Evil is the vehicle, not the destination

[Kevin B.]

I have had a lot of fun reading the various threads on what the change in Durkon's state/alignment will do to complicate (or even destroy) the current make-up of the party, and I was hesitant to start a new thread that would be covering the same ground, but I don't think what the nature of evil is has been discussed except in a somewhat cursory manner (I may have missed it and apologize if I did).

The fact that Durkon is now evil may cause problems with the party, but not because he is secretly planning on betraying them (because he is now *evil* (mwuhaha)). From my understanding of how alignment works, it provides a framework that a character will follow to achieve their goal, and I don't see how his goal/motivation has changed (yet).

Take Redcloak for example. His goal broken down into its simplest is to better the position of the goblin race. If he was of good alignment he could have the same goal, but his tactics for achieving it would be different; he would not be a cleric of an evil god, may try diplomacy over violence and so on. Tarquin, if good aligned, would probably have been lauded as a good (and somewhat lecherous) king living the good life, but instead of burning slaves he would have been building a glorious, well ordered fair kingdom (that follows the proper storytelling arc). Even characters that seem like pure evil because of what they want can have their goals broken down to a level where a character of any alignment could also follow it - but in a different manner. Xykon craving for power probably stems from the fear of being controlled and the need for safety and autonomy, which are feelings a character of any alignment can have. The fact that Xykon is evil is why he takes the actions he does to achieve his goal of becoming the biggest kid on the block, not the reason he wants to be.

I think Durkon's future behavior will probably be closer to the behavior of Malack than any other villain so far, not only because they share an alignment, class and undead state, but also certain character traits even before Durkon's change, such as loyalty to their friends and a clear mission in life (or undeath). Malack was reasonable when he could be (trying to convince Durkon that they didn't need to fight) and ruthless when he felt necessary (attacking Durkon after he refused to be negotiated with). Durkon's killing of an incapacitated Z follows this formula, as does his continued membership in the party, and as long as his goal remains aligned with theirs, things should be as right as Thor's rain.

This is complicated by the fact that evil is a quantifiable thing in OOTS. You can smite it, certain things are filled with it or made with it and due to the nature of his existence, Durkon is it. This fundamental fact will shape how he sees and interacts with the world, and this will cause conflict with the rest of the group. Belkar, the only other group member with an evil alignment, seems to instinctively realize the danger of what an evil Durkon is capable of. The party has made efforts to minimize the impact of Belkar's alignment since the beginning. No one besides Belkar seems to be willing to discuss if the same needs to be done with Durkon, and this is where the group may be setting itself up for disaster.

Just my two cents. I don't think Durkon is no longer a valuable asset, or even a good friend to the party, but the longer everyone ignores the fact that he is now evil, the harder the hit will be when it finally lands.

[hamishspence]

The party has made efforts to minimize the impact of Belkar's alignment since the beginning.

In Origin of PCs, they warn him not to attack the rest of the party, after he was accidentally hit by friendly fire and wanted payback.

They give him a second warning here:

http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0125.html

Aside from that, they basically don't exert much control over him- unless they hear him saying he's about to do something evil:

http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0101.html

[Kevin B.]

In Origin of PCs, they warn him not to attack the rest of the party, after he was accidentally hit by friendly fire and wanted payback.

They give him a second warning here:

http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0125.html

Aside from that, they basically don't exert much control over him- unless they hear him saying he's about to do something evil:

http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0101.html

That may be, but we have a graph for tracking how much influence they (or at least Roy) have exerted here:

http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0489.html

[hamishspence]

True. While the influence appeared to be declining toward the end of 1184, Shojo had the Mark of Justice put on him at that point.

[Kish]

Bear in mind the implications of kilonazis of evil: At his lowest restrained-by-Roy point, Belkar was apparently still the equal of at least a few hundred nazis.

[Keltest]

Bear in mind the implications of kilonazis of evil: At his lowest restrained-by-Roy point, Belkar was apparently still the equal of at least a few hundred nazis.

isn't kilo the thousand unit?

[hamishspence]

isn't kilo the thousand unit?

It is- and the minimum point was about halfway between the two- though it's hard to tell exactly.

[BrotherMirtillo]

Even characters that seem like pure evil because of what they want can have their goals broken down to a level where a character of any alignment could also follow it - but in a different manner.

They can have some of their goals broken down -- not all of them. Regarding Tarquin, you mentioned a hypothetical good parallel to him building a well-ordered, fair kingdom. I could see that. My objection is that he has other goals that I can't see any possible way of achieving without being Evil. (A forumite whose name I can't recall once said that Evil isn't just looking out for yourself -- it's boosting yourself by explicitly taking from someone else. That's what I'm using for this argument.)

Tarquin's insistence on getting whatever woman he wants, even when they clearly say no? That'd be difficult to achieve through Good means. His joy at wrecking people who got the better of him once? (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0783.html) If he were sarcastic or resentful, it would be one thing, but it sounds like their emotional and physical destruction was his destination from the start. Also, there's his simple liking of killing innocent people, even as a father-son past-time (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0794.html). It sounds like he enjoys it for its own sake, and there's no way to recast that as Good.

As for Xykon, I'm fairly sure he just does what he does for the glory and the lulz, not necessarily in that order. I could go into detail from Start of Darkness, except I don't know how to build a spoiler tag.

TL;DR -- Good goals done by an Evil strategist could be fun to watch, but if he's that kind of guy, he might want to slip in some Evil goals too. Depends on the guy.

What does any of this have to with Durkon? I don't know, not yet. You phrased it well:

From my understanding of how alignment works, it provides a framework that a character will follow to achieve their goal, and I don't see how his goal/motivation has changed (yet).
The only goals I've seen so far are: stop the Linear Guild permanently, save the Order (first from the Silicon Elemental, then from the army, then from Tarquin), and heal the Order. The third one is pure Durkon. The second one, he handled pretty well, considering his naught-for-spells abilities. (I'd have thought he'd look more worried at the sight of his buddy Roy gored by a triceratops (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0927.html), but although he seems to have lost a few facial expressions with his pulse, I refuse to read very far into that, given the art style here.)

His behavior towards Nale and Zz'dtri is pretty much the one thing that gives me pause. The last time Durkon fought the Guild without the enemies retreating (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0398.html), he fought to the level of incapacitation. This time, he had a hankering for death with a side order of blood-drinking. Effective, certainly, and when Nale bailed, he gave up on that and went to help his allies. ("Still a good friend to the party," as you said.) It's just that this one point on the graph is a bit higher than most. It remains to be seen if that becomes an outlier or a trend.

Meh, I'll wait and hope. In setups like this, I recall my old Literature teacher's advice: "What does a character want? And what are they willing to do (or give up) to get it?" After Durkon's awakening, he's favored his friends pretty well. I look forward to seeing how he acts in more mixed company -- not to mention how he reacts when it comes down to crunch-time priorities. Hopefully, that'll show what's changed in his inherent ends and/or in his round-to-round means.

[halfeye]

I could go into detail from Start of Darkness, except I don't know how to build a spoiler tag.
The easy way is click on the little icon of a speach bubble saying "SPOIL". You probably have to have Javascript enabled for that to work.

<edit>

PLEASE NOTE that it is generally not acceptable on the internet to post not safe for work (NSFW) images in spoilers, because browsers typically load the contents of spoiler tags before showing them, which means they show up in people's browsed contents whether they've opened the spoiler or not.

[Kevin B.]

Tarquin's insistence on getting whatever woman he wants, even when they clearly say no? That'd be difficult to achieve through Good means. His joy at wrecking people who got the better of him once? (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0783.html) If he were sarcastic or resentful, it would be one thing, but it sounds like their emotional and physical destruction was his destination from the start. Also, there's his simple liking of killing innocent people, even as a father-son past-time (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0794.html). It sounds like he enjoys it for its own sake, and there's no way to recast that as Good.

I agree with you 100% that those goals cannot be pursued as Tarquin does with a good alignment, but I view his base goals differently than you present them. Instead of getting any woman he wants, what if his goal is to be married to the woman of his choice. If he was of good alignment he would still pursue the woman he wants, but he would use different actions and play by different rules (including the possibility of not getting his way). A good aligned Tarquin could also hold grudges against those he thought wronged them, but his reaction would not be as heavy-handed (a good aligned character may be more inclined toward forgiveness). As far as the killing of innocents go, it always seemed he was acting very pragmatic for me, most of the deaths were in retribution for what he views on attacks on his power/honor. I think he enjoyed the act of winning more than the act of inflicting suffering, sometimes his definition of winning could seem comically absurd, as seen here: http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0785.html. A good aligned character can hate "losing" and love "winning" too, but the steps they take and games they play differ.


As for Xykon, I'm fairly sure he just does what he does for the glory and the lulz, not necessarily in that order. I could go into detail from Start of Darkness, except I don't know how to build a spoiler tag.

I haven't read Start of Darkness so I may be way off with Xykon.

However it goes it will probably be a great read, and I am really looking forward to seeing how it turns out.

[Amphiox]

Bear in mind the implications of kilonazis of evil: At his lowest restrained-by-Roy point, Belkar was apparently still the equal of at least a few hundred nazis.

The average run of the mill nazi, though, wasn't really that evil. Just regular people living regular lives and turning blind eyes to the actions of their leaders.


It is- and the minimum point was about halfway between the two- though it's hard to tell exactly.

Can't discount the possibility that it was a log scale...

[halfeye]

Can't discount the possibility that it was a log scale...
The scale up the side is strictly linear.

[Kish]

The average run of the mill nazi, though, wasn't really that evil. Just regular people living regular lives and turning blind eyes to the actions of their leaders.
Hundreds of Nazis aside, I think Rich showed (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0133.html) pretty (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0115.html) clearly (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0685.html) just how well-prevented from causing harm Belkar was when Roy was ostensibly taking responsibility for him.

(And how good the precautions Roy had taken for Belkar's continuing harmlessness (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0539.html) in the event of Roy's death were, too.)

[Amphiox]

The scale up the side is strictly linear.

It can be a linearized log scale. 1 on such a scale is log 1, or 10, 2 is log 2, or 100, etc. It is a common way of graphing things in science, because anything that would otherwise plot as a log curve plots instead as a straight line, and is easier to analyze (and for something that rises rapidly, the curve doesn't fly off your page and need exponentially more and more paper to graph it as you go up the scale). The Richter Scale is an example of such a scale (richter 2 is x times more powerful than richter 1, richter 3 is x time more powerful than richter 2 and x squared times more powerful than richter 1).

[rodneyAnonymous]

The scale up the side is strictly linear.

The y-axis labels on a logarithmic-scale graph often look identical to linear ones, but the 0 1 2 3 4 (etc) stand for 10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3 10^4 (etc).

[Amphiox]

Hundreds of Nazis aside, I think Rich showed (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0133.html) pretty (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0115.html) clearly (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0685.html) just how well-prevented from causing harm Belkar was when Roy was ostensibly taking responsibility for him.

(And how good the precautions Roy had taken for Belkar's continuing harmlessness (http://www.giantitp.com/comics/oots0539.html) in the event of Roy's death were, too.)

Naturally, the actual Nazi leaders, who commanded the actions of millions of followers, would rank in the meganazi ranges.

[jidasfire]

I think it's an interesting point for the most part, and yes, very few people hold up the idea of doing evil deeds as an end rather than the means, but I would say Xykon is the one who does. For him, power isn't the end goal. Oh, sure, he likes it, but only insofar as it allows him to commit the atrocities he finds so funny. He really only wants to rule the world so he can be the biggest, most awful villain there is and commit horrors on an even grander scale.

[Seto]

I agree with the OP, and that's also basically what I'd been saying in other threads (but more developed).

[martianmister]

I think it's an interesting point for the most part, and yes, very few people hold up the idea of doing evil deeds as an end rather than the means, but I would say Xykon is the one who does. For him, power isn't the end goal. Oh, sure, he likes it, but only insofar as it allows him to commit the atrocities he finds so funny. He really only wants to rule the world so he can be the biggest, most awful villain there is and commit horrors on an even grander scale.

