Got a Real-World Weapon, Armor or Tactics Question? Mk. XXIV

[Roxxy]

if you cant build magitek cameras, I assume you cant build magitek computers, which Is a major problem for a Rods form God system as they need precision targeting and course-correction ability to accurately hit a target (as opposed to merely landing close enough the target sees the flash of impact), both of which require high speed number crunching.


so, it could be done, but it would be extremely inaccurate. the only sort of comparison I can give for long range 1940s computer guidance is the V2 program, which struggled to consistently hit one of the largest cities in Europe at 300Km range. magic may help, but frankly its a bugger to do well with modern tech, let alone 1940s (One of the reasons these system have not been developed in real life)In that case, I'm leaning heavily towards the nuke, and reevaluating exactly how 1940s spacecraft were (They have to exist to justify what will exist in 30 years, but perhaps they relied on an onboard wizard to figure out navigation back in the 40s [and finding the wizard who actually knows how to do that would be an extreme task], but ten or fifteen years or so later computers got good enough to take over, and then getting a spacecraft where you want it got practical.).


if you want an idea of the level of accuracy needed, check out Nukemap and see how close to a target a low kiloton bomb/KE event would need to be. but using London as an example, a 15KT bomb that landed directly on big ben would leave someone at the Tower of London with minor burns if they were outside, or basically unhurt if out of line of sight.That's not very far, is it? I've been to London, albeit for one week as a tourist, and I've been to both those places. It feels like they're super close together, at least to my American "used to everything being super far away from everything else" mind.

[Roxxy]

Ancillary question about this war. I like France, and I imagine that, with the Germans between them and the Russians, the French can handle a Spain immediately out of a civil war and not prepared for an international one (I think what Franco always knew when Hitler tried to get him involved holds true in my world, too: Spain didn't have the industry or the stability), and do their part in subduing Italy, then join the fight in Eastern Europe. I certainly don't intend to play with that stupid Cheese Eating Surrender Monkey stereotype,

However, France entered WW2 with some serious problems. I've leard their Air Force was substandard, and their armor not properly concentrated. I've also heard their median age for soldiers was middle aged and they lacked the young manpower of Britain or Germany, but I don't know how true that actually is (it sounded pretty suspect to me). That apart, are there any other key problems with the French military of 1940 that would be have to be addressed if they took part in a prolonged conflict? I'm wondering about things like leadership culture, technology, doctrine, and industry. Also, the warming of relations with Germany happened in the mid-30s, so the French still largely focused on the Maginot Line and another war with Germany up until very recently, meaning the French military largely looks as it did IRL (essentially, Italy went Communist and the Soviet backed side won in Spain, Britain and France got SUPER worried about commies, and democracy won out in Germany through ample fiery anti-Communism, and then the Germans flat out told the British and French that they were abandoning the terms of Versaille so they could address the Communist threat, and Britain and France could work with that and stand together with Germany, or they could stand apart. The Commies were a whole lot scarier than the Germans, and I imagine the German position sounded eminently reasonable.)

[jayem]

Also, the warming of relations with Germany happened in the mid-30s, so the French still largely focused on the Maginot Line and another war with Germany up until very recently, meaning the French military largely looks as it did IRL (essentially, Italy went Communist and the Soviet backed side won in Spain, Britain and France got SUPER worried about commies, and democracy won out in Germany through ample fiery anti-Communism, and then the Germans flat out told the British and French that they were abandoning the terms of Versaille so they could address the Communist threat, and Britain and France could work with that and stand together with Germany, or they could stand apart. The Commies were a whole lot scarier than the Germans, and I imagine the German position sounded eminently reasonable.)
The order is a bit odd, in real life it went Italy, Germany (33), Spain(36-39), which leaves it a bit late for a reaction. And at that point the influences in the civil war would be different.
The fascists were the firey anti-communism/socialist (although as the names indicate, with a complex history that defies that).
However the Soviets had turned a blind eye to Germany rearming in the 20's and the Maginot line was commissioned at the end ('finished' in 39). So even democratic Germany was seen as a threat to France. And in addition you then had the Mol/Rib pact on Poland (which Britain didn't back out of), Russia had campaigned harder on Czechoslovakia. So by that time things are decidedly messy.

While them and the communists were campaigning using 'democratic' political parties in Italy/Germany* (until one won, so arguably a weaker/less scary communism, would be better for medium term German democracy).

However the net effect of that is it's probably closer to real life till the late 30's than expected, so the military in all countries prior to the late 30's is probably similar (just as likely to be up as down).

*As one look at the map will half tell you, from the other side it's nominally democrats against imperialists.

[DavidSh]

However, I do have to ask one question. As I recall, historically the Enola Gay flew from Tinian, in the Marianas, a relatively close position to Japan. Given that the front at the current time is somewhere in eastern Poland, the allied powers don't really have a good place to launch a plane carrying the bomb from. Carriers won't work, as planes large enough for atomic missions (B-29s) were too large to fit on carriers. Swedish airbases could probably serve as a base to hit Leningrad, but not much else, and as the war has been long already and the Allies control Oresund the Baltic probably isn't the most strategically important region. So, to get planes close enough to bomb Moscow and the other major industrial centers, one is still obliged to fight a *major* land war, while simultaneously guarding their flank in the Middle East. If too many troops are committed to the Steppes, the Red Army can use the Caucasus as a breakout point to hit the Middle Eastern regions where the Allies are likely getting almost all of their oil.


Tinian is about 2542 km from Nagasaki. Moscow is about 2462 km from Paris. (Using convenient airports and the Great Circle Mapper website.) I really don't think there is a problem, if the front is in eastern Poland.

Though I guess Roxxy already made the point about aircraft ranges. I just like to make points about geography.

[Storm Bringer]

Ancillary question about this war. I like France, and I imagine that, with the Germans between them and the Russians, the French can handle a Spain immediately out of a civil war and not prepared for an international one (I think what Franco always knew when Hitler tried to get him involved holds true in my world, too: Spain didn't have the industry or the stability), and do their part in subduing Italy, then join the fight in Eastern Europe. I certainly don't intend to play with that stupid Cheese Eating Surrender Monkey stereotype,

However, France entered WW2 with some serious problems. I've leard their Air Force was substandard, and their armor not properly concentrated. I've also heard their median age for soldiers was middle aged and they lacked the young manpower of Britain or Germany, but I don't know how true that actually is (it sounded pretty suspect to me). That apart, are there any other key problems with the French military of 1940 that would be have to be addressed if they took part in a prolonged conflict? I'm wondering about things like leadership culture, technology, doctrine, and industry. )

the median age thing was a result of the proportionally higher losses the French suffered in WW1 (about twice the % of population killed than England, and slightly more than Germany), which created a much more of a "lost generation" effect than in England, and with a lower population than Germany (both in 1914 and 1939), the only way to get enough soldiers was to have a broader section of the population in uniform (whereas the Germans in 1940 could be more selective with who they sent to the front line and who they held back for home garrison duty).

a lot of their material problems were, ironically, a side effect of winning WW1, and thus having large stockpiles of surplus equipment that made it hard to justify getting new equipment for much of the 20s and 30s. For example, a lot of the French tanks in 1940 were FT-17 or similar WW1 era "light" tanks that were state of the art in 1917, and not really updated since.

a big problem with French tanks in general was a preference for the one man turret, as opposed to the two and three man turrets elsewhere (lindybeige did a video about why this is important (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HV2nIkqnGBI), but the short version is that a one man turret means you have one man trying to do three jobs that need your full attention to do properly, so he struggles at all three and much slower than a three man team would be at the same jobs). the Air force was similar, and updated its aircraft somewhat later than the Germans or Brits.

the Germans, having been forced to give up most of their equipment in 1918, didn't have these large piles of "legacy" kit, so were forced to start fresh, which meant they had equipment that was much newer than the French (or Brits and soviets, for that matter) in 1940.

Because they were using mostly WW1 era equipment, they formed doctrines based on that WW1 kit, and based on their ww1 experiences, which meant there understanding of what tanks could do is based on the slow, clunky, unreliable mobile pillboxes of 1918, not the faster, more reliable tanks of 1940. Thus, they formed a tank doctrine formed on those foundations and based around supporting the infantry's advance while spread out in penny packets, not independent advances by massed armour.

[Vinyadan]

A question would be the likelihood of the bomber being shot down. Iirc, Japan had large problems with air defense when the A bombs were dropped, to the point that certain aircraft was explicitly to be ignored (lonely planes were understood as recon and consequently ignored). How many planes and bombs could be necessary to reach Moscow, instead, if their fighter and pilot production is still OK?

Also, +1 to fascist regimes being a reaction to communism. However, there's a question worth asking: had fascist Italy never existed (here it's a communist country, right?), could Nazi Germany have been born? Hitler got his power in 33, which means that Mussolini had had more than a decade to showcase the results of his government: general pacification being the most perceivable.

Now, this is something which I haven't often seen in summaries, but in Germany the Nazi party was seen as a revolutionary party, neither more nor less than the Communists. There were proposals to essentially curtail their ability to participate in politics. There was a proposal by Carl Schmitt to suspend parts of the Weimar Constitution to allow the more important or vital parts to survive. This wasn't something he pulled out of his hat: there really was an article (article 48) in this Constitution that allowed the Parliament to concede extraordinary powers to the President, which allowed him to ignore some articles of the Constitution.
There were a lot of problems with this. In practice, once the Federal Chancellor had the President's hear, he could govern through emergency laws passed by the President. This meant that extremely weak governments could survive after losing parliamentary majority. So democracy had already been eroding, as well as the federal nature of Germany, since the President allowed von Papen to take direct government of the Prussian state (population: ~40 million, out of ~65 of the whole of Germany) in 1932.
So Hitler gained his power in this already hypertense atmosphere, but it didn't come easy: the nov. 1932 elections actually saw Communists and socialists gain more votes than he did. However, the revolutionary parties had the overall majority. At this point, the choice was between using the President's powers to call off the Parliament and have him rule only by dictatorial decrees or building another weak government, likely without parliamentary support. So they tried the latter. It didn't go anywhere, at which point a coalition government comprising various parties to the right and the Nazi was built, and Hitler was made Chancellor. The thing is, he actually didn't have a parliamentary majority. He ruled through the special powers accorded to the President by article 48. So one could say that, in a democracy with a different Constitution, Hitler might have never gained his power.
It is however an extremely complex history, and many points remain unclear.
But the 1933 elections? There Hitler was already in power and had spent the last months persecuting his opponents. That's why he suddenly gets over 40%. He then had the Parliament exclude from itself the seats won by the Communists, reducing the total number and gaining the absolute parliamentary majority. He then had the Parliament (involving other parties to reach a 2/3 majority) transmit its powers to the government. I don't think that this last part would have been possible, hadn't there already been various governments that ruled by the will of the President, instead of that of the Parliament, as well as previous similar laws giving part of the Parliament's powers to the government. There also were armed SS in the building, though (they couldn't use the Reichstag because it had been burnt down, and, when the deputies entered, it was full of SA).

Generally speaking there were a lot of precedents and a legal doctrine that facilitated the ascent of a dictator by gradually eroding the meaning of the Constitution and its institutions.

However, concerning international alliances, a Soviet Union which came earlier out of the civil war would have been extremely scary, especially if Italy, then a recognised Great Power, had fallen to Communism. In practice, an alliance to contain communism in such conditions would probably have been a priority. One of the rl reasons why Hitler was tolerated was that a strong Germany was seen as a necessary defense of Europe against a massive and industrialized Soviet Union. It's also why the EU exists, its necessary foundation having been an alliance between France and Germany for reciprocal security against the Eastern Block, financial gain by ensuring French access to German raw materials, and reintegration of Germany in Europe.

[KarlMarx]

Ancillary question about this war. I like France, and I imagine that, with the Germans between them and the Russians, the French can handle a Spain immediately out of a civil war and not prepared for an international one (I think what Franco always knew when Hitler tried to get him involved holds true in my world, too: Spain didn't have the industry or the stability), and do their part in subduing Italy, then join the fight in Eastern Europe. I certainly don't intend to play with that stupid Cheese Eating Surrender Monkey stereotype,

However, France entered WW2 with some serious problems. I've leard their Air Force was substandard, and their armor not properly concentrated. I've also heard their median age for soldiers was middle aged and they lacked the young manpower of Britain or Germany, but I don't know how true that actually is (it sounded pretty suspect to me). That apart, are there any other key problems with the French military of 1940 that would be have to be addressed if they took part in a prolonged conflict? I'm wondering about things like leadership culture, technology, doctrine, and industry. Also, the warming of relations with Germany happened in the mid-30s, so the French still largely focused on the Maginot Line and another war with Germany up until very recently, meaning the French military largely looks as it did IRL (essentially, Italy went Communist and the Soviet backed side won in Spain, Britain and France got SUPER worried about commies, and democracy won out in Germany through ample fiery anti-Communism, and then the Germans flat out told the British and French that they were abandoning the terms of Versaille so they could address the Communist threat, and Britain and France could work with that and stand together with Germany, or they could stand apart. The Commies were a whole lot scarier than the Germans, and I imagine the German position sounded eminently reasonable.)

I'm not 100% certain that the French could simply occupy Spain hands-down. After all, the Spanish do have a history of bogging down specifically French invasions, and a Soviet Wellington being sent over with a small force to occupy the French army could easily drag out that war for a long time. This would especially be true given that there would be an immense population of trained militia or guerillas being present as a result of the Civil War (which I'm assuming the Republic won). Italy might be easier, but again has plenty of defensive points to hold of an invasion with relatively few troops--the Nazis did it pretty well IRL. So while the French would have an important role to play, it's very easy to see them getting bogged down in these side campaigns while Britain and Germany take the lead against the Soviets and Scandinavia fights a Continuation War on steroids.


Tinian is about 2542 km from Nagasaki. Moscow is about 2462 km from Paris. (Using convenient airports and the Great Circle Mapper website.) I really don't think there is a problem, if the front is in eastern Poland.

I didn't realize the distances were actually that similar, I guess I was just looking at bad map projections. Still, while B29 bombings are definitely possible, they'd definitely be exceedingly risky--there are a lot of places to put AA or scramble fighters from on the way to Russia, and every bomb lost is an asset that you can't really afford to lose. Also, by the time that large-scale a-bombings become realistic, Soviet industry may well be safely moved to Siberia. The Russians might surrender simply as a result of population attrition from the bombings, but historically the Nazis were quite efficient at exterminating large numbers of Russian civilians without provoking a surrender. That's not to say the Russians might not lose in the end, but rather that just the bombings still might not do the trick.

What I think is actually the strategic wildcard is probably what Turkey and Iran do. The Turks can in theory shut down the ability of the Soviets to supply the Mediterranean, and have plenty of reason to hate the Soviets, but also plenty of reason to fear them. If they openly side with the Allies to the point of risking war, Spain and especially Italy become much easier for the Allies to attack as the Soviets cannot resupply them. Iran, on the other hand, might declare war on Britain or the USSR in an effort to take back its regional standing and control its oil--Reza Shah especially could be plenty belligerent at times, and might well set up a point where his slightly-less-belligerent heir Mohammed Reza Shah would have no real choice but to follow his policy. If Iran sided with the CCCP, it could easily invade the British and French "mandates" in the Middle East, eliminating their oil supply. On the other hand, war with the Soviets would open up a front on their exposed "underbelly" in Central Asia, limiting the degree to which the Soviets could give ground, threatening their oil in the Caucasus, and forcing them to split their forces. Thus, the decisions of these middling powers could prove major in the war's ultimate outcome.

[fusilier]

a big problem with French tanks in general was a preference for the one man turret, as opposed to the two and three man turrets elsewhere (lindybeige did a video about why this is important (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HV2nIkqnGBI), but the short version is that a one man turret means you have one man trying to do three jobs that need your full attention to do properly, so he struggles at all three and much slower than a three man team would be at the same jobs). the Air force was similar, and updated its aircraft somewhat later than the Germans or Brits.

That's a good, if somewhat rambling, video, and I feel that lindybiege makes a balanced argument.

The one-man turret French tanks did well against the German tanks when they were deployed correctly. This may have been due to the many other advantages that French tanks had. From an empirical standpoint (and Lindybiege points this out after a long digression at the end), in terms of combat performance there aren't enough examples to say conclusively that one-man turrets were inferior in combat. (Although there are strong logical arguments) I seem to recall reading that the French tankers themselves didn't complain about the one-man turret -- they had plenty of other complaints though. Perhaps their training and tactical doctrine made it less of an issue for them?

In my opinion the one-man turret was a flaw, but not a fatal flaw, on French tanks.

Also, concerning how the French organized their tanks, it's actually a bit more complicated than they failed to concentrate them. While they dispersed the infantry tanks to support infantry units, they did concentrate the cavalry tanks (like the Somua 35) into responsive units, supported by mechanized infantry. Leading to the large tank Battle of Hannut.

This deployment may have been more effective when waging an offensive campaign -- as Lindybeige pointed out that attacker has the advantage of deciding where to concentrate tanks.

[gkathellar]

Yeah.... I know it can't have an exact answer. It was more of a "in a general sense" question, so that I could ahve an idea.

Indeed.

Once again, thank you for taking the time to reply. :smallsmile:

As Mike G says, it's all about the type of sword, and the way it does its job. Let me give some examples:

Jian want their center of balance exactly 4-6" up from the guard (depending on blade length), because a huge amount of technique involves rotation of the weapon around that point. Adding more weight to the pommel isn't helpful in this case, because once you've changed that, you should get a sword other than a jian.

Dao is similar to jian in ideal balance, but a heavy pommel might have its uses, since the pommel "leads" certain chops and short-range attacks. On the other hand, the extra weight is going to slow down some of those same moves, and others are going to feel wonky with a different center of gravity on the weapon.

In either case, the technique plays a huge role in why the extra weight would or would not make sense. Foil, as was mentioned, rotates around its own hilt, so it makes a lot more sense there. I think you could make distinctive argument for any sword in relation to specifics of how it was used.

[Gnoman]

The one-man turret French tanks did well against the German tanks when they were deployed correctly. This may have been due to the many other advantages that French tanks had. From an empirical standpoint (and Lindybiege points this out after a long digression at the end), in terms of combat performance there aren't enough examples to say conclusively that one-man turrets were inferior in combat. (Although there are strong logical arguments) I seem to recall reading that the French tankers themselves didn't complain about the one-man turret -- they had plenty of other complaints though. Perhaps their training and tactical doctrine made it less of an issue for them?


There are few post-1940 uses of single-man turrets on tanks, but there was a huge usage of two-man turrets - the T-34 used turrets with just a commander and a loader, and there is a wealth of data to suggest that this was massively inferior to the three-man turrets in common use. German tanks were often able to get three shots off to the T-34's one (caused by the Soviet gunner having to stop operating the gun to command the tank) and were far better coordinated (due to the Soviet vehicle commanders having to stop commanding their tanks to operate the gun). The problem was so bad that a major reason the T-34-85 was introduced was that production planners were reluctant to stop T-34-76 production to fix the turret problem, as on paper it was not enough of an increase in combat power. By adding a more powerful gun (that was useful but not really needed), there was enough of an increase to justify slowing production, and since the new gun needed a new turret anyway, why not design it for three men.

[snowblizz]

I'm not 100% certain that the French could simply occupy Spain hands-down. After all, the Spanish do have a history of bogging down specifically French invasions, and a Soviet Wellington being sent over with a small force to occupy the French army could easily drag out that war for a long time. This would especially be true given that there would be an immense population of trained militia or guerillas being present as a result of the Civil War (which I'm assuming the Republic won). Italy might be easier, but again has plenty of defensive points to hold of an invasion with relatively few troops--the Nazis did it pretty well IRL. So while the French would have an important role to play, it's very easy to see them getting bogged down in these side campaigns while Britain and Germany take the lead against the Soviets and Scandinavia fights a Continuation War on steroids. I agree with the general principle (occupying Spain would consume most of what France could muster at the time I suspect), though I think the point made was that France could neutralise Spain, ie defend against whatever a weak post-civil war Spain could pose in the way of threat. Similary Spain, no matter which side won would be internally weak economically and politically. I would assume France and Portugal would have a fair share of various "nationalist" flavour emigrees sitting close to the borders causing problems too.
What has not been answered, is whether Spain is Republican or Communist in this scenario. While the latter were some of the stronger elements the majority of Spain formed a much more moderate left-leaning faction, most of them not necessarily that Soviet friendly when it comes down to it. And end up with something much more Yugoslav like as a state, communist-lite. Or even somewhat democratic. Either way in Alt-WW2 I don't see Spain being much of a player coming out if it's civil war.

As an interresting aside, I think France would be better equipped for a slower campaign (infantry + artillery) against Spain or Italy than they were for the fast armoured warfare that IRL developed.

France, Spain and Italy all face similar geographical issues (stoopid mountains) trying to attack each other though, advantage going to the defender. Easily sustaining an armed status quo. Neither of these three are industrially or politically strong enough to really go to war "for reals".



What I think is actually the strategic wildcard is probably what Turkey and Iran do. The Turks can in theory shut down the ability of the Soviets to supply the Mediterranean, and have plenty of reason to hate the Soviets, but also plenty of reason to fear them. If they openly side with the Allies to the point of risking war, Spain and especially Italy become much easier for the Allies to attack as the Soviets cannot resupply them. Iran, on the other hand, might declare war on Britain or the USSR in an effort to take back its regional standing and control its oil--Reza Shah especially could be plenty belligerent at times, and might well set up a point where his slightly-less-belligerent heir Mohammed Reza Shah would have no real choice but to follow his policy. If Iran sided with the CCCP, it could easily invade the British and French "mandates" in the Middle East, eliminating their oil supply. On the other hand, war with the Soviets would open up a front on their exposed "underbelly" in Central Asia, limiting the degree to which the Soviets could give ground, threatening their oil in the Caucasus, and forcing them to split their forces. Thus, the decisions of these middling powers could prove major in the war's ultimate outcome.Definitely. Both Turkey and Iran was courted by WW2-Germany IRL, somewhat successfully too. Though Turkey remained neutral and Iran was essentially occupied by Britain and the Soviet union (for their own good, much thanks to the inroads the Germans made) to ensure communications between the British empire and the Soviet union, a lot of supplies flowed in this way through the Caucasus.
I think it's more likely that Iran would become a frontline between the Soviets and Allies than it being a successful partner of the Soviets on it's own. It's another country with potentially fatal internal weaknessess (the Britts and Soviets IRL took it over one day just like that). The British without losing an army in Europe could use the troops from the Empire, if they are not threatened from Japan e.g. With a better plan and commanders than in WW1 it's not going to be such a weak spot I'd think.


Ancillary question about this war. I like France, and I imagine that, with the Germans between them and the Russians, the French can handle a Spain immediately out of a civil war and not prepared for an international one (I think what Franco always knew when Hitler tried to get him involved holds true in my world, too: Spain didn't have the industry or the stability), and do their part in subduing Italy, then join the fight in Eastern Europe. I certainly don't intend to play with that stupid Cheese Eating Surrender Monkey stereotype,

However, France entered WW2 with some serious problems. I've leard their Air Force was substandard, and their armor not properly concentrated. I've also heard their median age for soldiers was middle aged and they lacked the young manpower of Britain or Germany, but I don't know how true that actually is (it sounded pretty suspect to me). That apart, are there any other key problems with the French military of 1940 that would be have to be addressed if they took part in a prolonged conflict? I'm wondering about things like leadership culture, technology, doctrine, and industry. Also, the warming of relations with Germany happened in the mid-30s, so the French still largely focused on the Maginot Line and another war with Germany up until very recently, meaning the French military largely looks as it did IRL (essentially, Italy went Communist and the Soviet backed side won in Spain, Britain and France got SUPER worried about commies, and democracy won out in Germany through ample fiery anti-Communism, and then the Germans flat out told the British and French that they were abandoning the terms of Versaille so they could address the Communist threat, and Britain and France could work with that and stand together with Germany, or they could stand apart. The Commies were a whole lot scarier than the Germans, and I imagine the German position sounded eminently reasonable.)

If they built the Maginot line the 2 main weaknesses is 1) the economic and military drain it represents. Almost everything else had to take back seat to that, and it will have been a massive waste in this scenrio. Not that it was of much use IRL either. 2) tied to nr1 the psychological trauma of WW1 in France cannot be underestimated, it drove the idea of the Maginot line, but France was essentially not only forced to use old equipment their entire military thinking was reliving WW1. What independent tank formations existed were positioned to plug the gaps in the Maginot line while infantry piled on. There were no plans or strategies for when they were all strategically outflanked. France at this point is also internally weak, the governments had limited popular support which makes it difficult to properly organise anything. Ordering men up for conscription, organising reserves, production capacity for the industry etc etc etc. IIRC most governments rules for short periods of time ending in disagreements, just about the only thing they could agree on was to fund the Maginot line. The one thing they really shouldn't have been doing, especially since it drained funds that could been used to improve the nation. I don't like the steroetypical surrendermonkey idea but as a nation it can't be denied the French did really really not want to fight another war (and it should be noted it was British waffling that decided it for the French the few times sparks were igniting in 30s Europe, it's not they weren't brave, but they did question the need of a war rather hard). It wouldn't surprise me if this in part influenced why French soldiers were older, they simply had immense trouble with the idea of sacrificing another generation of youth. The fear of the Next Big One drove a lot of French military planning, spending etc as well as societal thinking. It might be a bit hyperbolic but essentially France started WW2 already defeated. They gambled everything on the Maginot line and could not recover from the shock of that not working. (I know I've blamed the Maginot line for almost everything, there's a lot of stuff playing in but it's hard to sidestep how symbolic it is for France's issues post-WW1, well unless youa re the Wermacht, thne you can sidestep it easily.)

[Vinyadan]

The Maginot line had a German counterpart, though - the Westwall, aka Siegfried Line. And there also was the Alpine Wall. Everyone was preparing for a possible new WWI-style conflict, with huge static defense. The big difference was that the Germans were also preparing for a new kind of war, in which they would have the initiative (and overrun Belgium, again, which actually is a WWI thing France did not prepare for).

Anyway, Italy surely wouldn't have defeated France on its own. The attempts at an attack across the Alps while Germany was invading ended with very little achievement and iirc about ten times more losses for Italy than for France. France could have occupied Piedmont, as usual (I mean, if they had fought a war against Italy without German involvement).

As for the surrender monkey myth, that's a weird myth for a country that lost more men in four years than the US in their whole history. It staying mainstream is probably the weirdest heritage of the Iraq war.

[Galloglaich]

I remember watching this documentary that talked about Teutones and Cimbri raiding Roman settlements as they migrate south into Italy.

This documentary portrayed the raid in a fashion that seemed outright goofy to me. At first, there was a perfectly normal, humdrum market town with butchers and blacksmiths working out in the open and people browsing the stalls on the streets. All of a sudden, a pack of bloodthirsty barbarian warriors, wearing furs and wielding a motley collection of swords and axes enter the shot by rounding a corner, and they're upon the town instantly, slaughtering everyone, grabbing random baskets and pots and chickens, and kicking over everything they did not take.

So this seems silly for a few reasons:

First, I'm finding it kind of hard to believe that the town wouldn't know about the raiders until those raiders were literally upon them. Wouldn't it make more sense for someone, anyone, to have seen the raiders and informed the town? In order to have a town in the first place, shouldn't there be people who live close to, but not in the town itself?

Second, I don't know that the way the raiders behave makes much sense either. Why would raiders be trying to loot things as they come into the town? It strikes me that response times for local defenses would probably not be so quick that the raiders need to actually smash, grab, and get out.

So my question is, what do we know of how raids were performed from antiquity to medieval times? Were there any accounts from survivors or raiders that have some good historical value? Did anyone write anything like a guide to raiding or a guide to fighting back against raids?

You are correct, I think, to be skeptical of the scene you described, which is kind of the standard Hollywood depiction of a raid. Down to the shirtless blacksmiths and astounded townsfolk who have no idea they could be raided.

Yes there is a ton of stuff, not all of it that accessible. But there are actually reams of reports, first hand accounts, military manuals giving advice, and so on. It's a very popular subject in the military literature since raiding was arguably the main form of warfare.

As usual with these things, it helps to narrow down the region and the time period.

There are a lot of Classic Sources, too many to list out, (Thucididyes, Xenophon, Herodotus and Tacitus are good places to start) but though I don't for a primer I'd recommend John Gibson Wary's Warfarein the Classical World (https://www.amazon.com/Warfare-Classical-World-Encyclopedia-Civilizations/dp/0806127945/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1508168810&sr=1-1&keywords=warfare+in+the+classical+world). I don't usually recommend secondary sources but for Classical warfare I think it helps a lot to get oriented so that you can handle and make better use of the many excellent primary sources.

For the migration era you have many, mostly Roman sources, I think the best of which is Justinians War histories by Procopius (https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_2?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=procopius+the+wars), which is an excellent source describing various wars with different types of enemies (Goths, Franks, Vandals, Sassanids etc.) in Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and so on. The only issue with these is that there are so many of them it's a lot to wade through.

In the early Crusades (you can get some very good depictions from the fantastic autobiography or monograph of Usamah Ibn Munqidh (https://www.amazon.com/Book-Contemplation-Crusades-Penguin-Classics/dp/0140455132/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1508168193&sr=1-1&keywords=Usama+ibn+Munqidh) which I highly recommend to anyone interested in medieval warfare. You also have Ana Comnena and various Byzantine sources, and De Joineville etc.

In the late medieval world where I'm a little more familiar, you break it down by region.

Froissart among many others talked a great deal about raiding in the 100 years War in northern France, Brittany and Burgundy.

In that region, the 'raid' was often called the Chevauchee. If you use that search term there are reams written about it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevauch%C3%A9e

There is also a lot written about raids in the Italian Wars, in Spain, in Ireland and Scotland, raids in Germany, and raids in the Baltic among many other zones.

In the Baltic raids were known as 'Reysa', and were done on an annual basis by all sides in the wars. Typically the Teutonic Knights would conduct 3 raids every year, one in the summer to make castles, and two in the Winter. The Lithuanians would do 1 raid every year in the fall when the Teutonic Knights went to their annual meeting (leaving defenses lightly manned) and often 1 or 2 other ones opportunistically.

There are several accounts of these raids including a first-hand account of a 14th Century raid by Crusaders into Lithuania by an Austrian poet named Peter Suchenwirt which I have somewhere. Here is an excerpt:

“Women and children were taken captive,
What a jolly medly could be seen,
Many a woman could be seen,
Two children tied to her body,
One behind and one in front. On a horse without spurs,
Barefoot they had ridden here,
The heathen were made to suffer,
Many were captured and in every case,
Were there hands tied together,
They were led off, all tied up,
Just like hunting dogs.’

Many foreign potentates and famous knights went on Crusader raids in the Baltic, including Boucicault and the man who would later become King Henry IV of England. You can read a bit about one of two raids he participated in here (https://books.google.com/books?id=a5zKQM7eEMgC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=reysa+lithuania&source=bl&ots=itukPExpB0&sig=wHe33tLD3sdcJCKyEmp5cLUhJqM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi3m4rYvPXWAhXhyFQKHcdkBl4Q6AEIPTAI#v=on epage&q=reysa%20lithuania&f=false). If you read medieval Latin you can read a long detailed account of both raids, including the siege of Vilnius and his getting mugged by Robber Knights in Mecklenburg on the way to the Crusade. Sadly I can't or I'd publish a translation and be famous.

There are also the Chronicles of Henry of Livonia (https://www.amazon.com/Chronicle-Livonia-Records-Western-Civilization/dp/0231128894) which happily has been given a very good translation into English and covers the raiding by all sides in the earlier Northern Crusades. There are a variety of Teutonic Knights sources from this era which you can read if you read German.

The Mongols had two different types of raids, sefers which were the big raids organized by the Khan (and could be forestalled by treaty), and çapuls, which were smaller raids organized by Mongol nobles which went on all the time regardless.

The goal of Mongols raids was 90% in taking slaves, which they called 'harvesting the Steppe'. Other raids may be to steal cattle or horses, or to burn crops and devastate the land, or to kill and destroy. The Mongols used to also do things like poison or fill in wells, destroy bridges and even agricultural terracing and so on, in a conscious effort to break down the economic system.

There was also regional vs. local raiding. Local raiding between neighbors tended to be much more about stealing a few cattle or horses and less brutal, regional raiding especially across language and religious barriers could be really nasty. The French and Spanish were nasty as hell in Italy (and then paid the price). The Mongols were nasty everywhere they went, pretty much, at least until you submitted to their rule, the Cossacks and Poles various mercenaries who raided into Mongol territory were none to gentle to them either.



Generally, towns and even villages were either fortified or had a fortified citadel of some kind (for villages this might be something simple like a stone granary or a Church) or both, more typically. As I've mentioned before, in medieval times larger towns were usually (not always - there were important exceptions) very well fortified. Villages less so but the villagers had other options like hiding places they habitually fled to, and yes they did keep lookouts posted to warn them of raiders, and used things like signalling beacons and so forth to help stay ready.

Military manuals of the era also do talk about how to conduct raids, too many of these to list though in this already long post.

G

[gkathellar]

The goal of Mongols raids was 90% in taking slaves, which they called 'harvesting the Steppe'. Other raids may be to steal cattle or horses, or to burn crops and devastate the land, or to kill and destroy. The Mongols used to also do things like poison or fill in wells, destroy bridges and even agricultural terracing and so on, in a conscious effort to break down the economic system.

All of which makes a lot of practical sense when you consider that a raid's goals were often military aggression and/or extortion of a foreign state. In a modern context, you could liken it to one criminal organization performing a smash-and-grab on another's turf: aside from the immediate financial benefits, the action and the reaction will both have political ramifications that are probably part of the decision to attack in the first place.

[wolflance]

The goal of Mongols raids was 90% in taking slaves, which they called 'harvesting the Steppe'. Other raids may be to steal cattle or horses, or to burn crops and devastate the land, or to kill and destroy. The Mongols used to also do things like poison or fill in wells, destroy bridges and even agricultural terracing and so on, in a conscious effort to break down the economic system.
G
Actually, given the way of life of the steppe, aren't the slaves just add extra burden (more mouths to feed) to the Mongols while add nothing of value? The knowledgables, craftsmen, artisans and women might be of some use, but what are they gonna do with a bunch of lowly peasants that worth jack? The cost of keeping these slaves alive far outweigh the price these slaves can be sold (and besides, who are their customers to sell these slaves?).

There's no cities to be built and no galleys to row, either.

[fusilier]

Anyway, Italy surely wouldn't have defeated France on its own. The attempts at an attack across the Alps while Germany was invading ended with very little achievement and iirc about ten times more losses for Italy than for France. France could have occupied Piedmont, as usual (I mean, if they had fought a war against Italy without German involvement).

It should be kept in mind that Mussolini ordered forces that were arrayed in defensive positions, and had made no preparations for an offensive, to attack immediately. That said, the French border with Italy, was generally recognized to be more heavily defended and stronger than even the pre-WW1 border with Austria. Italy's plans for war with France when they were part of the Central Powers, involved simply tying down French troops on the border, and sending as many troops as possible to fight alongside the Germans on the western front. Although an amphibious assault was also contemplated.

[Galloglaich]

All of which makes a lot of practical sense when you consider that a raid's goals were often military aggression and/or extortion of a foreign state. In a modern context, you could liken it to one criminal organization performing a smash-and-grab on another's turf: aside from the immediate financial benefits, the action and the reaction will both have political ramifications that are probably part of the decision to attack in the first place.

yes, the other factor is raids are what they could do. The primacy of defense in the medieval era, and even pretty far into the Early Modern, meant that it was hard to capture well defended strong points. This meant there was a long lasting emphasis on soft(er) targets.

I think people tend to imagine, and in the case of Hollywood, portray raids as being more brutal than they often were. Often the goal was just to provision your army (soldiers need to eat, and horse fodder in particular was a major problem for cavalry forces) and maybe to drive off the 'enemy' population, which you can do just by stealing cattle - since without their cattle they have a hard time living.

But while we all know many stories of atrocities in pre-industrial warfare and especially raids, from reading the records I am often struck by how mild they are. Raids which were full-on massacres seem to stand out and cause surprise and consternation. More often they only steal some of the cattle and grain and leave the rest, precisely because they don't want the peasants driven off. In Central Europe and Italy when fighting neighbors they often seemed to almost play by certain rules, the rules of what the Germans called "Fehde" or private war. For example capturing and then paroling enemy soldiers and ransoming back captive civilians at relatively low rates.

