whole Eastern campaign, depended on a number of very flawed assumptions. The most obvious ones were the belief that the Soviet resistance could be crushed within a matter of weeks (!) and a complete failure to plan for a prolonged campaign. As soon as the initial offensive failed to achieve its, ridiculously optimistic, objectives then the Germans were locked into a war that they could not win. This is something that no amount of tactical victories could have changed - as soon as the conflict shifted to an attritional contest, which tested the resources of both nations, then there could be only one winner.I'm not sure that's strictly true. Remember that each tactical victory that actually seized ground reduced the Russians' ability to field further armies. A rapid string of tactical victories can eventually destroy a nation's power to produce materiel and keep up the war of attrition. Again, the example of Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persian Empire is instructive. If you measure the Macedonians' and Persians' relative ability to recruit soldiers and provide funds for campaigns, then the Persians should have been able to mop the floor with Alexander in attritional terms. But Alexander's tactical victories threw the Persians off balance to the point where they lost the war.

Later excuses, such as the winter or logistical preparations, were proffered by German generals, who have had a huge impact on post-war evaluation, unable to accept that the invasion was deeply flawed and doomed on a fundamental level.I think those issues were actually important. The only chance the Germans had of winning (and the odds were not in their favor) was to keep hitting the Soviets over and over, never letting them catch their breath, until the Soviets were too weakened to prosecute the war effectively.

It might not have been possible even if the Germans had done everything right (started the campaign in April, maintained their strategic focus, captured Leningrad before the Soviets were able to reinforce it, not gotten sucked into Stalingrad, etc.) But I would argue that it was possible, that the Soviets were actually in real danger of losing the war and being conquered if the Germans played their cards right.

To my mind you are focusing far too much on hardware issues. Soviet equipment may well have had reliability issues, though I don't believe they were nearly as bad as you make out, but to the extent that they would severely hinder or halt a division's manoeuvres or attack? I can't accept that at all.They might not halt the maneuvers on the first day, but they would assuredly halt them within a week or so.

For a precedent, look at the Red Army's offensive campaigns of 1943-45. The Soviets had a lot of trouble keeping their units supplied. This frequently forced them to halt while the Germans were still retreating in disarray, giving the Germans a chance to reinforce and patch together another defensive line.

Even if the Soviets were able to completely shatter and rout NATO forces, the mechanical unreliability of their equipment would have imposed a halt well before they could reach the Bay of Biscay, giving NATO (especially the US) a chance to reinforce and patch together another defensive line. And the Soviets would have had a lot of trouble winning an offensive war in Europe once their initial surge ran out of steam.

Even if we take this analysis down to the level of individual tanks, Western armies may have maintained the edge in development but their Soviet counterparts were still very respectable fighting vehicles. Its true that the T-72* was considered a relatively cheap vehicle but the opposite approach was taken during the development of the T-64 and T-80. These were tanks that emphasised "quality over quantity" if you want to reduce it to such a simplistic form. Certainly I don't see how anyone could simply write off the T-80 as a "bucket of bolts".

However, we're not talking about hardware but rather operational capabilities. While I'll grant, for the sake of argument, that Western formations were of higher quality than their Eastern Bloc counterparts, this advantage would have to be of several magnitudes to compensate for their huge numerical disadvantage. Even if this was the case I do not believe that it could overcome the hopeless strategic deployment forced on NATO by political concerns. Unlike the Soviets during Barbarossa, there was no possibility of trading space for time.At some point, hardware imposes limitations on operational capabilities. If 90% of your tanks break down within the first week of operations because they need constant maintenance that you can't do on the battlefield, that imposes a limit on how far your armored columns can go before they lose all semblance of effectiveness. You're going to be bleeding tracks every kilometer of the way, even if there's no enemy fire involved.

Similarly, if your jet pilots have a fraction of their opponents' experience in the air, you're going to need a very very great numerical advantage to beat down their air force. The required numbers get even higher if the enemy's jets are technically superior to your own because your aviation industry has trouble making things like air-to-air missiles.

In addition, Soviet plans for breakthrough fully accepted that losses would be heavy. That's not to say that they ascribed to the "human wave" doctrine, the opposite is the case, but it was known that the vanguard formations would be badly mauled during the initial breakthrough. This would open the front for the reserve divisions to race through and exploit the opportunity - its mobile warfare at its purest. It was merely assumed that this high price was worth obtaining a breakthrough in a mobile war and the destruction of NATO combat assets.The question is whether the Soviets were accurately estimating how much damage their vanguard divisions would inflict before being mauled. I suspect not.

The main shame that I can see was that every adult male was not required to own a weapon and be trained in it's use, as the British were back in the days of the long bow. That would be an imposition on the people, however, and I suspect the framers decided most everyone would do it anyway.Actually, very few Britons were longbowmen. Being a longbowman was a lifestyle choice; it wasn't something you could pick up by practicing on weekends. This was one of the main reasons that longbowmen fell out of style in England after the invention of gunpowder- they were just as lethal, but supporting a longbowman required a lot of economic resources and their numbers were very limited.

Stephen_E

2007-06-03, 08:55 AM

I was under the impression the entire battle might have been avoided by masking Stalingrad according to plan. Was there some reason why this was not possible? Why couldn't the Germans pull back and entrench around the city, relying on shelling and air attacks to disrupt the Soviet supply chain on the far side of the Volga?

IIRC, ands it's been a while, it was the old difference between playing wargames and having to operate with real humans. The German forces got engaged with Soviet forces and as the battle flowed they drifted into Stalingrad. This isn't a particuly new or unusual situation. Once your forces start fighting each other it comes down to local command, and people are moving in reaction to what the enemy is doing as much as any actual orders they may have. Combined with the ease to lose track of exactly where you are, and things can go wrong awfully quickly. I beleive Napolean had the same problem with some cruicial forces at Waterloo.

It might not have been possible even if the Germans had done everything right (started the campaign in April, maintained their strategic focus, captured Leningrad before the Soviets were able to reinforce it, not gotten sucked into Stalingrad, etc.) But I would argue that it was possible, that the Soviets were actually in real danger of losing the war and being conquered if the Germans played their cards right.

Well there is the problem that the Germans, including Hitler, neither planned on conquering the Russians, nor thought they could do it (well not at that time). The plan was to take a large amount of territory (I vaguely recall the Volga been the line, but I could easily be wrong). At the same time they'd smash the Soviet war machine, and force the Russians to make peace cedeing all that territory to Germany. Some sort of term about "living space" was used (the Nazis did love their cute bull**** political catchphrases. Sadly it was a feature that current western politicians also love). A place for the Germans to expand.

Stephen

Wehrkind

2007-06-03, 09:44 AM

Mike_G

2007-06-03, 10:55 AM

I tend to go with your view of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war myself.

I think your point about the Soviets defending against German is a crucial point. Quantity over quality does work when you don't play in such a way that quality doesn't get to use its edge to the full. Irregular war and defending one's home are the two situations that come to mind where I don't think you can take the "quality" victory as a given..

Which I think we can see in the US conflicts in Somalia or Iraq, even though the technical gap has gotten wider.

Just out of curiosity where do you fit the Korean war in this discussion. IIRC the Western forces were the ones getting beaten like a drum until they managed to use naval power to turn the Nth Koreans flank. Do you see the Nth Koreans of the time as "Quality" or "Quantity".

Stephen

You're oversimplifying Korea.

The initial NKPA offensive caught the South Koreans and handful of US troops offgaurd and pushed them south to Pusan, effectively overrunning 80% of the country. The North Korean army was large, initally well suppplied with Soviet tehcnology, and the South was poorly supplied and prepared. We initally had no good way to kill a T-34, either with our own oudated Sherman tanks or infantry weapons, so the NKPA had both quality in equipment and quatity in men. Plus surprise.

Then the reinforced defense of the Pusan perimeter, the arrival of newer tanks like the Pershing and later the Patton that were much better than the T-34, plus the Marine landing at Inchon, behind the NKPA's front, cutting it's supply lines and the drive to Seoul, effectively destroyed most of the NKPA, and drove them back to the border of China.

The sudden appearance of three quarters of a million Chinese "volunteers" took MacArthur by surprise, and while he probably should have at least considered it, managed to maul the Army unit on the West coast, and stop the Marines on the East, who at leastr managed to exrticate themselve and their equipment and wounded before things ground to a stalemate in early 1951. Even in the retreat, the mostly Marine unit inflicted casulaties on the Chinese of about 30:1.

The Chinese were brave, not bad a co-ordination, and very good at night manuvers, but less well armed or supplied. I guess that falls under quantity. The fact that they destoryed one flank of the UN forces, but not the other, and took horrible casualties doing so, argues that enough quantity can beat not-quite-enough quality. Against qualtity troops, quantity can only win at a terrible price.

Korea was a back and forth war where the side that sprang the surprise could drive back the other, but prepared positions became hard to take, and it settled down to a WWI-like war of static lines. Better technonolgy allowed the US/UN forces to kill a lot more Chinese and North Koreans soldiers, but the edge was not enough to overcome the element of surpirse, or the huge disparity in manpower once the Chinese showed up.

But, as one who has worn the Marine uniform, I must argue that my predecessors were hardly "beaten like a drum" while inflicting more than 30 enemy casualties for each man we lost.

Fhaolan

2007-06-03, 11:12 AM

Actually, very few Britons were longbowmen. Being
a longbowman was a lifestyle choice; it wasn't something you could pick up by practicing on weekends. This was one of the main reasons that longbowmen fell out of style in England after the invention of gunpowder- they were just as lethal, but supporting a longbowman required a lot of economic resources and their numbers were very limited.

True, but in the time of the Cavaliers and Roundheads (Cromwell and the lot), every able-bodied man in England was required to train at least *some* of the time in the local militia as a pikeman. If you was reasonably skilled with a longbow, he would be classified as a 'dual-armed man' (his pike would have a hook added to it, though I've not been entirely clear why. Either he was expected to hang the bow from the hook so he can get to it easier, or use the hook to pick the bow up from the ground. Either seems rather awkward to me.)

Hunting guns were relatively common in the period, and it would be a somewhat surprising (or just dirt poor) household that *didn't* have at least one fowling piece. If you owned a gun, you'd very likely be required to train with it with the militia. Militias were very big in that period.

Adlan

2007-06-03, 02:35 PM

At several Points in British History every able bodied man, while not a Professional Longbowman, did train with the longbow. During the reign of the Edwards it was a fantasticly popular sport (just look at all the streetname, Butt lane, the Butts, Butt Avenue and variations can be found in every town across the county).

The decline of the Longbowman conicides with changes in agriculture (Less big strong plowmen, bigger cities), and the rise of other sports. Not for nothing was football banned.

Being a longbow man, a real 150lb+ longbowman requires hours of daily training. But it's like professional footballers. There are what 5000 professional footballers in the country? including all the leauges. People at their leval of talent only exist because across the country everyday, almost every little boy plays football every day. It was the same with the longbow (it can be seen in the popularity of Robinhood, written records of the story suddenly explode after the reign of Edward the 2nd. Up untill longshanks (Edward the 1st) made the longbow a weapon of glory, a bowman was just a peasent).

I did have a massive and wonderful post, full of links of sources, describing the change from the 1680 Bill of Rights, which included the right (for protestants) to have arms for self defense, to the Dunblane Massacre, and others which changed public opinion on legally owned weapons.

But the Machine ate it. If I get time I'll type it up again.

Matthew

2007-06-03, 02:42 PM

Ah, but Adlan, that's because written records (the surviving ones anyway) suddenly explode in general at that time, particularly vernacular English records. It doesn't necessarily correspond to any popularity of that myth.

All the same, I find it hard to believe that every able bodied man really did practice the Long Bow at that time. There is a huge gap between what is prescribed by law and what actually happens in medieval society. There would no doubt have been an increase in practitioners (both part time and professional), but it doesn't strike me as quite as simple as 'and so it was done'.

Fhaolan

2007-06-03, 02:50 PM

All the same, I find it hard to believe that every able bodied man really did practice the Long Bow at that time. There is a huge gap between what is prescribed by law and what actually happens in medieval society. There would no doubt have been an increase in practitioners (both part time and professional), but it doesn't strike me as quite as simple as 'and so it was done'.

I belonged to a re-enactment group in Ontario, Canada at one point (before I moved to the 'states for work) called the 'Tabard Inn Society'. Fun people, I recommend them, if they're still around. We were doing the English Civil War, and I think we pretty much nailed it. Technically, the locals were required to do pike drill as part of the militia training. Technically, we (portraying the locals) did indeed do the pike drill as required once a week. I can tell you that drilling once a week for months does not make one a good pikeman. These people wouldn't be able to fight their way out of a paper bag, but they did do the drill. :smallsmile:

Adlan

2007-06-03, 03:14 PM

@Matthew, thats a good point about written records, Hadn't considerd that.
I practice my Longbow once a week (school pressures), and although I can pull the low limit for a warbow (80lb) I can't do it with the speed and length of time that would be required for a professional.

The Laws were passed only once there was a decline in the number of longbowmen, for several hundred years (from the 15th to the 18th century, despite the fact that the last company of archers fought in the 16th) people decried the state of english yeoman ship and wished for a return to the glory days. Really there was a golden age of the 3 Edwards, lasting until the middle of the hundread years war, at which point the laws concerning mandatory longbowman ship start to be passed, because it was necessary to force people to practice. With a shift in agriculture (an increase in sheep farms is mentiond, Sheperds don't make good longbowmen apparently), and a rise in industry combined to reduce the number of people practacing.

An attempt to increase the number of longbow upwards wouldn't work or (I think) ocour to the kings, but an attempt to maintain numbers, and bring them back to numbers seems to fit exactly with the monarchs mentality.

And Conerning the laws effectiveness? It's still on the books, do you see how many professional longbowment there are?

Stephen_E

2007-06-03, 04:19 PM

You're oversimplifying Korea.

The initial NKPA offensive caught the South Koreans and handful of US troops offgaurd and pushed them south to Pusan, effectively overrunning 80% of the country. The North Korean army was large, initally well suppplied with Soviet tehcnology, and the South was poorly supplied and prepared. We initally had no good way to kill a T-34, either with our own oudated Sherman tanks or infantry weapons, so the NKPA had both quality in equipment and quatity in men. Plus surprise.

Then the reinforced defense of the Pusan perimeter, the arrival of newer tanks like the Pershing and later the Patton that were much better than the T-34, plus the Marine landing at Inchon, behind the NKPA's front, cutting it's supply lines and the drive to Seoul, effectively destroyed most of the NKPA, and drove them back to the border of China.

The sudden appearance of three quarters of a million Chinese "volunteers" took MacArthur by surprise, and while he probably should have at least considered it, managed to maul the Army unit on the West coast, and stop the Marines on the East, who at leastr managed to exrticate themselve and their equipment and wounded before things ground to a stalemate in early 1951. Even in the retreat, the mostly Marine unit inflicted casulaties on the Chinese of about 30:1.

<snipped>

But, as one who has worn the Marine uniform, I must argue that my predecessors were hardly "beaten like a drum" while inflicting more than 30 enemy casualties for each man we lost.

Mike, it would be more accurate to say I was refferring to only the initial period of the war. From the attack, the UN/US intervention, and the flanking manuver at Inchon.

Thus in all respect to your Corp, it was before the 30:1 casulties were been inflicted (and no, getting buried under bodies doesn't constitute "been beaten like a drum".

I think I take your answer as the initial NKPA offense, which was the period I was refferring to, wasn't per se a quantity over quality force. Which seem fair enough.

ps. Humor note: A while back I got the book of the classic movie "Kelly's Heroes". The character "Kelly" (played by Clint Eastwood) is a busted officier in the movie, but they don't say what he was busted for. In the book the author gives the detail that he was in command of an army unit on Sicily IIRC and his unit had captured a villiage and gotten throughly drunk. He then received orders to take one of 3 hills in the vicinity. They did so with much energy and verve. Kelly decided they'd take another of the hills since the 1st was so easy. It wasn't till after taking the 2nd hill that they realised it'd been held by Marines. Kelly thought that half the reason he'd got in so much trouble was that he'd made the Marines look bad.:smallbiggrin:

Stephen

2007-06-03, 05:01 PM

I'm not sure that's strictly true. Remember that each tactical victory that actually seized ground reduced the Russians' ability to field further armies.That's the problem - it didn't. Despite the huge territorial gains made by the Wehrmacht, Soviet industry was still capable of vastly outperforming German production. There was almost no contest in this area.

Merely destroying the Soviet armies was useless unless it was accompanied by the collapse of the Soviet economy or government. These were two crucial assumptions that underpinned the German invasion and yet neither was ever likely to occur. For every army destroyed the Soviets simply raised another and the Germans were unable to compete.

Let me put it this way - had the Germans gotten their two extra months then Operation Barbarossa still would, in all likelihood, still have failed. Nothing the Germans did could prevent the raising and arming of Soviet armies (testament to the sheer size of the country).

They might not halt the maneuvers on the first day, but they would assuredly halt them within a week or so.Why? Simple question really. NATO formations had no space to manoeuvre - a result of natural German terrain and their own instance on forward defence. The frontline formations would be pierced by the first Soviet thrust and effectively destroyed by the follow up formations. The only other force that could be expected to halt the advancing Soviet divisions were located on the other side of the Atlantic.

For a precedent, look at the Red Army's offensive campaigns of 1943-45. The Soviets had a lot of trouble keeping their units supplied. This frequently forced them to halt while the Germans were still retreating in disarray, giving the Germans a chance to reinforce and patch together another defensive line.Completely different circumstances. Drawing lessons on doctrine and strategy is one thing, arguing that specific instances still apply decades later is nonsense. The Soviet Army in '85 was completely different from that of four decades earlier.

At some point, hardware imposes limitations on operational capabilities. If 90% of your tanks break down within the first week of operations because they need constant maintenance that you can't do on the battlefield, that imposes a limit on how far your armored columns can go before they lose all semblance of effectiveness. You're going to be bleeding tracks every kilometer of the way, even if there's no enemy fire involved.Come on now... 90%? Why don't we just decide that the Soviet guns didn't work either?

I'll gladly concede that no army with 90% breakdown cannot hope to win. What I dispute is that the Soviet armour units had anywhere near that rate. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that every single Soviet operational plan was worthless because their tanks couldn't travel a few metres without breaking down. You're essentially suggesting that every last Soviet armoured formation was in fact worthless and existed solely on paper. That's ridiculous.

The question is whether the Soviets were accurately estimating how much damage their vanguard divisions would inflict before being mauled. I suspect not.Based on what? Every army overestimates its own capabilities but I see no reason to suspect that Soviet estimates for defeating NATO were any more outrageous than NATO's estimates for repulsing such an offensive.

Given the lessons learned from WWII, and everything we know about armoured warfare, its safe to say that a hard hitting armour formation, with the necessary support, will generally break through a static defensive position.

Mike_G

2007-06-03, 05:15 PM

Mike, it would be more accurate to say I was refferring to only the initial period of the war. From the attack, the UN/US intervention, and the flanking manuver at Inchon.