Fun is the goal, evil is the vehicle.

[Amphiox]

I think it's an interesting point for the most part, and yes, very few people hold up the idea of doing evil deeds as an end rather than the means, but I would say Xykon is the one who does. For him, power isn't the end goal. Oh, sure, he likes it, but only insofar as it allows him to commit the atrocities he finds so funny. He really only wants to rule the world so he can be the biggest, most awful villain there is and commit horrors on an even grander scale.

Personal enjoyment can count as an end.

[Bulldog Psion]

It's difficult to enter this without bringing in real world politics, but I think that there can be evil goals, too. It's not just means that are evil, it can also be ends.

Consider serial killers, such as some of the infamous "highway killers" who might have slain hundreds of people over a fairly short period of time. Their sole objective was some kind of dark satisfaction in the act of killing successfully. They weren't pursuing some non-evil end by doing this stuff. The evil was a goal in and of itself.*

A thug who knocks over a liquor store may be using evil means to achieve neutral ends, I agree. They may be buying food, medical treatment, repairs to their home or vehicle, etc.. In this case, the means are evil but the goals aren't (though they usually aren't good, either).

Robin Hood, as portrayed in modern legend, would be more of the "evil means for good ends" type.

So, I think that both ends and means can be evil. Or good, or neutral. The fact that they can be mixed up in many different combinations is what keeps things interesting. :smalltongue:

*Note: I do not actually believe in objective evil. Serial killers are actually insane, the equivalent of a diseased carnivore running amok. But for purposes of this discussion, I need to label as evil that which is actually a form of perilous dementia.

[Keltest]

It's difficult to enter this without bringing in real world politics, but I think that there can be evil goals, too. It's not just means that are evil, it can also be ends.

Consider serial killers, such as some of the infamous "highway killers" who might have slain hundreds of people over a fairly short period of time. Their sole objective was some kind of dark satisfaction in the act of killing successfully. They weren't pursuing some non-evil end by doing this stuff. The evil was a goal in and of itself.*

Trying to avoid morality or anything, satisfaction/fun are fairly non-aligned goals, that they went about achieving through evil means, like Xykon does.

[Bulldog Psion]

Trying to avoid morality or anything, satisfaction/fun are fairly non-aligned goals, that they went about achieving through evil means, like Xykon does.

Yes, I guess that's true. I'm not sure how far down you can split it before the difference between means and end becomes moot, though.

[Keltest]

Yes, I guess that's true. I'm not sure how far down you can split it before the difference between means and end becomes moot, though.

There isn't any moral dilemma that cant be solved through excessive oversimplification.

But seriously, I think youd be hard pressed to find something committed for the evulz that didn't have a goal that was neutral. The people may be sick and twisted, but the goal, taken by itself and without the means they used to achieve it, would be at least neutral.

[malloyd]

But seriously, I think youd be hard pressed to find something committed for the evulz that didn't have a goal that was neutral. The people may be sick and twisted, but the goal, taken by itself and without the means they used to achieve it, would be at least neutral.

If you are willing to class personal pleasure as a neutral goal, then no, all goals are neutral. Why do you mercilessly slaughter those people you imagined offended you? It gives me a nice feeling. Why do you donate all of your time and income to helping starving children? It gives me a nice feeling. With enough reduction there basically are only two possible goals "feel good" and "don't feel bad", and with enough logical gymnastics I think you can reduce all the actual *goals*, as opposed to motives to stop doing something that is making you feel bad *right now* to the good feeling you get from anticipating avoiding future suffering.

[Keltest]

If you are willing to class personal pleasure as a neutral goal, then no, all goals are neutral. Why do you mercilessly slaughter those people you imagined offended you? It gives me a nice feeling. Why do you donate all of your time and income to helping starving children? It gives me a nice feeling. With enough reduction there basically are only two possible goals "feel good" and "don't feel bad", and with enough logical gymnastics I think you can reduce all the actual *goals*, as opposed to motives to stop doing something that is making you feel bad *right now* to the good feeling you get from anticipating avoiding future suffering.

Is that not what I just said? except for the "only two goals" bit.

[malloyd]

Is that not what I just said? except for the "only two goals" bit.

The only two goals bit is really my point. If you allow this level of reduction, *all goals are the same*. There are no evil goals, but there are also no good or neutral ones.

When it's used as a counter to a simplified two color morality, for which it is fairly popular, it irritates me because it amounts to saying your two (three I guess for D&D) color moral system is too simple, so let's replace it with this version that has only one.

Edit - Mind you, it could be *true*. Morality could be a purely human delusion with no objective reality at all, but that's not normally the argument it's advanced in support of.

[The_Tentacle]

Of course. Intent does not define you. One's goals, after being simplified down to a certain level, are just that - goals. They don't say nothing about you, but pretty darn close.

What does define you is how you reach those goals. This is what D&D alignment gets at. In the strip where Roy is being judged, the fact that he uses Chaotic means to accomplish Lawful goals tilts him towards Chaotic. I think this is what the OP is saying.

[Kevin B.]

I am not a fan of the super reductionist view that turns every action into "It Makes Me Feel Good". It seems reasonable at first glance, but doesn't account for personal sacrifice when the stakes are high, like life or limb. Running into a burning building to save your grandfather and dying in the process cannot be explained away by "He would have derived great pleasure from rescuing his Grandfather, enough to risk his life." Also, forgoing what makes you "feel good" because of what you see as your duty/responsibility is generally described as a virtue, especially in situations where no one is there to witness and compliment your actions.

@Bulldog Psion: Mental illness is a subject that I have no professional experience with and I would like to start out with that very clear from the beginning. As far as I know, D&D doesn't really deal with mental illness very often. I think Ravenloft had tables that a character would have to roll on periodically to gain some kind of mental illness due to the strain of the constant horror (I remember one of them was that the character needed to eat dirt three times a day, many were more severe), and a character of any alignment could become afflicted. In this way I believe the Ravenloft setting was assigning "needs" that the character had added to their overall make-up, something that may or may not affect their alignment. A paladin that eats dirt three times a day is going to be fine, a paladin with an uncontrollable desire to kill may not be a paladin for very long. Would that paladin become evil due to their actions? Do serial killers kill because they obtain satisfaction from the act, or do they "need" to kill and obtain satisfaction from fulfilling a "need"? I never watched the show, but I think Dexter was about a serial killer who channeled his need to kill into killing only dangerous criminals, I wonder what his alignment was.

Tarquin is evil because of the actions he takes to get to his goals (ruling a kingdom), but what if he was afflicted with a type of mental illness that made him believe, with every fiber of his being, that he was simply the man casted to play the villain in a play, and his knowledge and preferences for storytelling convention was not a clever quirk but something he was enslaved to. Would he still be evil? I don't think so. Tragic, and a person that needs to be stopped, maybe even killed if necessary, but not evil.

All of this stops being comparable to the world we live in when Durkon comes up, because he is evil by his very nature. Since evil is a thing in the oots universe (and a lot of fantasy settings) and one of the effects of Durkon's transformation is that his alignment changes to it, the sudden shift in his behavior may seem comparable to mental illness, or that it isn't Durkon at all, but a completely different being. While these are important questions to some, I don't think it changes the fact that as long as Durkon's goals haven't changed (or the being now inhabiting Durkon has similar goals), he will continue to be an asset to the party, though the methods he employs will reflect his new evil nature. This in itself may be enough to create chaos in the party, and if left unchecked I think he will probably start doing things the other party members (with the exception of Belkar maybe) would be unwilling to do.

[Cavenskull]

It can be a linearized log scale. 1 on such a scale is log 1, or 10, 2 is log 2, or 100, etc. It is a common way of graphing things in science, because anything that would otherwise plot as a log curve plots instead as a straight line, and is easier to analyze (and for something that rises rapidly, the curve doesn't fly off your page and need exponentially more and more paper to graph it as you go up the scale). The Richter Scale is an example of such a scale (richter 2 is x times more powerful than richter 1, richter 3 is x time more powerful than richter 2 and x squared times more powerful than richter 1).
Considering a base-10 logarithmic scale in this case would imply that Belkar would have been over 10 million times worse without Roy's guidance, I think the scale is linear. Even at a base-2 logarithmic scale, that would make Belkar over 128 times worse without Roy's guidance. That just sounds too exaggerated.

[hamishspence]

I am not a fan of the super reductionist view that turns every action into "It Makes Me Feel Good". It seems reasonable at first glance, but doesn't account for personal sacrifice when the stakes are high, like life or limb. Running into a burning building to save your grandfather and dying in the process cannot be explained away by "He would have derived great pleasure from rescuing his Grandfather, enough to risk his life."

It could, however, be explained with "He knows that not trying, would have resulted in him feeling incredibly guilt-ridden".

"Avoiding pain" (physical and emotional) is just as much a selfish motivator as "Gaining pleasure".

[Kevin B.]

It could, however, be explained with "He knows that not trying, would have resulted in him feeling incredibly guilt-ridden".

"Avoiding pain" (physical and emotional) is just as much a selfish motivator as "Gaining pleasure".

While I agree that some actions can be taken to avoid the feeling of guilt that would come with inaction, I cannot think of many people who would choose a possibility of death over a possibility of guilt. The main problem I have with reducing all behavior to "avoiding pain" and/or "gaining pleasure" is that it doesn't account for selfless behavior, and that is a stance I cannot take in good faith with what I have seen and experienced in my life.

[hamishspence]

While a case could be made that not all apparently selfless behaviour has a bit of selfish motivation somewhere in it - it can be hard to prove one way or another.

[masamune1]

It's difficult to enter this without bringing in real world politics, but I think that there can be evil goals, too. It's not just means that are evil, it can also be ends.

Consider serial killers, such as some of the infamous "highway killers" who might have slain hundreds of people over a fairly short period of time. Their sole objective was some kind of dark satisfaction in the act of killing successfully. They weren't pursuing some non-evil end by doing this stuff. The evil was a goal in and of itself.*

A thug who knocks over a liquor store may be using evil means to achieve neutral ends, I agree. They may be buying food, medical treatment, repairs to their home or vehicle, etc.. In this case, the means are evil but the goals aren't (though they usually aren't good, either).

Robin Hood, as portrayed in modern legend, would be more of the "evil means for good ends" type.

So, I think that both ends and means can be evil. Or good, or neutral. The fact that they can be mixed up in many different combinations is what keeps things interesting. :smalltongue:

*Note: I do not actually believe in objective evil. Serial killers are actually insane, the equivalent of a diseased carnivore running amok. But for purposes of this discussion, I need to label as evil that which is actually a form of perilous dementia.


I am not a fan of the super reductionist view that turns every action into "It Makes Me Feel Good". It seems reasonable at first glance, but doesn't account for personal sacrifice when the stakes are high, like life or limb. Running into a burning building to save your grandfather and dying in the process cannot be explained away by "He would have derived great pleasure from rescuing his Grandfather, enough to risk his life." Also, forgoing what makes you "feel good" because of what you see as your duty/responsibility is generally described as a virtue, especially in situations where no one is there to witness and compliment your actions.

@Bulldog Psion: Mental illness is a subject that I have no professional experience with and I would like to start out with that very clear from the beginning. As far as I know, D&D doesn't really deal with mental illness very often. I think Ravenloft had tables that a character would have to roll on periodically to gain some kind of mental illness due to the strain of the constant horror (I remember one of them was that the character needed to eat dirt three times a day, many were more severe), and a character of any alignment could become afflicted. In this way I believe the Ravenloft setting was assigning "needs" that the character had added to their overall make-up, something that may or may not affect their alignment. A paladin that eats dirt three times a day is going to be fine, a paladin with an uncontrollable desire to kill may not be a paladin for very long. Would that paladin become evil due to their actions? Do serial killers kill because they obtain satisfaction from the act, or do they "need" to kill and obtain satisfaction from fulfilling a "need"? I never watched the show, but I think Dexter was about a serial killer who channeled his need to kill into killing only dangerous criminals, I wonder what his alignment was.