I think because today's enemy or victim might be tomorrows victor, and turn about is fair play. Or today's enemy might be tomorrows ally when a much more dangerous enemy arrives from another region (the French army or the Mongol hordes for example)

G

[Galloglaich]

Actually, given the way of life of the steppe, aren't the slaves just add extra burden (more mouths to feed) to the Mongols while add nothing of value? The knowledgables, craftsmen, artisans and women might be of some use, but what are they gonna do with a bunch of lowly peasants that worth jack? The cost of keeping these slaves alive far outweigh the price these slaves can be sold (and besides, who are their customers to sell these slaves?).

There's no cities to be built and no galleys to row, either.

They did capture skilled laborers and craftsmen, especially useful for when they had to do siege warfare of any kind, since they didn't seem to have the cultural context for that really, but mostly seemed to use them for sex - women and children specifically. Slaves were currency much like cattle. many were sold to the Mongols or to other settled people in Central Asia, mainly through major centers like the Crimean towns such as Caffa (controlled by the Italians) or the larger Mongol quasi-urban centers like the Sarai. The Ottomans in particular had an insatiable demand for slaves for which they would pay with gold, spices, and other valuables, but the Mongols clearly used a lot of them as well.

I think a lot of the slaves had a relatively short life span. Certainly the descriptions i have read of how they were brought to market indicate a low level of regard for their survival let alone comfort, not unlike the horror-stories you read about the Middle Passage in the infamous transatlantic slave trade.

They estimate about 2 million slaves were taken from Poland, Ukraine and Russia alone by the Mongols over the course of several centuries. But quite a few Germans, Hungarians, Moldovans, Romanians, Bulgarians, and so on were also taken. Estimates are at about ~20,000 people per year were "harvested" by the Crimean Horde alone.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Khanate#Slave_trade

G

[PersonMan]

I agree with the general principle (occupying Spain would consume most of what France could muster at the time I suspect), though I think the point made was that France could neutralise Spain, ie defend against whatever a weak post-civil war Spain could pose in the way of threat. Similary Spain, no matter which side won would be internally weak economically and politically. I would assume France and Portugal would have a fair share of various "nationalist" flavour emigrees sitting close to the borders causing problems too.

Depending on the state of north Africa and Britain (for Gibraltar), it's possibly that the French could set up a solid defensive line and let a blockade do its work. I'm not sure how much food could be imported via the Mediterranean, but neither Spain nor Italy could produce enough to feed their populations.


If they built the Maginot line the 2 main weaknesses is 1) the economic and military drain it represents. Almost everything else had to take back seat to that, and it will have been a massive waste in this scenrio. Not that it was of much use IRL either.

It was useful, but primarily in a strategic sense - it meant that Germany couldn't attack directly into France, and would ideally be bogged down in Belgium fighting combined French/Belgian forces.


2) tied to nr1 the psychological trauma of WW1 in France cannot be underestimated, it drove the idea of the Maginot line, but France was essentially not only forced to use old equipment their entire military thinking was reliving WW1.

I wouldn't pin it all on the Maginot/old trauma. France decreased military spending, shortened the period they had to train men during their compulsory service and as a result couldn't modernize or implement new doctrines requiring a well-trained force. Pétain threatened to resign at least once over reductions in professional officers and budget cuts during the interwar period. But, looking back to just after WWI, under Poincaré, they had the largest army in Europe and allies surrounding Germany.

A lot of France's weaknesses came from an inability of the military to change in the way it needed to, due to a lack of proper resources, stemming from issues France had as well as the weakness of a democratic state when it comes to performing the "actually I'd like to just crank up the military and we can ignore the debt because we'll just invade the people we owe money to" strategy.

[Storm Bringer]

If they built the Maginot line the 2 main weaknesses is 1) the economic and military drain it represents. Almost everything else had to take back seat to that, and it will have been a massive waste in this scenrio. Not that it was of much use IRL either. 2) tied to nr1 the psychological trauma of WW1 in France cannot be underestimated, it drove the idea of the Maginot line, but France was essentially not only forced to use old equipment their entire military thinking was reliving WW1. What independent tank formations existed were positioned to plug the gaps in the Maginot line while infantry piled on. There were no plans or strategies for when they were all strategically outflanked. France at this point is also internally weak, the governments had limited popular support which makes it difficult to properly organise anything. Ordering men up for conscription, organising reserves, production capacity for the industry etc etc etc. IIRC most governments rules for short periods of time ending in disagreements, just about the only thing they could agree on was to fund the Maginot line. The one thing they really shouldn't have been doing, especially since it drained funds that could been used to improve the nation. I don't like the steroetypical surrendermonkey idea but as a nation it can't be denied the French did really really not want to fight another war (and it should be noted it was British waffling that decided it for the French the few times sparks were igniting in 30s Europe, it's not they weren't brave, but they did question the need of a war rather hard). It wouldn't surprise me if this in part influenced why French soldiers were older, they simply had immense trouble with the idea of sacrificing another generation of youth. The fear of the Next Big One drove a lot of French military planning, spending etc as well as societal thinking. It might be a bit hyperbolic but essentially France started WW2 already defeated. They gambled everything on the Maginot line and could not recover from the shock of that not working. (I know I've blamed the Maginot line for almost everything, there's a lot of stuff playing in but it's hard to sidestep how symbolic it is for France's issues post-WW1, well unless youa re the Wermacht, thne you can sidestep it easily.)

in defence of the maginot line, it did a lot of what was actually expected it to do.


The French knew that the Germans could flank north of the Line, but they couldn't fortify the border with Belgium as that was politically unacceptable (Belgium refused to formally join an alliance against Germany, fearing that such at alliance would make it a target while not being able to protect it. considering the course of events, its hard to argue they were wrong), so they fortified the France - Germany border, which closed the "direct" route off. the "plan", such as it was, was to wait for the Germans to violate Belgian Neutrality by invading it, then make a "dash" to a defensible river frontier inside Belgium and then fight off the German attack.

the basic idea was more or less ok, but political pressures kept pushing the river line to be held further and further into Belgium (and thus lengthening and lengthening the line to be held). The Belgians had fortified the Belgium/German border, which was expected to hold the Germans up for some time. However, fort Eben-Emael, the largest single fort in the world at the time, was taken by a combination of surprise, a "no one could pull that off" approach route via gilders and an honest to god secret weapon in the form of shaped charge warheads.

Also, the Germans made their primary push not through the easy-to-invade over Belgian plains (like they did in 1914), but though the horrible to invade though Ardennes, a region of poor roads, steep hills and thick forests, which caused so many logistical problems that the Germans would have been screwed if the allies knew what they were doing. However, the allies, convinced that the germans weren't so stupid to try something like that (and helped along by a captured copy of the original german invasion plan that went via the low countries), didn't understand what was going on until It was too late.



in short, the French didn't expect the Line to stop the germans on its own, and by forcing the germans to go around it, the Line did its part in the plan, it was just let down by the rest of the elements.

[Haighus]

yes, the other factor is raids are what they could do. The primacy of defense in the medieval era, and even pretty far into the Early Modern, meant that it was hard to capture well defended strong points. This meant there was a long lasting emphasis on soft(er) targets.

I think people tend to imagine, and in the case of Hollywood, portray raids as being more brutal than they often were. Often the goal was just to provision your army (soldiers need to eat, and horse fodder in particular was a major problem for cavalry forces) and maybe to drive off the 'enemy' population, which you can do just by stealing cattle - since without their cattle they have a hard time living.

But while we all know many stories of atrocities in pre-industrial warfare and especially raids, from reading the records I am often struck by how mild they are. Raids which were full-on massacres seem to stand out and cause surprise and consternation. More often they only steal some of the cattle and grain and leave the rest, precisely because they don't want the peasants driven off. In Central Europe and Italy when fighting neighbors they often seemed to almost play by certain rules, the rules of what the Germans called "Fehde" or private war. For example capturing and then paroling enemy soldiers and ransoming back captive civilians at relatively low rates.

I think because today's enemy or victim might be tomorrows victor, and turn about is fair play. Or today's enemy might be tomorrows ally when a much more dangerous enemy arrives from another region (the French army or the Mongol hordes for example)

G
I think the reforms of Alfred the Great in Anglo-saxon England to deter viking raids is a good example of this- he introduced a series of small fortifications- burgs, which later became known as bury/borough/burgh- in many of the more important villages and towns throughout Wessex, right up to the border with the Danelaw. The majority of placenames in England today ending in bury contained such a fortification (which shows how extensive such networks became). This was likely just an earthwork ring with a palisade in most places.

The system appears to have been a huge success, and allowed raids to be stalled long enough for the local fyrd to be raised to repel them. Maintaining such fortifications was one of the obligations freemen had to uphold in later Anglo-saxon kingdoms.

[Vinyadan]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

[Storm Bringer]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.


assuming something similar to the situation in the scots border (which is my reference for these sort of raids), they would normally grab as much of their portable wealth, and then hole up in a defendable strongpoint that would be difficult to attack without going into a full on siege. you see a lot of "tower houses" in the Scots Borders, which were tree or four storys high buildings, with thick walls, a few arrow slits to cover the arcs and a lot of space inside for temporary storage. the idea was basically to wait out the raiders, who didn't have a great deal of time before the cavalry arrived.

[Galloglaich]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

In the South of France, whereas you have fishing villages right on the coast, they would also have fortified villages up in the hills. The fishing village would be abandoned when they spotted the Saracens, or later on the Corsairs.

That is another area, both Italy and France (and Spain ... and even England) which was subject to more or less continuous slave raiding right into the 19th Century. basically ended when France invaded and conquered Morrocco in the 1830's.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbary_slave_trade

[fusilier]

Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.

I think, in some places at least, they would retreat to the watchtowers themselves. The pictures I've seen usually show a fairly substantial tower (at least among those that have survived).

[KarlMarx]

The point of all these towers, burghs, etc. wasn't to actually serve as a defensive position in a major invasion, but as people have said to let the area hold out for a few days. No raiding force could beat heavy cavalry, and most understandably wanted to spend as little time as possible in the area. Essentially, they'd grab anything they could that wasn't nailed down and run away to the ship or across the border, often stealing livestock in the latter case.

Thus, the relative low impact IRL of such raids was a result of a) raiders not having the time to make it worthwhile to destroy everything they couldn't use and b) peasants who survive raids recover and become raid-able again.

[Gideon Falcon]

I've asked this question before, actually, in a previous thread, but misphrased it and ended up getting some fantastic answers for a tangential topic;

See, in a story I'm working on, I have a character who's meant to end up being a formidable strategist, mainly by commanding his armies with tactics far ahead of his time. I've done a bit of research about the basics of Roman and Byzantine formations, especially the infamous phalanx, but those were pitted against bronze-age and iron-age tactics that I presume were not in use in more medieval settings like typical sword-and-sorcery

Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?

[Raunchel]

Great tactics and strategies always depend on a lot of things, but especially the surroundings and the kinds of forces. One thing that's really notable, at least, in the ancient world, is that speed really matters. This often has to do with keeping the baggage train small and letting your soldiers carry more of their own stuff. In the Hellenistic period this can be seen very well. Phillip made his infantry carry their own supplies (also to save cost, he wasn't rich) which allowed him to move his army as though it was a smaller one. Later on, this stopped happening because the successor kings had to essentially buy the loyalty of their men, which meant more baggage and slower armies. Of course, on lots of occasions they tried to get rid of at least some of the train, but it hardly ever had any success.

Rome of course did the same with the Marian reforms, but it wasn't the kind of thing that could be done to wealthier soldiers like the earlier legions.

Other than that, there aren't many big tricks that always work (like always putting the bulk of your cavalry on the right, because that's what Alexander tended to do). But in broad terms, deception is important. Let screening forces hide your real disposition so you can suddenly overwhelm the enemy somewhere because the infantry is double as deep there. Or you have a not too obvious weak spot start to appear, luring your enemy to focus there only to have strong forces hidden to intervene.

But what's really important is that information and control are very limited. It's practically impossible to see how deep a line of troops is from the ground, estimates of the strength of the enemy provided by scouts will be off in either direction, even a tiny ridge could hide whole cohorts and your cavalry might just run off to loot the enemy camp or pursue some enemy cavalry leaving you without it.

[Kiero]

One of the things often overlooked when considering the Roman success was something more subtle than strategy, tactics or equipment: logistics. The Romans were brilliant at organisation, and that came to the fore when it came to something really basic - making sure all their soldiers were fed. That may not seem like much, but if you can guarantee that on the eve of a battle the soldiers have not only eaten the night before, but on the morning as well, that makes a big difference to their performance and morale. Keeping all your soldiers well-victualled is a big advantage when your enemy isn't anywhere near as prepared.

[snowblizz]

in defence of the maginot line, it did a lot of what was actually expected it to do.

in short, the French didn't expect the Line to stop the germans on its own, and by forcing the germans to go around it, the Line did its part in the plan, it was just let down by the rest of the elements.
This is sort of where I disagree. Hindsight is 20/20 of course. But to me one major element letting down the defense is the line itself, by it's conception, contruction and the thinking it supported. The problem with the line can be best described in the following realisation IMO. A large part of the French army was encircled and pinned against the Maginot line in 1940. Had France tried to fight on they would have had something like 1/3 of the army cut off and strategically unsupported. From an already weaker starting position than the German one. Further it's problematic when we say it forced the Germans to go around, since that's what they planned to do anyway. So in a sense it didn't really force the Germans to do anything. What it however did very effectively was force the French into committing to very static defense. WW2 showed how inadequate fixed forifications were in a modern war usually are. Much of the German Blixtkrieg success came from their opponents insisting on playing ball with them. In the end trying to blixtkrieg they way out every problem turned the war on them.

Which is why I think the Maginot line did exactly the opposite of what it was supposed to do. Wikipedia lists a set of 9 things it was supposed to do, and it more or less completes 4-5 by my count. 2 of those would have happened anyway and none of the reasons were relevant within weeks of the attack of France. Basically the Maginot line is a result of and cause of France's inflexible military thinking, consuming most what little military resources existed in a way that was essentially doomed from the start.

I can't say France would have necessarily been better off without it, but at least not been worse off and may have given a military mindset more appropriate to modern war (e.g. defense in strategic depth).


Coastal Italy had loads of watchtowers because of the Saracens. I wonder where people went after the sightings.
In (pre) ironage Scandinavia "forts" built out of stones piled up on high hills and rocky outcrops existed close to most larger communities where people would flee to wait out hostiles. Presumably the towers themselves or similar fortifications would be built. The mediterranean coast in many places is ideal for it.



Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?I'm not convinced you can really parcel out tactics from weapons, technology and society like that. Basically tactics are how you deploy the weapons and men at your disposal with regards to location, communications and how well trained they are. The last two are going dictate a lot of what you can do. You need well trained men to pull of feigned flights, various maneouvers in the face of the enemy etc. Being able to see and communicate with subordinates places heavy restrictions on what can be accmplished. Much of ancient and medieval tactics flows naturally from this. In a sense what I'm saying is that advanced tactics will have to be implemented when you train you first soldier. The best tacticians had well traine dmen and subordinates who knew what to do as situations unfolded with regards to the overall goal. E.g. Roman centurions .


Great tactics and strategies always depend on a lot of things, but especially the surroundings and the kinds of forces.

But what's really important is that information and control are very limited. It's practically impossible to see how deep a line of troops is from the ground, estimates of the strength of the enemy provided by scouts will be off in either direction, even a tiny ridge could hide whole cohorts and your cavalry might just run off to loot the enemy camp or pursue some enemy cavalry leaving you without it.Yup this. The limits of line of sight and ability-to-shout-loudly :smallbiggrin: was for the longest time hard limits on tactics.

[Storm Bringer]

I've asked this question before, actually, in a previous thread, but misphrased it and ended up getting some fantastic answers for a tangential topic;

See, in a story I'm working on, I have a character who's meant to end up being a formidable strategist, mainly by commanding his armies with tactics far ahead of his time. I've done a bit of research about the basics of Roman and Byzantine formations, especially the infamous phalanx, but those were pitted against bronze-age and iron-age tactics that I presume were not in use in more medieval settings like typical sword-and-sorcery

Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?


One the best hallmarks of excellent strategy is that people look at your battles and go "I don't know what all the fuss is about, anyone could have won that battle!", because you stacked the deck so thoroughly beforehand that the enemy never had a chance.

as kerio mentioned, logistics is a big part of this, and the devil is often in the details, like ensuring that your troops have food (especially hot food), water, somewhere to sleep, haven't marched too far to get to the battle, etc.

I recommend reading the art of war (http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html). the actual, original text is only a few thousand words, which is much shorter than most young adult novels, for a frame of reference. anytime you see a copy of the art of war that is larger than your hands, most of what your looking at is commentaries by various authors.

their is also the Thirty Six Stratagems (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty-Six_Stratagems), another historical Chinese work, which are a series of sayings that encapsulate a lot of what Sun Tzu thought about strategy.

the basics of Chinese warfare was, in Sun Tzus words, based on deception. get your enemies to believe what you want to believe, and on using your strengths against their weaknesses.

[Haighus]

The point of all these towers, burghs, etc. wasn't to actually serve as a defensive position in a major invasion, but as people have said to let the area hold out for a few days. No raiding force could beat heavy cavalry, and most understandably wanted to spend as little time as possible in the area. Essentially, they'd grab anything they could that wasn't nailed down and run away to the ship or across the border, often stealing livestock in the latter case.

Thus, the relative low impact IRL of such raids was a result of a) raiders not having the time to make it worthwhile to destroy everything they couldn't use and b) peasants who survive raids recover and become raid-able again.Well, burgh/burg is a very loose term- at least some of them were intended to be very serious fortifications. Some of these burys were pretty important, so would've been reasonably heavily fortified in the Anglo-saxon period, like Shrewsbury. It was a general term for fortified places, and was applied to all manner of defences. Similar to castle really, which is used for tiny wooden motte-and-baileys all the way up to the Malbork monstrosity.

I am under the belief that burg means fortification in german too.

[Vinyadan]

I think it's worth saying that strategy and tactics are two different things, although they necessarily interact with each other.

Tactics are more limited in scope and often have a shorter duration in time. So how you arrange your army before battle is tactics, and ordering your cavalry to charge a suddenly unprotected flank is also tactics. In practice, tactics allow you to improvise with what you have.

Strategy is larger. It can be grand strategy, building the general modus operandi of a state that could go on for centuries. On a smaller, more common level, a strategy is going to deal with the war as a whole. See "Germany first", where the strategy was to first concentrate on a German surrender, and Japan was deliberately left for later.

So tactics tend to be at battle level, and strategies at war level. And it's not necessarily true that being good at one means being good at both, although experience at the tactical level will almost surely create a better strategist, at least because of better understanding of how battles work and what soldiers need.

As for what made the Romans that good: I'll say that one contributing factor must have been fortified encampments, and the ability to build them under attack. Then there is the use of complex siege machines, and the habit to avoid long lasting sieges: they rather stormed the walls after having surrounded them, or built a rampart, or rammed the walls down, or built a cave beneath them. This meant that you wouldn't have an army swamped for months around a target, and you could use it for something else.
In general, they put enormous care in giving the best preparation to their elite, and, since Rome gave military command to civilian magistrates (unlike e.g. Athens, where the separation was very clear), it meant that a well prepared landowner could be a well prepared general.
They also were strict and generous, with a harsh care for discipline, but paying the citizen professional soldiers very well. To make an example, during the first hundred years of Roman rule, Gallia paid Rome less taxes than what Rome paid its soldiers stationed in Gaul, which essentially turned Roman occupation into a century long economic stimulus package.

[Galloglaich]

I've asked this question before, actually, in a previous thread, but misphrased it and ended up getting some fantastic answers for a tangential topic;

See, in a story I'm working on, I have a character who's meant to end up being a formidable strategist, mainly by commanding his armies with tactics far ahead of his time. I've done a bit of research about the basics of Roman and Byzantine formations, especially the infamous phalanx, but those were pitted against bronze-age and iron-age tactics that I presume were not in use in more medieval settings like typical sword-and-sorcery

Essentially, I want to know some examples or guidelines for how, given a medieval (or, failing that, earlier) setting and tactics, a more advanced set of tactics could dominate. Not necessarily better weapons and technology, simply better strategy. Any ideas?

Aside from the examples in the Classical World which have already been mentioned (Philip of Macedon and Marius / Marian reform being two excellent though large scale examples) there are also a lot of real-life examples of this from the Middle Ages, where a leader (or group of leaders) recognizes the elements missing from war as conventionally practiced in their part of the world, and then institute some major organizational reforms which make a big difference on the battlefield, they usually involve the following elements:

1) Recognize the limitations of the current ways of warfare as done by allies
2) Recognize the advantages and disadvantages of the current ways of warfare as done by enemies / rivals
3) Figure out how to improve these elements within your own forces, while exploiting weaknesses in the potential enemies
4) Whip your armies into shape and develop the new elements as needed, while remaining agile and responsive enough to adapt to changing realities on the battlefield.

Sometimes these events, which occurred both on the very large scale (i.e. nations or Empires) and on smaller scales (individual campaigns or smaller regions) involved major new technological and organizational innovations - filling gaps in an over-specialized type of army to make it more of a 'combined arms' force for example, whereas sometimes they involved more incremental 'tightening and fine tuning' done over many iterations.

Some examples:

William the Conquerer, 11th century - integrated heavy cavalry into his army effectively (arguably for the first time on such a large scale) and improved logistics sufficiently to move an army with horses and supplies across the Channel in a very short amount of time.

Richard Lionheart, 12th Century - filled gaps in the Crusader armies and created a combined arms military force by adding elements of effective light cavalry, improving missile warfare and enhancing C3I and scouting capability. William saw that the Arabs and Turks had adapted to Latinized heavy cavalry by adopting a hit and run strategy, relying on their mounted archers and superior mobility and logistics to sew confusion among the Crusaders and attack when conditions were ideal. By recruiting turcopoles (mixed ethnicity light cavalry), and making extensive use of crossbowmen, including mounted crossbowmen, Richard was able to neutralize well led and highly organized Arab cavalry forces and was able to maneuver his army with impunity, avoiding the kind of disasters (i.e. Hattin) that other Latin Monarchs faced. He made effective use of diplomacy among the Arabs while achieving his somewhat limited goals. Though he didn't change the course of the Crusades in the Levant, he temporarily reversed the decline of Latin fortunes there.

Ghenghis Khan, 12th-13th Century - fine tuned and tightened the organizational and battlefield tactics of the Mongols. The most important element of which was an iterative but ultimately revolutionary fine tuning of C3I - command, control, communications and intelligence. He established 'arrow riders', which included systems of whistling arrows, colored flames, semaphore flags and other innovations, which gave him an unprecedented level of battlefield / situational awareness as a leader. All of these elements already existed, either among the Mongols themselves or among the Chinese, but he combined them together very effectively. He also reorganized military units on the basis of the decimal system and streamlind the integration of nominal allies into effective assets (the Romans did much the same thing). Finally he added a raft of dirty tricks, new weapons and techniques with an eye toward disruption of enemy C3I and harming enemy morale. This included chemical and biological weapons, systematic war-atrocities, and gunpowder weapons among other innovations.

Jan Ziska and the Hussites, 15th Century - Reorganization of the army. Faced with a massive international Crusade about to launch an imminent invasion into Bohemia, the highly experienced veteran Jan Ziska (who had fought at Agincourt with the English and Grunwald with the Poles) helped orchestrate a revolutionary re-organization of Bohemian forces which proved extremely effective. Using wagons as moving fortresses, he organized burghers as marksmen and peasants with militarized flails, and effectively integrated them with existing assets (heavy cavalry, marksmen and infantry), as he collaborated with the large University town of Prague (with it's huge number of skilled artisans and well developed industries) to produce military innovations, especially cannon and other pyrotechnic devices. He also organized the systematic training of mounted crossbowmen to use as scouts and screening forces. The new Czech war-system proved spectacularly effective and smashed the 5 Crusades organized against them, then when neighboring Kingdoms refused to sign a peace treaty, went on devastating invasions until the Pope ultimately agreed to the Prague Compacts, effectively allowing them to continue as a heretic Kingdom.

More broadly you can also look at how the Cossacks adopted Czech Hussite and Ottoman / Tartar tactics and developed their own combined-arms force which proved to be the key to the gradual undoing of Muslim control of Western Asia, and similarly how the Swiss - especially Zurich and Berne, adopted new tactics and weapons (modifications of existing axes and spears into halberds and pikes) and built them into combined arms (if infantry dominated) forces for home defense (as distinct somewhat from their foreign adventures as mercenaries where they tended to fight more purely as infantry). Also how the Spanish invented the Tercio system to deal with the Swiss, among other challenges, and how the German Landsknechts were organized to mimic Swiss tactics under Emperor Maximillian I.


On a smaller scale, someone noted the challenges of scouting when you can't see from above. I know that Strasbourg and other towns which had large Cathedrals (Strasbourg's was 460 feet high) used them as high altitude observation platforms. Strasbourg made critical advantage of this during pitched battles against a very large force of French mercenaries in the 1440's. They were able to identify smaller foraging parties of a few hundred at a time which left the main mercenary camp in a nearby town to go find fodder and supplies, and then sent fast-moving columns to attack them, following up with (larger) secondary columns to hit their relief forces. For Strasbourg, the Cathedral, from which you can apparently see ~20km on a clear day, was almost like having an observation balloon like you would see in the 19th Century or WW 1

G

[Brother Oni]

I recommend reading the art of war (http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html). the actual, original text is only a few thousand words, which is much shorter than most young adult novels, for a frame of reference. anytime you see a copy of the art of war that is larger than your hands, most of what your looking at is commentaries by various authors.

their is also the Thirty Six Stratagems (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty-Six_Stratagems), another historical Chinese work, which are a series of sayings that encapsulate a lot of what Sun Tzu thought about strategy.

I'd say the the Art of War is more about logistics and running a war (The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice; Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs), while the 36 Stratagems has a primary focus on deception in general not just military, although as the quote in the OP says, war is just a continuation of politics by other means.

[PhoenixPhyre]

Semi-on-topic question:

How big should a border garrison be?

So how big were the forces stationed in frontier watch towers/posts? 10 men, max? 20 soldiers? 1-2? I really have no clue here.

Setting details (if needed)
Time/place: pseudo-medieval, Khmer analogue. It's the furthest outpost for this civilization, about 30 miles from a regional center. No major known threats except "savage" hunter-gatherer tribes (who aren't particularly known for raiding settlements). Jungle environment with substantial unfriendly wildlife (including dragon-like but unintelligent beasts).

The garrison is located in a village (~200 people, although that can be changed) and would be responsible for patrols and security against wildlife (mostly). The civilization is military-oriented, so I figure they'd have more than normal, but this is probably somewhat of a punishment post. There is a silk-analogue plantation a few miles to the south, but most of the village is subsistence farming and fishing (on the local lake). Relatively low magical resources--at most a level 1-ish wizard or cleric.

[gkathellar]

A big thing is training. One easy way to portray your strategist as skilled is to have them make improvements in the drill, discipline, and general preparation of the soldiers, as well as to their kits. This is on the one hand very concrete, and on the other hand doesn't require you to depict ttheir matching wits with others directly. It's also a very real part of what made famous commanders throughout history so successful - creating the types of human resources that would become necessary to them in the field.

[Kiero]

They also were strict and generous, with a harsh care for discipline, but paying the citizen professional soldiers very well. To make an example, during the first hundred years of Roman rule, Gallia paid Rome less taxes than what Rome paid its soldiers stationed in Gaul, which essentially turned Roman occupation into a century long economic stimulus package.

Just on this, until the time of Marius, they didn't pay soldiers at all, because they were a citizen militia doing their duty in return for all the rights they were granted. They got a share of plunder, and that was it. These men were yeoman farmers and upwards, expected to be able to equip and support themselves on campaign.

By contrast when Marius started recruiting from amongst the urban poor, they had nothing and had to be both equipped and paid. However, they were also not tied to the farming seasons, and didn't have to be back home in spring to plant and autumn to gather in the harvest. Thus they could be signed on as professional, full-time soldiers.

[Galloglaich]

Nova made a close replica of some 16th C. tempered Greenwich armor, with some legit people involved.

The replica stopped a musket ball at short range.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ancient/secrets-shining-knight.html

[fusilier]

Nova made a close replica of some 16th C. tempered Greenwich armor, with some legit people involved.

The replica stopped a musket ball at short range.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ancient/secrets-shining-knight.html

I saw that, it was very good. Showing the complete construction of the armor, beginning with the raw iron, and explaining the use of a placard(sp?) on armor of that period. Unfortunately they don't go into the details of the musket (caliber, weight of ball, amount of gunpowder used, etc.). Nevertheless, it showed how much more effective the laminated armor with the placard was compared to a more typical steel breastplate. The bluing process at the end was very cool too.

[Raunchel]

Nova made a close replica of some 16th C. tempered Greenwich armor, with some legit people involved.

The replica stopped a musket ball at short range.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ancient/secrets-shining-knight.html

Unfortunately I can't seem to view it because of the rights. Does anyone know if there is a summary somewhere?

[Max_Killjoy]

Nova made a close replica of some 16th C. tempered Greenwich armor, with some legit people involved.

The replica stopped a musket ball at short range.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ancient/secrets-shining-knight.html

I've got that on my DVR, haven't had a chance to sit down with a notepad and really immerse in it. I wanted to watch it before posting about it.

Since you're speaking positively of it, I'll move it up my priority list.

:smallsmile:

[Galloglaich]

Unfortunately I can't seem to view it because of the rights. Does anyone know if there is a summary somewhere?

basically they were looking at this 16th century Greenwich armor, they made one replica with modern steel, and another far more laborious one with medieval methods, made by armorers who knew what they were doing (very rare people in other words). The 'traditional' one was medium carbon steel with a good heat-treatment. The metal crystalization didn't look quite as good as the antique under electron microscope but it was in the ball park.

Then they took a fairly large looking 16th century style musket (though fusilier is right, they didn't get into the specs on it) and shot it at both breast plates from what looked like about 20 feet away.


The one with modern steel got a hole shot right through it, which was to be expected.

The one with the traditional methods shattered the musket ball and just had a small dent on the plackard.

Then they went back and did the goldwork and bluing of the armor so it looked just like the antique.



As I have pointed out before, at least in earlier generations - armor of this quality (tempered medium carbon steel) was affordable to ordinary people, so nobles like the owner of the armor they were studying had their armor embellished with gold scrollwork and so on.




Unless there is something drastically wrong with the test, it looks like I have to revise my understanding of how effective top quality plate armor was. I knew it could stop smaller firearms like handgonnes, arquebus and pistols, but I had always assumed a musket (which was originally an armor-piercing weapon) could punch a hole through one. Now I'd have to say, it looks like maybe not. helps explain why people who could afford it still had this kind of armor made in the 1570's (when the original that the show was based on was made).

And it kind of changes our whole perception of the way warfare changed between the late medieval and early-modern era, the reasons for the collapse of the armor making industry which moved from large industries in city-states like Augsburg and Milan to very small royal armouries with 'pet' craftsmen working for Kings in Innsbrook and Greenwich. The reason we were told for many years that armor goes away was because guns. I have been saying for a long time already that I think it was a combination of cannon and massive socio-economic changes in Europe largely caused by the opening of the Atlantic / Pacific and discovery of the New World. To me this short documentary and test reinforces that view.

It also reinforces my long-standing view that the people living 4 and 5 centuries ago were very smart and the craftsmanship and material culture of the time was far more advanced than we had once thought. We have always been able to see this in the architecture from that time. We have already learned this about swords in the last 10-15 years, and about their martial arts, and we are increasingly learning it about armor. I've also seen considerable evidence on guns too.

But it's just one test, so before we changing too much about how we perceive the era we should do more tests like this.

Also, we know "back in the day" they also used iron bullets in muskets too sometimes for extra armor-piercing power. An iron bullet would have probably shot right through it. And as Fusilier alluded, there was a fairly wide range in the power of muskets. Generally these 16th century ones were much more hard-hitting than later muskets say in the 18th / 19th century, and the one they used looked like a 16th Century type to me, but we didn't get a lot of info about the musket itself. It also depends on the powder and the size of the bullet and how the gun is loaded and etc.

Hopefully NOVA or Toby Capwell who has links to the HEMA scene will publish some of the data. It is the most interesting experiment of this type that I know of since the Graz tests in the 80's

G

[fusilier]

Also, we know "back in the day" they also used iron bullets in muskets too sometimes for extra armor-piercing power. An iron bullet would have probably shot right through it. And as Fusilier alluded, there was a fairly wide range in the power of muskets. Generally these 16th century ones were much more hard-hitting than later muskets say in the 18th / 19th century, and the one they used looked like a 16th Century type to me, but we didn't get a lot of info about the musket itself. It also depends on the powder and the size of the bullet and how the gun is loaded and etc.

Generally speaking, my feeling is that they tend to think "a musket is a musket." They put an impressive amount of effort in to understanding the technical capabilities of the armor and how it was made, but there's little evidence (in what's presented in the show) that they spent that much time considering the historical firearm.

From what I could tell, the musket looked like a decent replica of what you would find on the market today for reenactors. It appeared to be about .75 caliber. The barrel looked modern, i.e. straight walled, without taper. Spanish muskets of the time period tended to be heavy, around .85 caliber, and they often had a strong taper, making them very thick at the breech (this actually causes some complications in construction, as the priming pan has to be dove-tailed into the breech). There's also evidence that they used significantly more powder than would be used today.

A footnote in Gunpowder and Galleys sums up the issue succinctly:

In tests conducted at the H. P. White Laboratory, Eel Aire, Maryland, on 1 July 1970, an 85 caliber lead ball of 890 grains (about 2.3 ounces), driven by 215 grains of black powder (0.49 ounces), typically produced a muzzle velocity of about 1,100 feet per second. Sixteenth century Spanish musketeers almost certainly used a considerably larger powder charge, as heavy as the weight of the ball according to Jorge Vigon, Historia de la Artilleria Española (Madrid, 1947), Vol. I, p. 236.

Incidentally, that's the same lab that did the ballistics tests in the NOVA episode. I suspect that the tests done in the episode used the manufacturer's recommended powder charge, and weren't overcharging the piece.

I think it's still very impressive what the show presents, and how much better the laminated armor performed. It's just a shame that they didn't put the same amount of effort into the "other side of the equation".

I still run into people who think that arquebuses and muskets were so inaccurate that their primary effect on the battlefield was to scare horses. :-/

[Galloglaich]

I still run into people who think that arquebuses and muskets were so inaccurate that their primary effect on the battlefield was to scare horses. :-/

yes, I think we have to realize that not only armor and swords were better than we thought, and bows and crossbows, but also early firearms and that needs to be revised going all the way back to the 14th century.

I saw a fascinating study about some experiments done on an exact replica (via lost wax casting) of three 14th century bronze handgonne barrels, and they actually performed much better (and objectively, significantly well) with the older types of gunpowder formula. I remember one in particular, a copy of a Danzig handgonne barrel with a chambered barrel, performed about the same as a 9mm with modern powder but equivalent to a 44 magnum with the older type powder.

Performance was measured as penetration of mild steel plates and moving a heavy iron pendulum.

When you see a handgonne which looks like a zip-gun on a stick, you tend to assume that it's incredibly crude and even weak in terms of performance, but in reality even with some of the oldest handgonnes you have a fairly long barrel there (equivalent to 6" I think for the Tannenburg gun) with a large caliber bullet, and it hits pretty hard, with overall performance not that different from an 18th century pistol.

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/54/5c/a4/545ca49a459f9f65e192c5ef51d1c6ef.jpg

By the 15th century handgonnes look similar but have 20" or even 25" barrels so they perform more like a modern shotgun.

G

[fusilier]

I saw a fascinating study about some experiments done on an exact replica (via lost wax casting) of three 14th century bronze handgonne barrels, and they actually performed much better (and objectively, significantly well) with the older types of gunpowder formula. I remember one in particular, a copy of a Danzig handgonne barrel with a chambered barrel, performed about the same as a 9mm with modern powder but equivalent to a 44 magnum with the older type powder.

Yes, I've seen that study (or a similar one). The long chambered bore performed much better with the old fashioned serpentine powder (i.e. the simple mixed, non granulated kind).

I remember reading another experiment where they were using serpentine powder in a cannon. They found that the powder produced very little force, until they tried packing the powder tightly -- which the old manuals instructed -- then they found it generated almost as much force as using a later "corned" powder.