Thus in all respect to your Corp, it was before the 30:1 casulties were been inflicted (and no, getting buried under bodies doesn't constitute "been beaten like a drum".

I think I take your answer as the initial NKPA offense, which was the period I was refferring to, wasn't per se a quantity over quality force. Which seem fair enough.

No prob.

The later battle between the UN and the large, comparably poorly armed Chinese forces could be seen as quantity versus quality, so I assumed you were talking the war as a whole.

The initial successful drive by the NKPA was done with an advantage in equipment, training, and numbers. They had new model T-34s, while the ROK trrops had hand-me-downs from the US, and the US troops on the penisula had the older stuff, since all our best equipment was in Europe at the time. The old Bazookas and WWII era Shermans were no match for the Soviet armor, and the ROK troops were poorly trained in comparison to the NKPA.

ps. Humor note: A while back I got the book of the classic movie "Kelly's Heroes". The character "Kelly" (played by Clint Eastwood) is a busted officier in the movie, but they don't say what he was busted for. In the book the author gives the detail that he was in command of an army unit on Sicily IIRC and his unit had captured a villiage and gotten throughly drunk. He then received orders to take one of 3 hills in the vicinity. They did so with much energy and verve. Kelly decided they'd take another of the hills since the 1st was so easy. It wasn't till after taking the 2nd hill that they realised it'd been held by Marines. Kelly thought that half the reason he'd got in so much trouble was that he'd made the Marines look bad.:smallbiggrin:

Stephen

There is a lot of kidding between the Army and Marines. A soldier buddy of mine used to tell a lot of Marine jokes (Why do they have Marines on ships? So the Sailors will have men to dance with. What do Marines call helicopters? *point upwards and grunt*) and wonder why I had no Army jokes in return. I just told him "There's plenty of Army jokes that are just names of battles. We didn't feel right making up more."

Dervag

2007-06-03, 06:52 PM

IIRC, ands it's been a while, it was the old difference between playing wargames and having to operate with real humans. The German forces got engaged with Soviet forces and as the battle flowed they drifted into Stalingrad. This isn't a particuly new or unusual situation. Once your forces start fighting each other it comes down to local command, and people are moving in reaction to what the enemy is doing as much as any actual orders they may have. Combined with the ease to lose track of exactly where you are, and things can go wrong awfully quickly. I beleive Napolean had the same problem with some cruicial forces at Waterloo.What I'm wondering is whether or not it was plausible for either von Paulus or the General Staff to say, at some point:

"If we keep getting sucked into this city it'll be the worst meat grinder in German military history; we're playing to the Russians' strengths here. All units pull back to a prepared defensive line around the city. We'll hammer it into gravel with artillery and blast anything that crosses the river with dive bombers, but getting into that rabbit warren with infantry and tanks will be a disaster."

Now, I'm not saying anyone tried to do that. What I'm wondering is if it could have been done without making things even worse in the short-to-medium term.

I was referring to the time of long bows, not the use of long bows specifically.
If memory serves, it was Henry II who declared that all able bodied men between 17 and 50 or so were required to have a weapon other than a knife, and be able to use it. He even sent 'round inspectors to make certain these weapons were there. Quite the opposite of today.Oh. OK.

What I'm wondering is why he did it and what results he got from it. I suspect that he was not trying to make the populace more secure against government abuse of power.

Thus in all respect to your Corp, it was before the 30:1 casulties were been inflicted (and no, getting buried under bodies doesn't constitute "been beaten like a drum".I agree, though I would nitpick that it's "your Corps." 'Corps' is one of those words where the singular and plural are the same. "Marine Corps" refers to a single Corps of Marines, not to a bunch of individual separate groups each of which is a Corp of Marines.

That's the problem - it didn't. Despite the huge territorial gains made by the Wehrmacht, Soviet industry was still capable of vastly outperforming German production. There was almost no contest in this area.

Merely destroying the Soviet armies was useless unless it was accompanied by the collapse of the Soviet economy or government. These were two crucial assumptions that underpinned the German invasion and yet neither was ever likely to occur. For every army destroyed the Soviets simply raised another and the Germans were unable to compete.You miss my point.

My point is that there is no such thing as a purely tactical offensive victory. If you take territory, capture cities, and push the front back, you will generally end up weakening your enemy's ability to wage war.

Historically, the Germans did not weaken their enemy's ability to wage war enough. But they did do damage; they did disrupt the Soviet war machine. They just didn't disrupt it enough, because they didn't score enough tactical victories to make up for unavoidable delays.

If the Germans had scored enough tactical victories, they would have won. It is not clear that they could score that many tactical victories, but the basic idea is valid. For instance, if they had taken or wrecked Moscow (which they probably could have done with an earlier start or a harder push), it would have disrupted the Soviet government. Documents would have been lost. Some government officials would have been killed. There would have been a hiatus in the functionality of government as they relocated to Kuibyshev. It is even possible that Stalin might have been killed, which would have really scrambled things.

Even with the fall of Moscow, the Soviets would have been able to fight and quite possibly win. But they would have been fighting less well.

Likewise, if the Germans had been able to capture Leningrad before the Soviets garrisoned it heavily, it would have freed up troops to fight on other fronts, troops that were historically stuck in front of Leningrad while the war was decided in the south of Russia.

Likewise, if the Germans had invested Stalingrad without entering the city and getting chewed up, they would have had more men and more tanks. They wouldn't have had to rely quite as heavily on under-equipped Italians and Romanians and Hungarians for flank security. They might have been able to stop the Soviet counterattack in winter 1942 rather than having to retreat the entire Army Group South or let it be surrounded.

None of this is guaranteed. What I'm saying is that there were several places where the Germans lost, but might have won, important battles. And if they won enough of those important battles, the Soviets would have a harder time prosecuting the war, possibly hard enough to lose.

Now, it is equally true that there are battles where the Soviets lost, but might have won. And if they won enough of those battles, the Germans would have suffered a rapid and ignominious defeat instead of a long, slow, grinding defeat.

Completely different circumstances. Drawing lessons on doctrine and strategy is one thing, arguing that specific instances still apply decades later is nonsense. The Soviet Army in '85 was completely different from that of four decades earlier.Except that there were some points of similarity, such as the fact that the Soviet Army of 1985 had a lot of equipment that was prone to breaking down and requiring a lot more maintenance than its NATO counterparts.

This led to some differences. The Red Army of World War Two had enough time that it could afford to throw semi-trained personnel at its high-maintenance equipment and keep fighting until the survivors became experienced and talented at keeping that equipment running. The Red Army of 1985 didn't have the budget, so most of its weapon systems were in mothballs at any one time. That was cheaper, but it meant that Soviet troops had a disadvantage in experience.

Come on now... 90%? Why don't we just decide that the Soviet guns didn't work either?That is not an objective assertion about Soviet tank reliability. It is a made up number to prove a point, which I should have made more clear:

Limitations on hardware can impose limitations on operation. In the case of the Soviet Army of the mid-to-late Cold War, I am arguing that those limitations were important.

You're essentially suggesting that every last Soviet armoured formation was in fact worthless and existed solely on paper. That's ridiculous.No, I'm not. What I'm suggesting is that their offensive would have gotten bogged down faster than they planned (which happens to a lot of offensives), and would have been less destructive than they planned (which also happens to a lot of offensives). Neither of these things is exactly unprecedented in history.

Based on what? Every army overestimates its own capabilities but I see no reason to suspect that Soviet estimates for defeating NATO were any more outrageous than NATO's estimates for repulsing such an offensive.Except that NATO kept estimating "we're doomed, because the enemy's weapons are as good as ours and they have way more of them." When in fact, the situation was "the enemy's weapons are not as good as ours, and are considerably less reliable, but they have considerably more of them."

NATO wasn't as screwed as they thought they were; conversely, the Soviets weren't as all-dominating as they thought they were.

Given the lessons learned from WWII, and everything we know about armoured warfare, its safe to say that a hard hitting armour formation, with the necessary support, will generally break through a static defensive position.How static is 'static'? Are we talking about a trench line, or a fifty-mile-deep zone in which mobile units can make small-scale maneuvers? Who has air superiority, the attacker or the defender? Does this take into account the existence of antitank missiles, which were not a major part of WWII armored warfare and which greatly enhance the defender's ability to kill tanks?

2007-06-04, 07:38 AM

My point is that there is no such thing as a purely tactical offensive victory. If you take territory, capture cities, and push the front back, you will generally end up weakening your enemy's ability to wage war.Again, this is what I've been saying - this did not occur. Its that simple.

The Wehrmacht had an abundance of tactical victories after tactical victory in '41 and '42. They destroyed army after army and captured city after city. In this respect its probably one of the most successful offensives in history. Looking back we can safely say that they performed at the limit of their capabilities to do so. Despite this they did not signficantly dent either the Soviet industrial base or the grip of the Communist Party. The bulk of the factories were successfully relocated beyond the Urals while there was never any doubt that Stalin was secure.

So in effect the entire Operation Barbarossa was to accomplish little except stretch German capacities beyond stretching point.

If the Germans had scored enough tactical victories, they would have won.True, but historically they never came close to the amount of tactical victories required to produce a strategic victory. Even if Barbarossa had reached the reaching the Arkhangelsk–Volga line, a completely ludicrous objective, it may not have ended Soviet resistance.

The Germans never came close to securing the number of tactical victories required in the first year of campaigning. Indeed this number was almost certainly beyond their capabilities.

Likewise, if the Germans had been able to capture Leningrad before the Soviets garrisoned it heavily, it would have freed up troops to fight on other fronts, troops that were historically stuck in front of Leningrad while the war was decided in the south of Russia.All three of the German primary objectives (Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad) proved impossible to take despite the vast resources invested in each. This says more about the strength of the Soviet resistance than anything else. In Moscow the Germans were driven back by the Siberian divisions, Leningrad's defence was nothing short of heroic while Stalingrad was the graveyard of the 6th Army.

All three cities were ultimately saved because the Soviets possessed an incredible ability to rearm and rebuild well out of German reach. Compare and contrast with inability of the Wehrmacht to make up its infantry deficit and their ridiculous expectations and subsequent preparations.

Would the fall of any one of these cities have impacted the war? Of course. Would it have been enough to bring the Soviets to their knees? No. Not as long as the Soviet industrial base remained unscathed. At the same time it was this industrial might that stymied the German advance and prevented the capture of these cities.

Except that there were some points of similarity, such as the fact that the Soviet Army of 1985 had a lot of equipment that was prone to breaking down and requiring a lot more maintenance than its NATO counterparts.The Soviet Army in '85 was not using Mongolian horses :rolleyes:

As regards the logistical effort required to sustain a rapid advance, the Soviets had no shortage of motorised vehicles. Besides, Berlin is merely an overnight train journey from Moscow.

This led to some differences. The Red Army of World War Two had enough time that it could afford to throw semi-trained personnel at its high-maintenance equipment and keep fighting until the survivors became experienced and talented at keeping that equipment running. The Red Army of 1985 didn't have the budget, so most of its weapon systems were in mothballs at any one time. That was cheaper, but it meant that Soviet troops had a disadvantage in experience.We all know that the Soviets would not be fielding highly trained personnel but this was a result of their conscription model. Budgetary constraints were not an issue until the late-eighties.

Limitations on hardware can impose limitations on operation. In the case of the Soviet Army of the mid-to-late Cold War, I am arguing that those limitations were important.Your first statement is of course true. What I disagree with however is the assertion that these rates of hardware failure, over three generations of tanks, were in any way severe enough to have a detrimental impact on any but the most ambitious of Soviet plans.

What evidence do you have to suggest that any Soviet offensive would almost immediately be stalled by mass breakdowns of equipment?

How static is 'static'? Are we talking about a trench line, or a fifty-mile-deep zone in which mobile units can make small-scale maneuvers? Who has air superiority, the attacker or the defender? Does this take into account the existence of antitank missiles, which were not a major part of WWII armored warfare and which greatly enhance the defender's ability to kill tanks?"Static" in this era means being tied to a frontline and with no ability to make strategic retreats. Make no mistake - a forward defence strategy would have severely curtailed NATO's operational capabilities and options. As soon as the Soviets had blasted though the first NATO line the latter would have only limited reserves to plug the rapidly appearing holes.

Both air power and infantry AT equipment play into the hands of NATO. The latter would be required to blunt the Soviet armoured spearheads and would almost certainly score heavy kills. Its a factor that would aid the defender but would not come close to closing the numerical gap or ending Soviet initiative.

Air power is also interesting. Given the technological advantages, nowhere near as pronounced as they are today however, and the ability to rapidly deploy assets in Europe, you'd have to give this one to NATO. Still, assuming a Soviet first strike, I don't believe that NATO would be able to establish unquestioned air supremacy akin to that of WWII. Its certainly possible but I'd imagine that NATO aircraft would enjoy local battlefield superiority while still having limited capabilities to strike behind Soviet lines.

Stephen_E

2007-06-05, 05:43 AM

Given the lessons learned from WWII, and everything we know about armoured warfare, its safe to say that a hard hitting armour formation, with the necessary support, will generally break through a static defensive position.

Unfortunately anyone who tool that lesson would be sadly mistaken. The Blitzkreig model of warfare was based on Infantry punching a hole through the defenses, which the armour them exploited through and used their mobility to isolate and catch out of posistion.

The lesson you talk about refers to a period from early to mid-war, when the tanks had advanced enough to be largely immune to what limited infantry AT weapons their were, and before the next gen of infantry AT (the 1st gen of real AT weapons) were produced. Once this period was past the real lesson of WW2 came out.

Against duggin infantry equiped with AT weapons, Armour dies. Tanks are really quite fragile creatures. Against duggin AT equipped infantry their choices basically come down to manuver arround, or wait for the Infantry to turn up. Aircraft also tear them up something chronic, and they're hungry beasts that stop if their fuel runs out.

All three of the German primary objectives (Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad) proved impossible to take despite the vast resources invested in each. This says more about the strength of the Soviet resistance than anything else. In Moscow the Germans were driven back by the Siberian divisions, Leningrad's defence was nothing short of heroic while Stalingrad was the graveyard of the 6th Army.

All three cities were ultimately saved because the Soviets possessed an incredible ability to rearm and rebuild well out of German reach. Compare and contrast with inability of the Wehrmacht to make up its infantry deficit and their ridiculous expectations and subsequent preparations.

Again I think you're missing the lesson. All 3 cities were saved because cause in rough terrain, such as a city, high tech loses it's advantage and it comes down to morale and numbers. When fighting in your home country against an invader the morale advantage is almost always with the defender. The sub-lesson was a reiteration of the armour vs duggin Infantry with AT. Armour dies!

Om, the thing that you miss in the destruction of the forward defense NATO posistions is that NATO had a lot better self-contained operating ability at low levels. The shattered chunks of the NATO forces were much more likely to be able to withdraw from the battlefield as cohesive units, even if those units were only platoons or squads. The Soviets didn't have that capacity.

The thing that I think the "Soviets will fall over" supporters miss is Soviet far outstrip NATO in manpower in Real terms. In WW2 the Soviets conservatively lost 20 million people. The two premier General spent several 100,000 men between them in the race against each other for the kudos to be 1st to Berlin. The Allies took a fraction of those losses and coniseder themselves as hurting badly. Sure, given the US can ship people over relatively freely, beyween West Europe and the US they they can vaguely compare in total bodies available. They can't lose the same number of bodies and still keep fighting. West Europe might come close percentage-wise in a willingness to take casulties in the circumstances (The British, French and Germans have historical precedants for fighting on their home soil) but they simply can't match the number of bodies, and there is simply no precedent to suggest that the US will be willing to take anything like the casulties required, in a far foreign war, for the census figures to match a corresponding actual manpower.

Re: Soviet Tank reliability. As I mentioned earlier about Tanks, they're fragile. Not just Soviet tanks, but all tanks. If you use them at high performance levels, i.e. extended high intensity combat and breakthrough, they crap out. I'm no US Military tech fanboy, but even so I concede the Abrams is one of the most reliable tank out there. They had serious problems in the push to Baghdad with engine death far exceeding expectations by everything I've heard. Yes, desert sand is a sod, but they were designed as all terrain, including desert. I seriously doubt Abrams could do the "Drive to Biscay" in the time you expect without entire formations dissintergrating through maintanance issues. I don't see Soviets tanks doing it without at least one major "freeze and regroup". And that's not even taking into issue the crews wearing out. Soviet tanks are not comfortable envioriments to be in. If you expect them to drive almost non-stop to the bay of Biscay I suspect even if the tanks made it, the crews would be so walking dead that they'd drive their tanks straight into the sea, and not relise until after they'd drowned. The common responce of Soviet tank crews in getting inside a US tank is along the lines of "wow, I could live in here". The common responce of US crews getting into Soviet tanks is more like "christ, how can you spend an hour in these things".

Stephen

Dervag

2007-06-05, 06:06 AM

The Wehrmacht had an abundance of tactical victories after tactical victory in '41 and '42. They destroyed army after army and captured city after city. In this respect its probably one of the most successful offensives in history. Looking back we can safely say that they performed at the limit of their capabilities to do so.I'm not sure I agree with your last sentence here, and it is critical to your conclusion; I think that's why I don't agree with your conclusion.

The Germans tried as hard as they could try, but it was not at all inconceivable for them to have made a few specific decisions in different ways. That would have resulted in more losses for the Soviets and fewer for the Germans. It might have resulted in damage that actually weakened the Soviet ability to continue the war (as would the fall of Moscow, for instance, or the capture and securing of the Baku oil fields).

The Soviets didn't have an infinite well of materiel that they could conjure up at will; they just had an extraordinarily deep finite well. Sufficient damage could reduce their power to draw from that well. As it stood, the Soviets suffered only nominal damage to their ability to make more weapons and train more troops (some disruption due to the need to pull back the factories, some districts from which to conscript troops that were overrun by the Germans). But I don't think you can just dismiss the idea that the Germans might have cut deeper than they did, or that if they had they might have inflicted real and non-superficial damage.

As many Russians would have (privately) agreed in late 1941, the Soviet Union was in real danger from the German invasion. It was not inevitable that they would beat back the attack, merely likely.

All three of the German primary objectives (Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad) proved impossible to take despite the vast resources invested in each. This says more about the strength of the Soviet resistance than anything else. In Moscow the Germans were driven back by the Siberian divisions, Leningrad's defence was nothing short of heroic while Stalingrad was the graveyard of the 6th Army.

All three cities were ultimately saved because the Soviets possessed an incredible ability to rearm and rebuild well out of German reach. Compare and contrast with inability of the Wehrmacht to make up its infantry deficit and their ridiculous expectations and subsequent preparations.Yes, but in all three cases the Germans made key mistakes that could have gone the other way. I'm not saying the Soviets 'got lucky', or that the German attack was very likely to succeed. I'm saying that the Germans could have gotten lucky and won, and that you can't blithely dismiss the threat that Barbarossa posed to the Soviets, any more than the Soviets themselves could.