Tarquin is evil because of the actions he takes to get to his goals (ruling a kingdom), but what if he was afflicted with a type of mental illness that made him believe, with every fiber of his being, that he was simply the man casted to play the villain in a play, and his knowledge and preferences for storytelling convention was not a clever quirk but something he was enslaved to. Would he still be evil? I don't think so. Tragic, and a person that needs to be stopped, maybe even killed if necessary, but not evil.

All of this stops being comparable to the world we live in when Durkon comes up, because he is evil by his very nature. Since evil is a thing in the oots universe (and a lot of fantasy settings) and one of the effects of Durkon's transformation is that his alignment changes to it, the sudden shift in his behavior may seem comparable to mental illness, or that it isn't Durkon at all, but a completely different being. While these are important questions to some, I don't think it changes the fact that as long as Durkon's goals haven't changed (or the being now inhabiting Durkon has similar goals), he will continue to be an asset to the party, though the methods he employs will reflect his new evil nature. This in itself may be enough to create chaos in the party, and if left unchecked I think he will probably start doing things the other party members (with the exception of Belkar maybe) would be unwilling to do.

Insanity is a legal term, not a medical term. It is not the same thing as mental illness. Insanity means that you were not responsible for your actions due to an inability to distinguish between right and wrong (by the standards of society and the law, not by you); or, less commonly, that you had an irresistible impulse to commit an action that was illegal- this generally applies only to those who actually seek help for this and see it as a problem, not for those who can't control themselves but don't care, and further most jurisdictions do not use this definition.

Most serial killers are not insane. They know the difference between right and wrong, and they can stop if they choose to. Wanting to kill someone is neither insanity nor mental illness; it just is. In fact its probably very common; most people just don't act on it, usually because they also want not to kill people and are otherwise decent people; more rarely because they feel that the costs (ie. getting caught) outweigh the benefits.

Mental illness does not make you kill people or go out and commit violence; in fact the majority of mentally ill people are less likely to be violent, not more. Most serial killers suffer from personality disorders (usually anti-social and narcissistic, maybe with one or two others) but they are treated differently from other mental health issues and they don't make you not responsible for committing crimes either; there is some debate whether they are disorders at all or merely styles. Most narcissists and most sociopaths don't become serial killers or murderers either.

Dexter is a very unrealistic example of a serial killer. Serial killers are usually normal people who are secretly *******s who enjoy doing bad things and not getting caught, and the most common type are lust killers who do what they do for cheap, sick sexual thrills. Typically they are just the shallow, arrogant, guiltless and self-centred jerks you see everywhere and the difference between the ones who kill and the ones who don't is personal choice, mixed in with personal experiences and particular desires, prejudices and frustrations, and commonly thrill seeking and boredom. They are the ones who fantasize about killing but are arrogant and shameless enough to take such fantasies seriously.

There are variations and different styles of serial killer, but those are the most common. Ultimately though a serial killer is simply someone who kills three or more people with at least a few weeks in between kills and nothing else- motive, mental health, backstory and the rest are irrelevant.

Belief, even strong beliefs, are not signs of mental illness, at least not in and of themselves. Tarquin absolutely believes he is the villain of the story but not because he has to; he likes the idea of being the villain and sees it as role-play, and on a more philosophical level thinks that "Good" and "Evil" are outdated concepts (so by "villain" he probably means "antagonist"), even if he knows they technically exist. He is a narcissistic sociopath with a sadistic streak but that isn't the only reason he thinks he's the bad guy- he could easily think he is Neutral or even Good and still be that kind of psycho.

Durkon though can demonstrably be said to suffer from an illness that affects his mental health, because he has indeed suffered an affliction that may / will affect his behaviour and possibly his personality. But vampirism is a supernatural phenomenon; the closest real-life equivalent would be if someone suffered brain damage which also affected their personality behaviour, but that would never be enough to in and of itself cause someone to commit murder.

All that being said, "mental health" is a term every bit as nebulous and up-for-debate as terms like Good and Evil, and that should be kept in mind.

[Kevin B.]

@masamune1: Like I said in my post, I have no real knowledge of mental illness/psychology so my views on it and how they would play out in a fantasy role-playing game (and by extention, the oots universe) are not well formed, and may be completely wrong. I agree that the term "mental health" may be too much of an umbrella term to discuss any of this in any real kind of detail, and hope that my post did not seem to link mental illness with being deranged or dangerous.

I do think that it isn't a great fit to compare Durkon's transformation to mental illness or non-supernatural event since I think that forces it to miss it's mark by default.

[masamune1]

I do think that it isn't a great fit to compare Durkon's transformation to mental illness or non-supernatural event since I think that forces it to miss it's mark by default.

Not really. That supposes a significant difference between the natural and the supernatural.

To put it another way, the difference between magic and science is the same between science and art- its really just a question of approach. Science is simply a way of looking at the world; if magic is real, it can be looked at scientifically. The supernatural is really still the natural.

What's more powerful- a sleeping potion or sleeping pills? Depends on the drugs and the potion. Is there even a meaningful difference between the two? Same for a supernatural illness like vampirism and a non-supernatural one (like, say, a man-made vampiric virus). Does anyone in the OotS-verse really see much practical difference between going to the pharmacist for a drug and going to a spellshop for a potion? Its not even a question of potency, because magic, even divine magic, doesn't have to be especially strong.

[halfeye]

Insanity is a legal term, not a legal term.
What did you actually mean to write? :smallconfused:

[Kish]

You mean that wasn't a koan? I'm disappointed.

[masamune1]

I meant to say "not a medical term".

But I'm going to start implying I meant it as a koan from now on.

[halfeye]

You mean that wasn't a koan? I'm disappointed.
I prefer koans that are a bit ambiguous, straight logical contradiction doesn't do it for me (I do not claim to be enlightened).

[Loreweaver15]

While a case could be made that not all apparently selfless behaviour has a bit of selfish motivation somewhere in it - it can be hard to prove one way or another.

It's also pointless, one way or the other, because as was pointed out earlier, intent only matters so much, and endless recriminations over WHY somebody does something selfless eventually need to stop and just get on with life. Otherwise, they inevitably get taken over by individuals who seek only to point out that we're all selfish and that any selfless act is really a selfish one blah blah blah people like that are boring.

[Kevin B.]

Not really. That supposes a significant difference between the natural and the supernatural.

To put it another way, the difference between magic and science is the same between science and art- its really just a question of approach. Science is simply a way of looking at the world; if magic is real, it can be looked at scientifically. The supernatural is really still the natural.

What's more powerful- a sleeping potion or sleeping pills? Depends on the drugs and the potion. Is there even a meaningful difference between the two? Same for a supernatural illness like vampirism and a non-supernatural one (like, say, a man-made vampiric virus). Does anyone in the OotS-verse really see much practical difference between going to the pharmacist for a drug and going to a spellshop for a potion? Its not even a question of potency, because magic, even divine magic, doesn't have to be especially strong.

This view makes sense from within the oots universe. I was making the distinction of comparing Durkon's transformation to an illness or event that could occur in our world, where there is no magic (aaaand I feel like I just killed Santa Claus).

[masamune1]

This view makes sense from within the oots universe. I was making the distinction of comparing Durkon's transformation to an illness or event that could occur in our world, where there is no magic (aaaand I feel like I just killed Santa Claus).

It applies to our world too. The point is that if magic exists, we would call it science. And we do.

There are distinctions to be made, but the line is blurrier than you think. In practical terms there is little to no difference.

And you didn't kill Santa Claus. Nobody can.

[veti]

Tarquin is evil because of the actions he takes to get to his goals (ruling a kingdom), but what if he was afflicted with a type of mental illness that made him believe, with every fiber of his being, that he was simply the man casted to play the villain in a play, and his knowledge and preferences for storytelling convention was not a clever quirk but something he was enslaved to. Would he still be evil? I don't think so. Tragic, and a person that needs to be stopped, maybe even killed if necessary, but not evil.

I don't think the idea of a clear hard line between 'evil' and 'mentally ill' can hold for long. I personally believe that Tarquin is every bit as insane (http://psychcentral.com/disorders/narcissistic-personality-disorder-symptoms/) as you describe, but he's still evil.

More subtly: from a certain perspective, it is beguilingly easy to classify evil in itself as a form of insanity. After all, "Evil" means "making the world a worse place". You have to live in the world. Therefore, wilfully doing evil is inherently irrational. (Socrates (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html) used a version of this as part of his defence. I would mention more contemporary versions of the idea, but that would go into real-world politics. Suffice it to say, it's a very bad idea, but also hard to rebut, which is a dangerous combination.)

[Taelas]

It applies to our world too. The point is that if magic exists, we would call it science. And we do.

There are distinctions to be made, but the line is blurrier than you think. In practical terms there is little to no difference.

And you didn't kill Santa Claus. Nobody can.

Magic -- as the term is actually used in real life -- is lack of understanding. If you cannot understand how something is done, it seems magical, at least as long as that lack of an understanding persists.

Magic in D&D is not actually magical. It is codified, acts according to rules, and can be explained as the ability to manipulate reality to change according to the user's will in specific ways. Sure, to non-magic users, it's inexplicable and thus magical, but its practitioners study its effects and understand them (to some degree).

So yeah, the magic of D&D is just science we don't understand.

But in reality, magic is not science. Science is the explanation of how something occurred. Magic is the lack of an explanation. They are polar opposites.

If it can be explained, then it was never really magic in the first place, was it?


Tarquin is evil because of the actions he takes to get to his goals (ruling a kingdom), but what if he was afflicted with a type of mental illness that made him believe, with every fiber of his being, that he was simply the man casted to play the villain in a play, and his knowledge and preferences for storytelling convention was not a clever quirk but something he was enslaved to. Would he still be evil? I don't think so. Tragic, and a person that needs to be stopped, maybe even killed if necessary, but not evil.

Your question seems to imply the existence of a Tarquin who in absence of something forcing him to act the part wouldn't actually be a villain.

That would be begging the question, though. "If Tarquin wasn't really evil, but instead forced by circumstances, would he still be evil?" It's circular reasoning.

It might be true, but there's no possible way we could know.

[Snails]

Intent without reference to means matters little. Means without reference to intent also matters little. The lesson is that being overly reductionist leads us nowhere.

Clearly both intent and means, in combination, are what we care about.

This is not really a question that OotS is attempting to delve into. Tarquin claims that his goal is worthy, but Tarquin is capable of many kinds of deception, including self-deception. We lack an important character who is attempted to achieve unambiguously Good goals with much less than good means. The best example is Elan in his childish foolishness -- at least he is outgrowing his simplistic Nicely Nice Good attitudes that leads to silly ideas like his mother remarrying a monster like Tarquin.

We could recast the question in a more mundane form: What is more important, trying hard or results? In fact, people who think there is a simple answer to that are prone to terrible personal dysfunctions. Only trying hard can forgive all kinds of sloppiness and encourage every kind of excuse making. Only caring about results discourages trying hard when failure is likely (and possibly the most rewarding) and encourages every kind of cheating/dishonesty. A whole and effective person in life has to value both trying hard and results, in a balanced mixture.

Likewise in the OotSverse, those worthy of admiration have struck some effective balance between goals and means, trying hard and results. Roy, Haley, Hinjo, O-Chul, Shojo would be the ones I would offer as most admirable.

[Kevin B.]

Your question seems to imply the existence of a Tarquin who in absence of something forcing him to act the part wouldn't actually be a villain.

That would be begging the question, though. "If Tarquin wasn't really evil, but instead forced by circumstances, would he still be evil?" It's circular reasoning.

It might be true, but there's no possible way we could know.