[Mr Beer]

I still run into people who think that arquebuses and muskets were so inaccurate that their primary effect on the battlefield was to scare horses. :-/

I know the 'common sense' test doesn't always apply to historical studies but it seems to me that if your aim to is make a loud noise which will 'scare horses', then developing a firearms industry would be a lot more onerous than simply making a bunch of firecrackers.

[Gideon Falcon]

Thanks a ton, guys! You had some fantastic ideas, as well as places for me to research later. Some ideas don't apply, as the general in question is actually a necromancer, and as such logistics and training are more aspects of the magic system, but that's more than made up for by the overwhelming advantages in those areas inherent to the archetypal undead soldiers (as I learned last time). So, again, thanks a bunch.

[Mike_G]

It also reinforces my long-standing view that the people living 4 and 5 centuries ago were very smart and the craftsmanship and material culture of the time was far more advanced than we had once thought. We have always been able to see this in the architecture from that time. We have already learned this about swords in the last 10-15 years, and about their martial arts, and we are increasingly learning it about armor. I've also seen considerable evidence on guns too.

G

I think this is just the way we look at technology in our age. Over the past few centuries, tech has gotten objectively better.

The line of flintlock musket from the American Revolution to the percussion lock rifled musket from the civil war to breechloaders of the late 19th century to bolt action Springfield of WWI to the semi automatic M1 and so on shows a continuous line of improvement. Our cars are safer and more fuel efficient that they were 30 or 20 or even ten years ago, the improvement in phones, computers and so on is exponential.

So, for us, the idea that technology was better a century earlier is really alien.

I know I grew up believing that technology was improving on more or less a continuing upward trend. That hard to shake.

[rrgg]

@Galloglaich

Without knowing the specs about the musket they used it's really hard to draw conclusions. Tests like this generally aren't willing to load the musket with a full 600 or 800 grains of powder like Sir Roger Williams was recommending.

Guns didn't render armor completely useless, and there occasionally are accounts of individuals who seem to be fairly well protected from bullets in their armor. However in general military writers from the period tend to stop putting much faith in the ability of armor to keep its wearer alive against firearms, even "proofed" armor. It seems to be more the case that once there was no guarantee that armor would even keep you alive the downsides of carrying heavy, uncomfortable armor started to outweigh the benefits in the eyes of most soldiers. In the eyes of military thinkers in the late 16th century armor remained essential for soldiers expected to engage in melee such as pikemen or cavalry, but if arquebusiers and musketeers had to march everywhere and fight in metal armor, there was a serious risk that they would be defeated by exhaustion more often than a lack of protection.

[Max_Killjoy]

I really suspect that the decline of armor was at least as much socioeconomic as it was about the rise of the gun.

(Based in part on things I've learned here.)

[KarlMarx]

I really suspect that the decline of armor was at least as much socioeconomic as it was about the rise of the gun.

(Based in part on things I've learned here.)

Definitely.

1. After the Black Death, in many European nations, peasants began gaining much greater control over their labor. The sudden rarity of common people made their labor a commodity in high demand, enabling many to begin working for their own benefit rather than those of feudal overlords. This freed many to move to cities, which rapidly became the focus of economic power rather than feudal estates. Cities produced much more portable wealth, enabling them to either higher mercenaries for their own armies (as in Italy and the German Free Cities) or pay for mercenaries in the royal armies (as in England). These mercenaries were most cost-effective as pikemen, crossbowmen, or (when from England or Wales) longbowmen, rather than mounted knights, who occupied a niche role and represented a significant investment. Thus, knights found both a decline in their economic base and loss of demand for their skills during the era, leading to their decline as a warrior class as many became professional soldiers (HRE Reiters, French Gendarmes, etc.) in royal service--but in an increasingly auxiliary, rather than central, role.
1A. However, in countries where the feudal system, having been established, didn't break down, this change was much less evident. The Polish-Lithuanian Winged Hussars, after all, were essentially a direct continuation of knightly tactics, and in Russia the druzhina and boyars, though not a 'genuine' feudal institution, played a major role in military affairs until Pyotr I forcibly modernized the country.

2. As has been mentioned somewhat, tactics evolved to respond to the mounted knight and take advantage of the much more common (even after the plague) commoners. The Scots, Flemings, Germans, and Swiss adopted the Pike, the English adopted the longbow, and pretty much everyone adopted the crossbow. All of these troops, in the right circumstances, could defeat armored knights, as at Bannockburn, Coutrai, or Agincourt. The introduction of gunpowder accelerated this trend, as it required even less training than the prior weapons, but under the circumstances it is hard to see these circumstances reversing, especially given the economic conditions observed above.

[fusilier]

I know I grew up believing that technology was improving on more or less a continuing upward trend. That hard to shake.

This is why people tell me that early firearms were only good for scaring horses.

People look at how inaccurate Napoleonic muskets were, and assume that two or three centuries earlier they must have been much, much worse. Technically there isn't much difference in terms of accuracy, and practically there's evidence that they may have been more accurate.

[Max_Killjoy]

This is why people tell me that early firearms were only good for scaring horses.

People look at how inaccurate Napoleonic muskets were, and assume that two or three centuries earlier they must have been much, much worse. Technically there isn't much difference in terms of accuracy, and practically there's evidence that they may have been more accurate.

I would guess that there was an earlier peak in quality and accuracy when they were still a more specialized and rare weapon used by highly-prized and well-trained soldiers.

[fusilier]

I would guess that there was an earlier peak in quality and accuracy when they were still a more specialized and rare weapon used by highly-prized and well-trained soldiers.

That was probably a factor. The weapons were typically hand crafted and provided with bullet molds specific to the weapon. The tolerances on mass-produced muskets were quite poor well into the 19th century.

Soldiers appear to have been able to make decisions about how to load their weapons. A smoothbore musket's accuracy can be greatly improved by using a tight fitting ball (or an undersized ball with a patch). It does however make loading take longer.

By the time armies started to mass produce and issue ammunition to their troops, a close range volley was the preferred method of firing. Speed of fire was emphasized over accuracy, so undersized ammunition was standard. The effect of undersized ammunition became interpreted as an "inherent" fault of smoothbore weapons. That assumption is bad enough, but combined with the above tendency to assume that weapons were always improving technologically, and that's where we get ideas about earlier guns being ridiculously inaccurate.

It's not that technology wasn't improving, but those improvements mainly applied to ignition systems - matchlock->wheellock->flintlock. Which do have an impact on overall effectiveness of the weapon. A lot of those technologies were actually figured out quite early, but took sometime for refinement and adoption.

[rs2excelsior]

There's also evidence that they used significantly more powder than would be used today.

A footnote in Gunpowder and Galleys sums up the issue succinctly:


In tests conducted at the H. P. White Laboratory, Eel Aire, Maryland, on 1 July 1970, an 85 caliber lead ball of 890 grains (about 2.3 ounces), driven by 215 grains of black powder (0.49 ounces), typically produced a muzzle velocity of about 1,100 feet per second. Sixteenth century Spanish musketeers almost certainly used a considerably larger powder charge, as heavy as the weight of the ball according to Jorge Vigon, Historia de la Artilleria Española (Madrid, 1947), Vol. I, p. 236.

Oh wow... the blanks we make for our muskets when reenacting are 60 grains of powder (granted for a .58 caliber rather than a .85, and without a bullet loaded, of course), which is the period load according to the Gilham's manual. You can really tell when someone in the line is firing "hot" cartridges with 100-120 grains. From my own experience accidentally double-loading (first cartridge didn't ignite, load a second on top of it) a 120 grain charge starts to give a little bit of kick even without a ball in front. I can't begin to imagine firing a two-hundred grain charge, much less nearly nine hundred.

[Gnoman]

There's also the "what is quality" factor.

For an example, there was a firearm from the mid-19th century that saw service in the American Civil War that was fairly accurate (minute of angle at 500 yards) even by the standards of today, and absurdly accurate in comparison to the weapons of the era. It was not adopted on a large scale by any army, although some (like the Confederacy) used it in a small specialist role, and was a major commercial failure. This is because the weapon was obscenely expensive to produce with the available technology, and fouled much quicker than other rifle muskets. Was this a quality arm or not?


Weapons (like all tools) evolve to suit the needs of their era, and sometimes that evolution will produce models that seem "inferior" to those that came before.

[Mr Beer]

There's also the "what is quality" factor.

For an example, there was a firearm from the mid-19th century that saw service in the American Civil War that was fairly accurate (minute of angle at 500 yards) even by the standards of today, and absurdly accurate in comparison to the weapons of the era. It was not adopted on a large scale by any army, although some (like the Confederacy) used it in a small specialist role, and was a major commercial failure. This is because the weapon was obscenely expensive to produce with the available technology, and fouled much quicker than other rifle muskets. Was this a quality arm or not?

Weapons (like all tools) evolve to suit the needs of their era, and sometimes that evolution will produce models that seem "inferior" to those that came before.

Sounds like a similar reason that apparently lead to the ubiquity of the AK47 and various knock-offs: it wasn't the 'best' rifle around, but it was cheap and easy to make in large quantities, durable and easy to maintain.

[fusilier]

Oh wow... the blanks we make for our muskets when reenacting are 60 grains of powder (granted for a .58 caliber rather than a .85, and without a bullet loaded, of course), which is the period load according to the Gilham's manual. You can really tell when someone in the line is firing "hot" cartridges with 100-120 grains. From my own experience accidentally double-loading (first cartridge didn't ignite, load a second on top of it) a 120 grain charge starts to give a little bit of kick even without a ball in front. I can't begin to imagine firing a two-hundred grain charge, much less nearly nine hundred.

I regularly use ~100 grains in my .69 smoothbore (110 is the regulation load), and if I ram the paper and wadding, I'll feel a little bit of a kick.

I've actually been at a reenactment where a reenactor was injured by overloading his musket (and he may have injured those around him too). So blackpowder can be pretty serious stuff.

Keep in mind those large caliber muskets weighed up to 20 lbs which would help handle the recoil -- also using the correct granulation of powder would be a factor. I too am skeptical that they charged them to that point, however, artillery of the era was known to have used a lot more powder (sometimes over half the weight of the projectile). In fact, it looks like they charged their artillery pieces to the max -- any more powder would have actually have resulted in a reduction in muzzle velocity.

[redwizard007]

I think this is just the way we look at technology in our age. Over the past few centuries, tech has gotten objectively better.

The line of flintlock musket from the American Revolution to the percussion lock rifled musket from the civil war to breechloaders of the late 19th century to bolt action Springfield of WWI to the semi automatic M1 and so on shows a continuous line of improvement. Our cars are safer and more fuel efficient that they were 30 or 20 or even ten years ago, the improvement in phones, computers and so on is exponential.

So, for us, the idea that technology was better a century earlier is really alien.

I know I grew up believing that technology was improving on more or less a continuing upward trend. That hard to shake.

I rarely post in this thread, but am constantly amazed at the quality of discussions. I do have to take a moment and chime in here. What Mike posted got my wheels spinning a bit, and I felt the need to throw out some context.

Much of the technological advancements that have been made throughout history have actually reduced the quality of top end goods, but have raised the median quality in significant ways. The conversion from bronze to iron in weapon and armor manufacturing would be a good example. Assembly line production over hand crafting would be another. Speed or ease of manufacturing can drive industry in directions where top notch quality is not the most important factor, and it is easy to assume that this means that what we have now is better, when quite often what we have is more.

Example:
A Beretta 451-E handmade shotgun runs over $18,000 and is said to be one of the best shotguns on the market, but for the same price, you could arm 10 men with ATI Road Agent shotguns. Which is a "better" gun? Which would make a "better" hunting party?

[fusilier]

A footnote in Gunpowder and Galleys sums up the issue succinctly:

In tests conducted at the H. P. White Laboratory, Eel Aire, Maryland, on 1 July 1970, an 85 caliber lead ball of 890 grains (about 2.3 ounces), driven by 215 grains of black powder (0.49 ounces), typically produced a muzzle velocity of about 1,100 feet per second. Sixteenth century Spanish musketeers almost certainly used a considerably larger powder charge, as heavy as the weight of the ball according to Jorge Vigon, Historia de la Artilleria Española (Madrid, 1947), Vol. I, p. 236.


I found a description of a contract for arquebuses made in 1535 in one of my sources. It specifies a lot of information about the weapons. The ball was supposed to weigh a little more than 3/4 of an ounce (approximately .60 caliber), and it specified that the weapons were to be proofed with a ball, and two charges: each charge of powder was to weigh as much as the ball as thats how they are used in service.

It also specified the weight (almost 15 pounds!), and that the arquebuses should be made to the same size so that in an emergency they could share balls.

[Galloglaich]

@Galloglaich

Without knowing the specs about the musket they used it's really hard to draw conclusions. Tests like this generally aren't willing to load the musket with a full 600 or 800 grains of powder like Sir Roger Williams was recommending.

Guns didn't render armor completely useless, and there occasionally are accounts of individuals who seem to be fairly well protected from bullets in their armor. However in general military writers from the period tend to stop putting much faith in the ability of armor to keep its wearer alive against firearms, even "proofed" armor. It seems to be more the case that once there was no guarantee that armor would even keep you alive the downsides of carrying heavy, uncomfortable armor started to outweigh the benefits in the eyes of most soldiers. In the eyes of military thinkers in the late 16th century armor remained essential for soldiers expected to engage in melee such as pikemen or cavalry, but if arquebusiers and musketeers had to march everywhere and fight in metal armor, there was a serious risk that they would be defeated by exhaustion more often than a lack of protection.

What you are describing here is a good, succinct summary of 19th through late 20th Century thinking on this subject.

However, as is usually the case, especially when it comes to anything High to Late medieval or Renaissance, the reality is much more complex.

In honor of your nicely concise summary, and in the spirit of Oscar Wilde's maxim "Brevity is the Soul of Wit", I'll keep my reply short here rather than my customary 11 paragraphs.

These are the five points I think you should consider:

1) Armor quality was such by the 15th century that tempered steel armor allowed it to become very light. Full harness went from ~80 lbs (transitional harness including mail) in the 14th century to as little as ~35 lbs (Gothic harness) by the mid 15th. A half armor (typical for infantry) might be as little as ~15-20 lbs.

2) Armor also got a lot cheaper in this period so as to be affordable by common soldiers. However it should be noted that in this period common (esp. mercenary) soldiers were high-skilled paid a lot and common artisans and merchants made a very good income compared to later periods.

3) Changes in the armor industry, including serious political / military problems in the main centers like Milan and Augsburg, led to a rapid decline in the scope and scale of armor production, leading to increased prices and declining overall quality.

4) By the late 16th Century armor made of simple wrought iron began to become much more common, while armor of the earlier level of quality, like the armor in the NOVA special, became increasingly luxury items.

5) By the 17th century, due to the threat of firearms (especially pistols for cavalry, who were the main troop type still wearing armor) the simple wrought iron armor got a lot thicker to compensate. Weight went way, way up. To the point that a single breast and back plate combo might weigh as much as ~50 lbs and still not offer very good protection against firearms. meanwhile pay for (often low-skilled) soldiers and for commoners in general was in steep decline.


I hope this makes sense, I know it's a bit twisty / fiddly. But these are the facts.

G

[rrgg]

That was probably a factor. The weapons were typically hand crafted and provided with bullet molds specific to the weapon. The tolerances on mass-produced muskets were quite poor well into the 19th century.

Soldiers appear to have been able to make decisions about how to load their weapons. A smoothbore musket's accuracy can be greatly improved by using a tight fitting ball (or an undersized ball with a patch). It does however make loading take longer.

By the time armies started to mass produce and issue ammunition to their troops, a close range volley was the preferred method of firing. Speed of fire was emphasized over accuracy, so undersized ammunition was standard. The effect of undersized ammunition became interpreted as an "inherent" fault of smoothbore weapons. That assumption is bad enough, but combined with the above tendency to assume that weapons were always improving technologically, and that's where we get ideas about earlier guns being ridiculously inaccurate.

It's not that technology wasn't improving, but those improvements mainly applied to ignition systems - matchlock->wheellock->flintlock. Which do have an impact on overall effectiveness of the weapon. A lot of those technologies were actually figured out quite early, but took sometime for refinement and adoption.

As near as I can tell accuracy was pretty similar at both the high end and low end between 16th century and napoleonic smoothbores. What's more even a typical napoleonic musket would have been accurate enough to make linear tactics pretty much suicide in the right hands. "Musket trials" from the period tend to show that a volley could hit a battalion-sized target ~50% of the time at 100 yards, but in actual combat the accuracy at that distance seems to have only been 0-5% at best.

The real issue tends to be the soldiers themselves. In a massive engagement involving 10s of thousands it turns out that very few men are actually able to keep their cool in the face of all the noise, smoke, and imminent death and even well-trained troops resort to firing as fast as they can without aiming or simply shooting into the air. This is how you end up with accounts of troops literally failing to hit anything beyond 10 yards.

There's another persistent myth that the widespread adoption of rifles during the US Civil War suddenly made napoleonic tactics obsolete. In reality most fighting was still done from around 100 yards away and the minie rifle doesn't seem to have improved practical accuracy outside of specific sharpshooters and small-scale skirmishes.

For some more data I would recommend looking up "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat
Reality and Myth" by Hess.


I found a description of a contract for arquebuses made in 1535 in one of my sources.

Out of curiosity, can you name what book that's from? I might need to add it to my library.

[Mike_G]

I rarely post in this thread, but am constantly amazed at the quality of discussions. I do have to take a moment and chime in here. What Mike posted got my wheels spinning a bit, and I felt the need to throw out some context.

Much of the technological advancements that have been made throughout history have actually reduced the quality of top end goods, but have raised the median quality in significant ways. The conversion from bronze to iron in weapon and armor manufacturing would be a good example. Assembly line production over hand crafting would be another. Speed or ease of manufacturing can drive industry in directions where top notch quality is not the most important factor, and it is easy to assume that this means that what we have now is better, when quite often what we have is more.

Example:
A Beretta 451-E handmade shotgun runs over $18,000 and is said to be one of the best shotguns on the market, but for the same price, you could arm 10 men with ATI Road Agent shotguns. Which is a "better" gun? Which would make a "better" hunting party?

Kinda.

But that's not what I'm getting at.

A normal modern rifle pulled out of the middle of a production run is objectively far far far better (in terms of accuracy, range, rate of fire, etc) than the finest musket ever made. Ditto for any economy car today compared to the finest car of 1920, in regards to reliability, fuel efficiency etc. A modern M1 tank can take out a dozen WWII Tigers or T 34s without breaking a sweat.

And we have to be cautious about what's better about top line gear. How much of the 18K shotgun goes into making it a better gun, as far as accuracy, reliability, and so on, and how much is a gorgeous burled walnut stock, scrollwork on the metal, and so on?

And I'm talking the basic weapon you issue to the infantry. The 1860 Springfield rifled musket is objectively more accurate, more reliable and has better range than the Brown Bess of a century earlier. The Springfield 03 is an order of magnitude better than the 1860. The past two centuries have shown dramatic improvements in standard firearms in every practical application.

So, unless you really study the stuff, it seems that from 1500 to 1700, they should have been getting better, not worse. Even when that's not the case, it's hard for not to think that way.

[Galloglaich]

Definitely.

1. After the Black Death, in many European nations, peasants began gaining much greater control over their labor. The sudden rarity of common people made their labor a commodity in high demand,

I agree with most of this, but I think too much emphasis is being put on the Black Death as the instigator of this change. it was already well underway centuries before the Black Death - in fact the Black Death itself may have been in part due to the rapid population expansion in the 13th and early 14th century as well as the extension of power Eastward by European (esp. Italian) city-States. The first European casualties of the Plague were Genoese from their colonies in the Crimea fighting a siege against the Mongol Golden Horde. The Plague hit the Mongols and they catapulted the heads of their own dead soldiers over the walls into the Genoese fortified towns. Then plague hit hard there and Genoese fled back to Europe on ships.

Many scholars believe the Plague would have gotten to Europe anyway, but the start was definitely in the Crimea.

Population growth in the 13th Century, triggered in large part by the rapid rise of the towns in the 12th-13th (which some people call the 'First Renaissance') meant that the population was more exposed to famines in the early 14th (notably 1315-1322) which may have caused a downward spiral of malnutrution in some areas. Starvation / malnutrution typically preceeded plague outbreaks throughout pre-industrial history including specifically Bubonic Plague.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Famine_of_1315%E2%80%9317

The main point though is that the re-urbanization of Europe is really what triggered the rapid economic changes and growth of the high-to-late medieval period. The European economy (and population) was actually a lot larger in say, 1280 than it was in 1380 or even 1480. As you can see in this chart on England, population is huge ~ 1300, takes a bit dip with the famine, then plunges catastrophically from the 1350's, only to begin recovering about 100 years later.

Recovery was much faster in the more developed areas like Italy, Flanders, South Germany etc., but you the same kind of dip. And in both cases, the period of 1100-1300 is where the most rapid growth occurs.

http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/.a/6a00d834515c2369e2014e880d5ccd970d-pi

Here is another similar chart which shows the overall European population

https://themedievalera.wikispaces.com/file/view/popdips2.gif/284894410/popdips2.gif

This is another interesting chart which gives us some insight into cultural growth. Notice stagnant manuscript production from Carolingian to beginning of High medieval, then very rapid increase (200% per century) from 1100-1300, then a modest growth in the 14th century, and then doubling again in the 15th.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/European_Output_of_Manuscripts_500%E2%80%931500.pn g/640px-European_Output_of_Manuscripts_500%E2%80%931500.pn g

I think mid to late 20th Century scholars seized on the idea of the Black Death as the easiest way to explain the onset of the period of intense cultural and technological genesis we call today The Renaissance (after the esteemed and magisterial though not always well understood Historian Jakob Burckhardt) but as usual with these things, it's more complex. The simple TL : DR is that the Renaissance had really already started in the 11th Century with the ultimately successful campaign for independence by the Lombard League in Northern Italy.

I do think the Crusades and Reconquista, and the sack of Constantinople in the IVth Crusade, all did contribute to the stimulus.

And the Black Death did shake things up as well, of course, but probably caused as many problems as it alleviated.

G

[Galloglaich]

Kinda.

But that's not what I'm getting at.

A normal modern rifle pulled out of the middle of a production run is objectively far far far better (in terms of accuracy, range, rate of fire, etc) than the finest musket ever made. Ditto for any economy car today compared to the finest car of 1920, in regards to reliability, fuel efficiency etc. A modern M1 tank can take out a dozen WWII Tigers or T 34s without breaking a sweat.

And we have to be cautious about what's better about top line gear. How much of the 18K shotgun goes into making it a better gun, as far as accuracy, reliability, and so on, and how much is a gorgeous burled walnut stock, scrollwork on the metal, and so on?

And I'm talking the basic weapon you issue to the infantry. The 1860 Springfield rifled musket is objectively more accurate, more reliable and has better range than the Brown Bess of a century earlier. The Springfield 03 is an order of magnitude better than the 1860. The past two centuries have shown dramatic improvements in standard firearms in every practical application.

So, unless you really study the stuff, it seems that from 1500 to 1700, they should have been getting better, not worse. Even when that's not the case, it's hard for not to think that way.

We go through periods of technological, economic and cultural genesis, periods of stagnation, and periods of decline.

Cultural genesis is often described (usually in retrospect by admirers of much later generations) as a "Golden Age", so for example in and near Europe we have

Some kind of "Minoan Golden Age" which seems to have been ended by a massive Volcano ~ 1200 BC
the "Golden Age" of Athens and of many other Greek city states, kind of twinkling on and off in different polis like fireflies ~ 5th Century BC
a smaller, sort of mini Hellenistic "Golden Age" triggered by the dissemination of Hellenistic culture in the wake of Alexander the Great (and influence of Persian, Egyptian etc. culture going back the other way) ~ 3rd Century BC
A Roman "Golden Age", or arguably two of them (one Republican one Early Imperial) ~ 2nd Century BC and ~ 1st Century AD
The Muslim Golden Age - like the Greek one breaking out and then being suppressed in one place and then another; Persia, Damascus, Baghdad, Cordoba
The High Medieval period ~11th - 14th Centuries
The Renaissance starting in Italy in the late 14th Century and spreading to Flanders, Germany and beyond in the 15th
A far more muted, Mini-Renaissance in France, England, Spain, Russia etc. in the 16th Century (largely triggered by imported Italian scholars)

then some pretty intense periods of decline in the various wars of Religion and especially the 30 Years War 1620-1648, interrupted by short 'Golden Ages' and more generally, stagnation.

and then more decline and stagnation, mostly, broken up by the enlightenment, short but intense ups and downs with the French Revolution, then the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England and Flanders, the Belle Epoch in France and then the rise of the United States and Pax Americana (with more short but historically beyond catastrophic events of WW 1, WW2 and other mass murder / destruction eruptions of the20th Century)

During periods of a Golden Age, the effects may be more technological, more cultural, or more economic + military. For example the Athens / Greek Golden Age was largely cultural and technological, but not as important economically and militarily, (the Greeks mostly continued to live pretty simple lives in spite of their great knowledge) while the Hellenistic and Roman were more about increasing technology and economic / military power.

Periods of stagnation usually include continued technological development, but not necessarily in a way that is dissemminated efficiently. For example per your analogy, in the 17th and 18th Century firearms technology did increase rapidly, with fine tuning of wheellocks, rifling, metal cartridges, breach loading and the flint lock, even revolvers becoming invented, but most soldiers in the field were still being equipped with fairly crude muzzle-loading smoothbore match-lock weapons and knowledge of advanced techniques was not always shared.

Meanwhile, I can show you breach loading firearms and rifled firearms from the 15th century, and i can show you revolvers and metal cartridges from the early to mid 16th.

Kind of like, you can see devices like the Antikythera mechanism from the Greek Golden Age, which do not seem to be widely disemminated, and we can see the Persians, Arabs and Moors developing Greek ideas like the cam shaft, cam slider and reduction gear but not doing that much with them in the 8th-11th Centuries, while in Latinized zones of Catalonia and Italy these same techniques (derived from the Greeks via the Arabs) are almost overnight made into the basis of new mechanized iron, wood, textile and paper industries.

In the US, we have been, since probably the 1850's or 1830's, in a pretty rapid and continuous period of technological innovation, a tech "Golden Age" if you will.

When you have periods of rapid technological advancement without corresponding cultural development however, that can contribute to problems.


I think you could make an argument that for example WW I is a good example of a situation in which economic and military / technological development outstripped cultural genesis.

G

[fusilier]

As near as I can tell accuracy was pretty similar at both the high end and low end between 16th century and napoleonic smoothbores. What's more even a typical napoleonic musket would have been accurate enough to make linear tactics pretty much suicide in the right hands. "Musket trials" from the period tend to show that a volley could hit a battalion-sized target ~50% of the time at 100 yards, but in actual combat the accuracy at that distance seems to have only been 0-5% at best.

The real issue tends to be the soldiers themselves. In a massive engagement involving 10s of thousands it turns out that very few men are actually able to keep their cool in the face of all the noise, smoke, and imminent death and even well-trained troops resort to firing as fast as they can without aiming or simply shooting into the air. This is how you end up with accounts of troops literally failing to hit anything beyond 10 yards.

There's another persistent myth that the widespread adoption of rifles during the US Civil War suddenly made napoleonic tactics obsolete. In reality most fighting was still done from around 100 yards away and the minie rifle doesn't seem to have improved practical accuracy outside of specific sharpshooters and small-scale skirmishes.

For some more data I would recommend looking up "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat
Reality and Myth" by Hess.

Yes, the tactics used and the training are factors in terms of battlefield performance. However, it's important to establish a baseline -- how accurate is the weapon under ideal conditions? Then ask how do the tactics, training, and battlefield conditions affect that. 16th century tactics and training (and probably battlefield conditions) were different from the 19th century.

The theoretical performance of the muskets across different centuries is going to be very similar. (Although I doubt a brown bess could handle a 600 grain charge) In practice, a Napoleonic soldier could only use loose fitting ammo. Whereas, a 16th century soldier might have an option. When and how often they used that option, is unknown to me.




Out of curiosity, can you name what book that's from? I might need to add it to my library.

It's James Lavin's A History of Spanish Firearms. I can quote the whole section about the contract if you would like.

[Galloglaich]

Yes, the tactics used and the training are factors in terms of battlefield performance. However, it's important to establish a baseline -- how accurate is the weapon under ideal conditions? Then ask how do the tactics, training, and battlefield conditions affect that. 16th century tactics and training (and probably battlefield conditions) were different from the 19th century.

The theoretical performance of the muskets across different centuries is going to be very similar. (Although I doubt a brown bess could handle a 600 grain charge) In practice, a Napoleonic soldier could only use loose fitting ammo. Whereas, a 16th century soldier might have an option. When and how often they used that option, is unknown to me.


It's James Lavin's A History of Spanish Firearms. I can quote the whole section about the contract if you would like.

I think you may concur with me on the Fusilier, but i have noticed that in Late Medieval shooting contests, they seem to have had fairly high expectations of accuracy - and not with an infinity of time to shoot either as shooting was usually timed with a mechanical clock. A ~10" target at roughly 70 - 100 meters seems to be fairly common (not always certain because you have to look at the actual invite to determine what the precise unit of measure is for each contest, as it varied from town to town and from year to year). Target distances as far away as 200 meters are not unheard of for the elite tier (elimination round etc.) of a contest.

And in battle there always seems to be a minority of shooters who could hit human targets as far away as 200-300 meters. In the Siege of Malta for example both the Ottomans and Spanish / Hospitaliers seemed to have some guys who could hit targets much further away than average.

Seems like these guys customized their guns, cast their own bullets and sometimes made their own powder, used special wadding, and did a lot of other special things to arrive at this kind of accuracy, but I've seen a lot of evidence that you had people with these capabilities.

Some maybe had rifled guns too since i know Augsburg was already banning them from shooting contests (as they were considered cheating) as early as 1401.

G

[rrgg]

What you are describing here is a good, succinct summary of 19th through late 20th Century thinking on this subject.

However, as is usually the case, especially when it comes to anything High to Late medieval or Renaissance, the reality is much more complex.

In honor of your nicely concise summary, and in the spirit of Oscar Wilde's maxim "Brevity is the Soul of Wit", I'll keep my reply short here rather than my customary 11 paragraphs.

These are the five points I think you should consider:

1) Armor quality was such by the 15th century that tempered steel armor allowed it to become very light. Full harness went from ~80 lbs (transitional harness including mail) in the 14th century to as little as ~35 lbs (Gothic harness) by the mid 15th. A half armor (typical for infantry) might be as little as ~15-20 lbs.

2) Armor also got a lot cheaper in this period so as to be affordable by common soldiers. However it should be noted that in this period common (esp. mercenary) soldiers were high-skilled paid a lot and common artisans and merchants made a very good income compared to later periods.

3) Changes in the armor industry, including serious political / military problems in the main centers like Milan and Augsburg, led to a rapid decline in the scope and scale of armor production, leading to increased prices and declining overall quality.

4) By the late 16th Century armor made of simple wrought iron began to become much more common, while armor of the earlier level of quality, like the armor in the NOVA special, became increasingly luxury items.

5) By the 17th century, due to the threat of firearms (especially pistols for cavalry, who were the main troop type still wearing armor) the simple wrought iron armor got a lot thicker to compensate. Weight went way, way up. To the point that a single breast and back plate combo might weigh as much as ~50 lbs and still not offer very good protection against firearms. meanwhile pay for (often low-skilled) soldiers and for commoners in general was in steep decline.


I hope this makes sense, I know it's a bit twisty / fiddly. But these are the facts.

G

Thanks, I think we've discussed the curious decline in armor quality during the 16th century before, but conversely prior to then most armors weren't really being made with firearms in mind. Even from the early 1500s for example you have Paolo Giovio's account of Pavia where he claims that the muskets used by the Spanish were able to kill two French men-at-arms with one bullet and in Jacapo's The Preceptes of Warre he describes gunners on horseback like this: "For no sorte of souldyers, is more profytable thā they nor yet doth more myschife and hurte. For no man is so well harnaysed, that can be saulfe from them: such a vyolence is in that warlye instrumente"

20-35 lbs is still quite a lot of weight. We know that the 20+ lb muskets seem to have had a lot of issues and it could be difficult to get musketeers to march long distances without wagons to help carry their weapons. Often the decision to abandon armor seems to have begun with the soldiers themselves, rather than some penny-pinching higher-ups. In 1600 ireland for example English troops were apparently leaving behind even helmets and breastplates in piles everywhere they went. In 1632 John Cruso was still complaining about carbineers who preferred to wear just a buff coat instead of a breastplate and backplate.

The whole knight=helpless turtle thing is a modern myth, but weight and encumbrance were a real problem and could even negatively impact combat performance. I suspect part of the issue was shift to more self-sufficient or lower class troops who couldn't afford multiple servants or draft animals to help carry the weight of their gear. Even when it comes to cavalry Sir Williams makes a distinction between true "men at arms" who require five horses each, and lancers, which he considers just as effective and more versatile while only needing the one horse. He wanted a horseman's armor to be pistol proof at the foreparts but otherwise to be made as a light as possible so that the horse could endure the weight up to ten hours.

[fusilier]

So, unless you really study the stuff, it seems that from 1500 to 1700, they should have been getting better, not worse. Even when that's not the case, it's hard for not to think that way.

They evolved to fit the environment they were in. Armor was no longer an issue by 1700, so a heavy musket using a huge powder charge was no longer necessary. The tactics of the day (which were employed because they were successful) emphasized close-range massed volley fire, so rate of fire became more important than accuracy.

A musket of 1700 would have been lighter, and more reliable than one of 1500 (or 1550). It would have been able to take a bayonet. In terms of accuracy . . . well that wasn't stressed at the time. In a theoretical sense, provide both with ammo of the same windage, and they will probably have similar accuracy. Practically speaking, militaries at least, weren't issuing tight-fitting ammo, and their muskets were no longer made with rear-sights.

A musket of 1550 would probably have been more powerful, in terms of armor penetration, and maximum effective range. It would also have had a slower rate of fire.

We can talk objectively about accuracy and armor penetration -- but whether or not that made a weapon better or worse is subjective, because it depends upon what we choose to measure. When we talk about things like accuracy and armor penetration, we are choosing to focus on certain aspects. We often end up ignoring the entire system that the weapon was a part of -- including things like training and tactics.

A 1550s musket would have been too heavy and slow loading for a battlefield in 1700. A 1700's musket would have had some benefits on a battlefield in 1550 -- but probably would lack the armor penetration expected of such weapon.

[rs2excelsior]

Meanwhile, I can show you breach loading firearms and rifled firearms from the 15th century, and i can show you revolvers and metal cartridges from the early to mid 16th.

I'd be really interested to see some of those, especially the 16th century revolvers. Not because I doubt you saying they existed, but because I'm really curious how they were constructed. I knew there were some breech-loading muskets earlier than most people think (Ferguson's rifled breechloader from the American Revolution comes to mind) but I was under the impression that while they worked, they were generally to difficult to make and often too unreliable for the battlefield. Were these functional weapons, or just idle curiosities that probably wouldn't hold up under battlefield conditions? If you can point me in a direction to look I'd be interested in finding out more about them.

Also, fascinating discussion from fusilier et al. about the relative quality of muskets across time periods, and the different ways they were better or worse. It's brought up several points I hadn't thought of before.

Regarding rifles in the American Civil War, I remember reading about a tendency for mid-range volley fire (I think on the order of 200-500 yards, but that could be off, I'm not sure) to be ineffective, due to the fact that around that range the arc of the bullets would take it over the heads of the enemy. While ACW rifles did have pretty good rear sights (my 1861 Springfield has a flip sight for 100, 300, and 500 yards, and my dad's 1858 Enfield is sighted for 100-900 yards in 100 yard increments), soldiers were not really trained to use them, nor would they have the time to when firing volleys--again, rate of fire over accuracy. They were also not generally trained to account for recoil or bullet drop, leading to a lot of shots falling short or going over the enemy's head. Plus the smoke, noise, and confusion generated by black powder weapons. The rate of fire issue is a very good point--one of the main reasons Napoleon didn't adopt rifles for his light infantry like the British did with their rifle regiments (not the entirety of their light infantry, but still enough for a couple of dedicated units) was the lower rate of fire from having to ram a tight-fitting ball. The Minie ball allowed rifle-levels of accuracy with smoothbore-levels of rate of fire, which is when the rifle began to see widespread adoption.

[Max_Killjoy]

The Union did deploy the Sharpshooter regiments, armed with breach-loading rifles (mainly Sharps, the name being purely coincidence), all volunteers, and requiring a high level of marksmanship on specific targets.