As regards the logistical effort required to sustain a rapid advance, the Soviets had no shortage of motorised vehicles. Besides, Berlin is merely an overnight train journey from Moscow.With roads and rail lines being damaged in combat, that 'overnight train journey' becomes rather more difficult.

Again, my point is that the logistics would have imposed a drag on the Soviet advance. Lack of training and reliability issues would not have caused the Red Army to fall apart at the West German border. They would quite probably have won a lot of battles on the frontier, probably so many that the NATO forces on the frontier would be smashed. But by the time they had advanced a few hundred miles their march would not have been as triumphal as you imply.

Offensives tend to slow down and peter out. We can see this pattern in every modern war since the advent of motorized transport. This is a simple product of the principle of friction, and it gets even worse when the equipment is starting to break down, when the soldiers are concealing problems from their superiors, and when the men at the front line are undertrained.

Air power is also interesting. Given the technological advantages, nowhere near as pronounced as they are today however, and the ability to rapidly deploy assets in Europe, you'd have to give this one to NATO. Still, assuming a Soviet first strike, I don't believe that NATO would be able to establish unquestioned air supremacy akin to that of WWII. Its certainly possible but I'd imagine that NATO aircraft would enjoy local battlefield superiority while still having limited capabilities to strike behind Soviet lines.When the defenders have air superiority, combined with antitank missiles, armored offensives don't work as well. If NATO aircraft had superiority, not necessarily supremacy, over the front lines (where the Soviets would be advancing into territory full of prepared NATO antiair defenses, while bringing forward only their own mobile antiair assets), the Soviets would have had a harder time overwhelming the front line NATO units with their vanguard divisions, and a much harder time driving armored columns deep into NATO territory (where they'd be even more vulnerable to air attack).

Wehrkind

2007-06-05, 08:42 AM

Oh. OK.

What I'm wondering is why he did it and what results he got from it. I suspect that he was not trying to make the populace more secure against government abuse of power.
He wasn't worried about the populace being secure from him, he was worried about the populace securing him from foriegn powers, as well as securing themselves from local threats (bandits and the like.) There was no official police force, and locals needed to protect themselves. The value of a populace that could take care of themselves, thus negating the need to for man power to be redirected every time Scruffy McNaughty comes down from the hill to plunder, had decent military benefits, as well as providing a populace who could be mobilized for war with less training needed to make them acceptable soldiers. Not good perhaps, but able to use that spear without embarrassing themselves.

It wasn't until somewhat later, after the stabilization of foriegn relations where Britain was not in immediate danger of being invaded, and the Protestant/civil war issue, that limits were placed when monarchs started to realize keeping power over the people might be easier if they didn't have a means to defend themselves. In the Elizabethan Era, a strong militia was still considered important, however.

As to the results Henry II got from it, I couldn't tell you directly. It did indirectly create a common law notion that went from "men are obligated to keep arms to defend the country" to "men have a right to keep arms to defend their country." The change from duty to right and the definite article to possessive is important.

Stephen_E

2007-06-05, 09:45 AM

What I'm wondering is whether or not it was plausible for either von Paulus or the General Staff to say, at some point:

"If we keep getting sucked into this city it'll be the worst meat grinder in German military history; we're playing to the Russians' strengths here. All units pull back to a prepared defensive line around the city. We'll hammer it into gravel with artillery and blast anything that crosses the river with dive bombers, but getting into that rabbit warren with infantry and tanks will be a disaster."

Now, I'm not saying anyone tried to do that. What I'm wondering is if it could have been done without making things even worse in the short-to-medium term.

Their probably was a point where Paulus realised half is army was now fighting a street war in the city they were supposed to be bypassing. At that point he would've had to decide to reinforce and hope to punch through (and he did almost succed at this option. I was a close run thing for a while) abandon half his army and try and carry out the original plan with half his force, try and extricate his troops from a very mixed combat situation, which would almost certainly put him so far behind schedule that the original plan would have to be scrapped anyway. Note the last choice has no "victory" condition other than saving his army. Military are trained to choose the "withdraw" option unless things are really obviously beyond hope. If they are they don't tend to get promoted far in an aggressive force. You give your enemies (The real enemies, those commanders who want your job) far to much ammo to make you look weak.

Look at the mud thrown as anyone who suggests the US pull out of Iraq. Retreats aren't sexy. Even a doomed charge sells better than anything less than a perfect retreat.

Stephen

Subotei

2007-06-05, 04:05 PM

Wow - a lot of stuff since I last had a chance to look.

Starting with the Soviet/NATO debate, I doubt that Soviet equipment was as poor or as technologically redundant as its made out to be - at least until the late 80's when I think the west started pulling away in terms of tech know-how. Any determined attack was likely to be devastating to western europe due to the small battlefield available - no 'space for time' to trade in West Germany. I recall a report from the 80's which said NATO troops in europe lacked fuel and ammo for more than a weeks fighting. If true, its hard to see how any prolonged defence could be carried out.

The Barbarossa question is interesting - I'm of the opinion it was doomed to bring disaster on the Germans because A) Opening a second front whilst leaving your first enemies undefeated is a huge error, and B) the initial divided aims ruled out any concerted push on the one target which could've ended the war - Moscow.

If the Germans had scored enough tactical victories, they would have won.

I can't agree with this - a string of tactical victories does not make a strategy. The Germans lacked a coherent strategy, which is why they eventually lost, despite initial gains, fatally weakened by the losses from each 'victory'.

Offensives tend to slow down and peter out. We can see this pattern in every modern war since the advent of motorized transport. This is a simple product of the principle of friction, and it gets even worse when the equipment is starting to break down, when the soldiers are concealing problems from their superiors, and when the men at the front line are undertrained.

I read something somewhere about this - allegedly there seems to be a point at approximately 250 miles where vehicles and men need a break, and where supplies dry up. It'd be interesting to compare conflicts to see if its true.

Given the lessons learned from WWII, and everything we know about armoured warfare, its safe to say that a hard hitting armour formation, with the necessary support, will generally break through a static defensive position.

Got to disagree with this too - I think someone has already stated that the infantry do the breaking and tanks to the exploiting. I guess armour is still really cavalry, in that they are good for the mobile breakthrough, but cannot really force defended positions and cannot hold ground by themselves.

German armour attacked heavily fortified positions in their 1943 Citadelle offensive, and were comprehensively beaten. And this was supposedly the one offensive organised by the High Command without Hitler's 'interference'.

Stephen_E

2007-06-05, 08:05 PM

My play on what would've happened if the Soviets/Warsaw had managed a relatively "surprise" attack in Western Europe/German front (Scandanavia and Yugoslavia/Southern Europe are another set of predictions again) is that the initial push would've shattered the Nato formations, with many been destroyed completely, and overrun West Germany, and probably the low countries as well. By this point they would be forced to stop and regroup through wear and tear in mans and machine. The initial assualt would bleed the assault forces badly with many been destroyed as functioning units with the NATO units dying hard.

That constitutes the high probablity predictions.

At this point the NATO units that hadn't been outright eliminated would either have disengaged and fallen back for the French border, or become raiders on supply lines. The rapid advance combined with heavy combat losses would mean that the Soviet control over the newly capyured territories would be very tenous. The two cruicial point that would follow would the Naval war and the French defense.
1) The Naval war would decide how fast US reinforcements would arrive. Even if the rest of the war saw both sides holding back from nukes, this is the place where limited use of nukes would occur. The US Super Carrier TFs would be priority targets. In particular the Carriers. While modern subs have shown that even the less sophistaicated Soviet Subs are extraordinaryly hard to stop, Carriers take a fair degree of sinking. On the otherhand even a near miss with a nuke will disable, if not outright destroy a super carrier. It's also about as "clean" a use of nukes as you're likely to see. In the long run the Soviets can't completely interdict Atlantic shipping, they don't have to. They simply have to interdict the shippment of military supplies, including infantry. On short notice the US simply couldn't flood the seas, and losing 1,000s of infantry to a watery death in the middle of the atlantic really doesn't sell well. Without even counting the fact that the US couldn't throw two many thaousands in the 1st couple of weeks.

2) The French Defense. Probably the most crucial point. Can the French hold their border against the 2nd/follow up Soviet push. Despite the much abuse they often receive the French have a military tradition that anyone can be proud off. If the political/social will is there, they will rally and hold the border, with support from the remmenats of the NATO units. Note that these NATO units will be the survivors of the border devastation. They'll be both skilled, lucky and motivated. If they weren't they wouldn't be there.

My money is on the French having the will, in which case the 2nd rank Soviets forces will hit a solid line of "hold to the death" fighters, on a narrowed front with zero surprise effect. See WW!. The Soviets will make some ground, but at an appalling cost that even they can't take in the short term. As I mentioned, the lesson from WW2 is that armour is toast against a determined infantry defense with AT weapons. If the US didn't eventualy get support over the French would fall, but probably only after the Soviets had buried a large portion of the French population.

You then go back to the Naval problem. If the Soviets didn't manage to shutdown the Atlantic convoy route, at least in the short term, then US forces can pour into France before the Soviets have managed to secure their gains. They have at most a few months in which the Soviets won't have a strong defense, and will be vunerable to been pushed back out of the territories that they recently gained. If such an attack was even moderately successful it would give opportuinities to try and get sympathetic uprisings in some of the Warsaw countries.

Endgame:
If the early counter-oofensive and uprisings occurred you could see a final ceasefire with the border considerably East of where it stood at the start.
If the early counter offensive didn't occur or failed eventually the war would wind down with the border around the low countries.
If the French didn't hold, but instead politically collapsed ala WW2, the Europes gone in the 2nd offensive, and the Soviets have won.
Note in none of these do I see the Soviets "losing". As even the stronger proponents of the fake tiger Soviets agree, invading Russia is a different story, and the simple fact is that if Russia thought it was seriously threatened it would launch all it's nuclear arsenal. At that point everyone loses.

Stephen

Dervag

2007-06-06, 07:54 PM

Starting with the Soviet/NATO debate, I doubt that Soviet equipment was as poor or as technologically redundant as its made out to be - at least until the late 80's when I think the west started pulling away in terms of tech know-how. Any determined attack was likely to be devastating to western europe due to the small battlefield available - no 'space for time' to trade in West Germany. I recall a report from the 80's which said NATO troops in europe lacked fuel and ammo for more than a weeks fighting. If true, its hard to see how any prolonged defence could be carried out.OK, that's a separate consideration that I didn't know anything about. If NATO lacked the resources to maintain a long defense, then it wouldn't matter how many Soviet tanks broke down. There'd be no ammunition to shoot at them.

Of course, NATO stockpiled for a short war because they expected everything to be decided by nuclear strikes within a matter of days, and rightly so. My argument is based on what would happen in a non-nuclear war, where nuclear weapons were not a factor. In which case NATO would likely have piled up more munitions to supply their troops.

But that's sophistry. I am happy to concede that if NATO only had enough supplies to fight for a week then the Soviets could have overrun them if neither side used nuclear weapons.

I can't agree with this - a string of tactical victories does not make a strategy.That isn't what I'm getting at.

What I'm getting at is that if you win enough battles you will eventually win the war. Now, if your strategy is bad you're going to have to win a lot of battles. For instance, to win in Russia the Germans would have had to win lots of battles they historically won and some of battles they historically lost and some battles that they historically never fought because their earlier defeats meant that they weren't in a position to fight those battles.

If you keep winning battles, taking cities, and destroying armies, eventually the enemy will run out of cities and armies and you will have won. My contention is that it was not impossible for the Germans to win by taking cities and destroying armies, though the odds were definitely against them.

The odds were even more against them because of their divided objectives and failure to concentrate; but if they'd kept winning battles and knocking the Soviets back they would have eventually won. It is not inconceivable that the Germans could have kept their momentum.

My play on what would've happened...I basically agree, with one caveat:

In the initial remark that started this argument, I specified "no nukes."

With nuclear weapons thrown into the balance, it was inevitable that both sides would lose a Third World War. The only way to win global thermonuclear war is not to play, after all.

So NATO couldn't use tactical nukes to stop Soviet armored columns in Germany, and the Red Navy couldn't use nukes to destroy American aircraft carriers in the Atlantic, if we consider this scenario. Of course, as I alluded to above, if neither side had nukes then both sides would have had military plans and equipment that looked very different from the ones they had historically, so it's a moot speculation in some sense.

I think your reasoning is quite good, though.

Thrall_Of_Ao

2007-06-06, 10:06 PM

They're not. At least not in 'most cultures'.

The North American civilizations didn't (although that may be a symptom of availablity), but neither did the Asian cultures (Japan or China, at least), and it wasn't very widespread in Europe either (as 'dominant weapons').

Um, I beg to differ.

The Katana, which originated in Japan was the most wide spread weapon and dominant weapon if you consider the history of Japan as a whole.

It's even considered the best designed sword in the world by some scholars and weapons practitioners.

Matthew

2007-06-06, 10:15 PM

Not really. The Yari would have been far more widespread, even the Yumi might be considered to be more dominant than the Katana.

Hades

2007-06-06, 10:43 PM

It's even considered the best designed sword in the world by some scholars and weapons practitioners.

Just as the Longsword is considered the Queen of Weapons by others. Such judgements are completely subjective and are easily influenced by movements such as Orientalism and Occidentalism. It is, essentially, impossible for any one sword to be the best designed sword in the world. Best designed for what? Armoured combat? Un-armoured combat? Mounted or on foot? For the battlefield or for duels? For use in formation or in individual combat? Thrusting, slicing, or chopping? No one sword can be designed for all of the different applications of the sword, different swords are designed for different uses. The katana may be the best designed sword for its purpose and use, but this does not mean that it is the best of all swords in all time periods in all situations.

Fhaolan

2007-06-06, 11:19 PM

Um, I beg to differ.

The Katana, which originated in Japan was the most wide spread weapon and dominant weapon if you consider the history of Japan as a whole.

It's even considered the best designed sword in the world by some scholars and weapons practitioners.

I was very glad for the little button so I could see what you were replying to. (Note to admins: Cute feature, I'll have to remember that one for the next time I build out a message board system.] Note that I'm not a Japanese historian or anything. This is all pieced together from various sources, including some posts by actual oriental sword experts on this very forum.

The Katana, like any sword, was not the most wide spread or dominant weapon in the region it existed. It had the highest status, but given the time, care, and skill necessary to create such a weapon it is impossible for it to be the most wide spread or dominant when compared to weapons that were far cheaper like the yari and other spear-like weapons.

Nearly everyone always looks to the most expensive armour or weapon of the period they're interested in. Maximillian plate, the katana, gatling guns, thermonuclear warheads, force fields (okay, that hasn't happened yet, but if it does...) These were always relatively rare items, used by only the elite forces of the time. The most wide spread weapons and armor are almost always the more inexpensive, but functional, ones when compared to the elite. Padded armor, glaives, bolt-action rifles, HEAP missiles, etc.

And the Katana was an excellent weapon... at the time... for the conditions. It was not designed to deal with tempered steel plate armor, because steel was too rare in Japan to make a complete European-style suit without truely astronomical cost. Also, remember that Japanese swordsmithing peaked twice, once in 1200 or so, and again in 1800 or so. The katana as you know it didn't exist in 1200, it was developed in around 1500. So, the best true katanas (properly called uchigatana) were made at the same time as Europeans and Americans were building the first railroads, steamboats, and the like. A bit of a time-frame issue. You have to realize that Japan's fuedal period lasted until somewhere around 1860's, due to an extreme level of enforced isolationism. They spent a *long* time perfecting medieval/renaissance-style combat techniques, armor, and weapons when Europe had moved to the Industral age.

As for experts talking about katanas being the best designed swords... most japanese swordsmith experts agree that the best swords from Japan was the tachi from the 1200's, not the katana from 1800's. While there is a superficial resemblance between the two swords types, they are quite different in size, balance and quality, and real sword experts get a touch upset when people confuse the two.

Adlan

2007-06-07, 02:25 AM

I'd go furthur on the same lines as you mentiond Fhaolan. I'd say that there has never been a culture where the sword has been the primary weapon. The Spear, the Pike, The Axe or Other polearms have been cheaper and more effective. Swords, because of the skill and cost of making even a bad one, are status items.

Several Cultures have had sub cultures where the sword was the primay weapon, or at least one of the primary weapons, but I can't think of one where it has been praised as the best weapon, at least militarily. I think the best you get to sword only culture is that of the reassaince louts, and their duling. Samurai, Knights, Huns, Gurkas, Mougls, everyone had other weapons than a sword, that they used at least as much, if not more. (Samurai Bow and Spear, Knights Lance, Huns had their famous Bow, Gurkas used spears and later muskets and rifles. Mougls the same).

2007-06-07, 07:58 AM

The Germans tried as hard as they could try, but it was not at all inconceivable for them to have made a few specific decisions in different ways. That would have resulted in more losses for the Soviets and fewer for the Germans. It might have resulted in damage that actually weakened the Soviet ability to continue the war (as would the fall of Moscow, for instance, or the capture and securing of the Baku oil fields).Such as? Even with the benefit of hindsight its hard, if not impossible, to identify German errors which if corrected could have shattered the Soviet resistance. Any such juncture would have had to have not merely increased Soviet losses but destroyed their industrial base while minimising German losses.

This was only possible, and OKW knew that it was only possible, if the Soviet resistance (ie military, economic and political) was crushed within the first weeks of the campaign. In hindsight we can safely say that this never came close to happening.

The Soviets didn't have an infinite well of materiel that they could conjure up at will; they just had an extraordinarily deep finite well. Sufficient damage could reduce their power to draw from that well.Indeed but my contention is that the Germans never came close to reaching this well. If you look at the maps you'll see that the Wehrmacht, despite having limited resources, successfully penetrated deep into Russia,

But I don't think you can just dismiss the idea that the Germans might have cut deeper than they did, or that if they had they might have inflicted real and non-superficial damage.Let's remember that as it was Barbarossa required the Wehrmacht, still a largely infantry army, to seize and occupy a vast territory. Historically their advance was approaching the actual limits of what was physically possible. While Moscow could have fallen in that first year its simply impossible for the Germans to have reached the Urals without a general Soviet collapse. By winter '41 the German initiative had begun to fade, as Soviet industry and manpower came into play, and it would eventually halt.

Again I come back to the fact that the key for the Germans was those first few months. Once the Soviet state failed to buckle under the pressure applied then the invasion was doomed. It was clearly a long slog, in which there was a continual danger to the existence of the USSR, but with every month the Soviet advantages in materials and manpower increased. Germany simply couldn't match this.

To boil it down to one sentence: It was impossible, or almost so, for the Germans to win the number of tactical victories required to produce a strategic victory.

Again, my point is that the logistics would have imposed a drag on the Soviet advance. Lack of training and reliability issues would not have caused the Red Army to fall apart at the West German border. They would quite probably have won a lot of battles on the frontier, probably so many that the NATO forces on the frontier would be smashed. But by the time they had advanced a few hundred miles their march would not have been as triumphal as you imply.Logistics is always a constraint. However there are two factors to bear in mind:

1) There would be no need for the Soviets to conduct high-octane combat operations after the initial Battle of Germany. With the NATO frontline formations smashed they could stroll to the Bay of Biscay and still get there before the Americans or French reserve divisions were in place. That was the whole point of the breakthrough and the complete folly of forward defence.