That's the crux of trying to arrive at any kind of truth by thought experiment, the mind has to account for all of the variables and constants which are less changeable in a real world experiment, and the one I built for Tarquin may not be functional in proving or disproving anything. People more clever and enlightened than I have debated for a long time whether ethics are relative to a situation or whether they exist separately and independent of what we think about them. That isn't really the discussion I am trying to foster though, mostly because it could quickly start a flame war.

But, instead of debating the issue we could just understand the whys and wheres the two schools of thought disagree, which allows us to move on and try to apply the argument to a different situation; the oots universe (and similar fantasy settings). In the oots universe, Good and evil are actual, provable things that can be affected, perceived (magically) and manipulated. Beings of great power exist that are embodiments of good and evil, law and chaos, and there are places they live where you can go that are governed by laws different from those found on the prime material plane.

So, how do the frameworks hold up when applied to this reality? Can evil be relative when demons demonstratively exist? I believe the answer is yes, since I think evil more accurately describes actions instead of goals, although so far there have been posts made that make me think hard about my position (a sincere thank you for that). I wasn't trying to talk in circles with my Insane Tarquin example, but like I have stated I am no psychologist and my attempt at fitting insanity into a similar position to Durkon's vampirism (namely, that neither of them would have asked to have the condition) falls flat. I would also like to keep this discussion of ethics as bound to the oots universe as possible to keep it from sliding back to our world, where conditions are different (no vampires and the like).


I don't think the idea of a clear hard line between 'evil' and 'mentally ill' can hold for long. I personally believe that Tarquin is every bit as insane as you describe, but he's still evil.

More subtly: from a certain perspective, it is beguilingly easy to classify evil in itself as a form of insanity. After all, "Evil" means "making the world a worse place". You have to live in the world. Therefore, wilfully doing evil is inherently irrational. (Socrates used a version of this as part of his defence. I would mention more contemporary versions of the idea, but that would go into real-world politics. Suffice it to say, it's a very bad idea, but also hard to rebut, which is a dangerous combination.)

If that's the case, oots is full to the brim with insane characters! Redcloak is evil, but I don't think anyone would describe him as insane. Bozzok was a very self interested rational evil character. I guess the question is "Making the world a worse place for whom?"

As I take a look back at what I have been typing I get the feeling I could come across as contrary or confrontational, and I would like to clarify that is not my intent. I am having a lot of fun reading everyone's thoughts on the matter, especially the ones that force me to take a harder look at what I believe. :smallsmile:

[veti]

If that's the case, oots is full to the brim with insane characters! Redcloak is evil, but I don't think anyone would describe him as insane. Bozzok was a very self interested rational evil character. I guess the question is "Making the world a worse place for whom?"

Which is sort of my point. From a number of perspectives, you could call Redcloak "insane". For instance, if you're a fervent worshipper of, say, Thor, and you believe the gods have built the world in the best possible way, then Redcloak's belief that it can be improved is clearly delusional. He should be restrained and re-educated until he sees the error of his ways. It's for his own good - when he understands the truth, he'll thank us!

Bozzok, similarly, is tragically misguided. Sure, he's grabbing things for himself - but in the process, he's creating a society without trust or stability, thereby ensuring that no-one, himself included, can ever live a peaceful and productive life, which we all know is the path to true happiness. If he turned his talents to supporting law and order rather than subverting or overriding it, everyone - himself included - would be better off. He's crazy, I tell you.

[davidbofinger]

Robin Hood, as portrayed in modern legend, would be more of the "evil means for good ends" type.

He's trying to restore a legitimate monarch by crimes against the usurper's regime. I would call that chaotic means for lawful ends, rather than evil for good.

[davidbofinger]

If [Redcloak] was of good alignment he could have the same goal, but his tactics for achieving it would be different; he [...] may try diplomacy over violence

Redcloak used diplomacy to make alliances with other cities. There's nothing intrinsically good or evil about diplomacy, as Saruman and Grima Wormtongue illustrate.

I think the principal characteristic of evil in OOTS is that evil characters enjoy the suffering of others and, all else being equal, will cause it wherever they have an opportunity, whereas good characters see it as something to avoid or prevent where possible. This is the basis for Elan pulling Nale to safety, for Redcloak and Xykon laughing over Tsukiko's almost being killed by an elemental, for Durkon smiling as he killed Z, for the Monster in the Darkness wanting O'Chul to have a meal he liked, for Team Evil torturing O'Chul, for Tarquin burning slaves alive, for Celia's pacificism, for Belkar's murderousness, etc.. I can't think of anything else so characteristic of evil in the story.

[Snails]

Which is sort of my point. From a number of perspectives, you could call Redcloak "insane". For instance, if you're a fervent worshipper of, say, Thor, and you believe the gods have built the world in the best possible way, then Redcloak's belief that it can be improved is clearly delusional. He should be restrained and re-educated until he sees the error of his ways. It's for his own good - when he understands the truth, he'll thank us!

Plato/Socrates was fond of the idea that if only Virtuous ideas were explained well enough everyone would simply agree (except for the insane).

Unfortunately, this idea happens to be wrong. Highly intelligent and emotionally competent humans can disagree about important things. The rub is that while it is fairly easy to gain consensus on what is a Value, there is no consensus on which Value is more important than another Value when they come into conflict. That is the nature of humans.

[Taelas]

He's trying to restore a legitimate monarch by crimes against the usurper's regime. I would call that chaotic means for lawful ends, rather than evil for good.

There are various incarnations of the character, but at the core, he is an outlaw who steals from the oppressive rich and gives to the oppressed poor.

You can twist the character of Robin Hood to fit any alignment by claiming other motivations, but the classic character is Chaotic Good -- he uses Chaotic means (stealing from those who can afford it with no personal benefit) for a Good end (to give to those who need it to survive).

Any other motivation ascribed to Robin Hood is people putting different spins on the same tale. You could make him out to be of any alignment you wish by doing that.

[Ring_of_Gyges]

@ Kevin B:
Would it be accurate to say that on your view, all ends are neutral with good and evil just applying to the means?

If that is your position, I don't think it can be right. There are good, evil, & neutral means & ends. Some examples of what I have in mind,

Good ends, good means: A wants to liberate his nation from an oppressive and evil regime, so forces the oppressors to confront and really truly understand the harm of their behavior and encourages them to develop their sense of empathy until they are willing to leave. Ghandi or Martin Luther King for example.

Good ends, neutral means: B wants to liberate his nation from an oppressive and evil regime, so travels to nearby nations and uses diplomacy to convince them that intervening to depose the regime would serve their economic interests.

Good ends, evil means: C wants to liberate his nation from an oppressive and evil regime, so embarks on a campaign of terror, murdering as many civilians as they can as painfully as they can until the oppressor can't take it any more and leaves.

Neutral ends, good means: D is hungry and wants to eat so works at his job in a free health clinic to earn money which he spends on food.

Neutral ends, neutral means: E is hungry and wants to eat so works on his farm to raise food. He eats some of it, and sells the rest at standard market rates.

Neutral ends, evil means: F is hungry and wants to eat so breaks into someone's home, kills them, and raids their pantry.

Evil ends, good means: G spends heavily to have an assassin on the brink of death healed so he can be hired to murder an enemy.

Evil ends, neutral means: H brings a meritorious lawsuit against an enemy because he hates him and wants him to suffer.

Evil ends, evil means: I hates his enemy and wants him to suffer, so stabs him in the face.

Lengthy, but that's what I have in mind. I have sympathy for your position, most ends aren't evil. The thief wants personal comfort, the tyrant wants a sense of control, the cop-killer wants not be arrested, etc... None of those are inherently evil ends, what makes the villain evil is his means, robbery, despotism, murder, etc...

Some ends are evil though. Hatred is probably the best example. If I hate someone I want them to suffer.

One could generalize means until they are all indistinguishable from each other. All of the means above for example could be covered by "get what I want", but that cuts out morally relevant information. "Get what I want" by itself sounds neutral, but if what you want to achieve is increasing or decreasing suffering then the end can be good or evil.

re: Evil vs. Mentally Ill, I think you just can't have both. If you take a moral view of the world, people make free willed decisions and choose between good and evil. If you take a scientific view, your actions are caused by something. Your upbringing, your biology, random chance, whatever. There isn't really room in a scientific worldview for phenomena which aren't caused by the neutral operation of natural laws. If your "choices" are the result of the operation of the laws of nature, a murder isn't qualitatively different from a landslide. I make no claims about which is better, but the two viewpoints are in (at least) pretty severe tension and (more likely) outright contradictory.

[hamishspence]

re: Evil vs. Mentally Ill, I think you just can't have both.

Some evil-aligned monsters in D&D are specifically insane:

http://www.d20srd.org/srd/monsters/derro.htm

And Savage Species's "Chaotic/Accepting" viewpoint basically boils down to "Evil creatures are the victims of their own psychoses".

While it may not apply to all evil beings, it could be quite common.

[Ring_of_Gyges]

Some evil-aligned monsters in D&D are specifically insane:

http://www.d20srd.org/srd/monsters/derro.htm

And Savage Species's "Chaotic/Accepting" viewpoint basically boils down to "Evil creatures are the victims of their own psychoses".

While it may not apply to all evil beings, it could be quite common.
Fair enough, but the SRD can get moral philosophy wrong. If the Dero only commit evil acts because they're mentally ill they're sick, not evil. If the Dero are evil, you call the cause an evil nature not an illness. They're fundamentally different ways of looking at motivation.

An author can say "There are Dero in the world" but can't accurately say "The Dero are simultaneously evil and not in control of their actions."

[halfeye]

Plato/Socrates was fond of the idea that if only Virtuous ideas were explained well enough everyone would simply agree (except for the insane).

Unfortunately, this idea happens to be wrong. Highly intelligent and emotionally competent humans can disagree about important things. The rub is that while it is fairly easy to gain consensus on what is a Value, there is no consensus on which Value is more important than another Value when they come into conflict. That is the nature of humans.
No, that's the nature of Nature. It is the way this universe is.

[hamishspence]

If the Dero only commit evil acts because they're mentally ill they're sick, not evil. If the Dero are evil, you call the cause an evil nature not an illness. They're fundamentally different ways of looking at motivation.
Unless you take the view that "Being evil is a mental illness"

However- this may not be the right view in D&D.

It may be possible for a Derro to change from CE to CN or even CG, and retain the "Madness" trait.

[Loreweaver15]

No, that's the nature of Nature. It is the way this universe is.

Please clarify.

[Ring_of_Gyges]

Unless you take the view that "Being evil is a mental illness"You shouldn't take that view though. If the evil behavior is caused by mental illness you either need to say people are morally responsible for getting sick, or that people can be morally condemned for things beyond their control. Neither seems tolerable.


However- this may not be the right view in D&D.D&D is pretty iffy when it comes to moral philosophy, who knows what's right for D&D. I'm not sure there is any moral theory that could justify all the parts of the D&D alignment system.


It may be possible for a Derro to change from CE to CN or even CG, and retain the "Madness" trait.If the illness causes an irresistible compulsion to stab people, I'd think a Derro could be any alignment. While he's in control of his actions he's LG, NE, or whatever and when he's not he's neutral and stabby.

He's neutral rather than evil while in the grip of his madness for the same reason a hungry tiger is neutral. Being dangerous and stabby (or bitey) isn't enough for an evil alignment, you also have to be capable of moral decision making as well.

What I don't see how one could get to is the result that the Derro are both evil and not in control of their behavior.

[Keltest]

What I don't see how one could get to is the result that the Derro are both evil and not in control of their behavior.

Nature vs Nurture. If you grow up in a culture where people compulsively backstab you (metaphorically and literally) you aren't going to be a very nice guy even when you aren't acting out a psychosis.

[hamishspence]

If the evil behavior is caused by mental illness you either need to say people are morally responsible for getting sick, or that people can be morally condemned for things beyond their control. Neither seems tolerable.

Alternatively, one could not condemn it at all, and focus on other ways of responding.