The Henry and Spencer lever-action "repeating" rifles also saw use by union forces.

[Vinyadan]

Has anyone watched The Profession of Arms? Any opinion?

[Galloglaich]

I'd be really interested to see some of those, especially the 16th century revolvers. Not because I doubt you saying they existed, but because I'm really curious how they were constructed.

http://www.vikingsword.com/vb/attachment.php?attachmentid=50766&stc=1
Breech-loading matchlock arquebus, Nuremberg 1470.

here is a page from a book with more detail about it
http://www.vikingsword.com/vb/attachment.php?attachmentid=50770&stc=1

This is a plan for a nearly identical weapon from a manuscript from 1456 by Lorenzo Ghiberti

http://www.vikingsword.com/vb/attachment.php?attachmentid=50892&stc=1

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cf/Drehling_GNM_W1984_ca_1580.jpg/640px-Drehling_GNM_W1984_ca_1580.jpg
8 barrel matchlok revolver from 1580 (Germany, I think Nuremberg)

http://www.vikingsword.com/vb/attachment.php?attachmentid=35660&stc=1

Breech-loading wheellock pistol, ~ 1560, also German


I knew there were some breech-loading muskets earlier than most people think (Ferguson's rifled breechloader from the American Revolution comes to mind) but I was under the impression that while they worked, they were generally to difficult to make and often too unreliable for the battlefield. Were these functional weapons, or just idle curiosities that probably wouldn't hold up under battlefield conditions? If you can point me in a direction to look I'd be interested in finding out more about them.


Well, the truth is we don't know how common they really were or how reliable they really were or any of that. We can really only make a (somewhat) educated guess.

Almost everything from the Middle Ages gets dismissed this way, for example upthread somebody mentioned the long-standing trope that medieval firearms were mainly for 'smoke and noise' - but after 15 years of pretty intense research and reading lots of primary sources, I have less and less faith in these 20th century Tropes. I believe these things were often if not always reliable, and they were more ubitquitous than what could be dismissed as a 'curiousity'. Certainly they represented the pinnacle of medieval and Renaissance craftsmanship but so did thousands of paintings, sculptures, finely made buildings, armor panoplies, swords, musical instruments, nautical instruments, and a thousand other things.

That was really part of the nature of the Renaissance, the material culture was at a very high level and most production was under the control of craft guilds run by master artisans. This is one of the things that changed by the 17th Century.

G

[Galloglaich]

Thanks, I think we've discussed the curious decline in armor quality during the 16th century before, but conversely prior to then most armors weren't really being made with firearms in mind.

I disagree 100% - I don't think plate armor would have come into existence as we know it if it wasn't for firearms. Firearms existed in Europe since the 13th Century.



Even from the early 1500s for example you have Paolo Giovio's account of Pavia where he claims that the muskets used by the Spanish were able to kill two French men-at-arms with one bullet and in Jacapo's The Preceptes of Warre he describes gunners on horseback like this: "For no sorte of souldyers, is more profytable thā they nor yet doth more myschife and hurte. For no man is so well harnaysed, that can be saulfe from them: such a vyolence is in that warlye instrumente"

Yes but at Pavia, they almost certainly had very heavy muskets using iron shot. 20mm weapons etc. Similarly, the last sentence doesn't specify a musket or an arquebus, he could be talking about cannon. No armor can protect you from a cannonball.



20-35 lbs is still quite a lot of weight. We know that the 20+ lb muskets seem to have had a lot of issues and it could be difficult to get musketeers to march long distances without wagons to help carry their weapons. Often the decision to abandon armor seems to have begun with the soldiers themselves, rather than some penny-pinching higher-ups. In 1600 ireland for example English troops were apparently leaving behind even helmets and breastplates in piles everywhere they went. In 1632 John Cruso was still complaining about carbineers who preferred to wear just a buff coat instead of a breastplate and backplate.

You are wrong - 20 lbs is quite light for a soldiers kit - yes 20 lbs is very heavy for a firearm to carry around, but it is not very heavy for kit that you wear in which the weight is distributed over your body. A modern soldier carries far more than in LBE, ammunition, water, body armor and other miscellaneous kit (not counting a backpack).

You also clearly missed my point about 17th century armor. The English troops ditching their breastplates were ditching wrought iron armor which could be as much as 6mm thick with just a breastplate alone weighing up to 40 lbs, whereas armor in the 15th or early 16th century which actually protected better might be as little as 3mm thick at it's thickest point and weigh less than half as much.



The whole knight=helpless turtle thing is a modern myth, but weight and encumbrance were a real problem and could even negatively impact combat performance.

The amount of weight carried by war-fighters is fairly constant going back to Roman times.

G

[Mike_G]

As technology, the 1860 Springfield is far, far, far more accurate than the Brown Bess.

The rifling, the Minie ball, and the back sight all mean that it was more accurate and threw a ball straighter and farther, with less of the wabbling and yaw of a round ball. And the percussion cap was much more reliable than a flintlock.

If troops weren't trained to use the sights or how to aim properly, that doesn't mean the rifle wasn't an improvement. It means that doctrine hadn;t evolved to take advantage of it.

I think that rifle fire was more effective in the ACW if we look at attacks that were stopped by fire alone in the ACW versus Napoleonic wars or Seven Years War, and if we consider the (slightly) looser formations relative to Napoleonic tactics. They weren't "loose" per se, but they tended not to fight in ranks three deep, or advance in column like the French did a Waterloo. The Union troops opened fire on Pickett's Charge at a far greater range than the British did on the French infantry attack at Waterloo.

Maybe the overall hit percentage wasn't higher, but a lot of that is context. The in combat hit percentage with modern assault rifles is lower than at Bunker Hill, but nobody's trying to argue for trading the M-4 for the Charleville.

[fusilier]

As technology, the 1860 Springfield is far, far, far more accurate than the Brown Bess.

The rifling, the Minie ball, and the back sight all mean that it was more accurate and threw a ball straighter and farther, with less of the wabbling and yaw of a round ball. And the percussion cap was much more reliable than a flintlock.

If troops weren't trained to use the sights or how to aim properly, that doesn't mean the rifle wasn't an improvement. It means that doctrine hadn;t evolved to take advantage of it.

I think that rifle fire was more effective in the ACW if we look at attacks that were stopped by fire alone in the ACW versus Napoleonic wars or Seven Years War, and if we consider the (slightly) looser formations relative to Napoleonic tactics. They weren't "loose" per se, but they tended not to fight in ranks three deep, or advance in column like the French did a Waterloo. The Union troops opened fire on Pickett's Charge at a far greater range than the British did on the French infantry attack at Waterloo.

Maybe the overall hit percentage wasn't higher, but a lot of that is context. The in combat hit percentage with modern assault rifles is lower than at Bunker Hill, but nobody's trying to argue for trading the M-4 for the Charleville.

This is generally how I see the issue -- rifled muskets were an improvement. Even if it's hard to measure when we look at the statistics. Training to use the rifles was lacking, which probably inhibited their success.

There was one advantage that smoothbore muskets had over rifled-muskets -- the ability to effectively use buck and ball. Between 30-40 yards that was considered more deadly than a rifle. During the Civil War, it was not uncommon for firing lines to form that close. I've heard some claim that veterans actually preferred smoothbore muskets, but I'm a bit dubious. It seems that troops gladly turned in their old smoothbore muskets for rifled muskets when they had the opportunity.

[Spamotron]

The amount of weight carried by war-fighters is fairly constant going back to Roman times.

G

IIRC earlier versions of this thread it was something like 100 lbs. marching load and 60 lbs. combat load correct?

[fusilier]

I'd be really interested to see some of those, especially the 16th century revolvers. Not because I doubt you saying they existed, but because I'm really curious how they were constructed. I knew there were some breech-loading muskets earlier than most people think (Ferguson's rifled breechloader from the American Revolution comes to mind) but I was under the impression that while they worked, they were generally to difficult to make and often too unreliable for the battlefield. Were these functional weapons, or just idle curiosities that probably wouldn't hold up under battlefield conditions? If you can point me in a direction to look I'd be interested in finding out more about them.

Also, fascinating discussion from fusilier et al. about the relative quality of muskets across time periods, and the different ways they were better or worse. It's brought up several points I hadn't thought of before.

Regarding rifles in the American Civil War, I remember reading about a tendency for mid-range volley fire (I think on the order of 200-500 yards, but that could be off, I'm not sure) to be ineffective, due to the fact that around that range the arc of the bullets would take it over the heads of the enemy. While ACW rifles did have pretty good rear sights (my 1861 Springfield has a flip sight for 100, 300, and 500 yards, and my dad's 1858 Enfield is sighted for 100-900 yards in 100 yard increments), soldiers were not really trained to use them, nor would they have the time to when firing volleys--again, rate of fire over accuracy. They were also not generally trained to account for recoil or bullet drop, leading to a lot of shots falling short or going over the enemy's head. Plus the smoke, noise, and confusion generated by black powder weapons. The rate of fire issue is a very good point--one of the main reasons Napoleon didn't adopt rifles for his light infantry like the British did with their rifle regiments (not the entirety of their light infantry, but still enough for a couple of dedicated units) was the lower rate of fire from having to ram a tight-fitting ball. The Minie ball allowed rifle-levels of accuracy with smoothbore-levels of rate of fire, which is when the rifle began to see widespread adoption.

Early Breechloaders

First, all early breechloaders suffered from poor gas seals, although one of the first successful military breechloaders (the Hall Carbine/Rifle) just ignored the issue. The poor gas-seal affected the range. Gas-seal wouldn't really be solved until metallic cartridges were employed, although there were some clever approaches; these were often frustrated by the messy residue that blackpowder left behind.

Second, they were significantly more expensive than a muzzleloading weapon. They required precision fitting, which was difficult to mass produce. If the cylinders of a revolver become misaligned, it can destroy the gun. This was a problem on some models even in the 19th century. Also, until the introduction of metallic cartridges, chain fires were always a potential issue on revolvers, and could destroy the gun and injure the firer.

Third, in my opinion most were too delicate for serious military service, although some of the simple versions may have seen some service.

There's a good number of these early breechloaders depicted in James Lavin's book (A History of Spanish Firearms) that I mentioned earlier. Although they tend to be more from the 17th and 18th centuries, they have similar designs to those that Galloglaich posted.

Recoil in the Civil War

Officers were known to tell their troops to aim for the knees, in an attempt to account for recoil (and probably the fact that they weren't trained to aim for center of mass).

[Galloglaich]

Just playing Devil's advocate here, I basically agree with everything you said. Just want to throw out a couple of other things to consider.


Early Breechloaders

First, all early breechloaders suffered from poor gas seals, although one of the first successful military breechloaders (the Hall Carbine/Rifle) just ignored the issue. The poor gas-seal affected the range. Gas-seal wouldn't really be solved until metallic cartridges were employed, although there were some clever approaches; these were often frustrated by the messy residue that blackpowder left behind.

Sure, but...

Let's keep in mind that they had been using small (and large) breach-loading cannon going back to the 14th Century. By the 15th Century this was pretty standardized. I think they had figured out how to either prevent the gas problem or work around it. At any rate, I can tell you that by the 1460's there was hardly a castle, a warship or a war-wagon that didn't have a breach-loading cannon, often in quite small caliber, 20-40mm.

I will say that these often seemed to be of 'medium' barrel length, you do see some with very long barrels (10' or more) but the majority are more like 3' or 4' long. So maybe that implies a lower gas pressure.

However I would suggest that given that they clearly made thousands of small breach-loading cannon of sufficient quality that they were in high and wide demand - not just in Europe but also in the Middle East and Asia, incidentally, for craftsmen in one of the more advanced workshops in a place like Nuremberg or the Venice Arsenal to make some breach-loading firearms possibly wasn't that big of a jump.



Second, they were significantly more expensive than a muzzleloading weapon. They required precision fitting, which was difficult to mass produce.

Yes, but...

this also applies to many other things in that same period, for example plate body armor. Crossbows and windlasses. Nautical equipment. Automata. And yet they cranked this stuff out. I think you may be aware of an incident I've mentioned before where Milan 'miraculously' produced armor for 8,000 paroled mercenaries in a matter of four weeks.

This is a different type of mass production than we are used to. The craft guild workshops of Augsburg, and the family based ones in Milan, did make things with a lot of personal attention but had also worked out complex systems of subcontracting and mechanization or what you might even call primitive automation (Barcelona hammer etc.) that it allowed them to produce at this very high quality while also managing a very high quantity too.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFpLuJMYJdEE

This is a 19th Century water-powered trip-hammer that has been rehabilitated. Medieval trip hammers were nearly identical. Of course you don't do the fine work of a gun cylinder with a massive hammer like this. But this is what helps speed up the process of turning billets of raw iron into smaller more carefully shaped piece of metal that you can then spend your time working with.



If the cylinders of a revolver become misaligned, it can destroy the gun. This was a problem on some models even in the 19th century. Also, until the introduction of metallic cartridges, chain fires were always a potential issue on revolvers, and could destroy the gun and injure the firer.

Third, in my opinion most were too delicate for serious military service, although some of the simple versions may have seen some service.

There's a good number of these early breechloaders depicted in James Lavin's book (A History of Spanish Firearms) that I mentioned earlier. Although they tend to be more from the 17th and 18th centuries, they have similar designs to those that Galloglaich posted.


Perhaps they were, but...

We know that Henry VIII had two breach-loading guns, an arquebus and a large pistol or caribne, that he used for hunting. At least one of them was 'a three shot' weapon, not sure if that means a revolver. I doubt he would have used it if he thought it didn't work or was delicate enough to be dangerous to him personally. I believe this is one of them:



This shows both guns together, the big and the little.
https://collections.royalarmouries.org/media/emumedia/321/363/large_A9_817.jpg

Closeup of the smaller gun
https://collections.royalarmouries.org/media/emumedia/321/351/tr_545.jpg

Royal Armouries dates the weapon to 1537

According to the Royal Armouries website here (https://collections.royalarmouries.org/object/rac-object-264.html), another interesting twist to this particular little story is that the weapon was originally a wheel-lock back in the 16th Century, but was later (in the 19th Century) made into a match-lock. Does this mean the wheellock was too delicate, as they have often been accused of being by modern writers, or does it mean that capabilities were declining ...?

Maybe it's just a matter of these things being incredible curiousities centuries ahead of their time, but maybe like the longsword, European martial arts and plate armor, we underestimated their quality to begin with.

Finally, I should also note that the Henry VIII breach-loader linked here, like the breach loading pistol I posted upthread, did use metal cartridges, re-usable steel ones. I think you can see one of the cartridges in the image of the pistol. This too was a well known expedient in the 16th Century among gunmakers, probably goes back to the 1480's at least.

Quote from the Royal armories on the Henry VIII gun follows:


This is the smaller of two breech-loading guns in the Armouries collection which were made for Henry VIII. Both were originally equipped with wheel-locks, which have now disappeared, the lock of this gun being replaced by a plain matchlock with an automatic sliding pan-cover, which was probably made in the nineteenth century. Both guns employ reloadable steel chambers which are pushed into the breech in the same way as a modern cartridge. The side hinged breech-block of both these guns bears a striking resemblance to the breech action, developed by the American, Jacob Snider, which was adopted by by the British Army in 1864.

Breech-loading hand guns using reloadable cartridges were produced intermittently from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, the earliest ones apparently being modelled on contemporary breech-loading cannon, the chambers simply lying in a trough at the breech end of the barrel and secured by lugs and pins or simple wedges.

The guns of Henry VIII are the earliest known examples of this type of hinged breech-blocks. Henry, who, like many of his contemport princes, seems to have been fascinated by new mechanical contrivances. He had no fewer than 139 breech-loading guns in his collection at the time of his death in 1547, including 116 Italian guns. It is now impossible to be certain which, if any, of the entries in the 1547 Catalogue Inventory of his possessions relates to this gun.

However, as this gun obviously had a velvet covered cheek pad it may be the 'chamber pece in a Stocke of woode, lyned in the Cheke with vellet' which is listed as being in the Palace of Westminster along with another chambered gun, perhaps the larger of the two now in the Royal Armouries collection. Henry's interest in breech-loading guns is further attested by the series of curious gun-shields from his arsenal which are also preserved in the Royal Armouries collection and which are equipped with breech-loading matchlock pistols of an otherwise unknown type (Inv. No. V.39).

The fine barrel of this gun, which is chiseled in the form of a column and bears the device and initials of Henry VIII, illustrates the quality of craftsmen that Henry could call upon. It seems likely that this barrel was made in England by one of Henry's own gunmakers. It is stamped with a mark which maybe that of William hunt who in 1538 was appointed Keeper of the King's Handguns and Demi-Hawkes and was 'emplo'd about the makeing and furnishing of te King's Highnesses' devices of certain pieces of artillery'.
It is perhaps this gun which Joseph Platter, a Swiss traveller, saw in the Armouries in 1599 and describes as a pistol 'very like a musket', which 'could be loaded at the breech, that by this means it might be less readily exploded'.

I may be misunderstanding what this Swiss guy Platter said, but the last quote seems to imply that he thought it was actually safer than a regular muzzle loader.

G

[Galloglaich]

IIRC earlier versions of this thread it was something like 100 lbs. marching load and 60 lbs. combat load correct?

yes, depending on if you include a rucksack and it's contents or not.

[fusilier]

Just playing Devil's advocate here, I basically agree with everything you said. Just want to throw out a couple of other things to consider.

Yes, this is a good conversation. The short response is: These weapons were too expensive, experimental, and delicate for regular battlefield service.


Sure, but...

Let's keep in mind that they had been using small (and large) breach-loading cannon going back to the 14th Century. By the 15th Century this was pretty standardized. I think they had figured out how to either prevent the gas problem or work around it. At any rate, I can tell you that by the 1460's there was hardly a castle, a warship or a war-wagon that didn't have a breach-loading cannon, often in quite small caliber, 20-40mm.

I will say that these often seemed to be of 'medium' barrel length, you do see some with very long barrels (10' or more) but the majority are more like 3' or 4' long. So maybe that implies a lower gas pressure.

However I would suggest that given that they clearly made thousands of small breach-loading cannon of sufficient quality that they were in high and wide demand - not just in Europe but also in the Middle East and Asia, incidentally, for craftsmen in one of the more advanced workshops in a place like Nuremberg or the Venice Arsenal to make some breach-loading firearms possibly wasn't that big of a jump.

They did use breechloading cannons for a while -- but they too fell out of favor. I would guess because of their lower ranges and less power. They held on longer for the smaller anti-personnel weapons, like swivel guns, but even those eventually gave way to muzzleloaders. (They did continue to make medieval style breechloading swivel guns, in North Africa, into the 19th century, but European navies seem to have abandoned them sometime in the 1600s(?)). The most common types used different, and often seemingly crude, systems of breechloading than employed on personal firearms. Although some of the light field pieces, used a screw system very similar to the Ferguson rifle.



Yes, but...

this also applies to many other things in that same period, for example plate body armor. Crossbows and windlasses. Nautical equipment. Automata. And yet they cranked this stuff out. I think you may be aware of an incident I've mentioned before where Milan 'miraculously' produced armor for 8,000 paroled mercenaries in a matter of four weeks.

This is a different type of mass production than we are used to. The craft guild workshops of Augsburg, and the family based ones in Milan, did make things with a lot of personal attention but had also worked out complex systems of subcontracting and mechanization or what you might even call primitive automation (Barcelona hammer etc.) that it allowed them to produce at this very high quality while also managing a very high quantity too.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFpLuJMYJdEE

This is a 19th Century water-powered trip-hammer that has been rehabilitated. Medieval trip hammers were nearly identical. Of course you don't do the fine work of a gun cylinder with a massive hammer like this. But this is what helps speed up the process of turning billets of raw iron into smaller more carefully shaped piece of metal that you can then spend your time working with.


Sure, but just like the most expensive armor, you're not going to be able to outfit many soldiers with it (do we have data on how expensive these breechloaders were?). While we see fairly standard (or similar) designs of muzzleloading muskets,arquebuses, and pistols, we see an impressive array of different breechloading systems. So it could be that the technology never coalesced around something that everybody agreed worked well. Also, I do think most of the breechloading weapons were too delicate for military service.


Perhaps they were, but...

We know that Henry VIII had two breach-loading arquebus that he used for hunting. At least one of them was 'a three shot' weapon, not sure if that means a revolver. I doubt he would have used it if he thought it didn't work or was delicate enough to be dangerous to him personally. I believe this is one of them:


https://collections.royalarmouries.org/media/emumedia/321/351/tr_545.jpg

According to the Royal Armouries website here (https://collections.royalarmouries.org/object/rac-object-264.html), another interesting twist to this particular little story is that the weapon was originally a wheel-lock back in the 16th Century, but was later (in the 19th Century) made into a match-lock. Does this mean the wheellock was too delicate, as they have often been accused of being by modern writers, or does it mean that capabilities were declining ...?

Or some bozo restored it in the 19th century to what they thought was more appropriate/valuable. I've seen a lot of old barrels with locks and stocks which were added/recreated much later and are in the wrong style.



Maybe it's just a matter of these things being incredible curiousities centuries ahead of their time, but maybe like the longsword, European martial arts and plate armor, we underestimated their quality to begin with.

They actually seem to be a bit more common than mere curiosities to me. They were rare on the battlefield, but it's clear from those that have survived that it was an on-going area of development for many years.


Finally, I should also note that the Henry VIII breach-loader linked here, like the breach loading pistol I posted upthread, did use metal cartridges, re-usable steel ones. I think you can see one of the cartridges in the image of the pistol. This too was a well known expedient in the 16th Century among gunmakers, probably goes back to the 1480's at least.

To me that's more of a removable breech -- it's very heavily built. I don't suspect it would expand much when fired (creating a gas-seal), then shrink to be able to be removed. That was the advantage that brass (and copper) cartridges had. Interestingly, the first models of the gatling gun used a similar system.


Quote from the Royal armories on the Henry VIII gun follows:

I may be misunderstanding what this Swiss guy Platter said, but the last quote seems to imply that he thought it was actually safer than a regular muzzle loader.

G

Hmmm. I'm not entirely sure how to follow that line either. One of the dangers of loading a muzzleloader is if there's an accidental discharge while pouring in the powder, or ramming the ball home. A breechloader avoided a lot of that danger.

However, revolvers had a particular set of problems, which are well documented, chain fire being a major one. When loading with loose powder, it was possible for powder to spill and get trapped around the cylinders. When fired, this loose powder might be ignited, and might ignite other loaded chambers (which are not aligned with the barrel). Careful loading and attention was required to prevent this -- that's easy enough in a target shooting or hunting situation, but on a battlefield reloading could become sloppy.

Likewise, even some 19th century revolvers could be damaged in such a way that they wouldn't "index" correctly (meaning the cylinder was no longer aligned with the barrel), but would still fire! This often happened due to rough-handling, like using your pistol as a club.

[rrgg]

I disagree 100% - I don't think plate armor would have come into existence as we know it if it wasn't for firearms. Firearms existed in Europe since the 13th Century.
Except small arms didn't really have much of a battlefield presence until the tail end of the 15th century. Even at the start of the Italian wars it would have been typical for only 10% of troops to have been armed with firearms.

Whats more, of what few firearms were in use during the 15th century there was a huge variety, ranging from small handguns which had less power than crossbows and probably were intended primarily as noise makers, to actual cannons as well as large caliber "hook guns" and swivel guns mounted on carts/wagons which I doubt any armor would be able to protect against. The type of penetration achieved at Pavia wasn't exactly something new, if anything the "musket" likely began as a relatively light wall gun which was turned into an infantry weapon with the addition of a forked stick.

In contrast to the late 16th century where small arms had become the biggest killer on the battlefield, plate armor in the 15th century designed specifically with bullets in mind and not just crossbows or edged weapons would have just been adding weight to counter only a very small proportion of battlefield threats.


Yes but at Pavia, they almost certainly had very heavy muskets using iron shot. 20mm weapons etc. Similarly, the last sentence doesn't specify a musket or an arquebus, he could be talking about cannon. No armor can protect you from a cannonball.

Jacobi was referring to light horsemen armed with arquebuses or other small guns, something relatively new to the early italian wars. Interestingly we start to see a far more significant distinction between light and heavy cavalry in the early 16th century, with duties like scouting, harrassment, and raiding becoming exclusively the domain of horsemen like the straiioti, jinetes, reiters, and mounted arquebusiers, while gendarmes grow increasingly heavy with barded horses and longer lances to become more exclusively used as shock cavalry.


You are wrong - 20 lbs is quite light for a soldiers kit - yes 20 lbs is very heavy for a firearm to carry around, but it is not very heavy for kit that you wear in which the weight is distributed over your body. A modern soldier carries far more than in LBE, ammunition, water, body armor and other miscellaneous kit (not counting a backpack).

You also clearly missed my point about 17th century armor. The English troops ditching their breastplates were ditching wrought iron armor which could be as much as 6mm thick with just a breastplate alone weighing up to 40 lbs, whereas armor in the 15th or early 16th century which actually protected better might be as little as 3mm thick at it's thickest point and weigh less than half as much.



The amount of weight carried by war-fighters is fairly constant going back to Roman times.

G

That last statement isn't true at all. The weight of a velites' combat kit was not the same as that of the triarii. The amount of weight carried by marius' mules on the march was pretty abnormal for the ancient world, and even today some argue that US infantry tend to be overburdened. In any period, the ideal marching weight and ideal combat weight are both 0, anything else is a compromise due to a lack of magic materials.

Pikemen's armor in 1600 was not expected to be musket-proof, at best it might have protected against pistols and carbines carried by cavalry at a distance. Sir Roger Williams described it as "proof of the caliver at ten or twelve score [200-240 yards]". That's part of the issue, it was extra weight and didn't even provide much protection. Unless you want to argue that pikemen were ditching their helmets because even that alone weighed more than 20 lbs.

As an anonymous author in 1628 put it: "If armours were musket proof, and men well able to endure them" they would still be very useful, but as it was neither of those things were the case.

[Galloglaich]

Except small arms didn't really have much of a battlefield presence until the tail end of the 15th century. Even at the start of the Italian wars it would have been typical for only 10% of troops to have been armed with firearms.

Totally incorrect. You are off by 80 years.

The first recorded use of significance to the outcome of a battle was in the 13th. Firearms were already important in siege warfare all through the 14th Century. Sieges wee only a part of war but, most soldiers did have to engage in sieges so this was already reason to be prepared for firearms.

The first large scale use of firearms on the open battlefield was in the 1420's during the Hussite Wars. By the 1430's the Czechs were producing large numbers of a wide variety of hand-gonnes, as well as hook-guns and other firearms. By the 1440's cities like Venice, Prague, Nuremberg and Ghent were producing hundreds of firearms every year.

The Hungarian Black Army by 1458 had a ratio of 1/4 handgunners to all other troop-types including cavalry, pikemen, crossbowmen and cannon crew. Probably about half of the infantry were gunners. This was also true at the same time for many German and Bohemian armies in Central Europe.



Whats more, of what few firearms were in use during the 15th century there was a huge variety, ranging from small handguns which had less power than crossbows and probably were intended primarily as noise makers,

Again, totally incorrect this particular cliche has been blown up years ago including on this very thread. Early firearms have been tested, not just replicas but the actual antiques have been tested, and they shoot very well thank you. Can even be aimed at things pretty far away and hit reliably and with plenty of force. If I had the patience right now I'd dig up some youtube videos, link some studies etc. but it's been done on this thread dozens of times already in various incarnations.

As somebody else pointed out upthread, if you just wanted to make noise you could use fire crackers. Roger Bacon wrote down instructions for making those in 1260. Fireworks and pyrotechnic devices were already in wide use, for warfare and just for celebration by the end of the 13th Century.



In contrast to the late 16th century where small arms had become the biggest killer on the battlefield, plate armor in the 15th century designed specifically with bullets in mind and not just crossbows or edged weapons would have just been adding weight to counter only a very small proportion of battlefield threats.

Again, totally incorrect. They were already marking armor with bullet dents as 'proof' in Augsburg and Nuremberg by the 1440's.



Pikemen's armor in 1600 was not expected to be musket-proof,

As I has previously mentioned, by 1600 armor was made mostly of wrought iron - so it was only marginally protective of , though there was some composite or laminated armor which also had a steel plate in the middle of the breast plate.

Look, I can tell you have read a couple of books, but I don't feel like you are either understanding what I've been telling you or just choose not to think about it too much, so I'm going to forgo further discussion with you on these topics, as I think it will be a waste of both of our time and I don't have as much time as I used to for online debates. Lets just agree to disagree.

G

[rrgg]

@fusilier and rs2excelsior

There was quite a bit of improvement when it came to gunpowder quality especially during the late 18th-19th centuries. At times it even outperformed modern powder due to people at the time having more experience with it and being better at matching the powder to the dimensions of their weapon. When Benjamin Robins performed his experiments with the ballistic pendulum in the mid 18th century he found that a .75 caliber musket with half the balls weight of powder had a muzzle velocity of 1700 fps. Just prior to the civil war the .69 caliber smoothbore used by us army could still hit 1500-1700 fps with just a 110 grain service charge and an "old rifle" firing a tight fitting round ball could achieve more than 2000 fps.

Interestingly though, with the introduction of the minie bullet the muzzle velocity of rifles dropped considerably down to just 1000 fps or so. This was apparently because the "skirt" of a minie ball tended to rip off instead of engaging the rifling if fired with too much power so the charge had to be reduced. Long story short this is why civil war muskets tended to have a much more noticeable drop over distance than older weapons.

[Galloglaich]

Yes, this is a good conversation. The short response is: These weapons were too expensive, experimental, and delicate for regular battlefield service.

I don't think we actually know that.




They did use breechloading cannons for a while -- but they too fell out of favo... sometime in the 1600s(?)).

Are you sure about that? I keep seeing them from all over. I think the Venetians among many others were still using them on Galleasses and Galleys well into the 18th Century. What is your source for their going away in Europe?


Sure, but just like the most expensive armor, you're not going to be able to outfit many soldiers with it

There is another very persistent myth about the armor. That the steel armor was so expensive. I've tried (and clearly failed) to debunk this. Let me just briefly quote two numbers from the 15th Century. Average reported annual earnings above rents and subsistence for mid-ranking peasant in Poland in the 1430's was 30 'zloty', equivalent to German gulden. Average net annual income after paying journeymen (as assessed for war taxes) for a tailor in Gdansk in 1450 was 24 marks (about 18 zloty).

Cost of a complete Milanese harness in the Krakow marketplace in 1440 was 7 zloty. 'Proofed' for 12, whatever that means in terms of quality precisely.

Ownership of armor was a requirement for citizenship in Danzig, Krakow and every significant town, and better kit for the militia translated to better prestige. This is the armor of an accountant in Augsburg in the 16th Century:

https://i.pinimg.com/236x/db/04/e0/db04e0e7a836d5e0b8300e07628af1c9--landsknecht-augsburg.jpg

as is this, same guy different armor

https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QAlviGgYJRI/Ti2FaljoaBI/AAAAAAAAAuw/CVPf4wNIVIg/s1600/MS+48.jpg

and this, also the same guy.

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/ea/bb/fb/eabbfb7fc1e8572a59d26bfcc2c8c26b--augsburg-illuminated-letters.jpg

In 1491, the wool-weavers craft guild of the small north-German city of Wismar listed an inventory of their armor including seven complete sets of 'proofed' armored harness, five proofed gorgets, and two proofed bevors. This is the extra stuff owned directly by the guild, since individual members had their own harness. Wool weaving wasn't even a big industry in Wismar and Wismar was a small town in 1491 I think like 13,000 people?.

Mercenaries - just hand-gunners or pavisemen, could make as much as 100 gulden a year in the 15th Century, assuming the actually got paid.

The reason why nobles armor was so commonly gilded, etched with magnificent artwork and so on is in order to make it stand out. Commoners could afford the good armor.



(do we have data on how expensive these breechloaders were?). While we see fairly standard (or similar) designs of muzzleloading muskets,arquebuses, and pistols, we see an impressive array of different breechloading systems. So it could be that the technology never coalesced around something that everybody agreed worked well. Also, I do think most of the breechloading weapons were too delicate for military service.

It's one of the major differences between the late medieval Renaissance and the 17th - 18th Century, in the earlier period there was a lot of variety in everything - including firearms. Things became much more standardized in the later period. That is not necessarily because it was better that way, it was more suited to the times which isn't precisely the same thing.



To me that's more of a removable breech -- it's very heavily built. I don't suspect it would expand much when fired (creating a gas-seal), then shrink to be able to be removed. That was the advantage that brass (and copper) cartridges had. Interestingly, the first models of the gatling gun used a similar system.

I honestly don't know precisely how they worked, they may have been something in between a breach and a cartrdige. The breach loading cannon worked that way, the removable breaches which often looked like beer mugs, would be pre-loaded with powder and then corked, so they could be put back into the gun in rapid succession. You can see a guy shooting a replica of a 15th Century swivel gun of around 1" caliber with 4 breaches here

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjmGTM1hWtQ

If you watch that video it gives you an idea of the rate of fire of these things. You just put in another breach, lock it, prime it and shoot. That quick.

If you watch from 04:14 to 5:21 he gets off 4 shots in just over a minute, all of which hit his target. Imagine what some guy who was a professional soldier with 5 or 10 years of experience could do with that weapon.

Here is some Swiss re-enactors assembling and shooting a larger caliber breach-loading 15h Century replica cannon of about 3" or 4" caliber I think. As you can see they can get it into action pretty quickly.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rk_bNFUqzo4

Larger caliber breach loading swivel gun (you can see the large amount of powder in the removable breach as he preps it) shoots a pretty big hoe through some wood here

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUm9zwPCFvw

G

[fusilier]

Are you sure about that? I keep seeing them from all over. I think the Venetians among many others were still using them on Galleasses and Galleys well into the 18th Century. What is your source for their going away in Europe?

I'm pretty confident that it happened, but I'm not sure of the timeline. The swivel guns that I've seen from the 18th century onward in European navies are muzzleloading. If there's evidence that they continued to use breechloaders throughout the 18th century, I would be interested in seeing it.


There is another very persistent myth about the armor. That the steel armor was so expensive.

. . .

The reason why nobles armor was so commonly gilded, etched with magnificent artwork and so on is in order to make it stand out. Commoners could afford the good armor.

Are you saying that in the late 16th century most soldiers could afford laminated armor?

I used the term most expensive armor, because I was referring to the expense, and pointing out that we haven't actually established the expense of breechloading firearms of the time. Most of those that have survived may be the high end of the market, and it's possible that there were lower grade examples.

By the end of the 16th century you occasionally see entire units of common soldiers being outfitted with wheellock muskets/arquebuses. They were usually given special duties like guarding the artillery and the powder train. Cavalry had been using wheellock pistols for a long time before then, but they were still considered an expensive weapon. One that needed to be well made otherwise they failed or wore out quickly.


If breechloading personal firearms weren't too expensive and/or too delicate for battlefield use, what was it that prevented them from being used? Or, is there evidence that they were more widely used on the battlefield that has been overlooked?

[Kiero]

That last statement isn't true at all. The weight of a velites' combat kit was not the same as that of the triarii. The amount of weight carried by marius' mules on the march was pretty abnormal for the ancient world, and even today some argue that US infantry tend to be overburdened. In any period, the ideal marching weight and ideal combat weight are both 0, anything else is a compromise due to a lack of magic materials.

Velites were skirmishers, you can't really call them "war fighters", that was the line infantry. And while the Hastati's kit was almost as light as that of the Velites, I don't think it's a coincidence that the "Mules" standardised on the kit used by the Principes.

[Brother Oni]

IIRC earlier versions of this thread it was something like 100 lbs. marching load and 60 lbs. combat load correct?


yes, depending on if you include a rucksack and it's contents or not.

If I remember correctly, the era also matters. Combat load was closer to 40-60lbs and it's only with the advent of modern warfare that infantrymen end up heading into combat with upwards of 60lbs.

Some digging indicates that during the Falklands, Paras and Royal Marines were carrying ~80lbs of gear, while in the most recent Iraq conflict, the average squaddie was typically carrying 145lbs.