2) Soviet doctrine maintained a number of divisions/armies behind the lines in preparation for the breakthrough. These would be fresh assets committed to continuing the advance after the major flashpoints had been resolved. So while bringing these divisions up to the front would have constituted logistical difficulties in its own, it would not be a matter of having a tank crew fighting for several hours before making a "sprint" across Europe.

When the defenders have air superiority, combined with antitank missiles, armored offensives don't work as well.Air power was clearly NATO's "ace in the hole". But as I said, while that, together with NATO AT, would narrow the gap, I don't consider these to be enough to surmount the Warsaw Pact's clear advantages.

On NATO stockpiles, I recall reading somewhere that there were enough for 30 days of combat operations. Given that ammo expenditure forecasts rarely have any basis in reality that would probably amount to a week or two of operations. After that they would be entirely dependent on US supplies making it across the Atlantic (which is another front of importance)

Norsesmithy

2007-06-07, 08:57 AM

On NATO stockpiles, I recall reading somewhere that there were enough for 30 days of combat operations. Given that ammo expenditure forecasts rarely have any basis in reality that would probably amount to a week or two of operations. After that they would be entirely dependent on US supplies making it across the Atlantic (which is another front of importance)

Fortunately the procurement folks in the American Military (and most NATO pattern Militaries) have never been stingy with shells.

Every gun in theater had thirty basic loads (how much ammunition the armoury officers calculate could be used in a day), and no Nato pattern Army (to my knowledge) has ever been able to have its tanks and artillery pieces use a whole basic load in one day. Each basic load lasted an average of 3 days of target rich combat in Gulf War 1 and 2.

Dervag

2007-06-07, 06:00 PM

Let's remember that as it was Barbarossa required the Wehrmacht, still a largely infantry army, to seize and occupy a vast territory. Historically their advance was approaching the actual limits of what was physically possible. While Moscow could have fallen in that first year its simply impossible for the Germans to have reached the Urals without a general Soviet collapse. By winter '41 the German initiative had begun to fade, as Soviet industry and manpower came into play, and it would eventually halt.How much disruption of Soviet industry and manpower would the fall of Moscow cause? What about the capture of the Baku oil fields (which was definitely possible if the German army responsible for covering the flank of the advance into the Caucasus hadn't been chewed up at Stalingrad)?

It might not have been enough, but I would argue that it might have, too. The Soviets had to strain every muscle to make enough weapons and recruit enough soldiers to defeat the Germans; with a few more of those muscles out of action or weakened, they might not have been able to make a push strong enough to shift them.

To boil it down to one sentence: It was impossible, or almost so, for the Germans to win the number of tactical victories required to produce a strategic victory.I contend that it was unlikely, but not impossible; however I can't satisfy you with a proof of this and I recognize that fact.

1) There would be no need for the Soviets to conduct high-octane combat operations after the initial Battle of Germany. With the NATO frontline formations smashed they could stroll to the Bay of Biscay and still get there before the Americans or French reserve divisions were in place. That was the whole point of the breakthrough and the complete folly of forward defence.So where were the French non-reserve divisions, anyway?

2) Soviet doctrine maintained a number of divisions/armies behind the lines in preparation for the breakthrough. These would be fresh assets committed to continuing the advance after the major flashpoints had been resolved. So while bringing these divisions up to the front would have constituted logistical difficulties in its own, it would not be a matter of having a tank crew fighting for several hours before making a "sprint" across Europe.So these follow-up divisions would encounter no resistance? At no point would the French patch together some semblance of a line? At no point would they run into rallied troops defending behind a river line where the bridges had been blown?

I don't think it's safe to generalize that all resistance to the Soviet advance in Europe would totally disintegrate after the battle of the frontier in Germany. The French Army would still exist. Some NATO units would be able to escape the battles of annihilation on the frontier. Most NATO aircraft would likely escape. So the Soviets would have had to fight a second round of battles, rather than just being able to "stroll to the Bay of Biscay." That would have slowed them down, limiting the effectiveness of their offensive, and making their logistic problems more serious.

Fortunately the procurement folks in the American Military (and most NATO pattern Militaries) have never been stingy with shells.

Every gun in theater had thirty basic loads (how much ammunition the armoury officers calculate could be used in a day), and no Nato pattern Army (to my knowledge) has ever been able to have its tanks and artillery pieces use a whole basic load in one day. Each basic load lasted an average of 3 days of target rich combat in Gulf War 1 and 2.This suggests that NATO would not just run out of ammunition after the first week.

Stephen_E

2007-06-07, 07:06 PM

Such as? Even with the benefit of hindsight its hard, if not impossible, to identify German errors which if corrected could have shattered the Soviet resistance. Any such juncture would have had to have not merely increased Soviet losses but destroyed their industrial base while minimising German losses.

This was only possible, and OKW knew that it was only possible, if the Soviet resistance (ie military, economic and political) was crushed within the first weeks of the campaign. In hindsight we can safely say that this never came close to happening.

Indeed but my contention is that the Germans never came close to reaching this well. If you look at the maps you'll see that the Wehrmacht, despite having limited resources, successfully penetrated deep into Russia,

<snipped>

To boil it down to one sentence: It was impossible, or almost so, for the Germans to win the number of tactical victories required to produce a strategic victory.
As I've mentioned before, nothing I've ever seen indicated that the Germans expected to conquer all of the Soviet Union. The thinking was that they'd capture all of Western Soviet Union upto around the Volgae River, and then force the Russians to make peace.

What crucial point did they fail that could've made a difference? Taking Moscow. Apart from been the hub of the Soviet Rail network, it was the political centre.

The Baku oil fields, while significant, weren't really important because Russia had other oil resources (the Germans were more interested in getting oil for themselves) and because it was largely a military objective. Lenigrad hurt because the holding of it was a important morale victory for the Soviets.

I differentiate between military objectives and morale/political objectives because I completely agree with OM that the Germans could never defeat the Soviets through tactical victories. The concept that if you keep winning tactical victories you must ineveitably win the war is exteremly flawed. Indeed at least technically it is possible to win every battle and lose the war. there have been cases where almost all the physical battles were won, but the war was lost. This is because wars can be won or lost on issues having little to do with who held the battlefield.

I disagree that there was no chance for a political victory. The Soviet Govt was never as strongly in power as OM seems to think. If Moscow had fallen, and there had been no "See Leningrad holds against the oppressors" then even if Stalin had survived Moscows fall, his Govt might not of (which would see Stalin die, but not at German hands). The replacement, while still quite capable of beating the Germans militarily, would've been far more likely to have sued for peace, giving up the land the Germans were after.

Logistics is always a constraint. However there are two factors to bear in mind:

1) There would be no need for the Soviets to conduct high-octane combat operations after the initial Battle of Germany. With the NATO frontline formations smashed they could stroll to the Bay of Biscay and still get there before the Americans or French reserve divisions were in place. That was the whole point of the breakthrough and the complete folly of forward defence.

2) Soviet doctrine maintained a number of divisions/armies behind the lines in preparation for the breakthrough. These would be fresh assets committed to continuing the advance after the major flashpoints had been resolved. So while bringing these divisions up to the front would have constituted logistical difficulties in its own, it would not be a matter of having a tank crew fighting for several hours before making a "sprint" across Europe.

Air power was clearly NATO's "ace in the hole". But as I said, while that, together with NATO AT, would narrow the gap, I don't consider these to be enough to surmount the Warsaw Pact's clear advantages.

On NATO stockpiles, I recall reading somewhere that there were enough for 30 days of combat operations. Given that ammo expenditure forecasts rarely have any basis in reality that would probably amount to a week or two of operations. After that they would be entirely dependent on US supplies making it across the Atlantic (which is another front of importance)

Aside from thinking that point 1) is simply rubbish. The French Reserves (and much of their frontline units) are in France. Can they, with a intact transport system mobilise on the border, faster than a Soviet advance, that has been chewed up, and with no transport system, and getting hit by air attacks, cross west germany and the lowlands. Don't be silly, of course they can.

Point 2) This requires a strength advantage that the Soviets simply didn't have. IIRC the after cold war count indicated that the Soviets never had the 3:1 advantage that is commonly consider nessacary for assualt breakthroughs. Now given the weaknesses of the NATO defense positions, a 3:1 advantage may not've been nessacary, but they sure as hell weren't going to have large stocks of undamaged divisions pouring across the frontline after the initial NATO defenses have been shattered. Those Reserve divisions will have been used to get the breakthrough.

I find it somewhat ironic that on the one hand you argue against the WW2 German "Supermen" (correctly IMHO) and then turn round and argue in favour of the cold war Soviet "Supermen" (incorrectly IMHO).

Stephen

2007-06-08, 05:13 AM

How much disruption of Soviet industry and manpower would the fall of Moscow cause? What about the capture of the Baku oil fields (which was definitely possible if the German army responsible for covering the flank of the advance into the Caucasus hadn't been chewed up at Stalingrad)?Baku was never an objective of Barbarossa. Moscow has often been identified, correctly, as key to the German victory. Would it have been enough? Personally I doubt this (the Soviet state apparatus never appeared to be even close to collapsing) but there's no way to say for certain.

Let's remember however that the initial delay in taking Moscow was due to Hitler's desire to take Kiev which was, ironically, a much more important industrial and economic hub than Moscow.

So where were the French non-reserve divisions, anyway?Metz, Lille, Baden, St Germain, plus the Legion at Aubagne. It would take 8-10 days to deploy these forward forces to Germany (CENTAG and NORTHAG) but 14-21 for a full positioning with other NATO formations.

So these follow-up divisions would encounter no resistance? At no point would the French patch together some semblance of a line? At no point would they run into rallied troops defending behind a river line where the bridges had been blown?The French would try, of that there is no doubt, but unless there has been a massive reduction in Soviet offensive strength (in the region of 50-60%) they aren't going to succeed. The same goes for whatever Belgian or Dutch divisions are coming into play.

So the Soviets would have had to fight a second round of battles, rather than just being able to "stroll to the Bay of Biscay." That would have slowed them down, limiting the effectiveness of their offensive, and making their logistic problems more serious.The point that I'm trying to make is that this "second round" would be fought entirely on Soviet terms. A rapid mobile war against a scattered enemy... what's not to like for them? Such a campaign would fully justify the losses incurred during the breakthrough phase.

As I've mentioned before, nothing I've ever seen indicated that the Germans expected to conquer all of the Soviet Union. The thinking was that they'd capture all of Western Soviet Union upto around the Volgae River, and then force the Russians to make peace.You're right in that the target was the Arkhangelsk–Volga line (ie virtually all of European Russia) but this would be a product of the complete collapse of the Soviet Union. Five weeks was the magic number, by which time fighting would have effectively ceased and the Soviet military/government in tatters.

Its also useful to note that Hitler was not interested in peace with Stalin. He, and his generals, expected complete and total victory.

I disagree that there was no chance for a political victory. The Soviet Govt was never as strongly in power as OM seems to thinkWhat makes you think that? I've seen absolutely no evidence that the Soviet state apparatus was even cracking. Throughout the massive losses and failures of '41, and the long slog of the rest of the war, the Russians rallied behind their government to a remarkable degree.

I could go into the reasons I think this occurred but it would require a detour into Russian politics of the previous two decades. Let's just say that by 1939 virtually all Stalin's internal foes (from the Left Opposition to the peasantry) had been subdued and the turmoil of the Revolution had finally subsided.

Aside from thinking that point 1) is simply rubbish. The French Reserves (and much of their frontline units) are in France. Can they, with a intact transport system mobilise on the border, faster than a Soviet advance, that has been chewed up, and with no transport system, and getting hit by air attacks, cross west germany and the lowlands. Don't be silly, of course they can.Can they make it in time to save NATO formations or permit a general strategic retreat? Possibly. Would the French arrival accomplish either of these objectives? Unlikely. The Soviet reserves would have dwarfed the French contribution.

The alternative is that the French are still moving after NATO formations in Germany have been effectively broken. In which case they are effectively going to have to contend with the Soviet Army on their own and on a highly fluid front. Odds anyone?

they sure as hell weren't going to have large stocks of undamaged divisions pouring across the frontline after the initial NATO defenses have been shattered. Those Reserve divisions will have been used to get the breakthrough.The Soviets, and many worried US officers, thought otherwise. The Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) was the cornerstone of Soviet doctrine and their key to victory. After the initial divisions had effectively blasted a hole in the NATO lines these strategic reserves would rush through to encircle enemy formations and seize strategic targets. If you want a reason why the Warsaw Pact would have won then this is it - their superior grasp of mobile warfare.

A good article that describes the concept, and possible NATO responses, can be found here (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/nov-dec/dalecky.html)

I find it somewhat ironic that on the one hand you argue against the WW2 German "Supermen" (correctly IMHO) and then turn round and argue in favour of the cold war Soviet "Supermen" (incorrectly IMHO).The comparison is sound in some regards - the terrible deployment of the defending assets would almost guarantee their destruction in the first weeks of conflict - but flawed in others. With regards the latter you have to contend with the issue that the European industrial base was well within Soviet reach and that Europe had neither the space or time or resources to mobilise and stage a counterattack.

The thing that gets me about this conversation is that while people are right in pointing out possible Soviet flaws we've yet to have a compelling reason as to how or why NATO might win or survive any such conflict.

Edit: To illustrate the almost compete superiority of Soviet doctrine I'll quote from the article I linked to above:

The 1982 version of the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 characterized this scheme of defense as static, terrain-oriented, and, necessarily, relying "primarily on firepower from fixed positions." Nearly 75 percent of NATO combat ground forces and significant tactical air assets are committed to this task. But if the Soviets can concentrate quickly and push highly mobile forces through weaknesses in the front created by massive firepower supported by airborne and airmobile operations (the OMG concept!) then the forward defense cannot function. Using Soviet calculus, the outcome of the war is not in doubt. A linear disposition of available forces, even such a high percentage as currently planned by NATO, cannot to any acceptable probability prevent Warsaw Pact forces from achieving the mass necessary for the insertion of OMGs.

Stephen_E

2007-06-08, 07:13 AM

Om,

There are a few major problems with the article you refer to.

1) He talks about the numerous bean counter studies that indicate the force superiority that the Soviets had. With post Soviet collapse making Soviet records accessible we now know that these figures were, to be polite, artifically "boosted" my conting different things on opposite sides. His assumptions for the effectiveness of the Soviet forces relied on them actually having the numbers of quality units that those bean counters were talking about.

2) He was writing this article at exactly the same time the Soviets were internally aknowleging that they were in deep trouble. This would suggest that their were problems with his analyse.

3) I'm less than impressed with his analyse of the WW2 German defeat of France and comparison to a NATO/Warsaw conflict. The German breakthrough of the French lines was nowhere near that simple, and was much more of a chancy thing than it is often portrayed, helped significantly by poor leadership on the French side, total air domiance, french reluctance to take casulties due to fresh memories of WW1, and significant internal political problems. Blithy saying "and they'll duplicate the WW@ German efforts" doesn't cut it for me.

That isn't to say that he didn't have valid points to make about the forward defense strategy been deeply flawed, mean his "the sky is falling" should be taken with a healthy pinch of salt.

----------

As for where French units would move to, to stop the Warsaw forces. They wouldn't be going to Germany. They'd be heading for the Western border of Germany, i.e. France and the Lowlands. The Rhine would be the line of choice, but further back would be acceptable if the Soviets had managed a real miracle. The French would abandon the Nato forces in Germany to make their own way back.

And the Soviets do have to smash the forward defenses. They can't just leave them to wither on the vine, because with modern air capacities you simply can't rely on that withering happening, and if you leave them there they can do incaluable damage to your supplys trying to go past them.

Stephen

Wehrkind

2007-06-08, 08:50 AM

With regards to swords and other weapons, I kind of want to clarify what I was talking about well back in the day.
When I was saying "dominant weapon" I didn't mean "most common" or "first used." In retrospect I can see why there was confusion. I meant "dominant" to mean "what people who had a wad of cash to spend on a weapon made certain they had."
The reason I was using that as a basis is that the "best" weapon is very rarely what the rank and file, ie. the bulk, of any army has, particularly in pre-industrial societies where mass production is a limiting factor. As such, weapons with a good price/effectiveness ratio are common, but not necessarily "best".
I do agree that status is sometimes more important than effectiveness, but only to a degree. There is a point where pride become suicidal, and sooner or later (usually sooner) people decide that effectiveness is more important, and make a version of a good but frowned upon weapon for the "upper class".

That said, just about every culture had swords, and generally they were considered must have items for those who could get them despite their price. Not the best weapon in all circumstances, but probably considered to be so widely useful that it was worth training in. The axe, mace, spear etc. were of course used, and in various places more or less commonly so, but the sword seems to be thought of as "the" symbol of war, at least from the English language stand point.

Now, how much of that is purely cultural cache unreflected in reality is a good point and topic of debate. But bladed weapons, longer rather than shorter, seem to be the choice weapon, if someone had the funds to make the choice, across history.

Matthew

2007-06-08, 11:53 AM

Wehrkind

2007-06-08, 12:26 PM

Heh, heh. Quite cultural, I would have thought. The Spear and the Horse also enjoy a similar status as symbols of war. Not to mention the AK-47...

To be clear, though, I'm not saying Swords weren't desirable, but the question is why were they desirable? For your average Spear Fighting Foot Soldier they aren't that necessary, but for a Roman Legionary (Now there is a Military Culture that could be said to have been dominated by Swords at some point) or a Mounted Knight, they really are the thing to have in addition to your primary weapon. Saying that, many Mounted Knights used Axes, Flails, Maces or Hammers as alternatives.

However, Swords are super versatile. They are impact/chopping weapons, they are cutting weapons and they are thrusting weapons. In my opinion, the average Sword (i.e. not the overly specialised/large ones) is the all rounder of Melee Combat.

Ita vero! :) Come to think of it, that all around goodness is probably why it was so dominant. The other weapons are great for their purpose, but only that purpose. Spears are a little awkward in close, lances are great until after the point of impact on a charge, axes and maces/hammers can be cumbersome (eg. not as easy to control as a sword for long periods, especialy from horse back), and flails are awkward to use comparatively. All have their uses in which they excell, but the sword is quite good in all, so you pick a main weapon to optimize your function, then take a sword for when you need to generalize.

Yea, I just restated your point, but it was a good one :)

13_CBS

2007-06-10, 07:35 PM

Ita vero! :) Come to think of it, that all around goodness is probably why it was so dominant. The other weapons are great for their purpose, but only that purpose. Spears are a little awkward in close, lances are great until after the point of impact on a charge, axes and maces/hammers can be cumbersome (eg. not as easy to control as a sword for long periods, especialy from horse back), and flails are awkward to use comparatively. All have their uses in which they excell, but the sword is quite good in all, so you pick a main weapon to optimize your function, then take a sword for when you need to generalize.