Regardless of why a person is "hurting, oppressing, and killing others" without satisfactory justification in the eyes of the players - it's happening - and they need to put a stop to it.

[halfeye]

Plato/Socrates was fond of the idea that if only Virtuous ideas were explained well enough everyone would simply agree (except for the insane).

Unfortunately, this idea happens to be wrong. Highly intelligent and emotionally competent humans can disagree about important things. The rub is that while it is fairly easy to gain consensus on what is a Value, there is no consensus on which Value is more important than another Value when they come into conflict. That is the nature of humans.
No, that's the nature of Nature. It is the way this universe is.Please clarify.
I agree with Snails that rational people can disagree about things. I disagree that it is something peculiar to humans. Rational wolves can disagree, rational lions can disagree with rational hyenas. The animals may not be able to put it into words, but they can disagree to the point of death about many things, often who gets to eat who. I believe that this is due to entropy, which is universal, some think it's peculiar to Earth, and we are just unlucky to be in/on the one place it applies, which is also the only place we know about, which I think is so unlikely, it is almost certainly incorrect.

[veti]

You shouldn't take that view though.

Can you define "shouldn't"?


If the evil behavior is caused by mental illness you either need to say people are morally responsible for getting sick, or that people can be morally condemned for things beyond their control. Neither seems tolerable.

Neither seems necessary. As HamishSpence says, why they do what they do is less important than stopping them from doing it.

If a mind flayer is raised from birth to dominate and, occasionally, snack on the brains of the lesser races, is it evil or is it sick? Seems like a moot point to me. Either way, it's not responsible for its own upbringing; either way, a good character will want to stop it.


D&D is pretty iffy when it comes to moral philosophy, who knows what's right for D&D. I'm not sure there is any moral theory that could justify all the parts of the D&D alignment system.

I am reasonably sure there isn't. Which is why this discussion is going round in circles - as it has done countless times before, as it will when it pops up again, probably before Easter.


If the illness causes an irresistible compulsion to stab people, I'd think a Derro could be any alignment. While he's in control of his actions he's LG, NE, or whatever and when he's not he's neutral and stabby.

If the LG Derro is aware of the "neutral and stabby" persona, then his number one priority will be to do whatever it takes to restrain it from harming people. If he doesn't, then he's evil.

[Ring_of_Gyges]

Can you define "shouldn't"?The acts you shouldn't do are the acts that violate some normative rule. In this case an epistemic rule, more specifically "don't believe things which aren't true".


If a mind flayer is raised from birth to dominate and, occasionally, snack on the brains of the lesser races, is it evil or is it sick? Seems like a moot point to me. Either way, it's not responsible for its own upbringing; either way, a good character will want to stop it.

Do you want your moral theories to distinguish between a Mind Flayer killing villagers and a hungry Tiger killing villagers? If you just care about saving villagers you won't need moral philosophy, you'll need spears.

D&D doesn't just care about saving villagers though. D&D presents a universe where the two are qualitatively different. The Mind Flayer is evil, worthy of moral condemnation, and takes extra damage from holy swords. The Tiger is neutral, an inappropriate target of moral criticism, and isn't affected by Smite Evil.

You don't have to have a moral theory that treats the two differently. You could be a perfectly happy utilitarian who just counts up the suffering inflicted and is indifferent as to why. You could be a nihilist and say neither of them are doing anything morally significant. You could be a big weirdo and think Tigers are evil. The sky is the limit.

D&D takes a particular moral position though. If you cast Detect Evil on a Mind Flayer it goes "ding" and if you cast it on a Tiger it doesn't. Does the grieving parent care if his kid was killed by a Mind Flayer or a Tiger? Probably not, but D&D cares. D&D has to label some violence as evil, some as neutral, and some as good so it can define how much damage things take when Paladins stab them.

The player's handbook says tigers are "neutral because they lack the capacity for morally right or wrong behavior", which is a bit too much of a tautology for me. I'd prefer something like "because they lack the capacity for moral choice". Wild animals don't have free willed souls choosing between good and evil, they're just acting out their instincts without any moral sense at all.

Good and evil (I think) are only coherent concepts if the moral agent has a choice between them. Don't ask me to elaborate more on that, I find the idea of free willed choice pretty incomprehensible, but I think that's what the English words "good and evil" mean. If you don't have any choice over your behavior you're just an automaton. The T-1000 of Terminator fame isn't evil, it's a machine running the program it has been given with no choice in the matter. The Tiger isn't evil, it's too mentally simple to grasp morality and make choices about it.

D&D blathers all over this issue in unhelpful ways. "Being good or evil can be a conscious choice" (PHB 105) but "For most people, though, being good or evil is an attitude the one recognizes but does not choose" (id). We find out D&D thinks good and evil are objective, which is nice, but never really what separates a dangerous Tiger from a dangerous Dragon.

I think that PHB section is logically incoherent. Good and evil are words in English and have meanings fixed by the actual usage of actual English speakers. If you have in mind a person with dangerous traits that they "recognize but did not choose", I think "evil" just isn't the English word for that concept.

We all have slightly (or not so slightly) different ideas about what's evil, but the idea that to be evil is to morally blameworthy is pretty basic and the idea that one can't be morally blameworthy for things beyond one's control is also pretty basic. I'm not morally responsible for tornados because I don't have any control over them. If I suffer from an irresistable compulsion (be it from Dominate Person, mental illness, or my "stab all the hu-mans" gene) I'm no more in control of the ensuing violence than I am of the tornado.

The reason you shouldn't say a Mind Flayer is both ill & evil is that he's either in control of his actions or he's not. If he is, he's not compelled by his illness he's deliberately choosing evil. If he's not in control, he's no more evil than a person under perfect mind control. They're just two different paradigms for describing the world, you get one, the other, or some other option, but you shouldn't believe both simultaneously.

[halfeye]

Do you want your moral theories to distinguish between a Mind Flayer killing villagers and a hungry Tiger killing villagers? If you just care about saving villagers you won't need moral philosophy, you'll need spears.
A thing about maneating tigers is that they are generally weak elderly ones that can't catch anything faster than a man, people are a lot more dangerous than deer, but people are slower over short distances.


D&D doesn't just care about saving villagers though. D&D presents a universe where the two are qualitatively different. The Mind Flayer is evil, worthy of moral condemnation, and takes extra damage from holy swords. The Tiger is neutral, an inappropriate target of moral criticism, and isn't affected by Smite Evil.
D&D is fiction, and D&D is weird.


You don't have to have a moral theory that treats the two differently. You could be a perfectly happy utilitarian who just counts up the suffering inflicted and is indifferent as to why. You could be a nihilist and say neither of them are doing anything morally significant. You could be a big weirdo and think Tigers are evil. The sky is the limit.

Maneating tigers are exceptional, and in places where they occur, many would call them evil.


D&D takes a particular moral position though. If you cast Detect Evil on a Mind Flayer it goes "ding" and if you cast it on a Tiger it doesn't. Does the grieving parent care if his kid was killed by a Mind Flayer or a Tiger? Probably not, but D&D cares. D&D has to label some violence as evil, some as neutral, and some as good so it can define how much damage things take when Paladins stab them.
As I said, D&D is fiction. *shrug*


The player's handbook says tigers are "neutral because they lack the capacity for morally right or wrong behavior", which is a bit too much of a tautology for me. I'd prefer something like "because they lack the capacity for moral choice". Wild animals don't have free willed souls choosing between good and evil, they're just acting out their instincts without any moral sense at all.
In the end, it comes down to who dies, does the predator starve, or does it eat its prey? Note that herbivores predate vegetables. There is no good and evil in the natural world, instincts are at least a substitute for thought, there is plenty of reason for believing that animals do think.


Good and evil (I think) are only coherent concepts if the moral agent has a choice between them. Don't ask me to elaborate more on that, I find the idea of free willed choice pretty incomprehensible, but I think that's what the English words "good and evil" mean. If you don't have any choice over your behavior you're just an automaton. The T-1000 of Terminator fame isn't evil, it's a machine running the program it has been given with no choice in the matter. The Tiger isn't evil, it's too mentally simple to grasp morality and make choices about it.
Probably 90% of people believe that, but I believe that's speciesist against tigers. What tigers don't have is a choice between eating flesh and starving, they can do one or the other but not neither, and being able to speak wouldn't make a difference to that.


D&D blathers all over this issue in unhelpful ways. "Being good or evil can be a conscious choice" (PHB 105) but "For most people, though, being good or evil is an attitude the one recognizes but does not choose" (id). We find out D&D thinks good and evil are objective, which is nice, but never really what separates a dangerous Tiger from a dangerous Dragon.
Thanks for the information about D&D, it's interesting that they avoid this issue.


I think that PHB section is logically incoherent. Good and evil are words in English and have meanings fixed by the actual usage of actual English speakers. If you have in mind a person with dangerous traits that they "recognize but did not choose", I think "evil" just isn't the English word for that concept.
I think English is confused.


We all have slightly (or not so slightly) different ideas about what's evil, but the idea that to be evil is to morally blameworthy is pretty basic and the idea that one can't be morally blameworthy for things beyond one's control is also pretty basic. I'm not morally responsible for tornados because I don't have any control over them. If I suffer from an irresistable compulsion (be it from Dominate Person, mental illness, or my "stab all the hu-mans" gene) I'm no more in control of the ensuing violence than I am of the tornado.
I think I mostly agree, but (there had to be a but) the tornado is responsible for the tornado, and there could be a description of one as evil. Which would probably be a silly description.


The reason you shouldn't say a Mind Flayer is both ill & evil is that he's either in control of his actions or he's not. If he is, he's not compelled by his illness he's deliberately choosing evil. If he's not in control, he's no more evil than a person under perfect mind control. They're just two different paradigms for describing the world, you get one, the other, or some other option, but you shouldn't believe both simultaneously.
It's not about self control, it's about available options, so long as it's a case of eat or die, then eating can't be coherently called evil, whether there is the mental capacity to think about it or not.

[veti]

The acts you shouldn't do are the acts that violate some normative rule. In this case an epistemic rule, more specifically "don't believe things which aren't true".

OK, next question: can you define "true", in the context of a fictional setting that obeys arbitrary rules that vary from one implementation to another, and most often also from one time to another within any given implementation?

I'm not trying to be a smartarse here. I think the epistomological problems here are deeper than you realise, and that's causing you to focus your effort in a place that can't deliver what you're looking for.


D&D takes a particular moral position though. If you cast Detect Evil on a Mind Flayer it goes "ding" and if you cast it on a Tiger it doesn't.

And I think that's a clue that the usage of "good" and "evil" in the D&D world is not consistent with any coherent moral theory about how they may work in the real world. As I said, the mind flayer isn't responsible for how it was raised. Nor is it responsible for its metabolism, which gives it an overwhelming urge to snack on intelligent brains from time to time.

The most salient difference between the tiger and the mind flayer is that the latter has the capacity to understand that it is causing suffering to intelligent beings. (We're assuming, for some reason, that mind flayers have the capacity for empathy, despite the fact that they're often described as "alien" intelligences.) But even if the mind flayer does have that theoretical capacity - for most people, empathy is something that's instilled in childhood - i.e., it's not in their control. You don't "choose" to be empathic, the only choice you get is what to do with your empathy once you have it.


Good and evil (I think) are only coherent concepts if the moral agent has a choice between them. Don't ask me to elaborate more on that, I find the idea of free willed choice pretty incomprehensible, but I think that's what the English words "good and evil" mean.

Umm. So to you, the terms "good" and "evil" can only make sense in the presence of an assumption that you yourself suspect to be logically incoherent? Might that be the source of your conceptual problem?

I don't want to get into real-world religion, but there is at least one denomination - a large, mainstream religious movement - that believes firmly in good and evil, but not in free will. And that's not just an un-thought-out, intellectually incoherent position - there's a whole branch of theology behind it. PM me if you need me to fill in the blanks in that description, but I think you're knowledgeable enough to recognise who I'm talking about.