US doctrine FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, 22 April 1992, Chapter 5, Annex I says the combat load shouldn't exceed 60lbs, but I've found some terminology and limits:
Fighting load - Only what is worn = 36.9 lbs
Fighting light - Worn plus the assault pack = 59 lbs
Approach march - Worn plus the rucksack = 72.9 lbs
Everything - Worn plus the rucksack and assault pack = 95 lbs

I can hear the laughter from the former serving right now. :smalltongue:

[snowblizz]

20-35 lbs is still quite a lot of weight. We know that the 20+ lb muskets seem to have had a lot of issues and it could be difficult to get musketeers to march long distances without wagons to help carry their weapons. Often the decision to abandon armor seems to have begun with the soldiers themselves, rather than some penny-pinching higher-ups. In 1600 ireland for example English troops were apparently leaving behind even helmets and breastplates in piles everywhere they went. In 1632 John Cruso was still complaining about carbineers who preferred to wear just a buff coat instead of a breastplate and backplate.

I've seen it noted that Swedish musketeers were reluctant to abandon the caliver, their "pipes", to go up to a musket with rest (should be around 1600s).

Soldiers seem to most of the time have been inclined to ditch and lighten items, even to their own detriment later on. It doesn't even have to be that heavy or bulky. It's just that it's more than nothing and I'm clearly not using it right now so why am carrying it?


Cavalry had been using wheellock pistols for a long time before then, but they were still considered an expensive weapon. One that needed to be well made otherwise they failed or wore out quickly. One reason for the "changes" in tactics for cavalry Gustav II Adolf introduced (early 1600s) was precisely the expense and problem of getting enough pistols to outfit cavalry "properly" so they kinda had to go with the swords.



Mercenaries - just hand-gunners or pavisemen, could make as much as 100 gulden a year in the 15th Century, assuming the actually got paid.

There's a fairly important distinction there.

Armies were very often in arrears. And a lot of your pay could be in kind. Which may not quite as easily be turned into quality equipment... I've read of a number of instances were loot from cities, e.g. cloth was used to settle some part of pay.

The Spanish army of Flanders was chronically underpaid as a particularly eggregious exanple. IIRC they were considered quite ragged when payment issues were particularly severe.

Gusta II Adolf in part started to issue equipment in-lieu of pay (and also let *him* and the state to do the profiteering captains usually did) to solve some of the money to equipment issues.

And this is ignoring a lot of the didn't use the signing bonus or equipment money to actually get equipment that was fairly common among recruits.

Oftne the high pay of mercenraies were rather more theoretical thna actual. IIRC there's evne a ongs about that intended to disencourage enlsitment. Which tended to work the opposite way.

[Kiero]

One reason for the "changes" in tactics for cavalry Gustav II Adolf introduced (early 1600s) was precisely the expense and problem of getting enough pistols to outfit cavalry "properly" so they kinda had to go with the swords.

There's also the question of getting cavalry of this era to actually charge home. One of the reasons Cromwell's Ironsides were feared, besides their religious fervour, was that they were quite willing to charge home with their swords. Not wheel away from the point of contact firing their pistols, as the Royalist cavalry preferred to.

[Galloglaich]

I'm pretty confident that it happened, but I'm not sure of the timeline. The swivel guns that I've seen from the 18th century onward in European navies are muzzleloading. If there's evidence that they continued to use breechloaders throughout the 18th century, I would be interested in seeing it.

As far as I can tell, they retained a niche for the smaller caliber swivel guns more or less continuously from the 14th Century until the advent of modern type cannon in the 19th.

This is just one of many examples, a French bronze 2.75" caliber swivel-gun from 1717. They seem to be all over the place, both on vessels and on fortifications. I have seen them in museums associated with old Spanish forts all over Spain and Portugal, the South of France, the Gulf South of the US and the Caribbean.

http://www.icollector.com/Rare-Early-18th-Century-Breechloading-Deck-Cannon-of-the-French-Compagnie-d-Occident-c-1717-To_i11154067




Are you saying that in the late 16th century most soldiers could afford laminated armor?

No. Not in the late 16th Century.

First by the late 16th Century most soldiers were much poorer than soldiers from earlier eras (say, up to the first quarter of the 16th Century). Second, by the late 16th Century the armor industry itself had largely collapsed and the only centers making the older types of steel armor were basically royal armouries like at Innsbruck and Greenwich. The scale of production of high quality armor had gone through a precipitous decline by then and the price had gone up accordingly.

If you go back to the first quarter of the 16th Century and into the 15th, then I would say then yes, though that also depends somewhat what you mean by 'laminated armor'.

If you mean steel armor with a plackard which is as strongly made as the armor in the NOVA documentary, then yes absolutely. Common soldiers could afford it, that (again) is why nobles decorated theirs with gold etc., so they could stand out as superior.

If you are referring to the type of laminated armor they made in the 17th century (and maybe in the late 16th, I'm not sure) where they put a steel plate inside of a thicker wrought-iron plate, then ... I'm not sure. I don't know much about the economy by that point. Probably not though.




I used the term most expensive armor, because I was referring to the expense, and pointing out that we haven't actually established the expense of breechloading firearms of the time. Most of those that have survived may be the high end of the market, and it's possible that there were lower grade examples.

I don't know the cost of such firearms however it shouldn't be impossible for find out. The major distinction I make on the armor is not lamination but quality of steel and heat treatment, mainly. The point I was making is that this type of armor, like the armor in the NOVA show, was affordable during the peak years of armor production, say 1440-1520.

How much the firearms cost would be interesting to look into. I know you can find records from the Venetian arsenal on gun purchases all over the place, and also the municipal archives of Nuremberg have a lot of surviving records. Maybe they distinguish on things like breach loaders. I do think breach-loading firearms were quite rare, maybe not curiousity rare but maybe as rare as something like a .50 caliber sniper rifle today... let alone something like that revolver which is clearly a masterpiece.



By the end of the 16th century you occasionally see entire units of common soldiers being outfitted with wheellock muskets/arquebuses. They were usually given special duties like guarding the artillery and the powder train. Cavalry had been using wheellock pistols for a long time before then, but they were still considered an expensive weapon. One that needed to be well made otherwise they failed or wore out quickly.


If breechloading personal firearms weren't too expensive and/or too delicate for battlefield use, what was it that prevented them from being used? Or, is there evidence that they were more widely used on the battlefield that has been overlooked?

As I've mentioned before, I suspect this may be a reflection of the changing economy and political / military landscape of the time. Breach-loading firearms probably came into being in the second or third quarter of the 15th Century, at least as far as I can tell. I doubt they were being made in any numbers until the fourth quarter of the 15th. But during the end of the second quarter of the 16th Century Europe began going through massive social changes with the onset of the Reformation, the German Peasants War, the major invasions of Italy and the snuffing out of the independence of so many of the Italian city-States. By the third quarter of the 16th Century we can detect a major shift in the material culture of weapons.

In other words, maybe this technology stalled out just as it was coming online. Craft industries took a while to tune up from luxury to middle class production. I have read detailed studies on similar changes in other industries, for example Venetian glass manufacture. in 1470 they were making mostly drinking vessels, eyeglasses, small mirrors and window-panes mostly for middle class consumption in towns in italy, Flanders, Germany and Poland. By 1530 they had already shifted dramatically into making glass beads and tiny mirrors for trade goods for the New World and Pacific Rim, and giant fancy mirrors for rich ladies in France and Muscovy (Russia).

Wheel-locks are a good analogy and probably a roughly similar level of challenge in terms of manufacture (maybe a little more). I think it got harder to make them in the 16th Century, just as they were needed more, because of the decline of many of the traditional manufacturing centers. But they had a more vital niche - it's very hard to manage a slow match on horseback. The wheellock's were needed for cavalry and the Reiter had an important battlefield role especially in Northern Europe. Maybe or maybe not it's a coincidence that this same zone was one of the hold-outs for Free Cities - many of the Hanseatic towns remained independent and pretty strong right up to the 30 Years War. I don't know enough about the history of firearms in that era.

Anyway, if I'm able to find anything on this I'll post it here for sure.

G

[Galloglaich]

There's a fairly important distinction there.

Armies were very often in arrears. And a lot of your pay could be in kind. Which may not quite as easily be turned into quality equipment... I've read of a number of instances were loot from cities, e.g. cloth was used to settle some part of pay.

The Spanish army of Flanders was chronically underpaid as a particularly eggregious exanple. IIRC they were considered quite ragged when payment issues were particularly severe.

Gusta II Adolf in part started to issue equipment in-lieu of pay (and also let *him* and the state to do the profiteering captains usually did) to solve some of the money to equipment issues.

And this is ignoring a lot of the didn't use the signing bonus or equipment money to actually get equipment that was fairly common among recruits.

Oftne the high pay of mercenraies were rather more theoretical thna actual. IIRC there's evne a ongs about that intended to disencourage enlsitment. Which tended to work the opposite way.

Yes, all very true in general, however it depended a lot on the specific mercenaries and on the people who hired them. The French had a saying "pas d'Argent, pas de Suisse' - "No money, no Swiss"

The odd thing about the Swiss was, once you hired them, they were very loyal, despite being mercenaries. They would fight to the death. it was part of their culture. This was a big difference from many other mercenaries and condottiere, many of whom were notorious for changing sides or being easily bribed to go from one side to the other. But the second you missed a promised payment, the Swiss companies marched home.

However this policy of the Swiss was not that unusual particularly in Northern Europe. Many of the Bohemian mercenary companies were similar - they would fight loyally unless they weren't paid. Then they became unruly. Same with some of the more famous Landsknecht companies, and notably, the companies making up the Hungarian Black Army from which I got that number.

Matthias Corvinus complained bitterly in letters about the need to scrounge money to pay his armies - that is actually how we know how much he paid the different types of soldiers, from letters he wrote to relatives complaining about the cost. But he did pay them, and when he couldn't for whatever reason, they left the field. Usually he found the money, quite often it was actually Venice (where one of his relatives lived) who footed the bill, because they very much liked the problems that Corvinus was causing for the Ottomans in the Balkans.

Conversely, unless you were Swiss, the French King was notorious for not paying his soldiers or mercenaries. This often led directly to their going looting and ravaging the countryside.


So long and short of it is that we know at least some mercenaries were indeed getting this kind of money. We see the huge payments made to them, as well as the vast sums they acquired from looting and ransom payments from towns and princes when they went on the rampage due to not being paid.

it's actually quite similar to the Vikings and the Danegeld in the late Migration / Carolingian era. They started out equipment-poor in the early days of the Viking raids in the 8th-9th Century but seem to have become fairly well equipped by the 10th

I know of one case in 15th Century Bohemia where two Bohemian mercenary companies had captured 3 polish towns from the Prussian Confederation, but the Teutonic Knights had run out of money to pay them. They gave them two months and then approached the Polish king to sell them back to him. He pressured Gdansk to come up with 190,000 gulden to pay them! This couldn't have been more than 2,000 mercenaries. But it was worth the investment for the Poles and the Prussian towns to have the 3 towns back. You can read about that incident here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirteen_Years%27_War_(1454%E2%80%9366)#1455_to_14 60



So yeah TL : DR mercenary pay, like mercenary life in general, had a capriciously random element and was often not what it was supposed to be, but mercenary work was routinely very lucrative. That is why so many people took the risk.

G

[rs2excelsior]

-snip-

Wow. The degree of craftsmanship in the late Medieval/early Renaissance continues to amaze me. I'm of a similar mind to fusilier regarding gas seals and cost to manufacture compared to muzzle loaders, but still, that's an incredibly impressive and ingenious bit of craftsmanship.

Specifically, my comment regarding the reliability of breechloaders was more related to the 18th century attempts, specifically the Ferguson rifle (which was ahead of its time, but not practical enough for widespread use). The revolver musket looks quite a bit like the pepperbox, just without individual barrels for each cylinder. Again, I'm really impressed they managed to get a good seal between the cylinder and barrel.

[Galloglaich]

Wow. The degree of craftsmanship in the late Medieval/early Renaissance continues to amaze me. I'm of a similar mind to fusilier regarding gas seals and cost to manufacture compared to muzzle loaders, but still, that's an incredibly impressive and ingenious bit of craftsmanship.

Yes, of course muzzle loaders are cheaper. As are unarmored troops, for example. We used to think that armor went away because it was just outclassed by guns, but it now kind of looks like maybe that wasn't the case.

What I've been getting at is that as far as the soldiers themselves you have a shift in the Early Modern era from skilled to unskilled (or high-skilled to lower-skilled) warriors. In the medieval you have people show up who are expected to know what they were doing. The skill level of a gunner, an archer or a crossbowman in 1450 was expected very high and they were paid accordingly.

The big shift in the 16th Century is that you start to have poorer, less skilled recruits specifically recruited from the poorest available areas (like Landsknechts from rural Swabia, and Conquistadors from Estremadura in Spain) and then being trained in a somewhat simplified version of what the earlier more skilled warriors did.

Maybe this is comparable to the Marian reform in certain respects -in terms of the demographic shift anyway.

We tend to think of this as an improvement, a modernization, because our society is more like Roman or Early Modern society than it is like medieval or barbarian tribal society. We are used to the idea of taking a recruit who knows nothing, teaching him step by step how to march and shoot, follow orders and submit to discipline. We don't expect fighters to show up knowing anything and the idea of civilians having military units is threatening to the modern mind.

Parallel to the changes in the types of soldiers, the economy also changed. Weapon making industries which previously were tailored to thousands of individual princes and aristocratic families, and to City States and mercenaries, shifted to a different customer - the Absolute Monarch.




Specifically, my comment regarding the reliability of breechloaders was more related to the 18th century attempts, specifically the Ferguson rifle (which was ahead of its time, but not practical enough for widespread use). The revolver musket looks quite a bit like the pepperbox, just without individual barrels for each cylinder. Again, I'm really impressed they managed to get a good seal between the cylinder and barrel.

Yeah i don't know how they work technically, I would like to learn more. I have seen enough evidence to convince me know though that medieval firearms very generally speaking were quite effective. I also can tell you though this one observation more generally.



Very much like the martial arts - you find these types of weapons like 16th Century revolvers and 15th Century breech-loaders, in auction house catalogues, collectors websites and so on. You do not find them in modern histories of firearms or military history books or in academia - except as outlier curiosities. Or at least I don't. I found those photos on a collectors forum, and have found similar ones in auction catalogues like Hermann Historica. The Henry VIII guns are an exception because ... Henry VIII. We also generally tend to get a lot more information on English sources in the English -speaking world. But this isn't necessarily where the epicenter of the tech is, particularly in the medieval era.

Once again, this mirrors the existence of European Martial Arts and the actual nature of medieval swords (also pioneered by an outsider), both of which we have learned a great deal about in the last 20 years. The data is out there, but it seems to be filtered out by our modern analysis.

G

[Haighus]

Very much like the martial arts - you find these types of weapons like 16th Century revolvers and 15th Century breech-loaders, in auction house catalogues, collectors websites and so on. You do not find them in modern histories of firearms or military history books or in academia - except as outlier curiosities. Or at least I don't. I found those photos on a collectors forum, and have found similar ones in auction catalogues like Hermann Historica. The Henry VIII guns are an exception because ... Henry VIII. We also generally tend to get a lot more information on English sources in the English -speaking world. But this isn't necessarily where the epicenter of the tech is, particularly in the medieval era.

Once again, this mirrors the existence of European Martial Arts and the actual nature of medieval swords (also pioneered by an outsider), both of which we have learned a great deal about in the last 20 years. The data is out there, but it seems to be filtered out by our modern analysis.

G

This is nicely demonstrated by the information you posted above about the guns of Henry VIIIths collection, in which over 100 of the guns (more than 2/3rds) were definitely or probably Italian built.

[Galloglaich]

This is nicely demonstrated by the information you posted above about the guns of Henry VIIIths collection, in which over 100 of the guns (more than 2/3rds) were definitely or probably Italian built.

yes, and I would guess you would see some Flemish and German as well. It's very much the same in France, incidentally.

[jayem]

Just playing Devil's advocate here, I basically agree with everything you said. Just want to throw out a couple of other things to consider.

Sure, but...

Let's keep in mind that they had been using small (and large) breach-loading cannon going back to the 14th Century. By the 15th Century this was pretty standardized. I think they had figured out how to either prevent the gas problem or work around it. At any rate, I can tell you that by the 1460's there was hardly a castle, a warship or a war-wagon that didn't have a breach-loading cannon, often in quite small caliber, 20-40mm.

I will say that these often seemed to be of 'medium' barrel length, you do see some with very long barrels (10' or more) but the majority are more like 3' or 4' long. So maybe that implies a lower gas pressure.
G
Could it also be an cube-square-line thing?
If say they could match the join to the nearest milimeter, then on a 20mm diameter gun, 20% of the backplate is leaky. On a 200mm gun, 2% of the backplate is leaky.
Similarly making a 10cm big fastening might be a bit easier than crafting a 10mm version (and for that matter you can push harder with your hand than your pinky).

(though that doesn't really tie in with the small caliber)

[rrgg]

@Galloglaich

Unfortunately I haven't had much time for arguing on the internet either lately, so sorry if I haven't been explaining myself in depth well enough. Unfortunately this makes it all the more frustrating that we seem to be talking past each other.

You know more about eastern Europe than I do so I'll have to concede on there, though I'm still not convinced many knights in western europe were ordering intentionally bullet-proofed armor.

Regarding the power of early handguns compared to crossbows I was just trying to cover my bases while still emphasizing variety (15th century sources as far as I know tend to be vague in distinguishing between handguns and small artillery, you can see many sizes of gun in this illustration of a Hussite wagon fort (http://www.xenophongroup.com/montjoie/hussites.jpg) as an example). There are some historical examples I doubt the power of though. For instance The Danziger Handgonne on this webpage (http://www.musketeer.ch/blackpowder/handgonne.html) has a caliber of just 12 mm. Even if it managed to achieve an extremely high muzzle velocity it's doubtful it could match the penetration of the highest-end crossbows with a bullet so light. Conversely I've seen 15th century handguns with a caliber of 25mm, 35mm, or higher and shot a bullet 15 times heavier. A bullet that large would be very difficult to stop even if the powder was weak.

Regarding the decline of armor, I guess I have two main points I'm trying to make.

The first is that blaming it all on guns wasn't just an invention of modern historians, it comes straight from military writers at the time explaining why they no longer fought the way their grandfathers did. "Sir, then was then, and now is now; the wars are much altered since the fierie weapons first came vp: the Cannon, the Musket, the Caliuer and Pistoll." Examples of high-end steel armors from Greenwich for example still exist today so presumably some of these men would have known better, yet still many seemed to express the opinion that it was impossible for any armor to fully protect from modern firearms, even "proofed" armor. (As an aside, Alan Williams (https://www.academia.edu/11697870/Bullet_dents_in_armour_-_proof_marks_or_battle_damage_) has an article where he studied a number of supposedly "proofed" armors from the 17th century and concluded that many of the indentations were inconsistent from even a very weak pistol, so proof marks alone possibly don't say that much about much protection an armor offers). The two explanations I see for this lack of faith are either that everyone suddenly forgot that steel armor is better than iron, or that even the highest end steel armors didn't offer guaranteed protection against high-powered muskets or a wheellock pistol literally pressed against the visor. I suspect the second explaination has much to do with it but yes, we might have to agree to disagree.

The second point I'm trying to make is that I do think armor is awesome, and it was extremely important during the middle ages, but armor isn't everything. Not all battles are decided by the side with the best armor, just off the top of my head the battle of Lechaeum, where Iphikrates and his peltasts routed a column of Spartan hoplites. Probably the most immediate impact of the matchlock arquebus is that it suddenly made light infantry and light cavalry much more powerful and much more important. An armored footman isn't going to catch an unarmored arquebusier while the arquebusier can kill from farther off and do much more damage than an archer or peltast previously could. Similarly it was typically suicide for mounted gendarmes to try and charge a line of dragoons taking cover behind ditches and hedges. Sure an arquebusier might gain more protection from stray bullets if he wears a heavy steel breastplate, but the same is true if he keeps most of his body concealed behind a tree or a rock.

What I mentioned earlier about armored arquebusiers being disadvantaged in armor comes from William Garrard in 1591. He isn't talking about a full 50 lb corselet, just a mail shirt, which was generally considered simple light armor.


Now as these careles persons farre misse the marke with ouer great securitie, so some bring in a custome of too much curiositie in arming Hargabusiers, for besides a Peece, flask, Tutch boxe, Rapier and Dag∣ger: they load them with a heauie Shirt of Male, and a Burganet: so that by that time they haue marched in the heat of the Sommer or deepe of the Winter ten or twelue English miles, they are more apt to rest, thē readie to fight, whereby it comes to passe that either the enterprise they go about, which requires celerity, shall become frustrate by reason of the staie they make in refreshing themselues, or else they are in daunger to be repulsed for want of lustines, breath, and agilitie.

[fusilier]

As far as I can tell, they retained a niche for the smaller caliber swivel guns more or less continuously from the 14th Century until the advent of modern type cannon in the 19th.

This is just one of many examples, a French bronze 2.75" caliber swivel-gun from 1717. They seem to be all over the place, both on vessels and on fortifications. I have seen them in museums associated with old Spanish forts all over Spain and Portugal, the South of France, the Gulf South of the US and the Caribbean.

http://www.icollector.com/Rare-Early-18th-Century-Breechloading-Deck-Cannon-of-the-French-Compagnie-d-Occident-c-1717-To_i11154067


Fair enough, I admitted that I was unsure of the timeline. Still, any search I do for swivel guns of the 18th century brings up only muzzleloaders. On the other hand, the opposite appears to be the case when looking at swivel guns from the 16th century. At the very least, breechloading swivel pieces went from being almost ubiquitous to being comparatively rare. That's significant.



As I've mentioned before, I suspect this may be a reflection of the changing economy and political / military landscape of the time. Breach-loading firearms probably came into being in the second or third quarter of the 15th Century, at least as far as I can tell. I doubt they were being made in any numbers until the fourth quarter of the 15th. But during the end of the second quarter of the 16th Century Europe began going through massive social changes with the onset of the Reformation, the German Peasants War, the major invasions of Italy and the snuffing out of the independence of so many of the Italian city-States. By the third quarter of the 16th Century we can detect a major shift in the material culture of weapons.

In other words, maybe this technology stalled out just as it was coming online. Craft industries took a while to tune up from luxury to middle class production. I have read detailed studies on similar changes in other industries, for example Venetian glass manufacture. in 1470 they were making mostly drinking vessels, eyeglasses, small mirrors and window-panes mostly for middle class consumption in towns in italy, Flanders, Germany and Poland. By 1530 they had already shifted dramatically into making glass beads and tiny mirrors for trade goods for the New World and Pacific Rim, and giant fancy mirrors for rich ladies in France and Muscovy (Russia).

Wheel-locks are a good analogy and probably a roughly similar level of challenge in terms of manufacture (maybe a little more). I think it got harder to make them in the 16th Century, just as they were needed more, because of the decline of many of the traditional manufacturing centers. But they had a more vital niche - it's very hard to manage a slow match on horseback. The wheellock's were needed for cavalry and the Reiter had an important battlefield role especially in Northern Europe. Maybe or maybe not it's a coincidence that this same zone was one of the hold-outs for Free Cities - many of the Hanseatic towns remained independent and pretty strong right up to the 30 Years War. I don't know enough about the history of firearms in that era.

Anyway, if I'm able to find anything on this I'll post it here for sure.

G

One of the things you might want to look into is spiraling wage inflation in the 16th century -- it had effects like encouraging the use of slaves as oarsmen, and the decline of stone firing cannons in the west (the stone cannonballs required much more labor to create).

However, there's a problem with the wheellock analogy. Wheellocks were a new technology at the beginning of the 16th century and they became more prevalent over the 16th century -- not less. Breechloading firearms remained rare, and never established themselves on the battlefield in any capacity (as far as I can tell). They didn't go away, but the technology never established itself. Perhaps they did fall into some sort of economic trap, but given how other technologies continued to develop, it seems unlikely to me.

[fusilier]

Could it also be an cube-square-line thing?
If say they could match the join to the nearest milimeter, then on a 20mm diameter gun, 20% of the backplate is leaky. On a 200mm gun, 2% of the backplate is leaky.
Similarly making a 10cm big fastening might be a bit easier than crafting a 10mm version (and for that matter you can push harder with your hand than your pinky).

(though that doesn't really tie in with the small caliber)

Breechloading cannons were common in the 15th and early 16th century, but they were displaced by muzzleloaders. The designs probably couldn't keep up with the increasing pressures that solid cast muzzleloading guns could handle. That was the big development in cannons over the 16th century -- better metallurgy meant they could make guns that weighed less but still provided as much power.

I suspect that light swivel pieces didn't generate as high pressures, and maybe that's why more of them were breechloaders? (Certainly the stave built ones couldn't have handled high pressures, but the longer barreled Versos and Esmerils were cast).

[Galloglaich]

Fair enough, I admitted that I was unsure of the timeline. Still, any search I do for swivel guns of the 18th century brings up only muzzleloaders. On the other hand, the opposite appears to be the case when looking at swivel guns from the 16th century. At the very least, breechloading swivel pieces went from being almost ubiquitous to being comparatively rare. That's significant.

Well, I'm not sure if they really did become that rare. But they seem to have had a specific niche - smaller swivel guns etc. intended for anti-personnel uses, the larger ones I don't see too much after the 16th Century. I am pretty convinced of the ubiquity of breach-loaders into the 17th and 18th centuries because I often excitedly saw one somewhere at a castle or in a museum hoping it was a medieval one only to be disappointed by the little plaque which said it was comparatively recent.

Naval warfare in the 17th Century of course was dominated by large quantities of larger caliber muzzle-loading cannon, but that may have been due to economic and political realities of the time. They had streamlined the process of press-ganing a naval crewman and training them to shoot the muzzle loading gun, the breach-loader may have been more complicated to use ultimately. And again, I think the skill of the labor pool for soldiers was going down.



One of the things you might want to look into is spiraling wage inflation in the 16th century -- it had effects like encouraging the use of slaves as oarsmen, and the decline of stone firing cannons in the west (the stone cannonballs required much more labor to create).

yes that was part of the general economic shift back toward serfdom too in many places, and part of a generalized inflation which I assume had a lot to do with Peruvian Silver and Canadian furs and Caribbean sugar and indigo, Virginia tobacco and so on. But I'll admit the complexity of the economics of this period are still a bit beyond me. i have tried a few times to figure out accurate comparisons of wages and prices from the 16th Century and came out of it more confused than i started.



However, there's a problem with the wheellock analogy. Wheellocks were a new technology at the beginning of the 16th century and they became more prevalent over the 16th century -- not less. Breechloading firearms remained rare, and never established themselves on the battlefield in any capacity (as far as I can tell). They didn't go away, but the technology never established itself. Perhaps they did fall into some sort of economic trap, but given how other technologies continued to develop, it seems unlikely to me.

I think the difference is this - the wheellock had a niche, it had a need. You can't really mess about with a match on horseback, I mean you can but it's a major disadvantage. The emergence of the Schwarze Reiter (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reiter) troop type in Northern Europe, and the hybrid adoption of pistols by Polish Hussars, French Gendarmes and others, create this niche for the pistol in cavalry warfare that was effectively exploited by armies and spread from the North to throughout Europe.

The breach-loader while innovative and potentially, hadn't been combined with brass or copper cartridges as you noted, or a revolver barrel and a magazine, and wasn't so efficient that you could build up a troop-type around it. Not when it was so cheap to arm 10,000 serfs with basic muzzle loading matchlocks and march them into your neighbor's kingdom.

So I suspect the technology was just stalled until the Industrial Revolution and post French Revolution era spurred a new interest and intensive competition to innovate new weapons systems

G

[fusilier]

Links to 18th century swivel guns:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Navy_030626-O-9999H-001_Restoration_is_in_work_on_this_18th_century_ca st_iron_swivel_gun_recovered_from_the_Penobscot_ri ver_near_Bangor,_Maine,_by_the_Naval_Historical_Ce nter_(NHC)_Underwater_Archaeology_Branch.jpg

http://jamesdjulia.com/item/lot-2339-rare-18th-century-bronze-swivel-cannon-44102/

http://www.bronzecannons.net/81inch_portuguese_swivel_cannon.html

A Dutch example from 1700:
http://www.antiquarianartco.com/items/1057018/Antique-Lantaka-Bronze-cannon-c1700-Dutch-Indies/enlargement6

http://nautarch.tamu.edu/CRL/Report10/gun.html

All muzzleloaders.

Links to 16th century and earlier swivel guns:

http://www.lennartviebahn.com/arms_armour/antiques/breech_loading_swivel.html

http://www.historicalimagebank.com/gallery/v/album02/album25/FW301d-+16th+Century+Spanish+Falcon+Breechloading+Swivel+ Gun.html

https://www.the-saleroom.com/en-us/auction-catalogues/cuttlestones/catalogue-id-cuttle10017/lot-6e73c2b9-1b05-47ac-962d-a44a01157155

All breechloaders.

[fusilier]

I am pretty convinced of the ubiquity of breach-loaders into the 17th and 18th centuries because I often excitedly saw one somewhere at a castle or in a museum hoping it was a medieval one only to be disappointed by the little plaque which said it was comparatively recent.

Don't move the goal posts. In the 17th century breechloaders were very common, in the 18th century . . . I still can't find an example of one (i.e. a European one) -- other than the one you posted. I believe there are more, I just can't find them. My suspicion is that the trend toward fewer breechloaders and more muzzleloading swivel pieces began around the middle of the 17th century.

[Galloglaich]

Don't move the goal posts. In the 17th century breechloaders were very common, in the 18th century . . . I still can't find an example of one (i.e. a European one) -- other than the one you posted. I believe there are more, I just can't find them. My suspicion is that the trend toward fewer breechloaders and more muzzleloading swivel pieces began around the middle of the 17th century.

Jeez man, seriously? How much unpaid research you expect me to do for his forum thread? I don't know but you can easily find a lot of breach-loaders from the 17th Century (which I guess you just conceded) and the 19th Century with google image search. or maybe they used some different technical name in the 18th Century, I'm not going to spend hours trying different search terms for specifically 18th Century stuff. it might require a specific search term like a term of art they used in French or Portuguese or something.

Or who knows, maybe for exactly 100 years they shifted exclusively to muzzle loaders and then went back to breech loaders again. I really have no idea. I can tell you that you see these things all the time in museums and fortresses, can't say how many were 1700's vs. 1800's or 1600's though it's not the type of thing I cared about.

here are some 19th Century ones.

https://p1.liveauctioneers.com/368/28455/10919295_1_x.jpg?version=1329313097&width=1600&format=pjpg&auto=webp

French 1837 72mm caliber

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f5/Perrier_a_boite_cal_72mm_length_140cm_weight_110kg _seized_in_Constantine_in_1837.jpg

American rifled breach loader 1890

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/USA_30mm_1890_steel_rifled_breech_loading_swivel_g un_captured_in_Madagascar_in_1898_length_230cm.jpg

[fusilier]

Jeez man, seriously? How much unpaid research you expect me to do for his forum thread? I don't know but you can easily find a lot of breach-loaders from the 17th Century (which I guess you just conceded)

I never questioned that they were used in the 17th century. I questioned the 18th century use. You showed me *one* example from that time period. I pointed out that the vast majority from then were muzzle-loading.


here are some 19th Century ones.

https://p1.liveauctioneers.com/368/28455/10919295_1_x.jpg?version=1329313097&width=1600&format=pjpg&auto=webp

French 1837 72mm caliber

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f5/Perrier_a_boite_cal_72mm_length_140cm_weight_110kg _seized_in_Constantine_in_1837.jpg

American rifled breach loader 1890

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0e/USA_30mm_1890_steel_rifled_breech_loading_swivel_g un_captured_in_Madagascar_in_1898_length_230cm.jpg

I'm not asking you to do unpaid research. I'm pointing out that what your claiming, doesn't square with the research I've done. I'm sorry if that offends you.

The top image is of an 1859 Belgian piece. Along with the 1890s breechloader they belong to time when new breechloading artillery was being developed, which does not have a direct link with medieval/renaissance designs.

That 1837 French breechloader you mentioned -- you should read the caption on wikipedia. If you had you might have noticed it read:

". . . seized by France in Constantine in 1837" -- not made in France. I admit I don't know when it was made, or where it was made. But that's no reason to misattribute it.

This is getting stupid. I don't have the time to vet every single image you post, and correct the misunderstandings that you've applied to them.

[KarlMarx]

Could catapults be tactically and strategically effective after the onset of the cannon? It seems to me that things like trebuchets could provide a cheaper and safer form of advanced fire, and could be quickly assembled on the spot rather than dragged into position. Furthermore, you can use them to lob things besides large rocks, such as dead cows to spread disease and human heads to demoralize the enemy. So, even if it didn't happen IRL, could such siege instruments be effective into the Renaissance?

[gkathellar]

Could catapults be tactically and strategically effective after the onset of the cannon? It seems to me that things like trebuchets could provide a cheaper and safer form of advanced fire, and could be quickly assembled on the spot rather than dragged into position. Furthermore, you can use them to lob things besides large rocks, such as dead cows to spread disease and human heads to demoralize the enemy. So, even if it didn't happen IRL, could such siege instruments be effective into the Renaissance?

Just speculatively, I think the answer would depend in part on whether they could outrange the defenders' cannons. If the other guy can just shoot your trebuchet, its use would be a lot more limited.

[Vinyadan]

Also:
1. Different education of specialists. Education costs money. So you try to go for the one that will give better value to your money.
2. Once fortresses were built with cannons in mind, I doubt that older throwing machines could have achieved much.

[rs2excelsior]

2. Once fortresses were built with cannons in mind, I doubt that older throwing machines could have achieved much.

Actually, as cannon became both more prevalent and more powerful, fortress walls became thicker but shorter--cannon could shoot through walls that would resist trebuchet/catapult projectiles, but couldn't really do indirect fire, so fortresses didn't need high walls to defend against lobbed projectiles. A catapult probably -could- do some damage to a fort built to resist cannon, but by that point the cannon will be much more damaging. I'm not entirely sure why people didn't try and revive catapults to bypass fortress walls, but I imagine it has to do with the greater versatility and power of cannon, coupled with the specialist education required to build and crew them that you mentioned.

[Kiero]

Actually, as cannon became both more prevalent and more powerful, fortress walls became thicker but shorter--cannon could shoot through walls that would resist trebuchet/catapult projectiles, but couldn't really do indirect fire, so fortresses didn't need high walls to defend against lobbed projectiles. A catapult probably -could- do some damage to a fort built to resist cannon, but by that point the cannon will be much more damaging. I'm not entirely sure why people didn't try and revive catapults to bypass fortress walls, but I imagine it has to do with the greater versatility and power of cannon, coupled with the specialist education required to build and crew them that you mentioned.

Howitzers and mortars could do indirect fire.

[wolflance]

Could catapults be tactically and strategically effective after the onset of the cannon? It seems to me that things like trebuchets could provide a cheaper and safer form of advanced fire, and could be quickly assembled on the spot rather than dragged into position. Furthermore, you can use them to lob things besides large rocks, such as dead cows to spread disease and human heads to demoralize the enemy. So, even if it didn't happen IRL, could such siege instruments be effective into the Renaissance?
Besides the issues mentioned by others before me, trebuchets were probably also vulnerable to counter-fire coming from the fortress.

EDIT: I suppose in theory you can load rotten carcasses into a shell and shoot them over using a mortar too, although I doubt if anyone had really done this.

[Max_Killjoy]

A trebuchet is also not something you just roll up with, is it?

[gkathellar]

A trebuchet is also not something you just roll up with, is it?

See now I've got a mental image of somebody pulling a drive-by with a trebuchet. Some killjoy you are :P

[rs2excelsior]

Howitzers and mortars could do indirect fire.

Ah, you're right. Forgot about those. Although "howitzer" is a sticky term; the black powder howitzers I am familiar with are simply short-barreled (and often large-caliber) direct fire guns. But mortars definitely were a thing (the "bombs bursting in air" and whatnot).

[Haighus]

Besides the issues mentioned by others before me, trebuchets were probably also vulnerable to counter-fire coming from the fortress.
I think this is a key point. Trebuchets are really short ranged compared to cannon. You won't be bombarding the fortress from a hill half a mile away. So anyone setting up their trebuchet to fire dead cows into the fortress, would have to build very substantial field fortifications for it to survive long enough to do it's job. It is probably just not worth it.

[Galloglaich]

I never questioned that they were used in the 17th century. I questioned the 18th century use. You showed me *one* example from that time period. I pointed out that the vast majority from then were muzzle-loading.

I found one in 5 minutes from the 18th century which was a breach-loader and I think you found 5 or 6 others which were muzzle loaders.