Yea, I just restated your point, but it was a good one :)

Of course, in the field of battle combined arms tends to overcome this advantage of well roundedness...

Mike_G

2007-06-10, 09:38 PM

Of course, in the field of battle combined arms tends to overcome this advantage of well roundedness...

But "well rounded" is great in a sidearm.

Sure, carry a bow or a pike or a lance or a halberd for your specialty, your primary job, but have a sword ready for when the plan goes pear shaped and your main weapon is poorly suited to the new situation, be it close quarter fighting in a broken formation, or melee when you brought a bow, or what have you.

A sword is never a bad choice. It's not always the best choice, but battle can be unpredictable. Expect to wind up in a situation where your pike is crap, and plan accordingly.

2007-06-11, 06:35 AM

That isn't to say that he didn't have valid points to make about the forward defense strategy been deeply flawed, mean his "the sky is falling" should be taken with a healthy pinch of salt.Naturally. The real value of his analysis was the criticism of the existing, at the time, NATO strategy and his explanation of Soviet doctrine.

As for where French units would move to, to stop the Warsaw forces. They wouldn't be going to Germany. They'd be heading for the Western border of Germany, i.e. France and the Lowlands.I'm not so sure. Aside from the fact that France was committed to the defence of Germany, ie their formations were detailed to both CENTAG and NORTHAG, the same political considerations that forced NATO to employ their forward defence would also come into play. The political consequences of the French refusing to advance past the Rhine would be enormous.

Even if we discount the political dimension, and assuming that the French have time to deploy in a coherent line, you still have the French Army being hugely outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact. They might be able to prevent a complete exploitation of the rupture of NATO lines in Germany but I don't see them holding for long.

Really once the NATO divisions in Germany have been removed, which was an express aim of Soviet strategy, then there's little to no hope remaining for the rest of Europe.

Dervag

2007-06-11, 09:55 AM

Naturally. The real value of his analysis was the criticism of the existing, at the time, NATO strategy and his explanation of Soviet doctrine.But his criticism was predicated on assumptions about Soviet strength and the efficiency with which the Soviets could carry out their doctrine that were not well-founded.

Really once the NATO divisions in Germany have been removed, which was an express aim of Soviet strategy, then there's little to no hope remaining for the rest of Europe.Yes, but you can't just handwave them away.

They would definitely be able to savage the first wave of attacking Soviet troops, and the Red Army could not safely bypass them until they were completely ruined as a fighting force. You can't leave a (potentially) mobile opponent in your rear when engaged in deep penetration of enemy territory. You must pin them down and destroy them, or your spearheads aren't safe.

Then the Soviet spearheads would have to advance over several hundred miles of territory, encountering sporadic patches of determined resistance and subject to constant harassment by NATO aircraft. NATO would not have absolute air supremacy, of course; but they would very likely have superiority, and that superiority would become more pronounced as Soviet troops moved farther out from under the protective bubble of their own static AA defenses.

To do this would require a very heavy stream of resupply and replacements, due in part to the low reliability of Soviet hardware. That's not unmanageable, but it can really slow down your offensive when all the rail lines and bridges have been blown up from the air while you're trying to advance, and while there are still remnant mechanized forces wandering around in your rear area, and while there are fighter-bombers zipping around over your front line troops.

The Soviets could not simply brush aside the NATO divisions with their first rush; they would have to expend a very substantial chunk of their total force to pin down and destroy those divisions in battle, just as the German blitzkrieg strategy forced most of the Wehrmacht to march around enemy armies and encircle them until they were forced to surrender. And they would still have to deal with very real, nontrivial obstacles that would act as a force divisor in any future confrontations with the French, the Dutch, the Belgians, reinforcements from the US, or any NATO troops that managed to escape the battle of annihilation in the Fulda Gap.

Stephen_E

2007-06-11, 10:02 AM

I'm not so sure. Aside from the fact that France was committed to the defence of Germany, ie their formations were detailed to both CENTAG and NORTHAG, the same political considerations that forced NATO to employ their forward defence would also come into play. The political consequences of the French refusing to advance past the Rhine would be enormous.

Ummm, No!. If the forward NATO defense has been hammered and broken the only political reprecussions for the French is if they DON'T dig in at the Rhine. The Europeans gave up writing "I'll throw myself on my sword" treaties back after WW1.

Even if we discount the political dimension, and assuming that the French have time to deploy in a coherent line, you still have the French Army being hugely outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact. They might be able to prevent a complete exploitation of the rupture of NATO lines in Germany but I don't see them holding for long.

Really once the NATO divisions in Germany have been removed, which was an express aim of Soviet strategy, then there's little to no hope remaining for the rest of Europe.

See this is where the huge gap between you and me. To you it's "remove/destroy the NATO divisions up front and it's all over". To me it's "remove/destroy the NATO divisions up, and the Warsaw 2nd rankers + the rememnats of their frontline units have to fight through all the NATO 2nd rankers who're on the defense on a narrower front, with Riverlines, and fighting for their homes." 2nd rankers aren't so hot on offense, but they defend OK. The Warsaw/Soviets won't have to worry about counter-attacks until the US forces arrive, but they aren't looking at any stroll in the park for their advance.

I will reiterate the point I've repeatedly made. The Soviets/Warsaw did not have a great superiority in frontline equipment. The Scenarios you keep putting forward rely on the Soviets having this vast advantage in frontline equipment. The US planners claimed and wrote scenarios based on them having a vast advantage in frontline equipment that didn't exist TTBOMK.

Om, can you point to some post-Cold War data that indicates the huge superiority in Soviet/Warsaw frontline equipment that you seem to require. I've never come across any myself.

Stephen

2007-06-11, 10:57 AM

Ummm, No!. If the forward NATO defense has been hammered and broken the only political reprecussions for the French is if they DON'T dig in at the Rhine. The Europeans gave up writing "I'll throw myself on my sword" treaties back after WW1.What do you think the response of the German government will be if the French refuse to move past the Rhine? Bear in mind that the entire reason for forward defence is the insistence of West Germany that their cities be defended.

Om, can you point to some post-Cold War data that indicates the huge superiority in Soviet/Warsaw frontline equipment that you seem to require. I've never come across any myself.I posted these links to both the Warsaw Pact (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/warsawpact.html) and NATO (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/oob1989.html) OOBs earlier in the thread. There can be no doubt that in the immediate theatre the Soviets possessed a clear and unmistakable advantage in numbers. This is something that Cold War estimates were accurate on.

Criticism of NATO "bean counts" following the collapse of the Cold War have charged analysts with overstating the capabilities of these formations, not their numbers. These armies were stationed in Eastern Europe, there is no doubt of that.

And this is a huge discrepancy. To repeat an earlier post, the USSR maintained six Category A armies in the theatre as part of WGF alone! In the event of war the Warsaw Pact forces would greatly outnumber their NATO counterparts. So yes, the Soviets would enjoy a "vast advantage in frontline equipment".

Now counter scenarios seem to assume that somehow the vast bulk of the conventional Soviet arsenal has been eaten up in the destruction of the NATO frontline formations and that the French would encounter Category B units. Given that Soviet plans explicitly calling for both a surprise offensive, and the exploitation of breakthroughs by designated reserve (strategic, not quality) formations, I do not see this happening.

As I said above, again, unless the Soviets suffer losses of 50-60% during the initial battles in Germany then the French will be outnumbered by a large margin. They will also be facing an enemy with all the momentum of a forward advance while they themselves are only arriving in their defensive positions. In what possible scenario do the French succeed in halting the Soviet advance for the week or so required for the US formations to arrive?

Now I obviously exaggerated in describing the Soviet advance as a "stroll" but given the destruction of the NATO frontline formations, and the various factors detailed over the last few pages, I think that it is safe to say that the Soviet advance across Europe would be relatively swift and very likely to succeed.

Dervag

2007-06-11, 09:35 PM

What do you think the response of the German government will be if the French refuse to move past the Rhine? Bear in mind that the entire reason for forward defence is the insistence of West Germany that their cities be defended.What do you think the French government cares about more, the security of France or the favor of West Germany?

Now counter scenarios seem to assume that somehow the vast bulk of the conventional Soviet arsenal has been eaten up in the destruction of the NATO frontline formations and that the French would encounter Category B units.Yes, with reason. Because those 'category A' armies are still inferior to NATO frontline formations, are still attacking prepared defenses, and are still dealing with NATO air superiority. The ones that actually attack the NATO line are going to get savaged. Even the ones that are 'designated reserve' formations will be hit from the air, hit by remnant NATO units (no breakthrough is perfect), and having to attack over routes damaged by sabotage and bombardment.

As I said above, again, unless the Soviets suffer losses of 50-60% during the initial battles in Germany then the French will be outnumbered by a large margin. They will also be facing an enemy with all the momentum of a forward advance while they themselves are only arriving in their defensive positions.Momentum can very easily prove to be a myth. It is harder to supply troops that are advancing, especially when the rail and road network between them and the rear has been chewed up and the supply lines are subject to interdiction from the air. All too often, a rapidly advancing army has been brought up short by determined enemies fighting from fixed positions. The defender has huge logistical advantages, especially when dealing with an enemy that suffers from training and mechanical reliability problems.

Stephen_E

2007-06-12, 05:54 AM

What do you think the response of the German government will be if the French refuse to move past the Rhine? Bear in mind that the entire reason for forward defence is the insistence of West Germany that their cities be defended.

Read your own sources. France only had a moderate force stationed in Germany. Since you posit a West Germany rapidly going under, yes I have problems with the Chancllor trying to browbeat the French President into anything. "If you don't actively drive the Soviets out of Germany before stabilising a defense line we'll stop trading with you soon as the Soviets stop occupying us". Right.......

I posted these links to both the Warsaw Pact (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/warsawpact.html) and NATO (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/nato/oob1989.html) OOBs earlier in the thread. There can be no doubt that in the immediate theatre the Soviets possessed a clear and unmistakable advantage in numbers. This is something that Cold War estimates were accurate on.

Criticism of NATO "bean counts" following the collapse of the Cold War have charged analysts with overstating the capabilities of these formations, not their numbers. These armies were stationed in Eastern Europe, there is no doubt of that.

Sorry, I missed your early reference.
The post cold-war disputed the number of frontline units. I just spent some time counting the T80's in WGF, the force assigned the job of crushing West Germany. They had approx 4,300, and they were by far the best equipped in T80's. The West Germans had just over 2,000 Leopard IIs and the British had 380 odd Challengers in Germany. Then there's the US M1A1's. I had trouble working out the exact numbers because your site is somewhat arcane in layout of actual numbers compared to what he does for everyone else. I haven't even git around to calculating the number of French frontline MBTs in Germany, let alone what they had back home.

So I repeat - Where is this huge numerical advantage? If it's in old model tanks (which is what your own sources, and everything else I've heard indicates) I don't really care, because it doesn't count. At best in defense older tanks can hold their own by using dug in cover, but attacking they're asking to get butchered.

As I said above, again, unless the Soviets suffer losses of 50-60% during the initial battles in Germany then the French will be outnumbered by a large margin. They will also be facing an enemy with all the momentum of a forward advance while they themselves are only arriving in their defensive positions. In what possible scenario do the French succeed in halting the Soviet advance for the week or so required for the US formations to arrive?

These are armies we're talking about, not chaging Pike units. Their is no "momentum of a forward advance". The reverse is more true. Armies are inclined to not move. To get them moving you must feed them lots of supplys and keep pushing. The closet thing to your concept is the effect of an army been on the backfoot, where they've been beaten back, and by rapid following up don't have time to regroup themselves and stop retreating, but since you posit the general destruction of the forward units, that's not a problem.

What scenarios do I see the French holding the Soviets. Any scenario which doesn't see the Soviets wiping out the NATO formations with minimal losses despite at best having a 50% superiority in frontline MBTs. In fact looking at the numbers there is some question as to whether the blow through will happen even with heavy casulties on the Soviet side.

Now I obviously exaggerated in describing the Soviet advance as a "stroll" but given the destruction of the NATO frontline formations, and the various factors detailed over the last few pages, I think that it is safe to say that the Soviet advance across Europe would be relatively swift and very likely to succeed.

I think it's safe to say that a number of people just don't see this swift high probability conquest of Europe that you do.

Stephen

Storm Bringer

2007-06-15, 01:19 PM

Dervag

2007-06-15, 11:22 PM

just to keep the thread moving......

moving to a related theme to the heated up cold war, if you'd been in the of the german commander of the Adlantic Wallshoes (I think it was rommel, but not sure), during the preiod leading up to the D-day landings and on them, what would you have done differently, assuming the same units, intel, and so on were available?It's hard to say; most of the fundamental problems the Germans had were on the strategic level, not the operational level. Hitler tied down too many of the mobile units to deal with an expected second set of landings that never occured. Free-ranging Allied bombers were cutting the French transportation network to ribbons. There wasn't a lot that a hypothetical other guy could do that would make the defense work better than Rommel's plans would.

In fact, speaking for myself, I would probably have done a much less efficient job of planning the defense than Rommel, therefore making it easier for the Allies to secure a beachhead and advance from it, probably saving hundreds or thousands of Allied lives and shortening the war by weeks.

Stephen_E

2007-06-16, 01:46 AM

Kioran

2007-06-16, 01:55 AM

just to keep the thread moving......

moving to a related theme to the heated up cold war, if you'd been in the of the german commander of the Adlantic Wallshoes (I think it was rommel, but not sure), during the preiod leading up to the D-day landings and on them, what would you have done differently, assuming the same units, intel, and so on were available?

German Intel was in a bad way at that juncture. Hitler expected a landing from the mediterranean, thus having relocated many elements there. The Divisions which fought the allies on D-Day where there for rest and resupply, so these where understrength, albeit veteran units with serious deficits in the Ammo(especially heavy guns, i.e. artillery) and fuel department. This is, in fact, the story behind most U.S. successes in WW2 - the enemy running out of supplies to fight back or retreat(the Musashi, sister ship of the Yamato, was lost to allied bombers because they didn´t have fuel for retreat and ran her aground to use her as battery).

In this case, they also had overwhelming numbers. There actually isn´t much that could have been done better without prior knowledge or better Intel.

Dervag

2007-06-16, 10:27 AM

German Intel was in a bad way at that juncture. Hitler expected a landing from the mediterranean, thus having relocated many elements there. The Divisions which fought the allies on D-Day where there for rest and resupply, so these where understrength, albeit veteran units with serious deficits in the Ammo(especially heavy guns, i.e. artillery) and fuel department. This is, in fact, the story behind most U.S. successes in WW2 - the enemy running out of supplies to fight back or retreat(the Musashi, sister ship of the Yamato, was lost to allied bombers because they didn´t have fuel for retreat and ran her aground to use her as battery).

In this case, they also had overwhelming numbers. There actually isn´t much that could have been done better without prior knowledge or better Intel.In fairness, Hitler was correct that there would be a landing from the Mediterranean; this was a specific part of the plan. The Allies had originally intended to make the "Anvil" landings in the south of France before D-Day to draw off German reserves from Normandy; due to one thing and another they didn't happen until three weeks after D-Day. But those landings Hitler expected in the south of France were real, unlike the Pas de Calais landing he expected.

Mike_G

2007-06-16, 12:33 PM

Sundog

2007-06-17, 09:13 AM

Rommel did as well as can be expected, given his situation.

If I were in his shoes, and didn't have to contend with Hitler's interference with tactical decisions, I'd have mobilizxed reserves more quickly to respond to the Normady landings.

The Normandy beachhead was hard won, the advance bogged down for several days, during which a lot of German units were held back, awaiting the "real" landing. Had the Panzer Lehr division counterattacked on June 7, they may well have pushed the allies back into the channel.

I must concur. Rommel had only a few choices; given his sheer level of outnumberedness, he had to try to stop a landing on the beach if he could, thus requiring a forward defence (a layered defence would have allowed allied forces to deploy intact in set-piece battles Rommel couldn't have won). Reinforcement brigades had to be sufficiently far back as to be unengaged by initial assaults, but close enough to respond; they also had to be large enough to prevent the enemy from just picking it off with a sudden and unexpected push, but small enough to retain mobility and controllable supply situations.

Formulae like these dictated Rommel's deployments, overlaying the terrain he had to work with. The fact that it took so long for the Allied forces to march through an area the Germans had taken in scant weeks a few years before shows how well his planning served his successors.

Dervag

2007-06-17, 08:48 PM

Rommel did as well as can be expected, given his situation.

If I were in his shoes, and didn't have to contend with Hitler's interference with tactical decisions, I'd have mobilizxed reserves more quickly to respond to the Normady landings.Unfortunately for the Nazi occupation of France, Hitler's interference with tactical decisions was part of Rommel's shoes. It was just his bad luck that one of his shoes happened to be a bucket full of cement.

Formulae like these dictated Rommel's deployments, overlaying the terrain he had to work with. The fact that it took so long for the Allied forces to march through an area the Germans had taken in scant weeks a few years before shows how well his planning served his successors.In the Allies' defense, they were marching in the opposite direction, and were pushing against an army they had never contacted before rather than one they had already shattered, and were operating in the era after people figured out how to counter combined arms/mobile warfare tactics.

Kioran

2007-06-18, 11:31 AM

Unfortunately for the Nazi occupation of France, Hitler's interference with tactical decisions was part of Rommel's shoes. It was just his bad luck that one of his shoes happened to be a bucket full of cement.

In the Allies' defense, they were marching in the opposite direction, and were pushing against an army they had never contacted before rather than one they had already shattered, and were operating in the era after people figured out how to counter combined arms/mobile warfare tactics.

Hitler´s insistence on nonsensical courses of actions were on of the biggest disadvantages the Germans had, several times.

The most ineffective Army in the entire War was, by far, the Italian Army. 2 Million regular troops were incapable of beating 65000 british colonial troops in northern Africa, being beaten and driven back to Tunisia before Rommel and the Nordafrikakorps effected a reversal of fortunes that was to last for quite a while.
However, the U.S. Army at that wasn´t known for high niveau of training or incredible prowess. The strongest points in U.S. warfare are (and reamin to this day) good preparation and powerful logistics. In outright fights against similiarly well equipped and prepared enemies, they lost more often than not (see market Garden, were elite elements of the US troops with heavy british engaged an only slightly outnumbered enemy prepared to fight). The Allied troops made little and very costly advances in Nijmegen while being routed in Arnhem and dealt heavy casualties. The most distinguished units i this were british, by the way.
In the end, there was no way of stopping the torrent of superior numbers and equipment pouring in from the undamaged united states, despite their lack of veteran troops and intial poor tactical doctrine. It was an amazing Feat to prevent allied victory on Christmas 44.......