If you don't have any choice over your behavior you're just an automaton. The T-1000 of Terminator fame isn't evil, it's a machine running the program it has been given with no choice in the matter. The Tiger isn't evil, it's too mentally simple to grasp morality and make choices about it.

But the T-1000's "brain" is comparable to a human's. According to the utterly incoherent drivel that was "Terminator 2", terminators can even feel pain. If a mind flayer has the capacity to rise above its upbringing (which - correct me if I'm wrong here - but I think this is the least that is required for the mind flayer to be considered "evil", according to your position), then the T-1000 has the same capacity. After all, we know that it learns and adapts - ergo, it can rewrite its programming.


I think that PHB section is logically incoherent. Good and evil are words in English and have meanings fixed by the actual usage of actual English speakers. If you have in mind a person with dangerous traits that they "recognize but did not choose", I think "evil" just isn't the English word for that concept.

I agree that D&D's depiction of good and evil doesn't stand up to logical analysis. What I don't understand is why you do understand and agree with this, but you're trying to apply that analysis anyway.


The reason you shouldn't say a Mind Flayer is both ill & evil is that he's either in control of his actions or he's not. If he is, he's not compelled by his illness he's deliberately choosing evil. If he's not in control, he's no more evil than a person under perfect mind control. They're just two different paradigms for describing the world, you get one, the other, or some other option, but you shouldn't believe both simultaneously.

Earlier, you were talking about a derro who acted compulsively some of the time, but had interludes when it was in full control of its actions. The mind flayer might be the same. Still, the same question applies - what does the lucid personality choose to do about the uncontrollable one? If the answer is "nothing", then - disregarding for a moment everything written above - the creature is both evil and ill.

[Loreweaver15]

That's.

I.

You didn't like Terminator 2?

How did you not like Terminator 2?

There is no more important question than that on the internet.

[veti]

That's.

I.

You didn't like Terminator 2?

How did you not like Terminator 2?

There is no more important question than that on the internet.

Oh, where to begin...

Shall we talk about the character derailment of Sarah Connor? The determined, stop-at-nothing heroine who, having resolved to murder the clever black man in cold blood (for the crime, apparently, of being clever), suddenly gets cold feet when it turns out there might be witnesses? Or her complete stupidity, in choosing to focus her ire on the blameless programmer, rather than on his corporate or political superiors? When I hear this movie being held up as an example of a strong female character, it's all I can do to keep my fists in my pockets.

Shall we talk about the cute-sification of Arnie? When he decided he had political ambitions, suddenly the fact that his most memorable role was as a cold, meticulous, unstoppable, murderous villain became inconvenient, and had to be retconned - into something that's not just heroic, but also bumbling, lovable and sympathetic. Doesn't that leave at least a little bit of bile in the mouth?

As part of this process, Sarah officially approves the T-101 as John's adoptive "father". (John's own foster parents having been entirely unsympathetic disciplinarians, lest we feel - something - when the T-1000 dispatches them both in short order.) You'd think, with that background, the champion of humanity could do with a father figure who could help him to be, y'know, human? Apparently Sarah doesn't think that's useful, and nor does this movie.

Shall we talk about the character of John Connor himself? Whose main role in the film, as far as I can tell, is to be the one guy who's even more annoying than the rewritten Arnie, thus deflecting criticism?

But no, my real beef with this pile of dreck is that it's not content with sucking in itself, on its own terms. Like the very worst sequels everywhere (including, e.g., Highlander II (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102034/), Crocodile Dundee III (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0231402/), The Mummy III (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0859163/), and do I even have to mention The Phantom Jar-Jar (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120915/)?), it actually rewrites its own predecessor to make it suck retrospectively. The premise of the first film is that Skynet sends an unstoppable assassin to rewrite history, and ends up bringing about (http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/YouAlreadyChangedThePast) the very history that it's trying to avert. The second movie throws that lesson away completely, in favour of its "No, actually you can rewrite the past" drivel.

[Loreweaver15]

Oh, where to begin...

Shall we talk about the character derailment of Sarah Connor? The determined, stop-at-nothing heroine who, having resolved to murder the clever black man in cold blood (for the crime, apparently, of being clever), suddenly gets cold feet when it turns out there might be witnesses? Or her complete stupidity, in choosing to focus her ire on the blameless programmer, rather than on his corporate or political superiors? When I hear this movie being held up as an example of a strong female character, it's all I can do to keep my fists in my pockets.

Shall we talk about the cute-sification of Arnie? When he decided he had political ambitions, suddenly the fact that his most memorable role was as a cold, meticulous, unstoppable, murderous villain became inconvenient, and had to be retconned - into something that's not just heroic, but also bumbling, lovable and sympathetic. Doesn't that leave at least a little bit of bile in the mouth?

As part of this process, Sarah officially approves the T-101 as John's adoptive "father". (John's own foster parents having been entirely unsympathetic disciplinarians, lest we feel - something - when the T-1000 dispatches them both in short order.) You'd think, with that background, the champion of humanity could do with a father figure who could help him to be, y'know, human? Apparently Sarah doesn't think that's useful, and nor does this movie.

Shall we talk about the character of John Connor himself? Whose main role in the film, as far as I can tell, is to be the one guy who's even more annoying than the rewritten Arnie, thus deflecting criticism?

But no, my real beef with this pile of dreck is that it's not content with sucking in itself, on its own terms. Like the very worst sequels everywhere (including, e.g., Highlander II (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102034/), Crocodile Dundee III (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0231402/), The Mummy III (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0859163/), and do I even have to mention The Phantom Jar-Jar (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120915/)?), it actually rewrites its own predecessor to make it suck retrospectively. The premise of the first film is that Skynet sends an unstoppable assassin to rewrite history, and ends up bringing about (http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/YouAlreadyChangedThePast) the very history that it's trying to avert. The second movie throws that lesson away completely, in favour of its "No, actually you can rewrite the past" drivel.

So the people making the movie write it to indicate that Sarah is neither sane nor an admirable example of a strong woman, and you're upset with it because some other people misinterpreted it. In addition, you missed that Sarah rationalizing her decision to abandon her son is supposed to be a bad thing, that she stopped trying to kill that programmer when she was forced to face the inhumanity of her current mindset. Also, that he's the mind that made Skynet a thing; killing his bosses does nothing to the project, but killing him directly interferes with Skynet's birth, and that killing him is presented by the people who made the movie as a wrong and horrible decision. Also also, that the decision to make the T-800 the hero of the movie was made by James Cameron before Schwarzenegger even signed onto the project, and Schwarzenegger spent the entire initial phone call trying to convince Cameron to let him kill people in the movie.

Also also also, that the first movie's entire message was that determinism is stupid and that there is no fate but what we make for ourselves.

So, basically, you're a fan of Terminator 3, then :P

[Taelas]

Shall we talk about the cute-sification of Arnie?

...

I don't even...

Huh?

Cute-sification? Arnold Schwarzenegger? How the boopin' bleep is the Terminator "cute"?

There's only one thing in the entire movie that the Terminator does which could be considered a change in his character, and that is when he at the end commits suicide, which he does because... character development.

Skynet does not "bring about" the future it is trying to prevent by trying to kill Sarah Conner; John Conner very deliberately sent back his own father to protect his mother. Unless he's a complete and utter moron, he would do that regardless of whether Skynet sends an unstoppable assassin or not. There is no aspect of the first film that prevents anyone from changing history. It just so happens that the people who want to preserve (an important part of) history WIN. Sorry but clearly you misunderstood the message of the first movie. (Seriously, if history couldn't be averted, what the hell would be the point of the first movie? Why bother trying to protect Sarah at all? Clearly the T-800, when attempting to kill the real Sarah, should have slipped on a banana peel and end up shooting its own head off rather than alter history. That "message" just about kills any semblance of tension.)

As for John Conner... yeah, he was a whiny annoying git. Don't really care. Sarah is the far more interesting character, and Arnold was at the absolute peak of his career in T-2. Both completely outshine the 12-year old "main character". Finally, the T-1000 manages to be more frightening than even Arnold's T-800, which is a damn nice feat.

[Loreweaver15]

Also also ALSO also, that this movie was made a decade before Arnold Schwarzenegger even made a move on the political scene.

[theNater]

Shall we talk about the character derailment of Sarah Connor? The determined, stop-at-nothing heroine who, having resolved to murder the clever black man in cold blood (for the crime, apparently, of being clever), suddenly gets cold feet when it turns out there might be witnesses?
She had built him up in her mind as a comic book villain, working in the name of evil to construct a machine that would Destroy the World(mwa ha ha)! When she was confronted with the reality, she was unable to cope. It's bizarre, but it is exactly the kind of bizarre thing humans do.

Shall we talk about the cute-sification of Arnie? When he decided he had political ambitions, suddenly the fact that his most memorable role was as a cold, meticulous, unstoppable, murderous villain became inconvenient, and had to be retconned - into something that's not just heroic, but also bumbling, lovable and sympathetic. Doesn't that leave at least a little bit of bile in the mouth?
I think you may have jumped to T3 there. There's very little bumbling in T2, and Arnie is an unfeeling murder machine through the bulk of the film.

As part of this process, Sarah officially approves the T-101 as John's adoptive "father". (John's own foster parents having been entirely unsympathetic disciplinarians, lest we feel - something - when the T-1000 dispatches them both in short order.) You'd think, with that background, the champion of humanity could do with a father figure who could help him to be, y'know, human? Apparently Sarah doesn't think that's useful, and nor does this movie.
John's value to the future is that he taught the humans how to outfight machines designed explicitly for killing humans. There is no indication in either film that his humanity does anything other than determine which side of the war he's on.

The premise of the first film is that Skynet sends an unstoppable assassin to rewrite history, and ends up bringing about (http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/YouAlreadyChangedThePast) the very history that it's trying to avert. The second movie throws that lesson away completely, in favour of its "No, actually you can rewrite the past" drivel.
Rewriting the rules for time travel hurt both movies pretty badly, I'm 100% with you there.

Skynet does not "bring about" the future it is trying to prevent by trying to kill Sarah Conner; John Conner very deliberately sent back his own father to protect his mother. Unless he's a complete and utter moron, he would do that regardless of whether Skynet sends an unstoppable assassin or not.
John didn't just stumble across a time machine; he captured the one Skynet built to prekill him. Any way you slice it, without Skynet's attempt on Sarah's life, she and Kyle never meet.

[Taelas]

John didn't just stumble across a time machine; he captured the one Skynet built to prekill him. Any way you slice it, without Skynet's attempt on Sarah's life, she and Kyle never meet.
Assuming that the time machine can only exist if Skynet attempts to kill Sarah. At most, Skynet enables John's existence. Unless there was an "original" John Connor (urgh; Conner or Connor? Meh); one who was not the son of Kyle but still Sarah's. Which is entirely possible.

[theNater]

Assuming that the time machine can only exist if Skynet attempts to kill Sarah. At most, Skynet enables John's existence. Unless there was an "original" John Connor (urgh; Conner or Connor? Meh); one who was not the son of Kyle but still Sarah's. Which is entirely possible.
Some time machine could exist for other reasons, but a time machine Kyle Reese would reasonably use in order to travel to 1984 Los Angeles is a bit more specific. I'm not sure whether some other series of events leading to Kyle going back in time and meeting Sarah Connor is more or less likely than John having an identical half-brother also named John Connor, but neither of them is particularly plausible.

On the other hand, history being immutable-Kyle went back and fathered John as a reaction to Skynet trying to kill John as a result of Kyle fathering John-is entirely self consistent, and does not require implausible coincidence, implausible human behavior, or implausible genetics.

[Taelas]

He doesn't have to be identical in the least -- he just needs to be called John Connor. He doesn't even have to be remotely similar to the "real" John. The John Connor we are familiar with is forced by the time loop to be called John Connor, but a different son of Sarah Connor could be entirely different from the John Connor we know--he simply ends up being the leader of humanity against Skynet. Then Kyle is sent back, fathers the John Connor we know, and then Sarah raises him to be the leader of humanity against Skynet, because she's aware of the future.