Originally, upthread you said that breechloading guns were phased out after the 16th century, then two posts later you concede (apparently after some googling) that they were still very common in the 17th (and accuse me of "moving goalposts"!). And we know there were tons in the 19th when they started developing new innovations for that type of gun again. So suddenly the whole discussion, now inevitably a debate - hinges on finding more examples of this specific type of gun from the 18th Century.



That, to me is a little bit ridiculous. And no, despite being tempted I'm not going to spend a ton of time running down more images because I already posted a perfectly good one, and finding a few more won't prove any point about how common the actually were, whether they were effective to begin with (I think they clearly were and I don't believe that is an outlier position but I'm not prepared to prove that here aside from posting videos) or whether muzzle-loaders were somehow technically superior.

If you want to find out anything like that you'll have to find some academic studies probably.



I'm not asking you to do unpaid research. ...
This is getting stupid. I don't have the time to vet every single image you post, and correct the misunderstandings that you've applied to them.

I fail to see whether that specific gun being captured by the French in 1837 or made by them in 1837 really changes anything about the argument...? What about the 1717 gun? Did Da Vinci make a time machine and put a 15th Century one on that shipwreck in Honduras ? (and actually if I remember right the article mentioned that there were two of those guns found on that same wreck).

But what this is devolving into is some kind of (predictably) bitter debate about what you can find with a google image search in 5 minutes. Anything beyond that would mean getting real sources.

I already have a whole lot of real sources available for Central Europe in the Late Medieval period so I'm ready to go on a deep dive for that time and place whenever somebody wants to. It took me close to 15 years to get all that data together but I have it at my fingertips now so to speak.

But getting that deep for some other era would require real research, not reading 1 or 2 books or doing a few google searches, and I'm not prepared to go there to win some unwinnable internet debate. Specifically your best bet for images would be to pick up a bunch of auction catalogues and pour through them but that could take a long time. You'd still need some kind of study or something to establish any meaningful pattern.


I hope folks enjoyed the NOVA documentary and the videos of the breech-loading cannons being fired at targets and learned something from them, I personally find that kind of thing informative. beyond that I guess signal to noise ratio starts to plummet inevitably.

G

[Max_Killjoy]

I hope folks enjoyed the NOVA documentary and the videos of the breech-loading cannons being fired at targets and learned something from them, I personally find that kind of thing informative. beyond that I guess signal to noise ratio starts to plummet inevitably.


I did.


Personally, I find it highly unlikely that breachloading guns ever went completely out of production or use.

[Mr Beer]

I check this thread every day for updates, it consistently provides some of the most interesting commentary I know of. There are a number of excellent posters who contribute but Galloglaich is a stand out here, which is saying something. I've learned a lot just by lurking and it feels like information that would be difficult and time-consuming to acquire elsewhere.

So yeah, just wanted to throw out a thanks to everyone who contributes and I'm sure I'm not the only person who feels like this.

[Brother Oni]

A trebuchet is also not something you just roll up with, is it?

Depending on the culture in question and resources on hand, generally the components were sourced from the local area and the trebuchets were manufactured in situ.

[Max_Killjoy]

Depending on the culture in question and resources on hand, generally the components were sourced from the local area and the trebuchets were manufactured in situ.

That's what I thought, but I didn't want to make an authoritative assertion when I might have been mistaken.

[wolflance]

OK now I got a new question. It's about the whole concept of knighthood. I found it extremely confusing.

From what I read, knights basically started out as relatively wealthy professional soldiers that could afford horses (among other equipment), then evolved into a landed warrior class of their own that were given lands in exchange of feudal obligation to their lords, then became a type of minor noble themselves, sitting at more-or-less the lowest hierarchy of the aristocratic ladder.

Then things start to get confusing (for me). From what I understand, knighthood was the lowest level of nobility, thus logically there must be nobles of higher rank than knight - for example, a Duke. However, there apparently existed dukes that were not knight, and dukes that were ALSO knight. How does this even work?

And apparently there were some cases that nobles of the highest level - i.e. Francis I of France, a KING (among several other kings), specifically went out of his way to get himself knighted. Wouldn't that be some kind of demotion? Why would he want to do that? How does this "double-title noble" works anyway?

Also, did this also happen to other nobility ranks? i.e. A King decided to...uh, duke himself.

[Vinyadan]

I guess catapults would have been harder to build on the fly, what about rolled ropes and humidity problems.

Does anyone know if some master archer has tried shooting an arrow across the rings of the blades of twelve axes struck into wooden supports? Possibly with a composite horn bow?

[gkathellar]

OK now I got a new question. It's about the whole concept of knighthood. I found it extremely confusing.

From what I read, knights basically started out as relatively wealthy professional soldiers that could afford horses (among other equipment), then evolved into a landed warrior class of their own that were given lands in exchange of feudal obligation to their lords, then became a type of minor noble themselves, sitting at more-or-less the lowest hierarchy of the aristocratic ladder.

Then things start to get confusing (for me). From what I understand, knighthood was the lowest level of nobility, thus logically there must be nobles of higher rank than knight - for example, a Duke. However, there apparently existed dukes that were not knight, and dukes that were ALSO knight. How does this even work?

And apparently there were some cases that nobles of the highest level - i.e. Francis I of France, a KING (among several other kings), specifically went out of his way to get himself knighted. Wouldn't that be some kind of demotion? Why would he want to do that? How does this "double-title noble" works anyway?

Also, did this also happen to other nobility ranks? i.e. A King decided to...uh, duke himself.

It's a question of time and place. Take knighthood in the modern UK, which is granted as a sort of "royal seal of achievement." It has nothing to do with the fighting profession, or even really the aristocracy. Knighthood tends to start off pretty much as you describe in the vast majority of cultures, but when the aristocracy loses its status as the principal warrior class (for whatever reason), the definition and implications tends to shift.

Take, for instance, Japan, where the arc of knighthood's history is relatively simple.The knightly class began as mercenaries, considered to be vulgar by the aristocracy, but merged with and replaced the ruling class almost entirely over the next several centuries. By the Sengoku period, you had knights parcelling out land to other knights, who were still not a formalized social class - it was only when the peasant-born Hideyoshi subsequently unified the country, and he closed the gates behind him, that Japan's knights become aristocrats in the conventional sense. And during the relative peace of the Edo period, their status as landowners and warriors waned, and most became little more than middle-class bureaucrats with a sword license. Eventually, due to foreign pressures, vestiges of the old warrior culture reappeared, removing the knightly Tokugawa dynasty from power and reinstating the last vestige of the pre-knightly aristocracy, the Emperor. Not long after, he abolished the class altogether, although much of it went on to form the new economic and political elite.

You should expect knighthood's history to be at least this complex, if not much more so, anywhere you care to look. Remember, knights as a class are an economic and political construct, and will change as the economics and politics of their class change.

[KarlMarx]

OK now I got a new question. It's about the whole concept of knighthood. I found it extremely confusing.

From what I read, knights basically started out as relatively wealthy professional soldiers that could afford horses (among other equipment), then evolved into a landed warrior class of their own that were given lands in exchange of feudal obligation to their lords, then became a type of minor noble themselves, sitting at more-or-less the lowest hierarchy of the aristocratic ladder.

Then things start to get confusing (for me). From what I understand, knighthood was the lowest level of nobility, thus logically there must be nobles of higher rank than knight - for example, a Duke. However, there apparently existed dukes that were not knight, and dukes that were ALSO knight. How does this even work?

And apparently there were some cases that nobles of the highest level - i.e. Francis I of France, a KING (among several other kings), specifically went out of his way to get himself knighted. Wouldn't that be some kind of demotion? Why would he want to do that? How does this "double-title noble" works anyway?

Also, did this also happen to other nobility ranks? i.e. A King decided to...uh, duke himself.

Knight was, as you said, the lowest rank of nobility, but it also meant much more than that. A knight was, from the origin, a defender of a certain lord, place, nation, or church. So, a King or upper noble would often be knighted to join certain orders, such as the Crusader Orders, the Knights of the Bath, Knights of the Golden Fleece, etc. Knighthood, furthermore, even for upper-ranking nobles, was conceived of something that had to be earned--while merely being born to a Duke would make you the heir of the duchy, you still had to train or otherwise distinguish yourself to become a knight. Finally, knighthood--particularly in national orders--could be used by kings (esp. in the late medieval period) to distinguish their subjects without handing over control of a valuable fiefdom.

As a noble, you could generally hold multiple titles, and would be addressed as the highest ranking title when brevity was required, save that for someone who was both an Emperor and King the titles would 'stack' to "Your Imperial & Royal Highness". Therefore, Charles V would be "His/Your Imperial & Royal Highness" when brevity was required or preferable, but in full held the title:
His Imperial and Royal Highness Charles, by the grace of God, Holy Roman Emperor, forever August, King of Germany, King of Italy, King of all Spains, of Castile, Aragon, León, of Hungary, of Dalmatia, of Croatia, Navarra, Grenada, Toledo, Valencia, Galicia, Majorca, Sevilla, Cordova, Murcia, Jaén, Algarves, Algeciras, Gibraltar, the Canary Islands, King of Two Sicilies, of Sardinia, Corsica, King of Jerusalem, King of the Western and Eastern Indies, of the Islands and Mainland of the Ocean Sea, Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, Brabant, Lorraine, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Limburg, Luxembourg, Gelderland, Neopatria, Württemberg, Landgrave of Alsace, Prince of Swabia, Asturia and Catalonia, Count of Flanders, Habsburg, Tyrol, Gorizia, Barcelona, Artois, Burgundy Palatine, Hainaut, Holland, Seeland, Ferrette, Kyburg, Namur, Roussillon, Cerdagne, Drenthe, Zutphen, Margrave of the Holy Roman Empire, Burgau, Oristano and Gociano, Lord of Frisia, the Wendish March, Pordenone, Biscay, Molin, Salins, Tripoli and Mechelen.
Although Charles was a Duke in addition to a King and Emperor, though, addressing him as "Your Grace" would be a major breach of etiquette if nothing else.

Thus, Monarchs awarding themselves lesser titles served to augment their prestige. Furthermore, if they had a legitimate claim to the territory but did not currently rule it, this essentially gave them a justification for opposing their rule. Furthermore, if they already controlled a territory, it prevented their subjects with their own claims to the title from claiming control--one couldn't, for example, both be a loyal servant of Henry VIII and claim the title Duke of York, even if they were a descendant of the powerful House of York. Likewise, the Tudor Monarch's holding the title Lord of Ireland forestalled the Gaelic lords from claiming the title High King of Ireland without risking a war they couldn't afford.

And, finally, secondary titles might be acquired almost by chance--as a side effect of a marriage into a different family, or the death of a distant relative without heirs and their subsequent decision to have you, a powerful king, appointed as their lord and protector.

In no instance where a noble or monarch held a lesser title was that title taken as a "demotion", though a king who listed some unimportant barony in their title might risk coming across as petty.

[Vinyadan]

Knighthood wasn't just a rank. Most nobles were knights. Emperor Barbarossa made a huge feast for the investiture of his sons to knights, and had huge numbers of nobles invited. These were all of different ranks, but were united by the fact that they all were knights, the Emperor too.

In general, knight sure is a concept with many different meanings. The attempt to work cross-language doesn't exactly help. What is occasionally called knights for antiquity are classes distinguished by their money (Athenian hippeis, Roman equites). Then we start having buccellarii, which you can search yourself, because I am not exactly sure of what they did. There is the Constantinian reform of border defense, with larger cavalry squadrons. There is the ideal knight starting out with the historical St Martin and St George. At some point, the Latin word to refer to this idealizes knight becomes miles, which earlier simply meant soldier (see Erasmus's Enchiridion Militis Christiani). Once again, we have a military evolution with barbarians entering the scene with efficient cavalry forces.
Then we have Charlemagne with his paladins. I think we have Heberard's testament, which describes him as a great feudal lord who fought as heavy cavalry (there are descriptions of the weapons he leaves).
However, to develop the knight to a ideal figure, I believe we need to wait for courtly culture. So we have a Mediterranean ideal of the knightly honour, among the Arabs too, although I don't remember the name they gave it. We have the ancient images of the brave (St George) and the charitable (St Martin) knights, mixed with the crusaders, so also ideas of pilgrimage, and of course the new knightly orders, while you have a common ideal of courtly love and adventure which take directions opposite to standard morality. So when the nobles called themselves knights, they were referring to a rather composite and complex concept, that I find very hard to explain succinctly. Anyway, this is why even a king wanted to be a knight.
This had some effects even in republics. So Dante for example served in a branch of the Florentine cavalry that was called feditori, and were lightly equipped and expected to be the first to hit the enemy. As a result, they were overcrowded by nobles, because of the great honour that was bound with the danger. This had more to do with the concept of the right occupation for a nobleman. Some later development got slightly weird, so, apparently, the people of Florence assumed the authority to knight meritorious citizens.

[Galloglaich]

So Dante for example served in a branch of the Florentine cavalry that was called feditori, and were lightly equipped and expected to be the first to hit the enemy. As a result, they were overcrowded by nobles, because of the great honour that was bound with the danger. This had more to do with the concept of the right occupation for a nobleman. Some later development got slightly weird, so, apparently, the people of Florence assumed the authority to knight meritorious citizens.

yes, knighthood is a very complex thing in most parts of the world. It took me a long time to get a basic grip on the idea. It's surprising how little this is generally understood in our culture given the huge importance placed on the concept.

I think I have a grip on it now though and I can break down what it meant in Latinized medieval Europe in three eras.

I'll get into the background a bit since it's Sunday and i have the time, but for those in a rush to get to the basic concepts of knighthood you can skip ahead to the High Medieval Period.

Late Merovingian / Carolingian period

in the Migration era, most of the male members of a Germanic, Gallic, Slavic, Nordic or what have you tribe, and apparently some of the females too, were warriors. There was distinctions between greater and lesser families (what we call today nobles and commoners) and of course slaves, but there was no distinct formal knightly class per se, and boundaries between noble and commoner were pretty fluid and amorphous too.

The rise of Franks as the Merovingian and then Carolingian dynasties consolidated power in Europe, also coincided with a number of increasingly dire threats to the emerging Latinized European Order. The Vikings of course were invading from the North and up the rivers along the coasts, the Moors and Saracens were invading from the South and conquered Sicily from the Byzantines and the Iberian peninsula from the Visigoths, and the Huns and later the Magyars were encroaching into German lands from the East. The Franks and other major rulers were scrambling to put in place a defensive system which could handle the increasing onslaught, and they found that the tribal armies were often incapable of handling the incursions - specifically lacking suitable equipment and troop types. The migration era can be seen as a time where a lot of the Europeans themselves were kind of like refugees - they had been roaming around for generations, and this resulted in a certain amount of poverty and probably a decline in some capabilities, making it harder to handle the huge, well organized armies of invaders seeking to ravage the land and enslave the population. It was a dangerous time.

The troop type which the Frankish elite found the most effective at this time (say 8th - 10th Centuries) was heavy infantry (armored with mail) and heavy cavalry (armored with mail, on a horse and armed with a lance) and also archers. But the cavalry was the most useful if only because they could reach trouble-spots more quickly, and the most expensive to equip for these poor tribes and the authorities wanted more and more of them. To ensure that they got the troops they needed, they started writing special laws, which we call Capitularies (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitulary). This, along with Church records, is the source of most of what we know about the formation of the early Feudal System in Latinized Europe.

Carolingian and Merovingian Capitularies, and their rough equivalents like the Norse Leidang (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leidang) stipulated conscription rules for tribal militia so that for example, for every five men, they had to equip one archer, and for every ten men, one horseman, and for every twenty men, an armored horseman. And so on. Some of these get into detail about the equipment which can be interesting. As the tribes were poor (the Saracen, Vikings and Magyar raiding wasn't helping with this) and the Frankish authorities had an increasing need for more and better soldiers but with very limited administrative resources. They needed to take things further.

The Dawn of Feudalism
In the late Carolingian period, during and after the reign of Charlemange himself, you started to see a new innovation. Some of those 1 in 20 or 1 in 10 guys who were meant to be the fighters equipped by the others, started to be granted land of their own by the Kings and their noble vassals (mainly the counts - using the latin term Comes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comes), and the Abbotts and Bishops). They were then given the right to force the others to supply them what they needed so that they could show up to muster appropriately armed with horse, armor, (eventually horse armor too though it's unclear precisely when that started) and increasingly, some attendants and vassals of their own.

This did not precisely correlate with nobility, it's worth noting. But it did overlap.

Conversely the Carolingians started dusting off old late Roman laws as justification to force the other pepole, the 19 out of 20 whose work had to equip the armored rider, so that they were not allowed to leave their land. This represented the onset of medieval serfdom, a Roman concept left over from the large farming estates in the Mediterranean called Latifundia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latifundium). That has a whole rather sinister history of it's own but it's another story for another time. In general, the establishment of Feudalism was incomplete at best and had a lot of problems. Many of the new landed gentry were harsh or incompetent administrators, and many of their families formed rivalries with each other and began spending as much time fighting among themselves as dealing with any external threats. Many of the tribes, accustomed to freedom, resisted being turned into serfs, often successfully. Only certain areas became what we think of as the typical "lord in the manner / serfs in the field" type of Feudalism, others especially in mountainous, marshy or heavily forested areas retained their freedom but made different types of arrangements with their Frankish rulers and ultimately did play ball in some way or another as far as providing troops to the New Roman / Frankish Empire. There was a lot of internal strife though with petty warlords increasingly fighting each other and nominal "peasants" remaining restive and often going on the warpath themselves. Latin Europe became safer from foreign invasions but a new kind of permanent internal struggle came into being.

The Feudal system, as rough and harsh as it was, did work and the emerging professional warrior caste proved capable of checking the Vikings, routing the Magyars and gradually pushing back the Moors. And if the slave raids never really ended in the Southern coastlines, at least they were no longer so disruptive as to throw entire provinces into turmoil. In addition, the subtle but ultimately substantive innovations they brought to the old Sarmatian concepts of heavy Cavalry proved so effective in the field that it allowed the Latinized Frankish forces to launch their own Crusades in the Middle East and for the Normans to capture Sicily and Naples for themselves (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_conquest_of_southern_Italy). In some legal documents the emerging professional cavalry caste was starting to be (very roughly) equated with the old Roman Equites (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equites), the equestrian rank which became associated with knighthood though it's not precisely the same thing. Arguably the peace established by the knights helped make possible the rise of the new emerging urban economy.

The High Medieval Period.
The period roughly 11th through the 13th Century saw major economic and social changes in Europe. The Empire broke up into three major zones - France in the West, Germany (the Holy Roman Empire) in the East, a series of smaller states in the Center roughly down the line of the Rhine through the Alps and into Italy. The Commune movement spread throughout Italy, Flanders, parts of France and Spain, and Southern Germany and Bohemia. Peasants banned together for mutual protection and created or began to revive fortified urban centers for mutual protection. These in turn spawned markets.

The nobility and the military class, now also commonly called miles milites (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milites) an old Roman term for soldier, or more simply miles (in German speaking areas they were also called Ritter for 'rider") almost universally built fortified homes which we now call castles. Most of the original ones were wooden or made of half timber / wattle and daub construction. Stone castles came into being gradually as the internal competition between warlords heated up. The knights of this era overlapped with the nobility, but it was a distinct rank. In order to do their jobs as soldiers, the knights were given special legal rights. They wore a special belt and gilded spurs. They were allowed to go everywhere armed. Their word carried legal weight in court (literally - the court of nobleman, or in the court of a tribal, town or religious magistrate). And they granted each other an emerging culture of professional courtesy on the battlefield, which meant in effect, that if captured they would be ransomed back to their overlord or to their family rather than being killed. This was a particularly nice perk to have needless to say. Nobles were not automatically knights, someone would usually be made a knight after they had proven themselves in battle. Even powerful princes had to follow this rule to some extent and would not be made a knight until they had actually seen combat.

Importantly, knighthood was not restricted to the aristocratic estate by any means. Burghers could become knights, monks could be come knights (usually as part of the special fighting religious Orders like the Knights Templar, the Knights of St. John of the Hospital, the Sword Brothers and the Teutonic Knights, as well as dozens of smaller knightly Orders found especially in frontier areas like in Spain). And even peasants could be made knights. The knights themselves sometimes united politically and militarily and formed a rivalry to the old nobility or the Church. They threatened commerce and the towns by kidnapping merchants on the roads and on the seas, forming a new concept, the Robber Knight. They also continued to fight among each other to gain more and more territory. Some of them who had humble origins became rich and married into the nobility as they gained land. Once some king or princes granted them land and made them a vassal, they moved up in status regardless.

Ministerials
A very curious thing happened in this era in the history of knights. As the rivalry between the nobility and the armed knightly caste got more and more intense and dangerous, Higher ranked nobility, or larger property owners such as Towns, Abbeys, wealthy merchants and so on, in order to have more muscle to face their enemies, began to arm and equip their serfs. I know the details of this a bit in the German speaking areas but there was similar things done in England and many other places. In some parts of Europe the term 'sergeant' means something similar - a knight who is equipped by a Lord - he doesn't own his horse and his armor himself, but fights for another. Confusingly, the term 'men at arms' or gens d'arms in French sometimes refers to an unfree knight like a Ministerial, but sometimes refers to a noble knight or just any kind of cavalry. Depending widely on the context. Personally I find that an unreliable term unless you are talking about a relatively short span of time (10 or 20 years) in a specific area.

Nevertheless, these 'serf knights', known as (latin) ministerialisor (German) Dienstmann (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministerialis) in German speaking lands, were conferred most or all of the respect of the knightly caste. The special rights of knigthhood seemed to be deemed necessary for them to do their job properly. There were also special administrators and effectively, courtiers recruited from this same class. Ministerialis had some advantages over noble knights or other free knights, as the latter could be unruly and often exploited the immunity provided by armor, a fast horse, and a fortified home to make their own minds up as to whether or not to support their Lord in a given conflict, while the ministerials were more loyal to their Lord and usually more disciplined. In a curious repetition of the previous cycle with the original miles, Lords (who could be a Count or a Duke, or could just be a Town or an Abbey) began to grant control (as opposed to ownership) of land to their ministerials so as to allow the latter to equip themselves for battle and meet their other needs.

Free Imperial Knights
Another odd nuance of the knightly caste, is that not all of them were Vassals to a lord. Many remained independent. Some of these became mercenaries or mercenary contractors (famously called Condottiere, literally Contractor (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condottieri), in Italy, often referred to simply as 'Captain' in many other areas). In the German-speaking areas, they were called 'Knights of the Empire' or Reichsritter, or in Latin, Eques imperii). In English we call them Free Imperial Knights (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Knight). Many of these men (and some women) were from the old tribes or clans who had traditionally never had their status downgraded into serfdom. Over time this became a rank of nobility which in German-speaking areas was called Edelfrei (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edelfrei). In theory these people and their families owed fealty to the Emperor, but this was seldom invoked, particularly after the major interregnums of the 13th Century. In Poland you had the Szlatcha who were basically free and armed tribesmen (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Szlachta) - some would say peasants, who remained armed and over time extracted concessions from various Kings and princes and gained the status of nobility and often knighthood, even though many of them were very poor and owned little or no land.

SIDEBAR - I know all this is complicated a bit confusing but you can think of it on a system-wide scale as simply a kind of Roman or Middle Eastern style hierarchy (Feudalism) unevenly imposed over a Barbarian (Germanic, Gallic, Slavic, Nordic etc.) clan or tribal society. Both systems existed simultaneously and neither one ever really had total control. In addition you had the Church and an emerging urban system which played by it's own rules. All four tried to impose their own reality on the others, with varying degrees of success and one ascendant and another declining in any given part of Europe at any given time. These four systems and the perpetually uneven balance between them are basically what defined the middle ages as such.

Over time the Ministerials and the Free Imperial Knights began to merge as Ministerials sought out Reichsritter status as the key to personal freedom.

The Lance
At this time, a true knight was not just one rider on a horse - he was the leader of a small unit called a Lance of anywhere from 3 to 10 or even 20 riders (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lances_fournies) (this varied widely by specific time and place, and whether they were self-organized or organized by some King or Prince). Typically, by this time (I think somewhere in the 13th Century) the knight himself would be armored and his warhorse(s) would be armored too. He would go into the field with 2 -4 horses, including both warhorses like chargers (destrier or palfrey) and riding horses like amblers or coursers for traveling or scouting. In addition, he'd be accompanied by at least one or two lancers (armored warriors on an unarmored horse) and increasingly, at least one mounted crossbowmen or mounted archer (depending on when and where specifically) and often 1 or 2 lightly armed or unarmed attendants or 'valetti'. Sometimes they would also have something like Dragoons - mounted men who were expected to fight as infantry. The lancers might sometimes be 'squires', something like a journeymen knight, and the valets might sometimes be pages, a kind of apprentice knight. However this was not always the case.

In Germany you also had the curious tradition of the Trabant (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trabant_(military)), the 'satelite', armed men who fought as infantry and who accompanied the knight on foot. The main significance of these guys to me is that they sometimes organized Fechtschuler and were therefore associated with the Kunst Des Fechten, or the fencing / martial arts systems of Central Europe. Too much to get into in this already long post though.


Knight and Trabant famous Durer painting

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ef/Albrecht_D%C3%BCrer_-_The_Knight_and_the_Landsknecht_-_WGA7122.jpg

This is important to point out because it became a big deal later on. Sometimes a young noble would be put into the care of a trusted knight who would help him gain battlefield experience and as soon as possible, knighthood, hopefully without getting killed. The lancers were sometimes 'part time knights' - often burghers or sometims free pesants or common gentry (Yeomen is an English term which sort of fits here), who were sent to join a princely or Royal army by a town, and had sufficient equipment and skill to fight as a lancer. These men would also expect to be knighted or given the squire rank, which eventually came to mean roughly the same thing as a knight though more on that in a minute.

Lances were further organized into banners which were usually led by nobles called 'Bannerets'. Sometimes these fellows weren't nobles either though.

Late Medieval Period

Ok whelp, I'm out of time now ... this took too long even for a Sunday. But lets just quickly summarize some of the big changes of this era.

As most are aware, infantry militias started to defeat noble armies dominated by knights in the late 13th and early 14th Centuries. In the High Middle Ages towns started evicting nobles from the towns and also began increasingly knighting their own citizens. Merchants, craft guild aldermen, and elite 'Patricians' (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrician_(post-Roman_Europe)) actively participated in the tournament circuit, sometimes dominating it, prompting princes to start organizing special "Nobles only" tournaments. The rivalry between the urban estate and the knights, especially when they became robber knights or raubritter (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robber_baron_(feudalism)), accelerated, with the towns struggling to keep the roads open for commerce and their merchants safe, and the knights often suffering as towns deployed cannon to knock down their castle walls and hanging them in reprisals.

Ultimately both towns and knights ended up having trouble with the Princes in the Early Modern era.

The four powers of medieval Europe led to many difficulties, one of which was that having status in one domain (say a town or a princely court) didn't necessarily give you status in the other. So nobles cautiously sought out citizenship with towns, so that they would have some town rights but tried to negotiate so as not to be under too many legal, financial or military obligations to the town; conversely, townsfolk sought out the status of knighthood - again trying to do so without conferring too many obligations either from their own towns taxes or militia requirements or to regional princes.

The bare minimum level of this was an 'Esquire' - technically a squire but it effectively meant knighthood, conferring all the same rights in the princely court and within the Church domains. Many burghers and some more formidable peasants acquired knightly coats of arms through their status of knighthood, often specifically of the Esquire rank. Kings and princes also granted this status to their functionaries like tax collectors and magistrates so that they could go about their business without running into problems with their legal status. The coats of arms of commoners were distinguished by the type of helmet on the crest. Artisans had a closed jousting helmet, patricians had one with bars, if I remember correctly.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgher_arms

This is further confused when, having ended the independence of their cities, the French King determined he needed the urban elite to have sufficient rights to do business without interference in the princely courts so he (I think Louis XIV though i could have this wrong) gave all the higher ranked burghers in the major cities like Paris technical knightly status, effectively making them petty nobles. This, i think, is the origin of the snootier more elitist connotations of the word Boureois as opposed to Burgher. In the middle ages they both meant the same thing - just town dweller.


The association with magistrates, lawyers and wealthy burghers is why some people today especially Attourneys put 'esquire' on their business card. I think.

TL : DR Knight was not the same as nobility, though many were and knights and nobles overlapped. Most nobles became knights. Some knights were actually 'unfree' serfs, some were burghers, some were robbers, and some were monks.

[Haighus]

Ok, I know this has been asked in earlier incarnations of the thread, but I am struggling to find them in the search function of this website, and don't fancy looking back through a thousand pages of thread.

How much did items cost in the late medieval period? In particular weapons and armour. Preferably with sources if people have them to hand. I am under the impression that the majority of people were able to afford a sword in this period, including peasants, and that many of them could afford good armour too- I have read this in earlier versions of this thread I now cannot find :smalleek: I have said as much in a conversation, and now am being asked to back this up (after all, it does oppose the common perception of late medieval life). This time, I will make sure to save the sources.

I recognise prices in the middle ages are a loose thing, and comparing prices is tricky with all the different currencies, and different levels of debasement.

[Vinyadan]

Unluckily, all I could find right now was the price of fish :P
If you are interested, I can post them.

Generally speaking there were books of reckoning and books of shop, in which there are priced items. I remember reading one in which a sword was bought.

I also have how much teaching swordsmen were paid, and the price of taxes in many cities in Europe in 1400, on weapons and other products, although I would need some time to post them, since I would have to do some translation.

[Galloglaich]

Unluckily, all I could find right now was the price of fish :P
If you are interested, I can post them.

Generally speaking there were books of reckoning and books of shop, in which there are priced items. I remember reading one in which a sword was bought.

I also have how much teaching swordsmen were paid, and the price of taxes in many cities in Europe in 1400, on weapons and other products, although I would need some time to post them, since I would have to do some translation.

Post them, we can never have too much of that stuff, seriously.

G

[Vinyadan]

These are the links, mainly as a bookmark.
In English: payment of a sword teacher in Bologna: https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/apd.2016.4.issue-1/apd-2016-0005/apd-2016-0005.xml&ved=0ahUKEwig2ZaQuoXXAhVGYVAKHa4fDyE4HhAWCCYwAQ&usg=AOvVaw2Mq0wmgsPBrSUF5AUkI_RI


Not in English
Pratica della mercatura
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratica_della_mercatura
Text http://www.medievalacademy.org/resource/resmgr/maa_books_online/evans_0024.htm

Fish&more https://books.google.de/books?id=lRvHDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA159&lpg=PA159&dq=prezzo+cose+età+preindustriale&source=bl&ots=OcLDzrLN2U&sig=kotrieQZStUMTub5uidvE6uqDME&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7voa-vIXXAhXIIlAKHRHWCToQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&q=prezzo%20cose%20et%C3%A0%20preindustriale&f=false

Once I have time, I'll post some translation.

[Galloglaich]

These are the links, mainly as a bookmark.
In English: payment of a sword teacher in Bologna: https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/apd.2016.4.issue-1/apd-2016-0005/apd-2016-0005.xml&ved=0ahUKEwig2ZaQuoXXAhVGYVAKHa4fDyE4HhAWCCYwAQ&usg=AOvVaw2Mq0wmgsPBrSUF5AUkI_RI

Oh yeah cheers, i've seen that one. Amazing stuff. I've done 4 articles for that same journal myself - the only ones I've ever published in a peer reviewed journal. I also helped a few other people fix up their English for some other articles on there. The APD is also where I got the article about stats on wounds by different weapon type, I think from the first or second issue.



Not in English
Pratica della mercatura
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratica_della_mercatura
Text http://www.medievalacademy.org/resource/resmgr/maa_books_online/evans_0024.htm

Fish&more https://books.google.de/books?id=lRvHDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA159&lpg=PA159&dq=prezzo+cose+età+preindustriale&source=bl&ots=OcLDzrLN2U&sig=kotrieQZStUMTub5uidvE6uqDME&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj7voa-vIXXAhXIIlAKHRHWCToQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&q=prezzo%20cose%20et%C3%A0%20preindustriale&f=false

Once I have time, I'll post some translation.

Pratica della mercatura is another superb source. Fascinating manuscript. I love that it also has riddles in it.

This is an excerpt I translated from it for my Baltic book, no prices there but some interesting lists of trade goods:

Going to China / Persia etc. down the Silk Road:

wax, tin, copper, cotton, madder, cheese, flax, and oil, honey, saffron, raw amber, amber beads, vair-skins, ermines, foxes, sables, fitches and martens, wolf skins, deerskins, and all cloths of silk or gold, pearls, wheat, Greek wine and all Latin wines “sold by the cask”. Malmsey and wines of Triglia and Candia “sold by the measure”. Caviar “sold by the fusco, and a fusco is the tail-half of the fish's skin, full of fish's roe”. Suet “in jars”, iron “of every kind”, tin, lead, zibibbo “or raisins of every kind, and the mats go as raisins, with no allowance for tare unless they be raisins of Syria. In that case the baskets or hampers are allowed for as tare, and remain with the buyer into the bargain”. Soap of Venice, soap of Ancona, and soap of Apulia “in wooden cases. They make tare of the cases, and then these go to the buyer for nothing. But the soap of Cyprus and of Rhodes is in sacks, and the sacks go as soap with no tare allowance”.

The goods purchased in China are equally interesting:

Raw silk, silk-gauze, dressed silk, ginger, cubebs, lign-aloes, rhubarb; mace, long pepper, ladanum, galangal [an aromatic root], broken camphor; nutmegs; spike (spike lavender? Spikenard?], cardamoms, scam-mony, pounding pearls, manna, borax, gum Arabic, dragon's blood [?], camel's bay, turbit [a drug from the East Indies], sweet-meats, gold wire.

G

[Vinyadan]

Payments for a cuirass maker by the entrepreneur
"corazias ab armigero italianas, corazias franzoxias, corazias spagno-
las, corazias teotonicas ad computum et rationem librarum IV imp. prò qualibet petia
suprascriptarum manerierum armorum; item corsitos franzoxios et teutonicos ***
scarselis et afoldatis de retro et ascarlionatis de antea ad computum et rationem libra-
rum XIV *** dimidia imp. prò quolibet; item corazinas secretas ad computum et
rationem librarum III imp. prò qualibet corazina; item pectora teotonica de qualibet
factione ad computum et rationem soldo rum XVIII imp. prò qualibet pezia; item spalas
teotonicas de qualibet facione ad computum et rationem soldorum XXVIIII imp. prò
qualibe
Payment of the worker if he tests the armour on the client
"item quod si dictus Petrus fecerit aliquam coraziam franzoxiam, teoto-
nicam, italianam, spagnolam, et eas corazias approbaverit ad personas hominum, quod
dictus dominus Petrus Innocenzus teneatur et obligatus sit dare et solvere eidem Petro
soldos decem imp. plus prò qualibet pretio suprascripto".
Milan, end of XV century

[Martin Greywolf]

A compilation of prices (http://www.myschwerk.webzdarma.cz/cenik.html) from Czech area, mostly based on Prague goods. It's in Czech, so to make it easier for you, the only relevant table is the first one, the rest are Italian prices for comparision. The prices are converted into gros (gr.) or kopa grosu (kop gr). 1 kop gr == 60 gr, though the exact amount varied, and should be equivalent to 253 g of silver. 1 kop gr was at first enough gros to get you 253 gr of silver, or 1 hrivna, but this being the middle ages, there's an ungodly mess there.

Some highlights:

550 liters of beer, varies due to place and quality = 25 - 42 gr.
36 liters of wheat, bought from farmer directly = 8 - 10 gr
helmet = 30 gr
good cow = 46 gr
helmet with visor = 48 gr
rent for 1 0,173 square kilometer of land = cca 60 gr
stallion = 6 kop gr
warhorse = 20 kop gr
property needed to serve as witness = 10 -12 kop gr
2-story ordinary house in a city = 17 - 22 kop gr
cuirass = 4 kop gr
Milanese cuirass = 8 kop gr
top of the line armor = 75 kop gr
price of a minor noble's (zeman) holdings = 50 - 60 kop gr
sword = 20 kop gr and higher

If we assume that Czechs drank as much beer back then as today (cca 140 liters per capita) - which we probably can, these being Czechs - then one person spent 6.4 - 10.7 gr on beer alone per year, and assuming 2 EUR per liter (for beer in somewhat higher end pubs), we get 1 gr = 28 EUR.