Raum

2007-06-18, 12:20 PM

However, the U.S. Army at that wasn´t known for high niveau of training or incredible prowess. The strongest points in U.S. warfare are (and reamin to this day) good preparation and powerful logistics. In outright fights against similiarly well equipped and prepared enemies, they lost more often than not (see market Garden, were elite elements of the US troops with heavy british engaged an only slightly outnumbered enemy prepared to fight). The Allied troops made little and very costly advances in Nijmegen while being routed in Arnhem and dealt heavy casualties. The most distinguished units i this were british, by the way.Market Garden is a poor example if you mean to show problems with U.S. Army training. After all, it was Montgomery's brain child. It was also under Montgomery's command. And the biggest failures were the reliance on a single road for resupply and reinforcement and the lack of urgency shown while moving troops up the road. Finally, it was the British 1st Airborne Division tasked with taking the bridge at Arnhem.

Kioran

2007-06-18, 02:06 PM

Market Garden is a poor example if you mean to show problems with U.S. Army training. After all, it was Montgomery's brain child. It was also under Montgomery's command. And the biggest failures were the reliance on a single road for resupply and reinforcement and the lack of urgency shown while moving troops up the road. Finally, it was the British 1st Airborne Division tasked with taking the bridge at Arnhem.

I didn´t lay the responsibility for the defeat at the U.S. feet alone - the british made mistakes as well. The U.S. troops didn´t, however, fare much better than the Brits after initial success, bogged down and were driven off.

In other wars like the Korean, U.S. troops have repeatedly proven themselves to be much less effective than cost of equipment and training would suggest.
It remains a fact that they have never lost a war in the fields.
This is, however, more due to the fact that few match the competence in logistics and moving supplies or reinforcements (see Red Ball Express or the Berlin Airlift), which is the U.S. real strength.
What won the war was not U.S. spirit or military prowess. It was U.S. weapons, tanks and Aircraft and russian soldiers.

Raum

2007-06-18, 06:17 PM

I didn´t lay the responsibility for the defeat at the U.S. feet alone - the british made mistakes as well. The U.S. troops didn´t, however, fare much better than the Brits after initial success, bogged down and were driven off.The 101st Airborne took four of five bridges intact as well as securing and crossing the southern bridge which was destroyed. The 82nd took the bridge at Grave and high ground near Nijmegen before running into a stiff defense of the Nijmegen bridge. All this in spite of stronger resistance than Montgomery planned for, poor resupply, and slow ground forces led by Dempsey. The airborne forces (British, American, and Polish) held almost twice as long as the maximum time called for in the plan. The German forces were more numerous, better trained, and better equipped than expected. Among other surprises were two Panzer divisions (9th and 10th) resupplying near Arnhem.

Market Garden certainly didn't meet all of it's objectives. But pinning the failures on any of the airborne troops is a stretch. While they didn't seize the Zon or Nijmegen bridges early enough, the XXX Corp advance was days behind schedule. Hell, they waited 18 hours after the Nijmegen bridge was secured to cross. Eighteen hours of their fellow British troops at Arnhem getting hammered.

In other wars like the Korean, U.S. troops have repeatedly proven themselves to be much less effective than cost of equipment and training would suggest.
It remains a fact that they have never lost a war in the fields. Eh, most consider Vietnam a loss I suspect. It certainly wasn't a win. But even that had issues other than the troops.

This is, however, more due to the fact that few match the competence in logistics and moving supplies or reinforcements (see Red Ball Express or the Berlin Airlift), which is the U.S. real strength.
What won the war was not U.S. spirit or military prowess. It was U.S. weapons, tanks and Aircraft and russian soldiers.I'd add Hitler to your list...among other mistakes, he attacked Russia. He also made the mistake of bringing the US into the war openly while not having an effective Navy.

Raum

2007-06-18, 06:29 PM

On a different subject, what was the most common armor type during the Hundred Years War? As I understand it, there was a move away from the previously dominant heavy cavalry to using more light infantry. Were they conscript or professional infantry?

Matthew

2007-06-18, 09:09 PM

My understanding is that:

On the English side there was a sharp division between two types of Soldier; the Bow Man, who was lightly armoured (if at all) and made up a significant proportion of troops (1:1, 2:1, maybe even 3:1) and the Knights and Serjeants, who had access to all kinds of Body Armour and were expected to do the majority of the hand to hand fighting.

The types of Soldiers involved varied considerably over the decades and within single groups, but they weren't conscripts. They were either Military Retinues subsidised by the King, the King's own Military Retinue or a Mercenary Company. Mainly professional soldiery and increasingly so as the war went on.

The French side put greater emphasis on the Feudal levy and lacked really good Bow Men. They did use Italian Mercenary Cross Bow Men and probably had enough of their own, but the proportion of Bow Men to Knights and Serjeants was smaller.

I'm sure somebody more expert can provide greater detail and correct any of my mistakes (as I say, this is a bit out of my period, so I might be completely off base).

Raum

2007-06-18, 09:49 PM

Are you certain the longbowmen would be mostly unarmored? By this point they were, if not an elite, well thought of and generally better equipped (hopefully) than a less skilled infantryman.

To be more specific, what was the common armor at Bannockburn in 1314? Robert the Bruce had 5000-6000 heavy infantry and a reserve of about 500 horse and was able to defeat a numerically superior English force of 2500 mounted knights, 3000 longbowmen, and 15000 light infantry. What armor would each group have been wearing?

Bannockburn is interesting. It's one of the few times an infantry force successfully attacked cavalry prior to firearms.

Matthew

2007-06-18, 09:55 PM

As I said, I'm certain of nothing, but the last paper I attended on the subject was of that opinion (which was some five years ago or so). Of course, the Bayeux Tapestry depicts an Archer putting on the Mail Hauberk of a fallen man, so perhaps the same sort of thing went on. Proportions of Body Armour to Soldiery are hard to be certain of. I have a few sources around here, so I might be able to shed some light on the subject.

Hmmn. Bannockburn. That's a bit of a legendary victory. Have to take a look at some resources. Do you kow this site: http://www.deremilitari.org/. You might find the online texts available there will shed some light on the subject.

[Edit] The Wikipedia Battle of Bannockburn (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bannockburn) Article looks okay, but it's sources are quite old.

Can't seem to get onto Jstor at the moment.

Raum

2007-06-18, 10:16 PM

Heh, I hadn't remembered the site but one of the books (http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/carey.htm) they're advertising is what I was browsing and pulling the Bannockburn numbers from.

On the subject of an English longbowman's armor, it has always struck me as unlikely that a yeoman (nearly a medieval middle class) would be armored as poorly as a serf. Longbowmen were typically from landowning families even if they didn't own as much land as a knight might.

Matthew

2007-06-18, 10:34 PM

Heh, Carey seems to speaking out of the side of his mouth in that Introduction. On the one hand he admits the existence of the combined arms force in early Medieval armies, albeit subordinated to Heavy Cavalry, and the dominance of sieges over battles and then proceeds to tout the 'dominance' of Heavy Cavalry from 1000-1300. Hard to make sense of his meaning. Looks like an interesting read, though.

Well, it's hard to say what's what about Long Bow Men. I'd be happy to go along with the Mail and Long Bow idea (i.e. Long Bow men with the means wore the Body Armour), but I couldn't even begin to offer up any evidence at this point. I bet there's an Article out there about it somewhere, damn Jstor.

Adlan

2007-06-19, 05:24 AM

The Hundred years war was not, as some see it today, one continious event. It was a series of stop and start campains, and the tactics, armour and society of England and france changed over the hundred years quite a bit.

However, Assume that we only look at the majority of each army, for the English, thats their longbowmen, for the french, thats their knights and Mounted men at arms.

Illustrations of the day certainly show Longbowmen wearing armour. There are some illustations in the british museum (also seen on P48 of the Longbow, a Social and Military History by R. Hardy), this shows Longbowmen, Circa Edward the 1st, wearing Chainmail Hauberks, Armoured Gauntlets, Open faced helms and greeves.

The Longbow men were not Serfs. They were freemen, the closest thing to a Medival Rural middleclass, owning land they worked themselves. So it's concivable that they could have afforded some armour previously.

However, during the hundred years war, the english army was revolutionised by replacing pure fudal levies with troops paid and armed by the state. I don't have a copy of the equipment orders to hand, but I know that while there were Thousands of Bows, Strings, and Millions of arrows orderd, I can't recall an orderd being placed for armour.

The french forces consisted of the Knights and armoured men at arms, who would have worn crusader type chainmail in the early ears, which would have changed to a suit of plates, jointed armour peicies over chain mail, half way between earlier armour and the classic articulated plate we know so iconically.

Arrowheads might tell us quite a bit, as early on, traditional heads http://www.by-the-sword.com/acatalog/images/AH-3522-3.jpg Simple leafs shape, http://www.by-the-sword.com/acatalog/images/AH-3522-5.jpg and traditional broadheads are most common along with Needle Bodkins (http://www.hectorcoleironwork.com/images/type%207.gif) which were designed for defeating chainmail.

Later on, as armour imporved, and bodkins were no longer as effective, http://www.hectorcoleironwork.com/images/sqbod.gif Shorter, stouter bodkins, with chisel points become more common.

This is gatherd from my reaserch, if anyone can supplement, or give me better sources, I'd appriciate it, as I'm always looking for more info.

Matthew

2007-06-22, 12:32 AM

Hullo folks. Adlan, I have to admit, I'd forgotten that a lot of the period drawings showed armoured Long Bow Men. Interesting stuff, but I have another topic up for discussion:

Tor the Fallen and I have been having a lively debate on this Thread: http://www.giantitp.com/forums/showthread.php?p=2776015#post2776015 about the frequency of the Sword (and, indeed, the Knight) in Medieval Warfare. Unfortunately, we rather ended up hijacking the Thread, so i thought I would move the discussion to here.

Basically, what I am saying is that the Sword was a relatively common weapon on the Medieval battlefield; part of my argument rests on the idea that the Knight was himself very common as a professional soldier and was gradually supplanted by similarly equipped Serjeants as the title 'Knight' became more restricted and associated with nobility.

One figure came up by way of comparison, and that was the number of Knights to Peasants in the late Eleventh Century in England. Now the last population estimate I heard was 1-2 Million, but it might go as high as 5 Million,as these can only really be ball park figures and estimates. However, we do know with some certainty the number of Knightly Fiefs was 5,000. This gives a range of ratios from 1:1000 to 1:200, or 0.1-0.5%.

I then compared this with the Modern US, my figures are old, but I heard 300,000,000 to an Armed Forces of 300,000 or 0.1%.

Anybody got any better figures. I know the Roman Army is estimated at something similar 300,000-600,000 or something? Anybody know the total population estimate?

Anywho, food for thought.

Fhaolan

2007-06-22, 01:46 AM

Adlan

2007-06-22, 05:54 AM

I have some figures for the musters raised for the hundred years war, I'm none to good at analysing them, but here they are:

1339, the order of arrary.
hampshire is demand to provide 30 men at arms (Knights effectivly, though no necessarily noble, mounted), 120 armed men (les well equipped than the men at arms, still mounted) and 120 archers.
Sussex is to provide 50 men at arms and 20 armed men and 200 archers.
Most other counties must provide the same as sussex (excepting rutland).

This was fundal demands, and by about 1340, it was paid service, as individuals were orderd to raise a certain number of troops.

in 1341 The Earl Northhampton raised 84 knights, 199 men at arms, 200 armed men and 250 archers, in 1342 The Earl 16 knights, 31 esquires, and 50 archers.

but in addition to these numbers, archers were raised by conscription (raised in their home counties and set by road to muster points), in 1341 this was about 150 from each county, apart from Rutland, which provided 40.

So perhaps the best figures I have are the ones from the black princes division for the 1355 campagin, 2600 men in total, 1000 men at arms, 1000 mounted archers (like dragoons, not huns, the fought on foot, but had horses so they could keep up with a mounted force), 300 foot archers and 300 welsh light infantry.

Wardog

2007-06-22, 07:42 AM

Just to clarify a few aspects of UK firearms law (if anyone is still interested):

There are a number of errors here:

You can indeed own a rifle in Britain.
Any Single Shot rifle, with I belive a limit of a 5 round magazine.
And any Single Shot rifle, or a multiple shot shotgun with a 2 round magazine, and a barrel of more than 20"
All Handguns are banned, excepting special designated historical interest pistols, and muzzle loading blackpowder pistols.

So the Mauser is permitted, but the SMLE (Short Magazine Lee Enfield, used by British troops during both World Wars) is not.

I find this profoundly ironic.

Or would both be prohibited on the grounds that they have barrels longer than 20 inches? Or have I misunderstood the last sentence there?

In general:

All automatic firearms are illegal.

Semi-automatic firearms are only legal if they use .22 rimfire ammunitions, or are shotguns.

"Handguns" are banned, defined as firearms with a barrel length less than 30cm, and/or a total length under 60cm. An exception is made for muzzle-loading black-powder pistols.

There are no limits on magazine capacity, although pump/semiauto shotguns with a magazine capacity of more than 2 rounds are classed as "firearms" rather than "shotguns", and so subject to stricter licenceing requirements.

Air rifles with a power of more than 12 ft/lb (and air pistols over 6ft/lb) are classed as firearms, and require an appropriate licence.

Examples of what can legally be owned in the UK:

Single shot / bolt / lever-action rifles, in any calibre (I think)< and with any magazine capacity.
Semi-auto rifles in .22 rimfire, any magazine capacity.
Semi-auto pistols in .22 rimfire, if they are long enough to not fall under the handgun ban.
Larger caliber revolvers, if they are long enough to not fall under the handgun ban.
Black-powder muzzle-loading revolvers and pistols.
Expanding ammo (hollow points etc), but only for hunting. (For hunting deer, it is mandatory).

What is illegal:

Any sort of automatic firearm.
Owning a firearm for the purpose of self defence.
Any sort of normal-sized cartridge-using handgun.
Semi-auto and pump-action rifles in any calibre other than .22 rimfire. (Yes, that does include .17 rimfire!)
Pepper spray/CS gas (classed as a "prohibited firearm"!)

"Shotguns" (by the legal definition, which is not always the same as the normal technical definition) require a licence called a "shotgun certificate". If you have one of these (which requires a police background check, "good reason" for owning shotguns, and secure storage), you can buy as many shotguns as you like (although they must be registered with the police).

Other firearms (and powerfuler air guns) require a licence called a "firearm certificate" (FAC). Every individual firearm must be recorded on this individually, you must have a "good reason" for each of them, and it also specifies how much ammo you can own for each. A "good reason" would either be hunting or pest control (in which case you must have access to land where you have permission to do so), or target shooting (in which case you must be a member of a gun club that has access to a range suitible for that firearm to be used).

Note, silencers (normally called "moderators") are classed as "firearms", and so require a good reason to own, and must be entered on the FAC. They are normally quite easy to get if you are a gamekeeper or pest controller, and the police have recently become much more willing to licence them. (Due to the number of people moving from the towns to the countryside, hearing gunfire (farms/ hunters/ gamekeepers/ etc), and calling the police. Ironically, I think it is easier to get a moderator in the UK than in the US.

I'm a member of a target-shooting club myself, but I don't own my own rifle, as the house I live in (rent) doesn't have sufficient security to keep a firearm in (and I'm not sure my landlady would agree to it even if it was). I mainly use Ruger 10/22s, which I can borrow from the club or from other members.

At a certain point, pilot quality will stop mattering. No four men with bolt action rifles, no matter how skilled, no matter how good they are as marksmen, can defeat four men inside an Abrams tank.

They just have to wait for the tank crew to get out to eat / sleep / take a leak / etc...

Raum

2007-06-22, 08:05 AM

I've heard anecdotal stories of tanks being taken out by a sniper. Evidently the sniper was using a modern .50 cal with depleted uranium ammunition and targeting either the tank's engine or tracks. Is there any evidence to support the claim?

Matthew

2007-06-22, 08:13 AM

Depending on the exact battle, I've heard of ratios anywhere from 1 Knight/Serjeant to every 5 conscripts/peasants/whatever all the way up to 1 to 100. And then there's the factor of elite foot troops who are not knights or serjeants but still have much better/expensive equipment. All in all, I think it's safe to say that swords might be *relatively* common, but are by no means the *most* common weapon. I still think that if you group together all the spear-like weapons (glaives, spears, pikes, etc.) they are still far more common than swords.

Certainly not the most common weapon, no. Those are interesting ratios, but I would love to see some evidence for them. I have just been reading through the Warfare section of Robert Bartlett's England Under the Norman and Angevin Kings 1075-1225 (to see if I am simply misremembering). He puts the population of England during the twelfth century at about 2.5 Million and the number of 'actual' Knights at 5,000 or so (not including unlanded Knights). His discussion of feudal levies seems to indicate that levying the peasants was rather rare (he cites only three examples, all emergencies) compared to the feudal levy of Knights and Serjeants. Much more common appears to be the hiring of mercenaries - Routiers or Brabanters (Bragmanni), recruited from Breton, Flanders and Wales (very popular, apparently).
He recognises three classes of Soldier, derived from the 1181 Assize of Arms - those with a Knight's Fee or over 16 Marks (Helmet, Mail Coat, Shield, Lance), those Free Men with over 10 Marks (Iron Cap, Mail Shirt, Lance) and Free Men with less than 10 Marks (Iron Cap, Padded Coat, Lance). Sadly, no mention of Swords or Bows there. However, he judges a 'paid and permanent force of household followers was the core of royal armies throughout the period.'

I have some figures for the musters raised for the hundred years war, I'm none to good at analysing them, but here they are:

1339, the order of arrary.
hampshire is demand to provide 30 men at arms (Knights effectivly, though no necessarily noble, mounted), 120 armed men (les well equipped than the men at arms, still mounted) and 120 archers.
Sussex is to provide 50 men at arms and 20 armed men and 200 archers.
Most other counties must provide the same as sussex (excepting rutland).

This was fundal demands, and by about 1340, it was paid service, as individuals were orderd to raise a certain number of troops.

in 1341 The Earl Northhampton raised 84 knights, 199 men at arms, 200 armed men and 250 archers, in 1342 The Earl 16 knights, 31 esquires, and 50 archers.

but in addition to these numbers, archers were raised by conscription (raised in their home counties and set by road to muster points), in 1341 this was about 150 from each county, apart from Rutland, which provided 40.

So perhaps the best figures I have are the ones from the black princes division for the 1355 campagin, 2600 men in total, 1000 men at arms, 1000 mounted archers (like dragoons, not huns, the fought on foot, but had horses so they could keep up with a mounted force), 300 foot archers and 300 welsh light infantry.

Yes, that accords with my understanding of the proportions of archers to Men at Arms and Knights during that period. Do we have any information for how Men at Arms and 'Armed Men' were equipped? I can definitely pull up some more figures for the 'hundred years war', but I don't know how that is reflected in Arms and armour off hand. Have to take a look at my sources.

The halberd developed when most of the other fancy polearms developed. It was a time period for large blocks of infantry, and most of those weapons were multi-purpose tools, just like the warhammer.

It was a Multi Purpose Tool insofar as it was a cross between a Spear and an Axe, but sure, all of these Pole Arms developed over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (they can be seen in manuscript illuminations of that period, for instance), and their frequency increased as Plate Armour increased during the fourteenth. It doesn't therefore follow that they were 'can openers'.