There are, in this situation, two time lines: the original time line, with a John Connor we never meet, who happens to be the right person to lead humanity against Skynet. He's the son of Sarah Connor, who never met a T-800. Skynet, on the verge of its defeat, sends the Terminator back in time, planning to kill John Connor before he is born. The mere act of sending the T-800 back in time changes the timeline. Ironically, in this hypothetical, they actually succeed, as this John Connor is never born due to the radically different sequence of events. The second time line becomes a time loop: Kyle Reese fathers a son by Sarah, whom she calls John because Kyle told her of her son from the original timeline. She raises him to be the leader of humanity against the machines, and tells him that Kyle Reese is his father, and that eventually, Skynet is going to send a terminator back in time to before he's born. John intervenes, sending his father back, who then fathers John again. The time loop is stable (at least until T-2, where it breaks apart after they destroy Cyberdyne).

As for there being another time machine, as soon as the time loop is established, John NEEDS to send Kyle back in time to meet his mother in order to exist. All that is required is a time machine that can take Kyle back to 1984's Los Angeles.

John knows that Kyle Reese is his father. If he doesn't send Kyle back, John cannot exist.

[Snails]

The original Sarah's son does not even need to be named John. He could be Joe. Joe happens to stumble upon the time machine during a successful offensive into an important Skynet facility. He notices it is set for Los Angeles 9 months before his own birth. Joe guesses that Skynet is targetting his mother. That guess may even be untrue! (The Terminator might be hunting other targets.)

Of course, Joe does the reasonable thing given his best guess: he sends his best soldier (Kyle) back and provides him with all the information he has on hand about everyone in Los Angeles at that time intimately connected to the in-their-future Resistance.

Joe's best data happens to be about his own mother.

Now Kyle meets Sarah first, and eventually father's John. Joe is never born. Kyle presumably hunts down the Terminator, perhaps without the benefit of Sarah's assistance. Sarah remembers valiant Kyle, having read about his demise in the newspaper, and is inclined to teach John the necessary skills to be a kick ass war leader.

Now, in the new loop, Skynet finds out that there is one particularly skilled and effective war leader named John Connor. In this scenario, Sarah Connor goes right to the top of the list for the Terminator.

The story, for now, is self-reinforcing. There is no logical reason that the loop must be so self-referential as we see in the movie, but it would be hard on the audience to decipher if it were written otherwise.

[theNater]

He doesn't have to be identical in the least -- he just needs to be called John Connor.
And be the leader of the humans against the machines, and be successful, and not make any mistakes that get Kyle killed during the fighting. All this despite radically different genetics and upbringing.

There are, in this situation, two time lines:
There are at least three, because John gave Kyle the picture of Sarah taken at the end of the film; a picture she was only in place for because she was getting off the grid after the attack. Nothing in the entire movie hints at these additional time lines, and there's a perfectly good explanation of how things happened that doesn't need them. Why add them?

Now Kyle meets Sarah first, and eventually father's John. Joe is never born. Kyle presumably hunts down the Terminator, perhaps without the benefit of Sarah's assistance.
This requires at least two slightly different versions of Kyle(because they've been fighting under significantly different commanders) to defeat different terminators(who will behave differently, due to having different missions) using only 1984 weaponry. Given how close a thing it was in the one we watched, it is not reasonable to assume Kyle just won handily the other time(s).

[Snails]

There are at least three, because John gave Kyle the picture of Sarah taken at the end of the film; a picture she was only in place for because she was getting off the grid after the attack. Nothing in the entire movie hints at these additional time lines, and there's a perfectly good explanation of how things happened that doesn't need them. Why add them?

Once the timeline finds a self-reinforcing configuration, it seems to be "miraculously" stable. That does not mean it was always stable, or always will be stable. It might be luck, but it is not necessarily a miracle.




This requires at least two slightly different versions of Kyle(because they've been fighting under significantly different commanders) to defeat different terminators(who will behave differently, due to having different missions) using only 1984 weaponry. Given how close a thing it was in the one we watched, it is not reasonable to assume Kyle just won handily the other time(s).

The point is that the fiddly details we know of were not necessarily there in the "earlier" loops through the timelines. The claim that the timeline we see is illogical is built on the assumption that every fiddly detail is actually critical.

It is possible that Skynet is just doomed for a thousand different reason, so even successfully killing a few dozen people does not ultimately help its cause.

If Sarah is on the top of Kyle's list, but the bottom of the Terminators, Kyle is investigating a "phone book" killer who is hitting other targets. He may have the opportunity to gather other weaponry. The US military may intervene before Kyle gets his chance, and now there are other resources in play.

The Terminator is absurdly tough when compared to flesh, but his limbs are vulnerable to simple explosives (even if his torso may or may not be). In fact, his legs are knocked out of commission by a mere well-placed low-explosive pipe bomb. A couple direct hits from military grade HE would cripple all limbs.

So Kyle's comment about "with these weapons" is not about 1984 technology per se, but the weaponry he has on hand and expects to be able to scrounge.

What does the military think when it captures the Terminator remains? (1) This awesome computer technology will help us (accelerating the appearance of Skynet). (2) We need personal heavy weaponry that can kill these things, in case the Russkies or Martians send battailions of these killer robots (thereby creating stockpiles of useful weapons for the future resistance).

[Loreweaver15]

Also, you guys are excluding the Trunks/Goodrich/Steins Gate model of time travel: screwing with the past shunts you into an alternate world line where the future is uncertain (as it should be, mind you; if the future is predetermined, then there are no people, only fleshy puppets acting out a shadow play).

After all, we don't get to see in T2 whether or not Annoying!John Connor ever turns out to be an effective leader, though he's got a pretty good head on his shoulders for an annoying kid.

[theNater]

Also, you guys are excluding the Trunks/Goodrich/Steins Gate model of time travel: screwing with the past shunts you into an alternate world line where the future is uncertain (as it should be, mind you; if the future is predetermined, then there are no people, only fleshy puppets acting out a shadow play).
The first movie would require at least three such worlds, and their existence is not shown, discussed, or even hinted at during the course of the film. There is no good reason to assume those alternate worlds exist.

The certainty or uncertainty of the future doesn't have to be the same in all fiction. What it does have to do is match the tone of the fiction. A single immutable timeline fits the tone of T1 very well. The different nature of time travel in T2 fits its tone well, but because the two films had different tones, the new rules had a worse tonal match with T1, making T1 a weaker film as a result.

[Loreweaver15]

The first movie would require at least three such worlds, and their existence is not shown, discussed, or even hinted at during the course of the film. There is no good reason to assume those alternate worlds exist.

The certainty or uncertainty of the future doesn't have to be the same in all fiction. What it does have to do is match the tone of the fiction. A single immutable timeline fits the tone of T1 very well. The different nature of time travel in T2 fits its tone well, but because the two films had different tones, the new rules had a worse tonal match with T1, making T1 a weaker film as a result.

T1 was a good film but not a great one, even before seeing T2, and it still always resonated with me on the free will side of the equation just like T2.

I really don't know what's so ambiguous about "there is no fate but what we make for ourselves."

[warrl]

No, that's the nature of Nature. It is the way this universe is.


Please clarify.

The rabbit wants to eat the grass.

The fox wants to eat the rabbit.

The two creatures agree that eating is desirable.

They have a disagreement about whose eating should take precedence.

[Taelas]

The first movie would require at least three such worlds, and their existence is not shown, discussed, or even hinted at during the course of the film. There is no good reason to assume those alternate worlds exist.

Actually, there is. The movie as shown is a closed-loop -- a predestination paradox. It is literally impossible for John to send his own father back in time to initiate the time-loop. (If John isn't there, he can't send Kyle back to father himself, which definitely means he won't be there.) Since nothing can start the loop, it cannot exist. If a different entity initiates the loop, however, it can become a stable loop. John simply takes over the role the other entity had before the loop began.

The reason I suggest a different John Connor is so as not to interfere more with the timeline than is strictly necessary. If there was an original John, the events of the movie is just the second iteration (assuming you ignore the detail of Sarah's picture--though that is properly dealt with by making it the third iteration). This is important, as the second iteration is the first involving time travel.

[theNater]

I really don't know what's so ambiguous about "there is no fate but what we make for ourselves."
That statement is never uttered in the first film.

Actually, there is. The movie as shown is a closed-loop -- a predestination paradox. It is literally impossible for John to send his own father back in time to initiate the time-loop.
It's only impossible in the absence of predestination. If John is irrevocably fated to send his own father back in time, there's no problem with his father arriving in the past as a result of it.

[Loreweaver15]

That statement is never uttered in the first film.

Really? Huh, misremembering it, then.

Guess the first film is even worse than I remember. I'll have to rewatch that.

[Taelas]

That statement is never uttered in the first film.

It's only impossible in the absence of predestination. If John is irrevocably fated to send his own father back in time, there's no problem with his father arriving in the past as a result of it.

You seem to miss my point. In order to send his father back, John must exist, and for John to exist, his father must have been sent back. If John is always the one who sends his father back, it leaves no possibility for him to even exist in the first place.

That is why it is called a "paradox"; it is literally impossible. It contradicts itself.

Once an initial iteration has been established -- Kyle has been sent back to father John, regardless of how precisely that event occurs -- every iteration after that can sustain themselves; the time loop stabilizes and there is no longer a paradox.

[theNater]

You seem to miss my point. In order to send his father back, John must exist, and for John to exist, his father must have been sent back. If John is always the one who sends his father back, it leaves no possibility for him to even exist in the first place.

That is why it is called a "paradox"; it is literally impossible. It contradicts itself.
When an effect can precede its cause, as with time travel, it is perfectly reasonable that an effect could be its own cause. As long as every effect has a cause, causality is preserved.

The fact that you can't find the beginning of the circle doesn't mean there is no circle, it just means that circles aren't line segments.

It's worth noting that "paradox" doesn't necessarily mean something that is self-contradictory, but can also mean something that seems to be self-contradictory but is in fact true. Barring the discovery of actual time travel, it is not clear which definition applies to the predestination paradox.

[Keltest]

You seem to miss my point. In order to send his father back, John must exist, and for John to exist, his father must have been sent back. If John is always the one who sends his father back, it leaves no possibility for him to even exist in the first place.

That is why it is called a "paradox"; it is literally impossible. It contradicts itself.

Once an initial iteration has been established -- Kyle has been sent back to father John, regardless of how precisely that event occurs -- every iteration after that can sustain themselves; the time loop stabilizes and there is no longer a paradox.

Like most people, I resolve that paradox by throwing my hands in the air, angrily shouting TIME TRAVEL! BAH!, and walking away and never looking back.

I suggest you read "by his bootstraps" by Robert Heinlein, in order to make your head hurt even more than it already does with time travel. It deals with this exact situation, only better (worse?)

[Taelas]

When an effect can precede its cause, as with time travel, it is perfectly reasonable that an effect could be its own cause. As long as every effect has a cause, causality is preserved.
I disagree. Cause preceding effect is impossible, even with time travel, regardless of what Janeway may say on the subject.

Besides, if effect precedes cause, there can be no time loop; there is only one iteration of the timeline. There is, in effect, no actual time travel. Kyle Reese and the T-800 suddenly come into existence in 1984 (effect), and when they leave their own time, they cease to exist (cause).

Simply put, if effect precedes cause, we may as well throw logic out the window.


The fact that you can't find the beginning of the circle doesn't mean there is no circle, it just means that circles aren't line segments.
The only circles that do not have a beginning are philosophical ones.