Helmet then costs 840 EUR (my kettle hat cost about 300, but really good helmets are about this expensive today), sword goes from 33 000 upwards (top of the line modern replica goes for about 1 000+ for a simple sword), 2-story city house goes for 28 000 EUR (HA! I wish), and top of the line armor sets you back a steep 63 000 EUR.

Keep in mind that, when smaller goods are concerned, these are prices for brand new items made by licensed craftsmen (they were taken from a city's guild records for the most part), you could and did find many of these made by not so great craftsmen or re-sold on second-hand market for much, much lower price.

[gkathellar]

@ Galloglaich - I believe "dragon's blood" may refer to bright red plant resins, which were mostly used as dyes.

[snowblizz]

yes that was part of the general economic shift back toward serfdom too in many places, and part of a generalized inflation which I assume had a lot to do with Peruvian Silver and Canadian furs and Caribbean sugar and indigo, Virginia tobacco and so on. But I'll admit the complexity of the economics of this period are still a bit beyond me. i have tried a few times to figure out accurate comparisons of wages and prices from the 16th Century and came out of it more confused than i started.

The economics of any period is complex and terribly confusing. To economist as well.

I am however very interested in them (I'm an economocis major after all and have a deep interest in history) and some of my most enjoyable readings have been economic history, too bad it was only a minor subject at my university.

With no hard data, infinite variables, only vaguely reliable records and loads of guesswork (and that's just modern economics!) it will be hard to ay anything except in general terms. Or sometimes for some things very specifically.

One of my favourite things was reading a textbook debunking "mercantilism" as a specific constructed system as it is often tauthing I'vght to be. It's more accurate to say it's a result of a process of cause and effect of a number of players playing a zero-sum game.

You are probably on to something with the discovery of Peruvian silver, every time large new deposits of precious metal has been found it has had significant impact on trade patterns. I read some nice examples of new deposits in europe in a book about medieaval trade I still can't remember. I may need to go and find it agian in the library.



Briefly about breechloaders and artisans. If I understood it correctly the earlier non-corned powder was more slowly energetic? Which would mean earlier breechloaders would suffer less stresses I'd think. And as one moves to corned powder as more reliable overall but more explosively energetic one has to "simplify" the weapons since metallurgy and craftmanship, high as it may be, simply cannot match what centuries of developemnt leads to. I think this is in part why breechloaders were "forgotten" sort of for a long period. That and they had bellmakers making cannons, if they had asked watchmakers we'd have a Maxim in 1500 ;P.

Also about artisanry. There's a curious thing I've noticed where the general skill of something seems to increase over time, regardless of the people doing it. Let me see if I can explain it. In the 1970s-80s when miniature wargaming was "developed" out of RPGs the miniatues being made were fairly crude. Now the people learning their craft then with decades of experience now create much much more sophisticated miniature models. The funny thing is, people not born when the Old Guard took their first sculpting steps can today match those masters with a fraction of that experience (using techniques and sometimes tools the master invented). And clearly they aren't magically better people, it's barely a generation ago. By examples it seems the standard for miniature sculpting has moved up. What was production quality 30 years ago would be considered an amateurs work today.
This seems to some degree be true in other fields, say drawing and art IMO. An artstudent today with the same tools as a medieval illustrator master could probably equal or better their work and the artstudent doesn't have better hand eye coordination and stuff due to evolution in that short a time. To me it seems some kind of intangiable setting the bar higher by example often happening. The early modern painters e.g. did much better naturalistic work than just one generation earlier. For some reason they decided to push the envelope. I watched a documentary once that argued it was using a camera obscura for scetching IIRC, but I don't quite buy that explanation. But whatever it was, enough people started doing it and there was no going back.

I guess what I'm saying that besides technical limitations, of which there definitely were some (like lacking modern highprecision tools). Especially in massproducing to high tolerance tiny margin specs. It may be a case that there weren't enough good examples of high enough quality to lift general quality. Even if the medieval craftman could have, and they certianly did sometimes, really push the levels of craftmanship.

[Vinyadan]

The values from the Latin texts I posted earlier

Note: 1 lira = 20 soldi, 1 soldo = 12 denari

French, Italian, Spanish or German cuirasses: 4 lire each

French and German corsets with pockets for soldiers (?) (Lots of strange words): 14,5 lire each (corset means in general upper body clothing, among which armour, but this is a part full of words I don't know: it looks like it was to have bags on the back, and maybe some sort of scales on the front).

Secret small cuirasses: 3 lire each

German breastpieces: 18 soldi each

German shoulders: 29 soldi each

Testing the armour on someone: 10 soldi for each armour.

[gkathellar]

You are probably on to something with the discovery of Peruvian silver, every time large new deposits of precious metal has been found it has had significant impact on trade patterns

Not just discovery, either. I'd be hard-pressed to source this, but I believe the collapse of new world silver supply was a major culprit in the fall of the Ming dynasty. European traders found the silver-to-gold exchange rate in China favorable, which spurred them to import large quantities, which fueled rapid economic growth. Conversely, when the silver dried up, the boom economy collapsed.

[Galloglaich]

A compilation of prices (http://www.myschwerk.webzdarma.cz/cenik.html) from Czech area, mostly based on Prague goods. It's in Czech, so to make it easier for you, the only relevant table is the first one, the rest are Italian prices for comparision. The prices are converted into gros (gr.) or kopa grosu (kop gr). 1 kop gr == 60 gr, though the exact amount varied, and should be equivalent to 253 g of silver. 1 kop gr was at first enough gros to get you 253 gr of silver, or 1 hrivna, but this being the middle ages, there's an ungodly mess there.

Some highlights:

550 liters of beer, varies due to place and quality = 25 - 42 gr.
36 liters of wheat, bought from farmer directly = 8 - 10 gr
helmet = 30 gr
good cow = 46 gr
helmet with visor = 48 gr
rent for 1 0,173 square kilometer of land = cca 60 gr
stallion = 6 kop gr
warhorse = 20 kop gr
property needed to serve as witness = 10 -12 kop gr
2-story ordinary house in a city = 17 - 22 kop gr
cuirass = 4 kop gr
Milanese cuirass = 8 kop gr
top of the line armor = 75 kop gr
price of a minor noble's (zeman) holdings = 50 - 60 kop gr
sword = 20 kop gr and higher

If we assume that Czechs drank as much beer back then as today (cca 140 liters per capita) - which we probably can, these being Czechs - then one person spent 6.4 - 10.7 gr on beer alone per year, and assuming 2 EUR per liter (for beer in somewhat higher end pubs), we get 1 gr = 28 EUR.

Helmet then costs 840 EUR (my kettle hat cost about 300, but really good helmets are about this expensive today), sword goes from 33 000 upwards (top of the line modern replica goes for about 1 000+ for a simple sword), 2-story city house goes for 28 000 EUR (HA! I wish), and top of the line armor sets you back a steep 63 000 EUR.

Keep in mind that, when smaller goods are concerned, these are prices for brand new items made by licensed craftsmen (they were taken from a city's guild records for the most part), you could and did find many of these made by not so great craftsmen or re-sold on second-hand market for much, much lower price.

Fascinating, very useful, thanks for posting.

I think something is off with the price of a sword there though. You have a sword costing as much as a warhorse and two and a half times as much as a Milanese curiass. Looking at the link I notice it says 'meč' for 'from 2 kop up' which sounds a bit closer to the numbers I've got from Poland and German speaking areas (still about 4 times as much because I usually show a sword at about half a mark, though clearly it varies pretty widely by quality and embellishments.)

Another entry said meč a nůž (Sword and knife?) for 21 'soldi' which I think is roughly 1 mark based on my (admittedly confusing) currency notes. 1 Soldo = 12 dinari or 1/20 of a mark

Thoughts?

G

[LughSpear]

Everyone knows that mounted archery was really awesome, the speed of the horse would add to the force of the arrow.

Would the same happen with an archer in a motorcycle?

[Galloglaich]

You are probably on to something with the discovery of Peruvian silver, every time large new deposits of precious metal has been found it has had significant impact on trade patterns. I read some nice examples of new deposits in europe in a book about medieaval trade I still can't remember. I may need to go and find it agian in the library.

New sources of precious metals did cause disruptions, as did major mines running out. This happened several times causing major currency crises, and leading, interestingly, to a host of new inventions each time in chemistry and mining tech which re-opened the mines.

But I was referring to more broadly the immense quantity of wealth which came to the Atlantic facing Monarchies thanks to their conquest of the New World, establishment of slave colonies overseas and capture of spice islands and so forth. This had a huge destabilizing effect on Europe in general which lasted for generations.




Briefly about breechloaders and artisans. If I understood it correctly the earlier non-corned powder was more slowly energetic? Which would mean earlier breechloaders would suffer less stresses I'd think. And as one moves to corned powder as more reliable overall but more explosively energetic one has to "simplify" the weapons since metallurgy and craftmanship, high as it may be, simply cannot match what centuries of developemnt leads to. I think this is in part why breechloaders were "forgotten" sort of for a long period. That and they had bellmakers making cannons, if they had asked watchmakers we'd have a Maxim in 1500 ;P.

Interesting theory but there is a problem with it- the various innnovations of powder you refer to, crumbled then corned powder etc. go back to the early 15th Century and are basically complete by the mid 15th. Two generations before 1500 in other words. By the mid-15th Century black powder was being produced with different grades and grains for primer, for small and large firearms, small, medium and large cannon, for grenades, and for different types of fireworks which were already in routine use for celebrations and so on as they are today.

It's unclear (at least to me) that breechloaders were ever forgotten, at least not breechloading cannon.

As for the Maxim, well they did have stuff like this (fast forward to 02:46 to see what I mean):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mKVdMNcG48



I guess what I'm saying that besides technical limitations, of which there definitely were some (like lacking modern highprecision tools). Especially in massproducing to high tolerance tiny margin specs. It may be a case that there weren't enough good examples of high enough quality to lift general quality. Even if the medieval craftman could have, and they certianly did sometimes, really push the levels of craftmanship.

It always took a while for a new technology to get fully established, especially something really new. There were always some artists and artisans who were a generation or three ahead of their time. You can actually see very similar innovations with other things like clocks and watches around this same time period, some of which slowed down a great deal in development in the Early Modern period. Others, like the printing press, took off with incredible rapidity.

It may be that the economic and political changes of the 16th Century simply swept over the craft industries before this kind of thing could be developed enough to set up 'Folwark' or factory type systems where they could have unskilled labor making them, as happened in so many other industries in the Early Modern period.

G

[Wartex1]

Everyone knows that mounted archery was really awesome, the speed of the horse would add to the force of the arrow.

Would the same happen with an archer in a motorcycle?

One of the advantages of a horse is that the horse can "drive" itself. Using a bow on a motorcycle (unless someone else is driving) would be largely ineffective due to the inability to steer while using the bow, drastically increasing the likelihood of a crash. If someone else is driving, I'd imagine it'd be decently effective, but still less so due to the lack of an elevated position and the added obstacle of another person being present on the motorcycle.

[Galloglaich]

One of the advantages of a horse is that the horse can "drive" itself. Using a bow on a motorcycle (unless someone else is driving) would be largely ineffective due to the inability to steer while using the bow, drastically increasing the likelihood of a crash. If someone else is driving, I'd imagine it'd be decently effective, but still less so due to the lack of an elevated position and the added obstacle of another person being present on the motorcycle.

hence the extensive use of the crossbow in the best movie ever made

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdr-f3MZgqo

[Mike_G]

Everyone knows that mounted archery was really awesome, the speed of the horse would add to the force of the arrow.

Would the same happen with an archer in a motorcycle?

Mythbusters did this with a truck, if I recall correctly. The speed added some force to the arrow.

That's not the great thing about mounted archery, though. If you want more power, you can build a more powerful bow and shoot from a nice solid stance on foot. The advantage of mounted archers is the ability for them to ride into range, shoot and then ride away. It's hard to counter archers you can't catch unless you have a lot of missile armed troops of you own.

[Wartex1]

hence the extensive use of the crossbow in the best movie ever made

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdr-f3MZgqo

To be fair, once you have access to modern firearms, crossbows become largely pointless unless resources are limited (as in Mad Max), since crossbows are much easier to build without manufacturing tools and ammunition is basically infinitely easier to create as well (sharpened stick vs very specifically made slugs).

[Vinyadan]

About prices: https://www.google.de/amp/s/amp.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/26nuj9/how_expensive_were_medieval_weapons_and_armor/ contains some info and bibliography (in English)

[Galloglaich]

Some prices - (these first ones are all from Poland or Prussian towns from 1420-1460

sword 1/2 mark or about 40 groschen - source Uzbrojenie w Polsce średniowiecznej 1350-1450, “Armaments in Medieval Poland 1350-1450”, Andrzej Nadolski, Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Historii Kultury Materialnej, (1990), page 471

A sheep, 56 dinari
Bushel of flour (1423) 6 kreuzer (144 dinari)
Side of bacon, 1 Mark (40 kreuzer)
Cubit of fine linen (30 kreuzer)
Pair of shoes (16 kreuzer)
Bushel of wheat 84 dinari
Sword 20 kreuzer
3 Tons of beer, 1 mark (1377, Hanseatic League law)
Crossbow (not sure what specific type) 1 mark / 40 kreuzer
Coat of plates (platendienst) 12 kreuzer
Cuirass with pauldrons, 39 kreuzer
Mail Haubergeon 2-7 marks or 10 marks for a ‘special’ Haubergeon (possibly tempered or fine links)
Half-Armor ‘of proof’ 90 kreuzer
Milanese harness 4 florins
Milanese harness ‘of Proof’ 7 florins, 4 kreuzer

Equipment for a mounted crossbowman, 11 florins, equipment ‘for a lancer’ 30 florins

Payment to a master tailor in Strasbourg 1460 for 1 week’s (6 out of 7 days) work: 144 pfennig. Outlay for apprentices, hired workers and worker meals, 29.5 pfennig. Net pay 115.5 pfennig or 26 Kreuzer, 104 Kreuzer per month.

Weekly earnings in Silesia, second half of 15th century:

24 Prague groschen – carpenter (roughly ½ mark, 18 Kreuzer)
18-35 Prague gr - master mason* (roughly 13-26 Kreuzer, 104 Kr per month)
8.5 gr Prague gr – non-guild worker
3.7 Prague gr- carter
* A master mason will often receive 2 or 3 times his normal pay because he will receive wages at his own rate for each apprentice or journeyman in his employ.

Mercenaries pay Hungarian Black Army:
Light Cavalry 2 Florin per month (120 kreuzer per month)
Gunner 3 Florin per month (180 kreuzer per month)
Halberdier 3 Florin per month (180 kreuzer per month)
Leutzule (guide) 2 Florin per month (120 kreuzer per month)
Lancer* 10 Florin per month (600 kreuzer per month)
Knight (‘Lance’)*20 Florin per month (1200 kreuzer per month)




A good primary source for all this stuff is the Balthasar Behem Codex, aka the Codex Picturatus. It's a survey of craft guilds in Krakow in 1505, it has prices and all sorts of regulations, though you need to be able to read (or painstakingly translate, as some friends and i did) medieval Latin. It also has tons of really cool paintings of each type of craft workshop. You can find scans of the whole thing online.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balthasar_Behem_Codex

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/20/Krakow_bell_caster_from_Behem_Codex_1505.jpg

[Tobtor]

Side of bacon, 1 Mark (40 kreuzer)

3 Tons of beer, 1 mark (1377, Hanseatic League law)

Crossbow (not sure what specific type) 1 mark / 40 kreuzer


What is meant with "tons" in this regard? It seem there must be some issue here, or is a side of bacon really priced the same as 3000kg litres of beer (or 2700 using US tons)?

I know the listed price of beer is earlier, but it sounds like a crazy inflation rate (above what I would expect).



I think something is off with the price of a sword there though. You have a sword costing as much as a warhorse and two and a half times as much as a Milanese curiass. Looking at the link I notice it says 'meč' for 'from 2 kop up' which sounds a bit closer to the numbers I've got from Poland and German speaking areas (still about 4 times as much because I usually show a sword at about half a mark, though clearly it varies pretty widely by quality and embellishments.)


As you say there is a great variance in quality in swords. The listed price is roughly a quarter of "top of the line armor". While the armour is of course much more steel and various pieces, it also is simpler to mass produce. So I don't think the price is off for a top-line nobleman's sword. Could you get a working messer for much less? Sure. Its like comparing what a car cost today.

I have seen quite a bit of late medieval swords, and some of them are very good, but there are also many very "crude" (however these are rarely displayed in the fancy public armouries/museums - giving a false impression). I think the ones costing half a mark must be very cheap (perhaps used?), or from an earlier source (inflation again?).

I think generally a good sword cost more than a crossbow (as opposed to this where its half of the crossbow).

[Galloglaich]

What is meant with "tons" in this regard? It seem there must be some issue here, or is a side of bacon really priced the same as 3000kg litres of beer (or 2700 using US tons)?

I know the listed price of beer is earlier, but it sounds like a crazy inflation rate (above what I would expect).

I'm not sure but I think it just means a barrel, I don't know how much. The source was "The Hansa, History and Culture Johannes Schildhauer, Dorset Press, (1988), ISBN 0-88029-182-6




As you say there is a great variance in quality in swords. The listed price is roughly a quarter of "top of the line armor". While the armour is of course much more steel and various pieces, it also is simpler to mass produce. So I don't think the price is off for a top-line nobleman's sword. Could you get a working messer for much less? Sure. Its like comparing what a car cost today.

I have seen quite a bit of late medieval swords, and some of them are very good, but there are also many very "crude" (however these are rarely displayed in the fancy public armouries/museums - giving a false impression). I think the ones costing half a mark must be very cheap (perhaps used?), or from an earlier source (inflation again?).

I think generally a good sword cost more than a crossbow (as opposed to this where its half of the crossbow).

The site he linked to as a source

http://www.myschwerk.webzdarma.cz/cenik.html

... does not seem to indicate a sword costing 20 marks. Unless I am missing something there I think he made a mistake. It shows one for 2 marks "and up" and one (with a knife) from Italian sources for 21 solidi or just over 1 mark. Unless I'm translating that wrong (using google)

The cost of both sword and crossbow at about 1/2 and 1 mark respectively seems to be very common from German sources for the 15th Century, (as does the crossbow costing more though I think that depends a great deal on the type of crossbow, not always indicated) and I believe those are cutlers guild prices for the swords. Swords were also 'mass produced' by guilds so to speak with a system of subcontractors - iron mongers, heat-treaters, sharpeners, hilt makers, and polishers, as well as the cutler himself who was kind of the overall contractor and designer. In Late Medieval Europe they built swords on a vast scale.

I have seen prices for swords from the 15th Century ranging from very low (10 dinari etc.) probably for the kind of junk you are referring to, to as much as 3 or 4 marks, to once 10 marks but that was for a gilded sword. I'd be very surprised to see data on a sword costing 20 marks, but I would assume that would be gilded with gold etc.

I found another price list, I think for England not precisely sure what date, only lists one sword (a 'cheap' peasant sword for 6D which is no doubt a very low price) but does show some interesting prices for armor and other things

http://medieval.ucdavis.edu/120D/Money.html

His armor prices roughly match the ones i've seen:

Ready-made Milanese armor £8 6s 8d in 1441

Cuirass of proof with pauldrons: (date not given)
plates: 5s 6d
finishing, rivets, and straps: 7s 6d
selling price 26s

Lance[r] armor:
plates 14s 5d
finishing, et cetera 40s
selling price 80s

G

[Storm Bringer]

What is meant with "tons" in this regard? It seem there must be some issue here, or is a side of bacon really priced the same as 3000kg litres of beer (or 2700 using US tons)?

I know the listed price of beer is earlier, but it sounds like a crazy inflation rate (above what I would expect).



I quick check on wiki shows that wine was shipped in massive. 954 litre casks, called tuns, which weighed about 1,000kg we believe are where the origin of both the ton of weight, and the use of tonnage for ships volume.

[Haighus]

Excellent, thanks everyone! This is exactly the stuff I was looking for. I do vaguely remember someone posting the typical income for a more well off peasant (boor?) awhile back? I think it compared favourably to the cost of swords.

It looks like in general, anyone who had a standard, reasonable wage could at least get a cheap sword.

Regarding the most expensive swords, Henry V apparently paid £2000 each(!) for 5 Toledo swords, which must've been festooned in gold and precious gems, considering a small castle could be built for that kind of price. Apparently the most old, battered, cheap swords could be as little as 1d as well (second hand in Coroners rolls evaluations). This was from Matt Easton.

The one mark side of bacon seems somewhat excessive. When it says a side, I'm assuming it means more like half a pig, than a single rasher. Interesting that is costs more than a sword in the price list it was mentioned in.

[Mr Beer]

If we assume that Czechs drank as much beer back then as today (cca 140 liters per capita) - which we probably can, these being Czechs - then one person spent 6.4 - 10.7 gr on beer alone per year, and assuming 2 EUR per liter (for beer in somewhat higher end pubs), we get 1 gr = 28 EUR.

Helmet then costs 840 EUR (my kettle hat cost about 300, but really good helmets are about this expensive today), sword goes from 33 000 upwards (top of the line modern replica goes for about 1 000+ for a simple sword), 2-story city house goes for 28 000 EUR (HA! I wish), and top of the line armor sets you back a steep 63 000 EUR.

I find it very pleasing that we're using the Beer Standard to convert to modern equivalent prices...facetious aside it's probably as good as any other yardstick given it's stability as a staple good over the period.

[Storm Bringer]

I find it very pleasing that we're using the Beer Standard to convert to modern equivalent prices...facetious aside it's probably as good as any other yardstick given it's stability as a staple good over the period.


well, with a username like that, you would say that.....:smallbiggrin::smallbiggrin::smallbiggrin :

jokes aside the big mac index (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Mac_Index) is a real thing, and as useful as many other comparative price measures. relative purchasing power is one of those ideas that seems like it should be simple, but as soon as you look into the details, it get horribly complex real fast.

[Xuc Xac]

The one mark side of bacon seems somewhat excessive. When it says a side, I'm assuming it means more like half a pig, than a single rasher.

That's exactly what it means. A side of beef or pork is the entire left or right half of the animal. A side of bacon is a side of pork that's been salted and cured.

It's the side of the animal, not a portion on the side of your plate as an appetizer to a main dish.

[snowblizz]

Everyone knows that mounted archery was really awesome, the speed of the horse would add to the force of the arrow.

Would the same happen with an archer in a motorcycle?

Yes.

Also works with crossbows and pick-ups. (The Mythbusters test)

[Tobtor]

That's exactly what it means. A side of beef or pork is the entire left or right half of the animal. A side of bacon is a side of pork that's been salted and cured.

It's the side of the animal, not a portion on the side of your plate as an appetizer to a main dish.

I know that (though you could argue that normally the legs etc is not counted in the "side of bacon"). I still think it is a very strange price.

3.000 of litres is a lot of beer (at least its more than what I drink in a year). A moden day pig weight around 100kg when alive, Slaughter weights is around 80kg (whith some bones still attached). A medieval pig (even a late medieval one) is much smaller. So maybe we are dealing with something like 25kg of meat costing the same as 3.000litres of beer. That is more than 100 times as much pr. kg!

Pigs where relatively easy to breed, eats trash, leftovers and roots/fruits from the forest, and is Thus usually cheaper than cattle. So it is "cheap" meat.

[wolflance]

Knowledge

Lots of knowledge

Moar Knowledge

EVEN Moar knowledge
Thank's a lots guys. I learned quite a lot from your answers, and that clears up most of my confusions. In fact, I learned a lot more than what I asked for. Most of the stuffs I don't even know I don't know！

So, in continuation of my last question: In a military context/On a battlefield in Europe, am I right to expect all of these to present?

1) Non-noble, non-knight troops that nevertheless armed themselves with the best equipment of the time, and fought in a typical "knightly" manner - as armored heavy lancer/dismounted heavy infantry (the "men-at-arms")
2) Nobility class troops that fought in a "knightly" manner as armored cavalry/dismounted infantry, but were not knighted and thus wouldn't be considered knight from a social sense (the "gendarmes").
3) Proper knights that nevertheless did not fight with a knight's capacity (i.e. a knighted person that fought as a musketeer).

EDIT
One extra question: Did something like "full plate musketeer" existed at any point in the history?

[Kiero]

In a semi-related topic, who could expect to be ransomed, if they surrendered to an enemy? Only the nobility, or could mercenaries expect the same treatment from mercs on the other side?

Did mercs go out of their way to capture (not kill) enemy nobles, since there was a payday at the end of it?

[DerKommissar]

Not just discovery, either. I'd be hard-pressed to source this, but I believe the collapse of new world silver supply was a major culprit in the fall of the Ming dynasty. European traders found the silver-to-gold exchange rate in China favorable, which spurred them to import large quantities, which fueled rapid economic growth. Conversely, when the silver dried up, the boom economy collapsed.

Do you remember where you got that information? This sounds very interesting for a friend of mine, so if you have a lead, he might be able to dig smth up...

[PhoenixPhyre]

A question (that got lost earlier)--

How big would a frontier garrison be under

a) the post-Marius roman system

b) mid-medieval continental europe?

I'm envisioning the far side being mostly wilderness, not a patrolled border of another power. More migratory tribes. Even rough numbers for a sense of scale would be nice. Thanks!


On a side note, I've learned a lot from this thread. I was at a show and a vendor (selling obviously pot-metal replicas of various bladed and crushing weapons) said "I'm amazed that they could walk around with all that weight (of armor and weapons)." Because of this thread I knew better. I didn't buy from him :smalltongue:

[wolflance]

Do you remember where you got that information? This sounds very interesting for a friend of mine, so if you have a lead, he might be able to dig smth up...
While that one was probably a contributing factor, the collapse of Ming was the result of quite a lot of factors that reinforced each others and eventually snowballed.

From the back of my head:
1) Rise of Jurchen (Manchu)
2) Little Ice Age
3) Political instability
4) Inability to collect tax effectively
5) Massive rebellion
6) Inflation & Deflation

among others that I can't remember. Collapse of Ming was a massive economic mismanagement/blunder. In the end, China at the time was still an agrarian society, so silver (or lack thereof) was much less important than FOOD.

[Galloglaich]

Thank's a lots guys. I learned quite a lot from your answers, and that clears up most of my confusions. In fact, I learned a lot more than what I asked for. Most of the stuffs I don't even know I don't know！

So, in continuation of my last question: In a military context/On a battlefield in Europe, am I right to expect all of these to present?

1) Non-noble, non-knight troops that nevertheless armed themselves with the best equipment of the time, and fought in a typical "knightly" manner - as armored heavy lancer/dismounted heavy infantry (the "men-at-arms")


Yes, plenty



2) Nobility class troops that fought in a "knightly" manner as armored cavalry/dismounted infantry, but were not knighted and thus wouldn't be considered knight from a social sense (the "gendarmes").

Rarer, but some. Most nobles who fight would be knighted, at least after a little while. By the time they have a 'moderate' amount of experience, depending on rank. For princely level youngsters just riding around on the battlefield or getting in one fight is usually enough. Lower ranking nobles would have to do something a little more noteworthy like capture an enemy or kill somebody in battle. Think of it about like getting a 'bronze star' in a modern army.

More common for the gendarmes etc. is that they are knighted but not nobles.



3) Proper knights that nevertheless did not fight with a knight's capacity (i.e. a knighted person that fought as a musketeer).

yes



EDIT
One extra question: Did something like "full plate musketeer" existed at any point in the history?

yes I think so, sort of - the caveat being that infantry, or anyone mostly walking as opposed to riding, usually wore half-armor, or armor protection on head, arms and torso down to upper thighs. Leg armor was hard to walk in.

So in the 15th & 16th Century you would have a few gunners etc. in full armor like this

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/5c/0b/c5/5c0bc58d59e5a289ca83d16ae7edc0a5--medieval-art-th-century.jpg

a lot of gunners (etc) armored like this

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/83/89/a6/8389a665e47e9bf6c3d52deeb54ba5a5--landsknecht-armour.jpg

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/aa/e0/f1/aae0f181cd17414fb30dc13e0cdcba90--landsknecht-armures.jpg


and even in the 17th Century some of the elite gunners, pikemen etc. would be armored like this:


https://i.pinimg.com/originals/7c/d3/65/7cd3656ee072683e3f26a8448ef63684.jpg

But more like this

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/2b/c7/df/2bc7df7722794d9f90f06ad9a1924845.jpgAnd most in just a buff coat or no armor at all.

G

[gkathellar]

Do you remember where you got that information? This sounds very interesting for a friend of mine, so if you have a lead, he might be able to dig smth up...

Should be able to later today. I have a historian in the family who I heard it from, and they just need to get home and dig around (allegedly it also affected Japan's fortunes at the time).


While that one was probably a contributing factor, the collapse of Ming was the result of quite a lot of factors that reinforced each others and eventually snowballed.

From the back of my head:
1) Rise of Jurchen (Manchu)
2) Little Ice Age
3) Political instability
4) Inability to collect tax effectively
5) Massive rebellion
6) Inflation & Deflation

among others that I can't remember. Collapse of Ming was a massive economic mismanagement/blunder. In the end, China at the time was still an agrarian society, so silver (or lack thereof) was much less important than FOOD.

My recollection is that the Ming had silver currency, and with the collapse of availability, the economy went in to recession. Certainly a sudden deficit of purchasing power wouldn't have made a famine better.

In general, my understanding is that most dynasties collapsed for roughly proximate reasons: mismanagement on the part of the state meant a lack of preparation for economic downturn and natural disasters, allowing opportunists to arouse popular support with the claim that the emperor had lost the Mandate of Heaven. Is that incorrect (or so general as to be vacuous)?

[Vinyadan]

Roman garrisons:
By practical examples, Castrum Divitium near Cologne had around 900 men, while one of the forts at Hadrian's Wall hosted around 1000 cavalry.
http://hadrianswallcountry.co.uk/history/life-hadrians-wall/frontier-garrison

Pre-Marius, colonies would be set up and the people living there would have served as non professional soldiers.

Medieval garrisons probably varied a lot. I would need to check some examples.

[PhoenixPhyre]

Roman garrisons:
By practical examples, Castrum Divitium near Cologne had around 900 men, while one of the forts at Hadrian's Wall hosted around 1000 cavalry.
http://hadrianswallcountry.co.uk/history/life-hadrians-wall/frontier-garrison

Pre-Marius, colonies would be set up and the people living there would have served as non professional soldiers.

Medieval garrisons probably varied a lot. I would need to check some examples.

Thanks. That's a lot bigger than what I was thinking.

How far would those forts be spaced apart then? (that is, how much territory would one garrison be responsible for)?

[Galloglaich]

Thanks. That's a lot bigger than what I was thinking.

How far would those forts be spaced apart then? (that is, how much territory would one garrison be responsible for)?

In late medieval times it could be much smaller. The Teutonic Order sometimes sent a force of ~ 50 guys pretty deep into the frontier zone to go actually build a 'castle' (probably a blockhouse) and man it for the summer.

Towns would defend small forts / gates on their outer (rural) perimeter with fortified buildings or towers of about 10 -20 guys. Specifically as one example during a time of strife in the 1440's, the city of Bremen had a ditch around the town to protect from robber knights, with two towers protecting the roads in. Usually 4 gunners and 6 crossbowmen from the militia with another 5-10 mercenaries protected each tower. There were also a couple of people stationed in the village Church to light a beacon if necessary to warn the city to close the town gates in the event of a major attack.

The towers had ammunition and supplies sufficient for maybe ~ 100 guys though and would be quickly reinforced in the event of a conflict.

G

[rrgg]

EDIT
One extra question: Did something like "full plate musketeer" existed at any point in the history?

Armor on musketeers generally tended to decrease over time outside of specific circumstances. For example during sieges in the late 16th century Sir Roger Williams mentioned that sometimes the Spanish would send musketeers wearing heavy armor to spearhead an assault on a breach. Garrard likewise mentioned that during a siege was the exception where mail shirts and burgonets would be useful for arquebusiers.

[Kiero]

Something worth considering about Roman garrisons and fortifications. They weren't there to hold a strong point, but to act as a staging post for an aggressive action, usually a punitive expedition. The Roman military mindset prioritised swift action, not hiding away behind walls.

[Mike_G]

So in the 15th & 16th Century you would have a few gunners etc. in full armor like this

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/5c/0b/c5/5c0bc58d59e5a289ca83d16ae7edc0a5--medieval-art-th-century.jpg

a lot of gunners (etc) armored like this

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/83/89/a6/8389a665e47e9bf6c3d52deeb54ba5a5--landsknecht-armour.jpg

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/aa/e0/f1/aae0f181cd17414fb30dc13e0cdcba90--landsknecht-armures.jpg


and even in the 17th Century some of the elite gunners, pikemen etc. would be armored like this:


https://i.pinimg.com/originals/7c/d3/65/7cd3656ee072683e3f26a8448ef63684.jpg

But more like this

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/2b/c7/df/2bc7df7722794d9f90f06ad9a1924845.jpgAnd most in just a buff coat or no armor at all.

G

Looking at this armor for gunners, I am forced to ask how the shoulder armor interfered with their use of the musket.

I've done a lot of shooting, and I can't see how you'd get a good firing position, a nice cup in the shoulder for the butt of the gun or a good stock weld with that kind of breastplate on. Did they hold and aim the weapons differently, or modify the armor to accept the gun butt in the right shoulder or what?

[PhoenixPhyre]

In late medieval times it could be much smaller. The Teutonic Order sometimes sent a force of ~ 50 guys pretty deep into the frontier zone to go actually build a 'castle' (probably a blockhouse) and man it for the summer.

Towns would defend small forts / gates on their outer (rural) perimeter with fortified buildings or towers of about 10 -20 guys. Specifically as one example during a time of strife in the 1440's, the city of Bremen had a ditch around the town to protect from robber knights, with two towers protecting the roads in. Usually 4 gunners and 6 crossbowmen from the militia with another 5-10 mercenaries protected each tower. There were also a couple of people stationed in the village Church to light a beacon if necessary to warn the city to close the town gates in the event of a major attack.

The towers had ammunition and supplies sufficient for maybe ~ 100 guys though and would be quickly reinforced in the event of a conflict.

G

So with this in mind, how would the later medieval times fortify a smaller village (maybe ~200 civilians) that occupies a strategic location (in this case, at the edge of the frontier at a natural choke-point for the local tribes) but without any significant known threat? It's a militaristic civilization, so they have more of a standing army than most, but the tribes in the frontier aren't particularly known for raiding civilization since they're more hunter-gatherer/amazon tribe level as opposed to the Germanic tribes that the Romans fought against. Would they even really bother? I'm thinking this is a punishment post for those that can't just be dismissed for whatever reason. If it matters, it's most of a day's trip to the nearest significant city has a large military presence.

My current thoughts are a palisade wall with a gate and a standing garrison of about 25 soldiers who conduct squad-size patrols (8-10 soldiers) out to the local farms periodically. There'd be a signal beacon chain (or someone with a consumable stone of sending, as there is magic) to signal for backup in case of anything major.

Thanks for those that responded by the way :smallbiggrin:

[wolflance]

Should be able to later today. I have a historian in the family who I heard it from, and they just need to get home and dig around (allegedly it also affected Japan's fortunes at the time).



My recollection is that the Ming had silver currency, and with the collapse of availability, the economy went in to recession. Certainly a sudden deficit of purchasing power wouldn't have made a famine better.

In general, my understanding is that most dynasties collapsed for roughly proximate reasons: mismanagement on the part of the state meant a lack of preparation for economic downturn and natural disasters, allowing opportunists to arouse popular support with the claim that the emperor had lost the Mandate of Heaven. Is that incorrect (or so general as to be vacuous)?
Sure that didn't help, but the situation in China had gotten so bad by that point that they would still implode even with continuous silver inflow. Even if they had the silver (and they did still have a lot, all those years of accumulating silver got to amount to something), they had nowhere to buy food with that silver, so more silver wouldn't help much.

[Galloglaich]

Looking at this armor for gunners, I am forced to ask how the shoulder armor interfered with their use of the musket.

I've done a lot of shooting, and I can't see how you'd get a good firing position, a nice cup in the shoulder for the butt of the gun or a good stock weld with that kind of breastplate on. Did they hold and aim the weapons differently, or modify the armor to accept the gun butt in the right shoulder or what?

All of the above.