The longbow could punch through plate, especially with pile-headed arrows.

Yes they can, but with what frequency? At what range? With regards to what quality of Body Armour? Just about any weapon can punch through plate, given enough force (I suppose even a Sword could be made to do so, though it's hardly likely or wise). This is such a hotly debated subject that claims one way or the other are always contested. The Long Bow was an effective weapon of war, but it was no more a super weapon than the War Hammer.

Do the calculations.

I would if we had some infallable data.

The thinner sword points were an answer to mail. They could slip into the links and stretch them as they went through, injuring the person and ruining that part of their armor.

Mail had been around for more than a thousand years. The change in sword typology wasn't simply a response to the frequency of Mail Armour. It was a response to the increasing frequency of Plate and Mail.

Most medieval armies were made up mostly of light infantry (the peasant rabble) which had maybe brigandine armor, but not much heavier and they were equipped with a polearm of somesort and a shortsword or large dagger. Even later in the period when standing mercenary companies were more common this "standard kit" held with minor modification, and those were usually to armor.

Please provide some evidence for this assertion. What armies do you have in mind?

Most of Willam's Normans carried a spear with a broadsword or axe as a backup weapon, the same as their Viking forefathers.

Yes, that's true (except for the term 'Broadsword', which we should probably keep away from - it's about as useful as the term 'Broad Axe' in this context). However, depictions of these Knights with Axes also show them with Swords. The Axe doesn't appear to be a replacement, but an addition. Swords are almost always backup weapons.

Edit:I almost forgot, a huge number of knights and heavy infantry used a poleaxe, which is kinda like a mini-halberd with a spear point on the butt of the haft.

What period are we talking about here and what kind of frequency?

Charlemagne was indeed competent, but if you look at the earlier barbarian kings his charisma kind of fades. He pretty much picked up their leavings and ran with them. Think Charles "the Hammer" Martel (sounds like a boxer doesn't he) or some of the Lombard kings.

Yes indeed, Charlemagne was just the most successful and powerful of these Kings. "The Hammer", probably refers to the same thing as Edward I "The Hammer of the Scots", which is to say to the Macabees.

Throughout history the spear shows up over and over as a lead-in weapon. It may or may not be the primary, but it's there for the initial charge or throw.
Absolutely, no question about that. The Spear/Lance/Javelin or similar Pole Arm was the most common weapon on just about any battlefield and was almost always the 'lead in' or contact weapon.

Dervag

2007-06-22, 09:47 AM

They just have to wait for the tank crew to get out to eat / sleep / take a leak / etc...In other words, they must wait until they are fighting four men, and not four men in an Abrams tank. By analogy, any pilot in any aircraft can defeat any other aircraft if that other aircraft is parked on the ground while the pilot is in the officer's club. It's not relevant to the case.

I've heard anecdotal stories of tanks being taken out by a sniper. Evidently the sniper was using a modern .50 cal with depleted uranium ammunition and targeting either the tank's engine or tracks. Is there any evidence to support the claim?Back in the day (early WWII), many militaries used anti-tank rifles as their main infantry antitank weapon. This was before the invention of rocket launchers such as the bazooka and panzerfaust. The anti-tank rifles were generally .50 caliber or higher, firing armor-piercing ammunition. They couldn't break more than an inch or so of armor plate, which limited them to targeting either light tanks, the rear of medium tanks, or specific, lightly armored parts of the tank. It could be done, though.

Eventually, the fact that anti-tank rifles had such a hard time hurting a medium-to-heavy tank, combined with inflation in the armor on the tank and improved designs with fewer weak points, made antitank rifles obsolete.

Stephen_E

2007-06-22, 11:06 AM

Back in the day (early WWII), many militaries used anti-tank rifles as their main infantry antitank weapon. This was before the invention of rocket launchers such as the bazooka and panzerfaust. The anti-tank rifles were generally .50 caliber or higher, firing armor-piercing ammunition. They couldn't break more than an inch or so of armor plate, which limited them to targeting either light tanks, the rear of medium tanks, or specific, lightly armored parts of the tank. It could be done, though.

Eventually, the fact that anti-tank rifles had such a hard time hurting a medium-to-heavy tank, combined with inflation in the armor on the tank and improved designs with fewer weak points, made antitank rifles obsolete.

The Germans used a 7.92 tungsten carbide round with a muzzle velocity of 1265m/s. Penetration 30mm/100m
Italy - 20mm, 850m/s, Penetration 40mm/100
Japan - 20mm, 609m/s
Britain - .55in, 900m/s, Penetration 21mm/300m
Soviet - 14.5mm, 1010m/s, Penetration 25mm/500m
Czech - 7.92mm, 1219m/s,

The Japanese one was interesting in that the anti-recoil mechanisms were so good that despite only been capable of full auto fire the only report that my source could find of a US Soldier firing it, reported it having no more recoil than a Springfield .30 Rifle. It also had bicycle handlebar-like attachments that meant it could be carryed safely while loaded, and straight after firing.

Aside from the Germans, the rounds were normally only Stell-cored as far as I can see.

The problem is that you needed very high velocity, superior materials, and a decent calibre, probably 20mm. No one could put all that together (the Germans might've , but they had severe material shortages in things like tungsten, so that their only experimentation in 20mm rounds used steel cored rounds (and instead came up with better AT weapons). Using DU rounds, and good marksmanship, It doesn't seem impossible that crippling damage could be done, even to modern MBTs.

Stephen

Sundog

2007-06-22, 02:06 PM

It would be possible to neutralize a tank with a sniper rifle in modern times, if you were good enough, and they let you.

The primary method would be to shoot out the vision systems. These vary from tank to tank, from simple periscope designs to video cameras, and most tanks have multiple methods in case of damage or destruction of one or more systems. So, you would have to nail each camera, periscope or vision block (thick, bulletproof glass direct vision windows - I don't know if anyone still uses them). After that, the Tank would be unable to see unless they unbuttoned - which would be suicide in a sniper environment.

Of course, this falls under the heading of "possible but not feasible". The chances are much better that the victimised tank will identify your sniping point and give you a 105mm enema.

Dervag

2007-06-22, 04:46 PM

What if you had a lot of snipers and they all started shooting more or less at once?

Mike_G

2007-06-22, 06:21 PM

The .50 cal round is designed to be anti materiel, and could punch through some armor.

I doubt you could knock out a modern main battle tank, but APcs or older tanks certainly.

And, as has been said, you can always rtarget the vision equipemnt, or thany exposed crew. If a tank buittons up fully, it can'treally see very well, and becomes less effective, even if it isn't killed. A good sniper could blind and suppress a tank long enough to allow his buddies to skulk up and slide a satchel charge under it.

Matthew

2007-06-22, 11:03 PM

Okay, here's somthing else to be thinking about, the effectiveness of War Hammers against Plate armour. What I want to know is what actual Primary and Secondary Sources have to say about the War Hammer. Was it just one weapon competing amongst many or was it head and shoulders above other weapons for dealing with Plate Armoured foes?

Discussion taken from the same place as last time:

2. Re: Warhammers. Having looked these things up a while ago for house rules' sake, yeah, can opener is the correct term, and definitely supplanted swords or whatever as the preferred weapon for such tasks. People picture these big slow hammers swung around like you're pounding railroad spikes. Wasn't like that at all.

So, what evidence did you turn up for this? Actually, could you post it in the Real World Weapons and Armour Thread? I think it would be an interesting subject for discussion.

Short version, it was developed to deal with plate armors, either by concussion/crushing or by punching through it by concentrating the striking force on the reinforced spike on the back.

Here's a good basic reference, though there's more detailed treatises out there:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_hammer

Feel free to cross-post this if you like, I'm not in the other thread.

Yeah, I have read that Wiki Article before. Unfortunately, to judge by the level of discussion and the lack of sources, it appears to be nothing more than hearsay. I'll post this question up in the Real Weapons and Armour Thread and we'll see what can be dug up. If you can link or recommend any sources there, I would be grateful.

To start us off, I'll mention what Geoffrey le Baker had to say of how the English Men at Arms at Crecy dealt with the French Knights:

*** Anglicis armatis confligentes securibus, lanceis, et Gladiis proternuntur
When fighting with the English Men at Arms, the French were beaten down by Axes, Lances and Swords.

So, around 1350, I think it is reasonable to say that the primary armaments of the English Infantry were perceived as being Axes, Lances and Swords. How does this change over the next 150 years and how far is it the result of a change in Body Armour? Is there evidence for an earlier preference for War Hammers over other weapons of war?

Fhaolan

2007-06-23, 12:24 AM

Do you include bec de corbin and pollaxes in the warhammer 'group'? The sources I have seem to indicate these being very common in tourney and judicial duels when two fully armored opponents are involved. (These sources being fight manuals, such as Tallhoffer, et al.) I don't seem to be able to find much mention of them in actual field combat though... There seems to be more mention of maces and the like.

In personal experience, there isn't much difference between a mace and a warhammer in end effect. Especially if it's a gothic-style mace with the flanges. It's still a weighted club with a small impact area.

I wonder if this might be another terminology issue. As in period writers lumping flanged maces, bar maces, warhammers, etc. all into one nomenclature, not differenciating between the various impact-style weapons. In which case it might be very difficult to find specific references in primary sources. We do know they existed, and were common enough to have regional variations. So why are they not mentioned?

Matthew

2007-06-23, 12:44 AM

See, I don't know. My knowledge of Pole Arms/Pole Axes is not very great. I just had a read of this MyArmoury Pole Axe Article (http://www.myarmoury.com/feature_spot_poleaxe.html), though, which I thought was very interesting.

I think you may be spot on with it being a terminology issue. These Pole Axes look to me to be taking the place of Spears and Axes in the regular order.

[Edit] Lycurgas posted these video links, which are quite cool - not sure how far they demonstrate the relative effectiveness of the weapons in question, though:

War Hammer (http://www.history.com/media.do?id=d...& action=clip)
Mace (http://www.history.com/media.do?id=d...&actio n=clip)
Billhook (http://www.history.com/media.do?action=clip&id=darkages_conquest_billhook_broadband)
Flail (http://www.history.com/media.do?action=clip&id=darkages_conquest_ballandchain_broadband)
Ahlspeiss (http://www.history.com/media.do?action=clip&id=darkages_conquest_ahlspeiss_broadband)
Godendag (http://www.history.com/media.do?action=clip&id=darkages_conquest_godendag_broadband)

...and in typical History Channel style, the Mace video has a little bit of text appear, making the false claim that the Mace was favoured by Clerics!

my_evil_twin

2007-06-23, 05:26 PM

...and in typical History Channel style, the Mace video has a little bit of text appear, making the false claim that the Mace was favoured by Clerics!I was under the impression that clergy tended to favor bludgeoning weapons for a time, thinking violence was somehow less reprehensible if it didn't involve spilling blood. (I think I recall several places across Eurasia where people have independently invented and utilized this "loophole.") Hence the old-school D&D restriction for clerics.

I remember that on the Bayeaux Tapestry we see Bishop Odo riding into battle with some sort of cudgel.

Matthew

2007-06-23, 06:18 PM

It's such a common mistake that I don't find it surprising that you might think so. Basically, the only evidence for this idea comes from the Bayeux Tapestry, but if you take a look at it, you'll notice that William is also carrying the same 'cudgel' type object. Current thinking is that these are symbols of authority, rather than weapons of war. I have heard that the Roman de Rose might contain some supporting evidence, but I am yet to find anything to that effect.

David R. Bates, in his article, 'The Character and Career of Odo, Bishop of Bayeux (1049/50-1097)' in Speculum, Vol. 50, No. 1. (Jan., 1975), pp. 1-20 cites on page 6 : Maistre Waces Roman de Rou, ed. R. Andresen, 2 vols. (Heilbronn, 1877), 352-53. The Carmen de Hastingae Proelio, ed. C. Morton and H. Muntz (Oxford, 1972), pp. 20, 28, refers to the hasta as a symbol of command. See Bourrienne, p. 25, to support his arguments against such an interpretation. (Notice he cites the Roman de Rose ).
Here's the relevant passage:

1066 is obviously a decisive turning-point. The Bayeux Tapestry assigns to Odo a prominent role as soldier and counsellor in the Hastings campaign. His portrayal as an active participant in full armour led Freeman to assume that he was a combatant, and that he wielded a mace rather than a sword to circumvent canonical prohibitions against the shedding of blood. The decisive phrase Hic Odo Eps. Baculum Tenens Confortat Pueros does, however, suggest support and command: Odo's baculw is a similar instrument to that carried by duke William in plates 57, 60 and 73 as a symbol of authority and direction. Wace, writing in the late twelfth century, derived his account from the Tapestry and certainly understood the scene in the sense that Odo encouraged the troops from the rear. William of Poitiers' statement that Odo and Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances were there to help only by their prayers suggests that the former's contribution may have been exaggerated in these sources which are closely connected with Bayeux. But Odo's jointcommission of vice-regency with William fitz Osbern and his early creation as earl of Kent indicate that the Conqueror from the first intended his half-brother to take a major part in the government of England.

The idea, however, is repeated on any number of websites without the slightest bit of evidence to support it. You just have to take a look at the crusades to see that, in practice, no such restriction was ever followed, either by participating Monks and Clerics or by Monastic Military Orders. If there ever was a theoretical restriction, I am yet to find any evidence of it.

Also, the chances of striking with deadly force with a Hammer or Mace and failing to draw blood are pretty low.

Here are some entertaining videos: Testing Blades and Materials (http://www.thearma.org/Videos/NTCvids/testingbladesandmaterials.htm)

Sundog

2007-06-24, 06:39 AM

What if you had a lot of snipers and they all started shooting more or less at once?

Then you'd have a chance, but I'd still count it a small one. They'd have to be good enough to take out the cameras pretty darn fast.

Given the cost of training a good sniper and equipping him appropriately, you'd probably be better off with a TOW II.

Matthew

2007-06-24, 07:54 AM

Stephen_E

2007-06-24, 10:15 AM

By the by, is the above mentioned Thread making anyone else feel like they are living in an Ivory Tower?

No, because if I recall correctly the question was in relation to DnD and most other RPG games. It very much comes back to the matters discussed here, and indeed may be in direct response to points raised here.

Namely that in real-life the spear (and spear variants) has always been a/the major weapon, yet when you look at RPG games it is very rare that the Spear is statted as a worthwhile weapon to use. If you go back to 1st Ed DnD it was the Long Sword supreme. There is more variation now, but the spear is still a poor cousin.

Stephen

Matthew

2007-06-24, 10:21 AM

Not quite what I meant. The question was quite valid in the place it was presented. The answers regarding Real World Weapons and Armour were, however, quite off base from what is often presented here and generally without any evidence to support them. What I meant, is that I feel quite out of touch with those Posters (i.e. isolated from them in my Ivory Tower).

It's worth noting that in (A)D&D 2.x the Long Spear actually ruled supreme for a while (2D6/3D6) - Complete Fighters Handbook, but there were complaints. Whilst, in my opinion, the Armour Class versus Weapon To Hit Modifiers in (A)D&D 1.x left no clear winner.

Still, I wonder if it would be worth producing a list of popular misconceptions, as they have at ARMA, with supporting evidence and variant view points. Then it could just be linked to as the need arises.

Raum

2007-06-24, 10:57 AM

Well I did notice you were experimenting with creative capitalization...an attempt to get in touch maybe? :-P

On the subject of crossbows using indirect fire: they certainly had to arc shots at range, but did they ever use true indirect fire? There is evidence of massed bows used to target an area often beyond the front line of potentially intermingled troops. The mongols also targeted areas rather than individuals to break up formations. I don't know of any similar use of massed crossbows.

Wehrkind

2007-06-24, 12:59 PM

My guess, and that is really all it is, is that while crossbows can be used indirectly, it doesn't work with their strengths, e.g. high power and ease of use.

A high powered crossbow is usually slow to load, requiring windlasses or at least a good foot brace, and so using one shot at an arc with less chance to hit leaves a good period of time before you can reload and get a good direct shot. Given the penetration loss at range pointed out somewhere else in this thread, I would think that the best use of a crossbow in a field battle would be to get a maximum flat range volley, then one close volley, as the enemy moved in, doing enough damage at once to break up the charge. A bow, perhaps, could fire quickly enough that throwing a few shots at an area was no big deal in terms of hurting the shots you need.

Use wise, judging the arc and distance of a shot with a bow always struck me as the hard part. Getting a feel for the angle of release and where your bow shoots at that angle probably takes a good bit of time. Since crossbows are generally considered better by virtue of requiring less training, it might make sense that their users were not really expected to be able to judge that distance well enough to be worth it, particularly in a fluid field battle where the time between shots means their target moves before they can react and correct.

Now, that all goes out the window (except the penetrating power issue) in seiges or very stationary field battles. Other than those points though, I see no physical reason why one would work better than the other, unless the construction of bolts doesn't lend itself to tilting themselves point first when coming down off the parabola.(?)

Norsesmithy

2007-06-24, 07:32 PM

IIRC, Crossbow Quarrels of traditional design tend to destabilize after 30 yards or so, but I haven't got anything to back that up with.

Swordguy

2007-06-24, 11:36 PM

Still, I wonder if it would be worth producing a list of popular misconceptions, as they have at ARMA, with supporting evidence and variant view points. Then it could just be linked to as the need arises.

Possibly it's because you've got a 2,000-post thread to wade through to find the answer to any given question. I agree, BTW, that a "short version" answer-only thread would be an excellent idea, with the lengthy discussion about the various points taking place here.

Wehrkind

2007-06-25, 11:30 AM

You would probably either need a Mod running the thread tightly, or a sub-forum with a series of polls, otherwise it would be nigh impossible to keep people from just posting their "answers" in the short form thread without discussion.

Subotei

2007-06-25, 03:51 PM

Mike_G

2007-06-25, 04:17 PM

Learning to adjust aim with a traditional bow is just practice. Getting used to the arc and the angle needed for indirect shooting is easily done by somebody who practices on a regular basis.

The high rate of fire (for lack of a better term- "fire" really shouldn't apply to bows) allows the longbowman to adjust his aim, and allows a company of archers to lay down a rain of arrows on a given enemy formation, where even if each arrow is not directly aimed, enough shafts in a given area should produce casualties. This is useful both to soften a target in preparation for you own infantry or cavalry to charge (and can be delivered ober the heads of your own advancing troops), or to weaken an enemy advance by attrition far sooner than waiting for the final moment to deliver one or two good volleys in the hope of breaking a charge, as was the custom with crossbows and later, muskets, which have simlar rates of fire.

The crossbow's disadvantages in barrage shooting are, first, its lower rate of fire, which makes for fewer shots into the beaten zone, second, raising a crossbow means that the stock is now directly blocking your view of the target, third, corssbowmen can be proficient without years and years of practice, so the average level of trianng for a given archer is higher for a longbowman than a crossbowman.

That said, projectile motion is projectile motion, and you can, with some practice and a degree in physics, use a crossbow like a mortar to target indirectly. It just takes much longer to adjust fire, and can't produce a "rain of arrows." A "light, sporadic drizzle of bolts" just isn't the same.