It's worth noting that "paradox" doesn't necessarily mean something that is self-contradictory, but can also mean something that seems to be self-contradictory but is in fact true. Barring the discovery of actual time travel, it is not clear which definition applies to the predestination paradox.
It is perfectly clear which definition applies to the predestination paradox. :smalltongue:

[Loreweaver15]

Besides, if effect precedes cause, there can be no time loop; there is only one iteration of the timeline. There is, in effect, no actual time travel. Kyle Reese and the T-800 suddenly come into existence in 1984 (effect), and when they leave their own time, they cease to exist (cause).

Simply put, if effect precedes cause, we may as well throw logic out the window.

Not at all.

Picture time as a massive cloth sheet, and individual items or people as threads being woven into that sheet independently of each other. As the needle dips over-under-over-under, it never leaves the sheet, plotting its course alongside the rest of the threads being woven in simultaneously.

Then a particular needle comes out of the sheet, and is sent elsewhere on the sheet to go back in at a different place in time. That's a time traveler. Now, some hypothesize that you just move to a different sheet entirely and continue on there (the Trunks-Goodrich model); some maintain that it's all one tapestry, and you get woven back in, shifting things aside on re-entry (the Whovian model); some have other theories. Still, if you're thinking of time as a river, as a thing that is only happening NOW and nowhen else, then sure, you may think that time travel throws logic out the window.

But that's because you are dismissing the myriad potential models, not because they're illogical. Time travel makes perfectly logical sense from the perspective of the traveler.

[Taelas]

If you visualize time as a cloth sheet, and individuals as the thread that make it up, effects do not precede cause.

Take your own wording: "shifting thing aside on re-entry" -- that means there was something to shift aside. Thus, there was something before the effect occurred, and more than one iteration of the timeline.

If effects precede cause, then from an objective observer's point of view, there is no time travel. (The time traveler would disagree, but his point of view isn't relevant.)

[veti]

If effects precede cause, then from an objective observer's point of view, there is no time travel. (The time traveler would disagree, but his point of view isn't relevant.)

If effects precede cause, then from an objective observer's point of view, there is no time.

But what does "an objective observer" have to do with anything? Where are you going to find one of those anyway? And why should their observation carry more weight than that of actual participants?

[theNater]

Besides, if effect precedes cause, there can be no time loop; there is only one iteration of the timeline. There is, in effect, no actual time travel. Kyle Reese and the T-800 suddenly come into existence in 1984 (effect), and when they leave their own time, they cease to exist (cause).
How is that not exactly what time travel is? A person ceases to exist at one time, and resumes existing at a different (possibly earlier) time.

The only circles that do not have a beginning are philosophical ones.
Consider the intersection of two surfaces in space. The first is a plane perpendicular to the axis of rotation of the Earth with maximal intersection with the Earth(if multiple such planes are comaximal, take the northernmost one). The second is the region surrounding Earth at which the force of Earth's gravity on a point-mass would give it an acceleration of 0.0000001 meters per second per second in the absence of all other forces. The intersection of these two surfaces will be a contiguous loop in space. How would you identify the beginning of this loop? Note that the loop is entirely defined by physical properties, not philosophical ones.

[Taelas]

How is that not exactly what time travel is? A person ceases to exist at one time, and resumes existing at a different (possibly earlier) time.
I suppose you could define it as such.

Look, I cannot give you an adequate answer as to why. But effect cannot precede cause, even using time travel. There must be a point of instigation, otherwise things begin to appear out of thin air. If effect precedes cause, we get paradoxes left and right.


Consider the intersection of two surfaces in space. The first is a plane perpendicular to the axis of rotation of the Earth with maximal intersection with the Earth(if multiple such planes are comaximal, take the northernmost one). The second is the region surrounding Earth at which the force of Earth's gravity on a point-mass would give it an acceleration of 0.0000001 meters per second per second in the absence of all other forces. The intersection of these two surfaces will be a contiguous loop in space. How would you identify the beginning of this loop? Note that the loop is entirely defined by physical properties, not philosophical ones.
How would I identify the beginning? The formation of the Earth, I suppose.

[Loreweaver15]

I suppose you could define it as such.

Look, I cannot give you an adequate answer as to why. But effect cannot precede cause, even using time travel. There must be a point of instigation, otherwise things begin to appear out of thin air. If effect precedes cause, we get paradoxes left and right.


How would I identify the beginning? The formation of the Earth, I suppose.

I hate to bring Doctor Who into this sort of discussion, but there's one point they set up that's actually relevant to these discussions, that time is less a set of straight lines beginning-to-end and more a big ball of liquid timestuff, constantly in flux, and things leaving their own time and re-entering at a different point alters the overall structure--i.e. there IS cause and effect because it already happened, and the fact that it happened then caused it to change and happen in a slightly different way the next cycle through. It also is how my earlier explanation worked; you should be looking at the timeline of the individual, not the universe, to see cause preceding effect.

[Liliet]

I hate to bring Doctor Who into this sort of discussion, but there's one point they set up that's actually relevant to these discussions, that time is less a set of straight lines beginning-to-end and more a big ball of liquid timestuff, constantly in flux, and things leaving their own time and re-entering at a different point alters the overall structure--i.e. there IS cause and effect because it already happened, and the fact that it happened then caused it to change and happen in a slightly different way the next cycle through. It also is how my earlier explanation worked; you should be looking at the timeline of the individual, not the universe, to see cause preceding effect.

So there's some sort of a meta-timeline that no-one can observe but it exists. Like another axis.

---
---
--->
<---
---
---
--->
The horisontal axis is the timeline of the universe from the point of view of its inhabitants, the line is the timeline of the time-traveler. and the vertical axis is the meta-timeline.

As long as there are not stable time loops, the cause always precedes effect on the meta-timeline and everything makes perfect sense.

As soon as there are stable time loops, this thing stops making sense and becomes the incoherent mess that whovian time-travel is.


On topic, yeah. The philosophical debates are complicated, but the reason for Durkon to betray the party pretty simply does not exist.

[Taelas]

I hate to bring Doctor Who into this sort of discussion, but there's one point they set up that's actually relevant to these discussions, that time is less a set of straight lines beginning-to-end and more a big ball of liquid timestuff, constantly in flux, and things leaving their own time and re-entering at a different point alters the overall structure--i.e. there IS cause and effect because it already happened, and the fact that it happened then caused it to change and happen in a slightly different way the next cycle through. It also is how my earlier explanation worked; you should be looking at the timeline of the individual, not the universe, to see cause preceding effect.

I am very familiar with Whovian time travel and the Timey-Wimey ball. But time travel has never been the point of Doctor Who, and they are rarely, if ever, consistent.

The problem with cause preceding effect is when the effect ends up being the cause of the original 'cause'. It is sustainable, but it can't start. The entire cycle should not be able to begin. When it does so anyway, it might as well have appeared out of thin air.

[theNater]

Look, I cannot give you an adequate answer as to why. But effect cannot precede cause, even using time travel. There must be a point of instigation, otherwise things begin to appear out of thin air.
Yes, sometimes things appear out of thin air. No, this does not violate logic. Logic does not tell us things don't appear out of thin air. Experience with our universe is what tells us that. However, as The Terminator does not take place within our universe, it does not have to follow the same rules. It follows its own rules, and logic can be applied to those rules just as easily as to ours.

Note that The Order of the Stick also features things appearing out of thin air. That doesn't mean logic has been thrown out the window, it just means that the conditions in that universe are different than the conditions in ours(and also from the ones in The Terminator).

How would I identify the beginning? The formation of the Earth, I suppose.
I'm asking about the spacial beginning, not the temporal beginning. Note that knowing the temporal beginning doesn't help, as when this appears, it is already an entire loop; different parts of it do not appear at different times.

I hate to bring Doctor Who into this sort of discussion, but there's one point they set up that's actually relevant to these discussions...
The nature of time travel in Doctor Who is not relevant to the nature of time travel in The Terminator, as it is another different universe with its own different conditions.

[Liliet]

I am very familiar with Whovian time travel and the Timey-Wimey ball. But time travel has never been the point of Doctor Who, and they are rarely, if ever, consistent.

The problem with cause preceding effect is when the effect ends up being the cause of the original 'cause'. It is sustainable, but it can't start. The entire cycle should not be able to begin. When it does so anyway, it might as well have appeared out of thin air.
The problem with stable time loops is that it doesn't line up with the meta-timeline model. See, in the meta timeline, when things change, they stay changed. In the original iteration, there is no returned time-traveller because this hasn't happened yet. The decisions have not yet been made, as measured by the meta-timeline. In the resulting timeline, on the other hand, there is no need to go back in time and change things because they are already changed. Well, I mean, there might still be the need, but it won't be the stable sort: the circle will end as soon as the time traveller is successful. And there will be as many instances of the same person in the resulting timeline as there were "aborted" timelines. (Hello, Homestuck! The one work I know with comprehensive and consistent rules of time travel. And when Homestuck is called comprehensive, you know something's wrong with the subject...)
In the model with stable time loops, the whole event just sort of collapses into one point. I don't think I can explain it logically, it's just sort of an image I have when I try to visualize it, but the point is, the meta timeline - the thing that enables free will and cause-effect connections - can't go back. There is just no way to do it. If there are stable time loops, free will and cause-effect connections go out of the window )=

Not that I know anything about Terminator beyond the fact that he will be back and that the transforming-shapeshifting freaky-thing was really freaky. I'm just really interested in time travel, its rules and implications ^-^

PS And I also forgive Doctor Who for inconsistent time travel, I really like Doctor yadda yadda. It is, however, slightly more difficult than forgiving Thunt for messed-up DnD rules and sci-fi writers for nonsense instead of physics :smallamused:


EDIT: I realized why the point keeps collapsing. For the stable time loop to exist, its start and its end must come into existence at the same time. When the event in the past happens, the event in the future is already determined, it already exists. When the writer thinks about them, it's the same point of time. From the point of view of the meta-timeline, it's the same point of time. A single point.

[veti]

'To Say Nothing of the Dog', by Connie Willis, is a (beautifully written) time-travel story with seemingly-stable time loops, which goes at some length into how "reality" itself basically railroads the time travellers into doing what they need to do. Nobody in-universe fully understands what's going on, even at the end, but it's increasingly clear that the physical laws of "time travel" will do whatever it takes to "fix" history and make sure that continuity is maintained.

Under some circumstances, you may be able to change things in the past. But the scope of those changes has to be such that your universe remains just as you remember it. In later books, we see how time travellers can send signals to the future by (for instance) taking out personal ads in newspapers (which no-one will even notice, unless they're specifically looking for them) - but they can't actually change the course of recorded history. What they know about the past - in so far as it's true to begin with - will continue to be true, no matter what they try to do about it.

[Liliet]

'To Say Nothing of the Dog', by Connie Willis, is a (beautifully written) time-travel story with seemingly-stable time loops, which goes at some length into how "reality" itself basically railroads the time travellers into doing what they need to do. Nobody in-universe fully understands what's going on, even at the end, but it's increasingly clear that the physical laws of "time travel" will do whatever it takes to "fix" history and make sure that continuity is maintained.

Under some circumstances, you may be able to change things in the past. But the scope of those changes has to be such that your universe remains just as you remember it. In later books, we see how time travellers can send signals to the future by (for instance) taking out personal ads in newspapers (which no-one will even notice, unless they're specifically looking for them) - but they can't actually change the course of recorded history. What they know about the past - in so far as it's true to begin with - will continue to be true, no matter what they try to do about it.
Yep, this appears to be an adequate solution ^-^ Like "we won't tell you exactly what would have happened if the history was broken, but there's a force overseeing that this does not happen".

Who, as far as I remember, attempted to introduce something similar, but it managed to be internally inconsistent within 13 series I watched, so... They just don't care.

[Loreweaver15]

The nature of time travel in Doctor Who is not relevant to the nature of time travel in The Terminator, as it is another different universe with its own different conditions.

It's relevant because we're debating exactly how Terminatorverse time travel works, while referencing other well-established fictional models like the Timey Wimey Ball and the Trunks/Goodrich World Lines.