Dervag

2007-06-25, 09:08 PM

Whats the velocity of a crossbow bolt once fired? If you know that you could work out the point blank range for a cross bow (ie the point 'n' shoot direct tragectoy range) if your maths is better than mine. I doubt it is more than a few tens of metres, so for any long range archery, indirect fire must have occurred. The view that seems to prevail that crossbows were used by the untrained (or unskilled) and so were limited to "point it there, pull this trigger" is, I think, a little simplistic.Yes, but there's "aim the crossbow up a few degrees to compensate for projectile drop" and then there's "aim it up at a forty-five degree angle to drop bolts on the enemy's head two hundred yards away."

However, your point is good. Crossbow bolts don't have an initial speed transcendantly greater than that of arrows, so they would need to be elevated considerably to hit a distant target. How much information do we have on the effectiveness of crossbows at long range- beyond what they could feasibly achieve with point blank shooting?

Rasilak

2007-06-26, 11:33 AM

Maybe, i'm wrong here, but it seems to me that crossbow bolts are significantly lighter than arrows, but have roughly the same amount of air friction, and thus about the same terminal velocity. Projectiles shot in a high arc tend to come down with terminal velocity, so the crossbow bolt is less effective than an arrow. (kinetic energy=1/2*mass*speed^2)
When shot directly more of the starting speed is conserved, so the crossbow gets an advantage for its higher pull (paid with lower RoF). For ballistic shots the bow has a higher RoF *and* more power, so there is no point in using crossbows.

Wardog

2007-06-26, 12:53 PM

13_CBS

2007-06-26, 10:15 PM

I can't remember where I heard this, but it seemed a reputable source (and sounds sensible).

Crossbow bolts are shorter than arrows, which makes them less aerodynamically stable than arrows, and so have a shorter range.

I always thought they were also about as heavy, and thus more dense (and thus compensate for their shortness)O_o

Wardog

2007-06-27, 11:50 AM

I always thought they were also about as heavy, and thus more dense (and thus compensate for their shortness)O_o

Would that restore their stability? (I don't know enough about aerodynamics).

vrellum

2007-06-27, 04:08 PM

I believe crossbow bolts are shorter and fatter than arrows, thus they are less aerodynamic. Therefore they won't perform at range very well, nor will they do a good job using volley fire.

Raum

2007-06-27, 05:38 PM

Arrows and bolts don't need to be aerodynamic in terms of a lifting body, they're ballistic. The only role air resistance plays is slowing it down. That said, there are a variety of things which will affect the projectile's flight path and accuracy: head weight, head shape, fletching, the projectile's mass, and the path of the bow string are a few. Here are some recommendations from a bow hunting site:
a) try and get the tiller etc. of your bow spot on, because an unstable arrow will be provoked less by a clean release. However, this will help rather than fix the problem unless your arrow is totally stable in flight. If your arrow is that good, you'll probably not have noticed any tiller problem anyway.

b) use (very) big fletchings. Feathers give better lateral stability than most plastic vanes.

c) use heavy broadheads

d) use broadheads with minimum windage i.e. vented blades, and few blades. Remember that a large blade may cause more damage to the target, but only if you hit.

e) keep the arrow centre of gravity well forward towards the point. It's amazing what an extra 25 grains can do to a marginally stable arrow.

Pilum

2007-07-01, 12:22 PM

How much information do we have on the effectiveness of crossbows at long range- beyond what they could feasibly achieve with point blank shooting?

I've read in some books dealing with the Crusades that the "Franks" would often march with armoured crossbowmen to the outsides of the column, as the "Turks" had quickly learned to respect the crossbow, and would often shoot from extreme ranges as a result. Apparently it was not uncommon for some men to be porcupined with these arrows, but to no effect - they lacked the power to penetrate the westerner's armour.

Now that's dealing with march security rather than open battle, but I'd say it imples that even a horse archer's bow *can*, in extremis, potentially fire further than a crossbow (or of course, that the crusaders had more need to preserve ammunition by not shooting beyond effective ranges) but don't expect it to have much effect against armoured men.

Of course, the unarmoured horses could be a different matter...

Lapak

2007-07-02, 12:09 AM

I can't remember where I heard this, but it seemed a reputable source (and sounds sensible).

Crossbow bolts are shorter than arrows, which makes them less aerodynamically stable than arrows, and so have a shorter range.The first thing that occurs to me:

Bullets are shorter than crossbow bolts...

I'm not sure that theory is sound.

Adlan

2007-07-02, 05:31 AM

Bullets travel much faster than even a modern compund can fire a bolt.

Edit:

Relevent figures, The Maximum FPS from a Modern Compound is somewhere around 350, though this is with long draws, and very light arrows, most workable and hunting arrows are closer to 270FPS.

Where as firearms, even piatols, fire with severl thousand FPS, as far as i'm aware, I'm not an expert on guns.

Wehrkind

2007-07-02, 09:14 AM

Most guns go from ~800 fps to 3000 fps for REALLY hot rifle loads (not certain about some of the larger caliber sniper rifles though.)
Come to think of it, part of the issue might be the length of draw on crossbows vs long bows. It seems to me that all the cross bows I have seen only go back ~3/4 of the distance of a full sized bow. This might limit their speed (time of acceleration is shorter) and/or cause accuracy differences similar to that of a pistol vs. a rifle (barrel length being directly proportional to accuracy it seems.) I don’t know the reason for the latter though.

Mike_G

2007-07-02, 12:23 PM

Come to think of it, part of the issue might be the length of draw on crossbows vs long bows. It seems to me that all the cross bows I have seen only go back ~3/4 of the distance of a full sized bow. This might limit their speed (time of acceleration is shorter) and/or cause accuracy differences similar to that of a pistol vs. a rifle (barrel length being directly proportional to accuracy it seems.) I don’t know the reason for the latter though.

The draw length is very much a factor.

The bow imparts energy to the missile during release, over the time of the release, whcih is longer in a Longbow than a Crossbow, therefore, for the saem draw weight, more energy is imparted to a Longbow arrow than a crossbow bolt.

A friend of mine makes crossbows for SCA competition as well as for collectors, and my recurve bow of simlar draw weight throws an arrow a lot further than one of his crossbows, and punches much more arrow through the target. The thing is, his crossbows for competition are ery light, since the cometition is at comparatively close range, nobody''s trying to pierce armor, and a light crossbow can reload faster in the speed round of competition, so heavier bows don't really give any advantage for his customers.

An explanaition of bolt energy is availible on his site here: http://freegatearmory.com/index.html

The thing about a crossbow is a high maximum draw weight, since you aren;t depending purely on muscle power to draw it, and it's easier to hold steady to aim, so a high end crossbow relying on a mechanical cocking mechanism can have a draw weight far beyond that of a standard bow.

Dervag

2007-07-02, 04:14 PM

The first thing that occurs to me:

Bullets are shorter than crossbow bolts...

I'm not sure that theory is sound.But with the exception of the armor-piercing sabot rounds fired from tank cannons, bullets aren't shaped like arrows, which makes the effect of length on their aerodynamics totally different. It's not obvious to me that a long 'rod' of bullet would be more stable than a spherical bullet or a cylindroconoidal bullet (a bullet shaped the way moderns think of bullets as being shaped).

Subotei

2007-07-02, 04:38 PM

I've read in some books dealing with the Crusades that the "Franks" would often march with armoured crossbowmen to the outsides of the column, as the "Turks" had quickly learned to respect the crossbow, and would often shoot from extreme ranges as a result. Apparently it was not uncommon for some men to be porcupined with these arrows, but to no effect - they lacked the power to penetrate the westerner's armour.

Now that's dealing with march security rather than open battle, but I'd say it imples that even a horse archer's bow *can*, in extremis, potentially fire further than a crossbow (or of course, that the crusaders had more need to preserve ammunition by not shooting beyond effective ranges) but don't expect it to have much effect against armoured men.

Of course, the unarmoured horses could be a different matter...

It also implies crossbows had decent effective range (say perhaps 100m or so, given the effective range of a horse archer's bow), indicating fire would probably be indirect.

Fawsto

2007-07-04, 01:40 PM

Hmm... I generaly know a few topics about firearms... But now I found a problem... I friend of mine asked me how Hollow Point Bullets works... Well, everything I could tell him is that they somehow expand/explode (not sure) and, with this, deal much more damage. But yet, I couldn't explain to him how it does that. Can someone help me here?

SpiderBrigade

2007-07-04, 02:23 PM

One of the more firearms/physics experts here will go into more detail, I'm sure.

But basically, the hollow tip (or notched tip, or softer tip, or any of several variants) causes the projectile to spread out ("mushroom") as it hits. Think about what would happen if you crushed the top of a paper cup against a hard surface - the result is vaguely like that. Instead of mostly holding its shape, the bullet expands sideways which obviously causes different kinds of damage.

Wehrkind

2007-07-04, 05:22 PM

Much like Spider said. Essentially due to the open point, upon contact the tip expands and the whole bullet flattens, looking like a mushroom top (or muffin if you are not into fungi), which pushes more flesh ahead of it, making a bigger hole. Not as much of a super killing effect as some people make it out to be, but definitely transfers more of the force than a jacketed bullet.

An interesting note is that hollow points going into say particle board or dry wall do not flatten. Apparently the harder or dryer material doesn't interact with the cup tip geometry very well. I am told that really thick clothing will also clog it up, though I can't confirm this. I believe this to be the reason for the slotted, and other oddly shaped expanding point bullets.

Fawsto

2007-07-04, 06:45 PM

Thanks, guys. Clarified here.

Fireball.Man.Guy.

2007-07-16, 06:07 PM

Raum

2007-07-16, 06:42 PM

Anyone else agree.In what situation? What point in time? What armor is worn?

Just about any weapon can be effective if the details are set to make it effective. In general though, your combination will be weak against longer weapons and against opponents wearing significant armor.

Mike_G

2007-07-16, 06:50 PM

I've gotten and Idea for a rather effective 2-weapon renesiance combo. The combo is:

Main-Gauche in Weak, handaxe in dominant. While blocking incoming attacks with the Main-Gauche, stick the axe in the lower stomach and pull/rip. I think the combination would be pretty effective. Anyone else agree.

Yeah, you'll have a serious reach disadvantage against a Rapier/Main Gauche, and while the axe is effective, it's no more deadly against an unarmored foe that the rapier.

It's a nice, brutal choice for infighting, when you've gotten inside the rapier fighter's guard, or for more confused melee than a straight duel.

Fhaolan

2007-07-16, 06:53 PM

I've gotten and Idea for a rather effective 2-weapon renesiance combo. The combo is:

Main-Gauche in Weak, handaxe in dominant. While blocking incoming attacks with the Main-Gauche, stick the axe in the lower stomach and pull/rip. I think the combination would be pretty effective. Anyone else agree.

No more than handaxe and buckler, hooked knife and main gauche, so on and so forth... :)

The combination is assuming too many variables. It assumes you're blocking a weapon that *can* be blocked by a main gauche. It assumes you're opponent has no lower stomach armor. It assumes your opponent is stupid/clumsy enough to close with you.

If your opponent has a flail, a poleaxe (and knows how to use it), or some form of breastplate, your combination would be utterly defeated.

Sorry 'bout that. :smallsmile:

Fireball.Man.Guy.

2007-07-17, 07:21 AM

I wasn't thinking duel, more like small group melee. And as for Era, 1600s thereabouts. And depending on the armor, one could get under the breastplate and into the soft stomach muscle.

Fhaolan

2007-07-17, 09:19 AM

I wasn't thinking duel, more like small group melee. And as for Era, 1600s thereabouts. And depending on the armor, one could get under the breastplate and into the soft stomach muscle.

In that 1600s era there is a piece of armor known as a plackart. In many cases breastplates have an intergal plackart, but a good number of gothic and italian breastplates have an independant plackart. I've actually seen illustrations where a combatant has discarded the rest of the breastplate and is just wearing the plackart over a maille hauberk, but I have never seen a case with a breastplate being worn without a plackart of some form. This piece of armor's singluar purpose is to protect the soft stomach and the kidneys.

In earlier armor, you would have a girdle. A very wide heavy leather belt, in many cases with metal plates attached, that would cover the same area.

If you are wearing a plackart or a girdle and someone can reach your stomach muscles with a blade of any kind, your armor is very badly fitted or you're wearing it wrong.

Period armorers were not stupid people. The soft stomach is an easy and obvious target, just like the neck, the head, and the groin. Any easy and obvious target is the first thing armourers will strive to protect. What you're looking for in this scenario is someone with no armor at all. A civilian, say.

Now, moving on to the main gauche. Pretty much the only primary weapon a main gauche can block is a rapier or a cut-and-thrust. In the 1600s, especially in small melees and outside of duels, you're going to be up against handaxes, falchions, clubs, etc., all of which can blow right past a main gauche with sheer momentum. It's the first thing you learn when taking medieval martial arts, or renessance rapier combat. Don't try to block or parry impact-style weapons with anything smaller/lighter than the weapon itself, all you'll do is slow it down slightly. Instead, beat the weapon aside to change it's target (or keep it from re-targeting) while you move out of it's path. Which means you can't close with the opponent to do the gut-rip thing.

So, this scenario is dependant on you fighting unarmored opponents with light weapons. Oh, and they have to have single weapons, because if they are wielding an off-hand weapon of their own, they've tagged you while you step in close enough to use a handaxe as a gut-ripper. Stop thrusts with their own main gauche, daggers, or whatevers give them longer reach than you as you need to be *close* to do the gut-rip with a handaxe.

Right, now we're dealing with unarmored oppoents with *single* light weapons... are you sure we're not in a duel situation? :smallsmile:

13_CBS

2007-07-17, 10:04 AM

Hmm, I've always wondered, how effective is a three sectioned staff both in and out of a battlefield (i.e. in a dojo vs. a real, life-or-death fight)? National Geographic likes to put it as the deadliest non-metal weapon, but I don't know...

Adlan

2007-07-17, 10:12 AM

Seems a mite complicated to me. And also seems to be of less use than a decent single sectiond staff.

If the user were incredibly skilled, it would be quite effective. But It seems to take alot of skill, and in a situation against an opponent with equal skill, I'd say the 3 sectiond staff looks to be a bigger, less agile version of nunchuks.

However, I have never seen, or encounterd a user of 2 sectiond staff, so I'm brobaly talking bollocks.

WhiteHarness

2007-07-17, 01:36 PM

Joran

2007-07-17, 03:01 PM

If the three-sectioned-staff were truly an effective weapon, then it would have been a more common feature on the Chinese battlefield. As it was, though, the Chinese employed the same weapons in war that the rest of humanity used; fancy kung-fu weapons simply aren't as effective as the old tried-and-true stand-bys: spears, bows/crossbows, swords, shields, etc.

Technically, those are effective when used by massed infantry. Perhaps a three-section staff could have been an effective weapon when used in duels by a skilled combatant (akin to the spiked chain in D&D), but completely useless when used in formation. I, alas, have no clue; three-section staves along with hook swords are a couple of my favorite weapons, but I have no idea if they'd be effective or not.

Also, often times, weapons are adopted because it is faster and easier to train unskilled people to use, rather than their effectiveness. For instance, the crossbow was not nearly as effective as the longbow in terms of distance and rate of fire, but longbowmen required training beyond what was necessary for a crossbow.

WhiteHarness

2007-07-17, 04:17 PM

I still don't see how someone could expect to cause harm to a man in any sort of rigid or semi-rigid armour with a three-section staff. I mean, the weapon doesn't look like it's as thick and weighty as, say, a quarterstaff. It might be a nice tool for one-on-one against an unarmoured man, but I don't think it'd be of any use versus someone armed at all points.

Raum

2007-07-17, 05:23 PM

As an impact weapon a three section staff is either a pair of attached kali sticks or a fairly awkward flail, from seeing demonstrations it's usually the former. Using one as a pair of clubs has it's disadvantages though - their mobility is limited compared to two separate weapons.

A three section staff's strength is in locking and trapping techniques. The length of each section and attaching chains allow a wielder to use it as a very effective lever or clamp. As such, it's probably more useful in situations where you don't want to kill your opponent than in warfare.

Cadugan

2007-07-17, 06:46 PM

Here's a question:

Cross Bows. A poster recently made the claim (in the "Why is the Humble Spear so Underrated?" Thread, of course) that whilst Bows were used for indirect shooting, Cross Bows were only used for direct shooting. I have no idea as to the truth of this, as I have been unable to find any online information (though I didn't look too hard, either) and don't have any books on the subject.
However, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, my understanding of things is that both Bows and Cross Bows were used for direct and indirect shooting. Does anybody have any answers about this and (preferably) some evidence? I'm sure physics comes into this somewhere...

By the by, is the above mentioned Thread making anyone else feel like they are living in an Ivory Tower?

alrighty then, i suppose i may be able to shed some light on the use of Crossbows in combat versus longbows, and why the spear is so 'underrated'.

The crossbow is a magnificent piece of equipment for one thing - 'direct' shooting up to about 80 yards on level ground, or up to 120 or so yards if you are on a wall of about 3 stories in height shooting downwards; the reason for this is rather simple, the crossbow quarrel, or bolt, is not heavy or fast enough to cause significant damage beyond that range. consider that your average modern crossbow has a aprox. 400FPS (feet per second) muzzle velocity, which rapidly decreases after initial release to about 225FPS at about 50 yards out, this means that the speed of the projectile in this case decreases almost geometrically up to a certain point;

now, the reason crossbows are good at what they do, namely siege situations, is that a crossbow fitted with a chisel-tip bodkin point bolts (bodkin points being armor-piercing) will punch through plate armor up to that 80 yards, this has been proven through numerous tests on plates of steel, shaped to equivalents of period armor and being of the same hardness and density as period armor.

the longbow was effective beyond ranges that the crossbow was because of the fact that an arrow launched from a longbow does not decelerate as quickly as a crossbow bolt, allowing it to climb to a significant height before gravity kicks in , which will then re-accelerate the arrow to a terminal velocity (being roughly 120mph, or almost 200kph).

Also, this is the main sticking point, arrows are longer, and usually have more mass than bolts, this provides for the 'pile driver' effect-

picture a ball of steel, roughly 2" in diameter, you launch it at a thick steel plate, it dents but does not pass through

you take the same mass of steel, and form it into a 1/4" rod and launch it at the same speed, it passes right through.

- the reason for this effect is the entire mass of the arrow presses on one thin point, a crossbow bolt that is shorter and lighter does not have the same energy potential as the arrow.

one thing to note however, is as technology progressed to the end of the 14th century, the longbow started to die out, as armor go better and better, and skilled archers got killed more and more, crossbows became the easy replacement, blame the hundred years war between the English and the French (Normans) for this; battles like A Orleans killed hundreds of English longbowmen, men that have to be trained for years, whereas you can be trained to use a crossbow in about a week, and the only sacrifice is range.

but i digress... crossbows do not have the stopping power at range that bows do, due to the lighter projectile and lack of velocity.