You see in the art, plenty of unorthdox firing positions, only gradually converging on the 'from the shoulder' way that we (mostly) do it now. A lot of shooting with the early to mid 15th Century guns (many of which had poles for stocks or were short like sawed off shotguns) was done under or overarm, or submachine gun style or whatever. Early match-locks and touch-hole firearms were a little sketchy to put your face next to apparently as well - primer blows up pretty dramatically.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qkbSTyT1COE

You do see little widgets or whatever you want to call them added to the armor, kind of like lance rests. I don't know that much about the specifics though.

[Galloglaich]

So with this in mind, how would the later medieval times fortify a smaller village (maybe ~200 civilians) that occupies a strategic location (in this case, at the edge of the frontier at a natural choke-point for the local tribes) but without any significant known threat? It's a militaristic civilization, so they have more of a standing army than most, but the tribes in the frontier aren't particularly known for raiding civilization since they're more hunter-gatherer/amazon tribe level as opposed to the Germanic tribes that the Romans fought against. Would they even really bother? I'm thinking this is a punishment post for those that can't just be dismissed for whatever reason. If it matters, it's most of a day's trip to the nearest significant city has a large military presence.

My current thoughts are a palisade wall with a gate and a standing garrison of about 25 soldiers who conduct squad-size patrols (8-10 soldiers) out to the local farms periodically. There'd be a signal beacon chain (or someone with a consumable stone of sending, as there is magic) to signal for backup in case of anything major.

Thanks for those that responded by the way :smallbiggrin:

I am not sure how to really translate that into a historical period.

I do know of a case though in the early 16th Century where Nicolas Copernicus (the same guy who was the astronomer) with a small garrison helped successfully defend a small fortified village from the Teutonic Knights. i know of an article about that incident if you want I can post that.

G

[Roxxy]

That might well work pretty well. My main question is whether the pain would be comparable to gunshot wounds.

What I really like is that, by maintaining a slow rate of fire for wands, it reinforces that, powerful as they are, wizards HAVE to go into battle with infantry support if they want to stay alive to screw up the enemy.

On the whole wants versus guns thing, I think I have something, and it's from watching Harry Potter. To put it simply, you can fence with them, and that extends to gunfire to a degree. See, the setting already states that swords see limited use. Only in the hands of mages, though, because many mages can use a sword to block gunfire jedi-style. Because magic. Add in that swords are really good at bypassing damage reduction, can deliver magics a bullet couldn't (the spell would dissipate too rapidly in a magazine, while a sword is basically connected to a human battery), that a lot of monsters are really good about forcing melee combat, that no mage has a non-magical sword, and that the rules of magic aren't typically tolerant of magical ranged weapons besides wands (the projectile won't carry the magic), and it makes some degree of sense.

Well, if you can do it with a sword, you can do it with a wand, and a wand is easier to carry. And if the other guy has a wand, you can try to block their blasts, like they do in Harry Potter. Of course, it's lower rate of fire means you have to prioritize what you can block if the enemy has a gun, because if you're facing an entire infantry squad, you can't just block every bullet, but on the other hand maybe one blast can deflect or shatter every bullet in a cone in front of you, essentially creating shrapnel and richochets and making the enemy scramble for cover (or killing them). Which balances the wand to the sword, because mages with swords are scary fast and can intercept multiple rounds in a way you can't with a wand. Then again, more mages know how to use wands than swords, because swords are a very specialized skill, and the mage who spends time learning fancy sword tricks has skipped learning some other things.

[snowblizz]

In general, my understanding is that most dynasties collapsed for roughly proximate reasons: mismanagement on the part of the state meant a lack of preparation for economic downturn and natural disasters, allowing opportunists to arouse popular support with the claim that the emperor had lost the Mandate of Heaven. Is that incorrect (or so general as to be vacuous)?
One thing IIRC is basically always present when a dynasty falls is a period of weak monsoons leading to poor harvests. And when it hits, it gets bad over an enormous area effectively impacting the whole realm. Usually at these crisis points the population has grown enough that even marginal lands are in heavy use and there's almost no safety margin in foodavailability (farming some of the more marignal areas demands quite a heavy labour investment). The various dynasties tended to expand to fill all the available space their technological level could support. So any shortfall rather quickly turns desperate. There's really no place to get more food even if such an idea would occur and the wast amounts needed makes for difficulties too.

The loss of the Mandate of Heaven is normally the claim made, and it is usually invoked at such times it "makes sense". All the peasants of the realm can sort of see it, you don't have to go around convincing people too much. It's not quite like when our current media and politicians cries catastrophy over everything yet if you check the fundamentals things are much sounder. What I'm trying to say it's going to be a fairly general agreement over the fact that it's not looking good. The circumstances need to be fairly right to make the claim stick.

With the economic foundation rocking all the smaller and wider cracks in the state show up. Outside invasions (they also suffer from the same weather related issues and so are more active), which may expose the unreadiness of an army that has grown bloated (it usually did) yet ineffective and e.g. soldiers are more farmers scraping by than anything else. Or other shocks to the system that would otherwise be endurable will topple the whole thing. Even the mismanagement can go on for quite some time as long as nothing is poking at the system. It won't be enough by itself.

[Martin Greywolf]

Fascinating, very useful, thanks for posting.

I think something is off with the price of a sword there though. You have a sword costing as much as a warhorse and two and a half times as much as a Milanese curiass. Looking at the link I notice it says 'meč' for 'from 2 kop up' which sounds a bit closer to the numbers I've got from Poland and German speaking areas (still about 4 times as much because I usually show a sword at about half a mark, though clearly it varies pretty widely by quality and embellishments.)

Another entry said meč a nůž (Sword and knife?) for 21 'soldi' which I think is roughly 1 mark based on my (admittedly confusing) currency notes. 1 Soldo = 12 dinari or 1/20 of a mark

Thoughts?

G

Yeah, I noticed that too.

First thought, the price on solids is from da Vinci diaries, and I don't know enough about Italian and Czech currencies stability at the time. I'd be very careful in converting them, because you tended to have rather rapid changes of silver content in certain periods.

As for the high price of swords, I think that's because these prices are usually taken from guild records in a city. Those 120 gr per sword are for a sword from a swordmaker who is rather well known in the area, and sets his prices accordingly. Cheaper stuff could be bought from his apprentices or from less famous craftsmen. Or you just bought a messer, since swords were often not allowed within city walls, meaning there was less demand for them when compared to, say, dussacks or messers.



So with this in mind, how would the later medieval times fortify a smaller village (maybe ~200 civilians) that occupies a strategic location (in this case, at the edge of the frontier at a natural choke-point for the local tribes) but without any significant known threat? It's a militaristic civilization, so they have more of a standing army than most, but the tribes in the frontier aren't particularly known for raiding civilization since they're more hunter-gatherer/amazon tribe level as opposed to the Germanic tribes that the Romans fought against. Would they even really bother? I'm thinking this is a punishment post for those that can't just be dismissed for whatever reason. If it matters, it's most of a day's trip to the nearest significant city has a large military presence.

My current thoughts are a palisade wall with a gate and a standing garrison of about 25 soldiers who conduct squad-size patrols (8-10 soldiers) out to the local farms periodically. There'd be a signal beacon chain (or someone with a consumable stone of sending, as there is magic) to signal for backup in case of anything major.

Thanks for those that responded by the way

If you want a really in depth look on how this would work when two large, modern (for the time period) kingdoms clash, look at Hungarian-Ottoman frontier, it falls right into your period.

And the quick answer is, you don't.

There are far too many villages to defend all of them with stable garrison, so only thing they can have is the local militia, that will be under-equipped and under-trained. Only thing they have money for are palisades, maybe a stone wall (a wall as in 2 meters high and maybe half a meter thick) and a moat if they're really dedicated. These are not there to really repel raiding parties, they are there to make raiding parties 'tax' your village instead of burning it to the ground (expect three to six taxes... yes, there are only 2 sides in this war, why do you ask?). If defenses like that get attacked by as little as 50 soldiers, they will crumble, unless the defenders are really desperate, and will likely fail even then.

The actual strong points are fortresses and cities - these both have enough money and therefore manpower and gear to field small contingents (about a hundred, though it can be bigger if it's an important city or fortress). If a raiding party is spotted, village sends messengers to them, and they set out in a counterattack.


https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ac/Fortress_Belgrade.jpg

As close as it gets to Minas Tirith IRL, picture from 16th c., it stopped Ottoman advance cold when it repelled a major siege three years after the fall of Constantinople. When it fell to the Ottomans in 1521, major bricks were shat by pretty much all of Europe.


If something bigger than a raiding party is spotted, fortresses and cities have one purpose and one purpose only - hold out long enough for the royal army to mobilize and counterattack. If this works, the attackers are in for a world of hurt, but if the royal army decides to sit this one out, the defenders are boned.


http://sacr3-files.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/_processed_/csm_Trenciansky%2520hrad_c9f941254b.jpg

Ottomans got to it once and decided to go home rather than siege the damn thing. Váh river marshes under it are not visible, mostly because they don't exist any more, not after the river was regulated by series of hydroelectric powerplants starting in 1950s.


For the villages themselves, it's far better to run and hide - mountains are great for this, as are marshes or any other hard terrain. Raiding party can't stick around and loot for too long on the account of the aforementioned cities with garrisons on the way, so if they can wait them out, they're set. Hiding your posessions (bury them in the ground or take them with you) is standard practice, and a major source for archeaological finds today.

With that, there's one thing that is characteristic of Hungary, or rather to modern-day Slovakia which used to be what was left of Hungary after Mohacs. Villages practically always built observation towers made of wood, sometimes with stone foundation, on tops of nearby hills to spot incoming raiding parities. These towers, called hláska (pl. hlásky) or vartovka (pl. vartovky), had a bell that was tolled when the raiders were coming, and since almost every village had them, they were capable of sending a signal and therefore request for reinforcements really damn quick.


http://www.svetokolonas.sk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/5-600x400.jpg


Edit: I apparently make a lot of typos in Slovak names when writing in English...

[wolflance]

Rarer, but some. Most nobles who fight would be knighted, at least after a little while. By the time they have a 'moderate' amount of experience, depending on rank. For princely level youngsters just riding around on the battlefield or getting in one fight is usually enough. Lower ranking nobles would have to do something a little more noteworthy like capture an enemy or kill somebody in battle. Think of it about like getting a 'bronze star' in a modern army.

More common for the gendarmes etc. is that they are knighted but not nobles.

G
I was thinking about early Renaissance French Gendarmes when I ask that question. I may be wrong, but aren't most of them nobles, but worked under professional state employment instead on feudal obligation, and they were generally not knighted?


Looking at this armor for gunners, I am forced to ask how the shoulder armor interfered with their use of the musket.

I've done a lot of shooting, and I can't see how you'd get a good firing position, a nice cup in the shoulder for the butt of the gun or a good stock weld with that kind of breastplate on. Did they hold and aim the weapons differently, or modify the armor to accept the gun butt in the right shoulder or what?
Plate armor definitely interferes with musket shooting, since the curved surface of breastplate is designed so things will glance off away from its surface. Unfortunately, that also makes musket butt slides off.

Musketeers at Jamestown modified their breastplates to include a "musket butt rest".

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1WwQkeDuXs


One thing IIRC is basically always present when a dynasty falls is a period of weak monsoons leading to poor harvests. And when it hits, it gets bad over an enormous area effectively impacting the whole realm. Usually at these crisis points the population has grown enough that even marginal lands are in heavy use and there's almost no safety margin in foodavailability (farming some of the more marignal areas demands quite a heavy labour investment). The various dynasties tended to expand to fill all the available space their technological level could support. So any shortfall rather quickly turns desperate. There's really no place to get more food even if such an idea would occur and the wast amounts needed makes for difficulties too.

The loss of the Mandate of Heaven is normally the claim made, and it is usually invoked at such times it "makes sense". All the peasants of the realm can sort of see it, you don't have to go around convincing people too much. It's not quite like when our current media and politicians cries catastrophy over everything yet if you check the fundamentals things are much sounder. What I'm trying to say it's going to be a fairly general agreement over the fact that it's not looking good. The circumstances need to be fairly right to make the claim stick.

With the economic foundation rocking all the smaller and wider cracks in the state show up. Outside invasions (they also suffer from the same weather related issues and so are more active), which may expose the unreadiness of an army that has grown bloated (it usually did) yet ineffective and e.g. soldiers are more farmers scraping by than anything else. Or other shocks to the system that would otherwise be endurable will topple the whole thing. Even the mismanagement can go on for quite some time as long as nothing is poking at the system. It won't be enough by itself.
Due to the sheer size of China, they were generally able to endure through/rebound from very nasty famine. The famine that caused the collapse of Ming was in part made worse by silver, although (I think) not in a way that most people would expect.

To make a very complicated and long story (oversimplify and overly) short, Ming recognition of silver as the circulating currency caused a lot of complications. People used to be able to pay their taxes with agriculture product, but now they had to pay in silver. So the farmers had to sell their agriculture products in the market, THEN pay the taxes. Since everyone harvest at the same season, the selling price was as bad as you'd expect due to overproduction. So, most of them went bankrupt/sold or lost their lands/forced into slavery/starved (basically, a deflation spiral in economic terms)...OR they started growing commercial plants (like cotton) that sell for a better price. For farmers from places that were unsuitable for growing cotton (i.e. Northwest China, guess where the rebellions originate?), well, tough luck for them.

(The situation was so bad, farmers often had to sell their wives just to gather enough silver to pay tax, even on a year of good harvest. In fact, good harvest means more overproduction/overstock, thus crops sell for even lower price, so farmers were doomed either way)

Since most of the agriculture products and silver had to pass through the marketplace before they went to the government (and vice versa), the merchants obviously grew richer by the day through price-scissoring. Instead of reinvest the silver to stimulate economy, the riches used the money to grab the lands of the poor (and use them to grow commercial plants for MOAR silver). So despite the massive inflow of New World silver, most silver did not circulate in the Ming economy. Thus, the people were piss poor, the government was piss poor, but the riches were filthy rich.

(At this point you don't need a degree in economics to see that this ain't gonna end pretty)

Obviously, more farmlands converted to grow commercial plants equal less farmlands to grow food, so China was already threading a dangerously thin line even on a good (harvest) day. Then the famine hit, and it hit ESPECIALLY HARD this time. Oh, and the Manchu cometh. So:

1) The poor were starving and unable to pay tax, so they rebelled.
2) The government was poor, didn't had the means to relieve the famine (no money to buy food + no food to buy with money, since the rebellion ORIGINATED from food-producing regions) and needed the money to fund the military to quell rebellion and resist Manchu invaders, but since they couldn't create silver out of thin air (or print money), they increased tax instead.
3) The troops were starving too, so they sold off their equipment for food, or simply defected/mutinied/surrendered to the Manchu/joined the rebellion, causing a sharp drop in combat capabilities.
4) The riches, wary of the unstable situation, began hoarding their silver (causing another/worsening deflation spiral), thus there were even less silver circulating for the poor to pay tax, and for the government to buy stuffs. (The dry out of Mexican mines, Japan went hikikomori, and capture of Malacca by the Dutch also added to the deflation problem, but even if the silver inflow continued, they all end up gather dust in the vault of some merchant anyway)
5) Deflation caused the shrinkage of productive force, so even LESS people were working the lands now. Thus the famine...famined harder.
6) The riches also used their wealth to gain political influence, to the point that they became untouchable even by the emperor. Attempts to tax them failed extremely hard.

The increased tax burden caused even more hardship to the people, so even more joined the rebellion (or started a new one when/if the previous one was crushed), so the government needed even more money to fund the military, so they increased tax again, and so on and so forth, the vicious cycle continued until Ming finally imploded.


TL;DR The Ming were chopping off their agricultural foundation for commercial-based economy (and silver), and then realized that people cannot stay alive by eating silver.

[LordEntrails]

Everyone knows that mounted archery was really awesome, the speed of the horse would add to the force of the arrow.

Would the same happen with an archer in a motorcycle?
To a point. Drag (the force acting against the velocity of the object) is squared to the object velocity. So the faster the object is going, the faster it slows down. part of why bows, crossbows, and firearms do not continue to get better range and "stopping power" every year.

[gkathellar]

@DerKomissar: Okay, the work you're going to be looking at was done by William Atwell. He published a series of articles on the idea in 1977, 1882, 1986, and twice in 1988, but the theory was eventually challenged and largely discarded. He wrote a more recent defense of his thesis in 2005, (this I actually have). I've not read any of it yet and cannot speak to its relative merits.

[Mike_G]

Plate armor definitely interferes with musket shooting, since the curved surface of breastplate is designed so things will glance off away from its surface. Unfortunately, that also makes musket butt slides off.

Musketeers at Jamestown modified their breastplates to include a "musket butt rest".

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1WwQkeDuXs



That's interesting.

I have wondered how armor affected shooting. It seems that the breastplate and shoulders like in the photo G sharedwould make the butt slide around and be hard to get a consistent sight picture, or control the stupid thing in recoil.

I had a similar issue when I shot a crossbow the first time, just because I wanted to seat the butt in my shoulder like a rifle, but they don't work that way. Just finding a consistent position for it took me forever.

Holding it under your arm would make it hard to aim and definitely hard to be accurate at long range. If we say that early muskets were just for short range volley fire I could but the underarm position, but if we want to say they were accurate at any distance, then I think you need a solid seat for the weapon, especially one that recoils.

[Galloglaich]

Yeah, I noticed that too.

First thought, the price on solids is from da Vinci diaries, and I don't know enough about Italian and Czech currencies stability at the time. I'd be very careful in converting them, because you tended to have rather rapid changes of silver content in certain periods.

As for the high price of swords, I think that's because these prices are usually taken from guild records in a city. Those 120 gr per sword are for a sword from a swordmaker who is rather well known in the area, and sets his prices accordingly. Cheaper stuff could be bought from his apprentices or from less famous craftsmen. Or you just bought a messer, since swords were often not allowed within city walls, meaning there was less demand for them when compared to, say, dussacks or messers.

Yeah but where was the price of 120 gr per sword? i saw '2 gr and up' .... where was the `120?

[Gnoman]

On the whole wants versus guns thing, I think I have something, and it's from watching Harry Potter. To put it simply, you can fence with them, and that extends to gunfire to a degree. See, the setting already states that swords see limited use. Only in the hands of mages, though, because many mages can use a sword to block gunfire jedi-style. Because magic. Add in that swords are really good at bypassing damage reduction, can deliver magics a bullet couldn't (the spell would dissipate too rapidly in a magazine, while a sword is basically connected to a human battery), that a lot of monsters are really good about forcing melee combat, that no mage has a non-magical sword, and that the rules of magic aren't typically tolerant of magical ranged weapons besides wands (the projectile won't carry the magic), and it makes some degree of sense.

Well, if you can do it with a sword, you can do it with a wand, and a wand is easier to carry. And if the other guy has a wand, you can try to block their blasts, like they do in Harry Potter. Of course, it's lower rate of fire means you have to prioritize what you can block if the enemy has a gun, because if you're facing an entire infantry squad, you can't just block every bullet, but on the other hand maybe one blast can deflect or shatter every bullet in a cone in front of you, essentially creating shrapnel and richochets and making the enemy scramble for cover (or killing them). Which balances the wand to the sword, because mages with swords are scary fast and can intercept multiple rounds in a way you can't with a wand. Then again, more mages know how to use wands than swords, because swords are a very specialized skill, and the mage who spends time learning fancy sword tricks has skipped learning some other things.

I'm going to be blunt here. This makes absolutely zero sense whatsoever the way you are describing it. Being able to throw up a short-lived (several seconds) shield before somebody shoots you is plausible, although the timing would be difficult enough to balance anything else. Intercepting individual bullets? The human body just can't move that fast. Jedi can do it because they have a very limited ability to see the future, and can block shots before they are fired. Even then, the ranged weapons of the SW universe fire so slowly that the Jedi has the chance to reorient against the next shot. That doesn't work with normal firearms, as they put shots out too quickly - in the time it takes you to read this paragraph, a dozen or more rounds could have been fired from a single autopistol.

[Roxxy]

I'm going to be blunt here. This makes absolutely zero sense whatsoever the way you are describing it. Being able to throw up a short-lived (several seconds) shield before somebody shoots you is plausible, although the timing would be difficult enough to balance anything else. Intercepting individual bullets? The human body just can't move that fast. Jedi can do it because they have a very limited ability to see the future, and can block shots before they are fired. Even then, the ranged weapons of the SW universe fire so slowly that the Jedi has the chance to reorient against the next shot. That doesn't work with normal firearms, as they put shots out too quickly - in the time it takes you to read this paragraph, a dozen or more rounds could have been fired from a single autopistol.
Best I can think of is that the sword itself is capable of sensing and intercepting something before the mage actually thinks about it, and the sword itself can move the mage's arm. However, the sword is only as smart as the mage is. It can process an react faster, but it can only process things the mage has taught it to process, and react in the manners the mage has taught it.

So, the sword only knows what bullets look like because it's been told, and it can only react in ways the mage was practiced before. That's where skill and experience comes in. If the mage isn't trained, the sword has no idea what to do, and if the sword was taught by a different mage, it's anticipating a different body and isn't going to move as well.

This would also justify long, drawn out sword fights. IRL fights are usually pretty short. As Matt Easton says, parry, parry, someone's hit. Well, this sort of magic would be great for parrying, but not offense. The sword knows how to react to an attack, but not how to initiate one. That sort of conscious decision making is on the wielder. This favors defense, so fights last longer before someone's sword slips up. It might also make more sense to spam attacks, because you need volume to increase the chances of slipping past the automated defense, and if you leave yourself open, the sword can rapidly move to cover you. And this actually fits D&D mechanics perfectly. The sword knowing to block stuff is just a flat armor class bonus.

On the other hand, this magic may have other uses I don't like, so I really need to think on this.

[Roxxy]

Aaand we're really getting into magic, and way divorced from IRL, so this might not be the best thrread.

On to the value of soldiers' lives. This is from a modern American context, and I'm specifically comparing American soldiers to American civilians. Basically, commanders send troops to die. In the context of my setting, soldiers may be deployed on American soil to defend civilians from large forces of demons or undead. From what zombie movies I've watched, the military usually seems to abandon civilians to their fate or bomb thousands upon thousands of them. This just doesn't feel right, and I feel like military commanders would have a lot more willingness to lose soldiers to protect American lives, because that's part of being a soldier in a defensive war. At the same time, there needs to be a limit. If you end up with 250 dead out of a division and evacuate 25000 civilians in the process, it'd be hard to argue that wasn't a sensible sacrifice to make. If you lose 4000 dead and another 4000 seriously wounded, and only had 10000 troops to begin with, but you still rescued those 25000 civilians? That kind of casualty rate, you're combat ineffective, and what if the overall defense fails once the horde pushes again, because your division overextended to reach more civilians and got mauled, and can't keep holding its objectives? And you certainly wouldn't accept a severe risk of losing an entire division to rescue 250 encircled civilians. That's not even getting into bombing civilian filled cities to get at zombie hordes.

I'm wondering if there's typically any sort of doctrine or philosphical system that discusses these issues. Does the US Army have a general idea of how willing commanders should generally be to sacrifice soldiers for American civilians? Or do we likely operate how we do overseas, where protecting soldiers is more important than preventing civilian casualties, even if we do take reasonable efforts to avoid civilian casualties where it wouldn't risk soldiers' lives (Would we likely be more willing to risk soldiers dying to avoid collateral damage if those dead civilians were our own people?)?

[Vinyadan]

I think that maintaining a fighting force would be the priority. This may or may not mean that it's OK to sacrifice 50.000 soldiers to save 10.000 civilians. Those soldiers aren't in a vacuum: they are part of a wider tactical and strategic vision. If they have nothing else to be used for, you can spend them on saving civilians. But, if they are needed to protect a flank from an incoming assault, they need to stay combat capable. There is of course the matter of not wasting resources, so you would still have some reflection before sacrificing a unit that might be useful in the near future, but that would not cancel the need of rescue of the civilians, unless the situation was really dire and you could expect that every man will be necessary.
If they instead are all that can be foreseen to come in during the next days, then it's best if they create a cordon and defend it without expending too much, and, when necessary, retreat to a position that can protect both them and civilian escapees.

If they are all that is left, well, I have no ideas.

[Vinyadan]

About the destruction of cities: in movies I think it's done because there is the expectation that keeping the city alive will destroy the country. You know, start a naton wide plague, that sort of thing.
It's a bit hard to think of a real life equivalent. There currently are international law norms concerning the bombing of areas inhabited by civilians. Essentially, they say that it's only allowed if the target is actually military in nature, and that civilian victims should be in a number not exceeding proportions, and collateral damage, not the intended target. Besides the difficulty of interpreting and applying such norms, there's the fact that the situation you describe would be fully internal.

[gkathellar]

About the destruction of cities: in movies I think it's done because there is the expectation that keeping the city alive will destroy the country. You know, start a naton wide plague, that sort of thing.
It's a bit hard to think of a real life equivalent. There currently are international law norms concerning the bombing of areas inhabited by civilians. Essentially, they say that it's only allowed if the target is actually military in nature, and that civilian victims should be in a number not exceeding proportions, and collateral damage, not the intended target. Besides the difficulty of interpreting and applying such norms, there's the fact that the situation you describe would be fully internal.

It also bears noting that civilian populations, and control thereof, are typically sort of the point. This is the case both in a strictly logistical sense (civilians have productive capacity and can be recruited from), and in the sense that one of the main reason people wage wars is to control land and, most of the time, the people that live on it. It's also just generally far easier to conquer the place, as opposed to systematically hunting down thousands or tens of thousands of people, some of whom will fight back. Unless an aggressor is committed to actual genocide or Mongolian-style terror tactics, the city's civilian population will probably remain, damaged but intact. Even a regime that plans to exterminate a conquered population typically needs time and coordination to do so, if only because they need to set up shop and get the gas chambers/firing squads/horrific implements of mass murder in order.

As such, part of the reason you might fall back and leave civilians behind is because you expect to retake the territory in the future. It can even be an effort to spare the civilians from the burden of a drawn-out siege during which many of them will be killed. A defender might also take into account the brutality of the ensuing occupation, the odds that the aggressor will be able to recruit from the locals, and the likely costs of retaking the city at a later date. There are also PR questions - by demonstrating inability or unwillingness to defend a civilian population, a regime can sabotage itself with seemingly rational decisions. These sorts of decisions are made intrinsically complex by the circumstances in which they take place, such that it is never as simple as "who do I value more?"

tl;dr - I agree, the danger to civilian populations is often limited barring genocide or lolmongols.

[Tobtor]

Plague and economy

This subject was discussed a while back. I wanted to comment, but I was very busy and wanted to do a more proper/filling answer. Incidentally I was (among other thing) busy with an excavation which is sort of relevant to this discussion (more about that below). I now feel I have the time to write a response/opinion, and I hope you will allow me to bring up the subject again (though the military aspect is not that clear in the topic).

Mainly I am going to discuss the folloowing (from KarlMarx):


1. After the Black Death, in many European nations, peasants began gaining much greater control over their labor. The sudden rarity of common people made their labor a commodity in high demand, enabling many to begin working for their own benefit rather than those of feudal overlords. This freed many to move to cities, which rapidly became the focus of economic power rather than feudal estates.

and Gs post, specifically his conclusion:


And the Black Death did shake things up as well, of course, but probably caused as many problems as it alleviated.

I generally agree with G on this one. But to go bit deeper I think some things need to be pointed out:

• First I think KarlMarx point is one strongly supported by good research, HOWEVER this research is mainly English language research and have focussed on England (and slightly expanded the hypothesis to France I think). It is true we see some improvement in rights of the English peasants post-plague which is tied to the plague, but this does not mean it can be generalised to a European thing.

• The notion of "Peasants" as a single coherent class is in this respect problematic.

• Also I think we need to consider what "control" of labour means in this respect. Is it legal control (that is changes in the laws) or changes due to changes in the economy (surply and demand issues).

I want to follow up with a short discussion on how I see the peasant class and its basic units and what rights they can have.

1. First we have free peasants (they can have different names in different countries, in England it is the Yeomen-class).
2. They own their own land and the land is inherited by their children. These are the top class and usually have several privileges (which laws they abide to, what political powe rthey have etc). Some might of course be poor (for instance in maginal poor areas we have some poor freemen), but usually they are pretty well of. They have to pay certain taxes, but usually have few responsibilities to any lord: except the military one. In most countries they had to bring arms when summoned. This is the class we often think of as well armed etc. However way before the 14th century plagues and famines, they military duty was in many regions replaced by a tax (usually starting as a fine for not showing up that over time got so small that it was worth paying the fine every year).

3. Then we have farmers sitting on a farm on contract. We could call them "tennants".
4. They do not own the land they work on, but "rents" it from the king, a noble or (quite often) the church. Usually this is on lifelong contracts, but with the children free to do other things. The rent was often as a mix of resource and labour. In many countries they were NOT expected to do military service (usually they transfer of their obligation was transferred to the nobleman).

5. We also see a group (in some regions large in others small) of people sitting on a house (usually as tennants) with no real farming land attached. So they have to work as labourers for free peasants or noblemen.

6. The we have some people not owning a house, but working as servants for free farmers or a nobleman and living in their masters home (this was often temporary until you could get a house or farm by signing a contract with a noble).

There also existed various day labourers and travellers etc, who did odd jobs around farms/mansions, but their status is usually not well defined.

So when discussing the terms of peasants during the medieval period we need to be clear on which of these groups we are referring, but ALSO how the relative distribution among these groups developed. For instance we might consider an improvement (in the laws) for the tennant-group was a sign of more control of their labour (as KarlMarx suggest in his post), but if we at the same time see a reduction in yeomen-famers and increase in people not having direct access to land the average might actually be a reduction in control of labour.

We also need to consider if we are talking political, legal or economic power of the "peasants". For instance are they "asked" in matters of law and have political influence, are there other regulation that limits them, is there a social mobility etc.

So with that out of the way lets go look at the development during the medieval period, and especially the plague. This is where excavation I was on might serve as an example: we where excavating medieval houses from the 13th and early 14th century, but the hamlet didn't seem to continue. The area was in general "poor soil", and it is very common that the villages on the poorest soils was abandoned in relation to the plague. This was not so much because the plague


This freed many to move to cities, which rapidly became the focus of economic power rather than feudal estates. Cities produced much more portable wealth, enabling them to either higher mercenaries for their own armies (as in Italy and the German Free Cities) or pay for mercenaries in the royal armies (as in England).


As G points out the cities where already growing in importance, and was often more severely hit than the rural district. It did cause positions to open up in the cities (almost all crafts needed new, non plague-dead people to enter into the craft), but even more importantly, as the most of the peasants was in the "tenant" group only tied to the land by a contract, it meant that their children we instead sign a more favourable contract with another noble/church. This was usually on better soils and the resulting lack of people meant the nobles and the church couldn't get tenants for the farms on poor soils. It also meant that the nobles ended up worse of because the tenant could "shop around" for the best offer.

This is where Gs point about shaking things up becomes important: it clearly caused everything to be re-evaluated and a breakdown of how things usually was. BUT it did not lead universally to better rights for the tenant group of peasants.
On the Danish isle of Zealand for instance, the nobles where strong enough to impose a rule that meant that a minimum one child had to take over their parents obligations, thus tying the families down for generation and removing a good deal freedom to go to towns, change noble etc. So a political response to the economic better position of the peasants was to reduce their legal status.

Similar laws was passed in other regions of Europe, though in some they didn't (England, but also parts of Denmark) where the tenant class of peasants did indeed gain more control over their labour due to a shift in the supply/demand-situation. The plague certainly was a catalysator for political changes, but as always who comes out on top is down to a contextual situational thing, and a not as a result of a general law.

Another thing is the general power between cities and peasants. Many modern people tend to think of the past as a struggle between "commoners" on one side and nobles on the other side, but in fact many political struggles where already between city and countryside (rights to sell goods outside cities, could peasants trade directly to others etc).

At one point I think I disagree with G in all of this. He often describes the medieval period one where the peasants got more rights and was gaining political influence, but in most of northern Europe (Scandinavia but also most of northern Germany, Poland, England etc), this is only true on the surface.

For instance in Denmark around 1100-1200 the peasant assemblies (the thing) still have quite a lot of power (similar in other countries) and have to pass laws, elect kings etc. Also the "nobles" was judged by the same laws. When we reach 1400-1550 the nobles can only be judged by peers (other nobles), and can themselves judge their tenants to pay fines, get beatings etc, something unheard of in the earlier parts. At the same time the majority of the peasant class was of the "yeomen class" across Northern Europe in the 12th century, but when reaching the 15th it was a minority (maybe 15%), with tenants and landless growing in numbers. It is true that after the plague the tenants got some more rights, but one reason was that the rights of the free peasants had been undermined by a shift within the peasant classes.

So when the peasants in the late medieval period in many countries (including Denmark) got access to assemblies/palianments (sometimes with real influence, sometimes it only mean a place for discussion), it was a weaker form of power than they had had in the 1100. At the same time the cities had secured many rights which limited the peasant class (primarily trade and craftsmanship).

[Galloglaich]

Plague and economy

First off, excellent post Tobtor, you did a good job of outlining the nuances of this issue. I particularly appreciate this point:



• First I think KarlMarx point is one strongly supported by good research, HOWEVER this research is mainly English language research and have focussed on England (and slightly expanded the hypothesis to France I think). It is true we see some improvement in rights of the English peasants post-plague which is tied to the plague, but this does not mean it can be generalised to a European thing.

This is BY FAR the biggest problem for getting people in the English-speaking world to understand just about everything and anything about the Middle Ages. Almost everything we learn in school (up to the postgraduate level) comes from English Language sources, with a few French and scattered others filtered through English, and is mostly about and to do with England.

But here is the problem with that. The rise and heydey of England was after the Middle Ages. England had a tough time in the medieval period. They were invaded and conquered by the Vikings - their first true King being Canute the Great who you seldom hear about, then they were conquered again by the Normans. Though they did found two of Europe's most important Universities (Oxford and Cambridge), had a couple of strong Kings (notably Richard Lionheart) and managed to cause a lot of problems for France, they really didn't have much to do with the rise of civilization in this period or with the Renaissance.

The heydey of England was in the Early Modern period. The time of Queen Elizabeth, Francis Drake and Shakespeare. The time of the opening up of the sea lanes to the New World and the Pacific Rim, and the establishment of the East India Company. This is when the Kingdom of England came into it's own and began it's seemingly inexorable rise to become a world power. This is when they started to generate culture and technology.

But in the Middle Ages the epicenter of civilization was elsewhere - it was centered in the Mediterranean, in the Adriatic. Down the Rhine and into the Low Countries, and in the Baltic and the foothills of the Alps and the Apennines. In Italy and Flanders, Catalonia, Bohemia, Swabia and Alsace, and in the Rhennish towns and the Hanseatic towns of the Baltic and North Sea.

Sadly, these places tend to be dismissed as "not English" by English academics, and as 'ferners' in American pop culture and such is the power and influence of Anglo-American media that this then has enormous influence even in the countries where all this interesting stuff did happen.

So particularly in the popular culture, including genre films and shows, computer games and all-too-influential RPG's, we tend to generalize about all things medieval, really all things pre-industrial, by seeing everything through an English filter and by extrapolating specific conditions in England to those all over Europe.



At one point I think I disagree with G in all of this. He often describes the medieval period one where the peasants got more rights and was gaining political influence, but in most of northern Europe (Scandinavia but also most of northern Germany, Poland, England etc), this is only true on the surface.

...

So when the peasants in the late medieval period in many countries (including Denmark) got access to assemblies/parlianments (sometimes with real influence, sometimes it only mean a place for discussion), it was a weaker form of power than they had had in the 1100. At the same time the cities had secured many rights which limited the peasant class (primarily trade and craftsmanship).

And this brings me to another problem. Within Continental Europe, more educated people in each of the various interesting countries around Europe tend to, understandably, to know a lot more about their own country than they do about others around them. They tend to extrapolate data from their part of the world to all others. To generalize the local to the universal.

We have to remember the past is a foreign country and we must endeavor not to offend the locals.

This is a sin i commit myself. So when I say very generally speaking (though I don't always use that caveat) that conditions for commoners, and including peasants, did improve generally speaking in the High to Late middle ages, I am committing a Sin. I do think that is a true statement, so long as you use the caveat, but it's also a dangerous thing to do. It's very hard to generalize about anything in the middle ages because it's such a variegated time. A lot of very different things going on simultaneously.


But I can speak a little bit to this specific issue and since we are here already here goes.

Ostsiedlung

So German historians have a word, which being German is a bit of a mouthful (to be honest I don't even know how to pronounce it) but being German, it's also pretty efficient and useful.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostsiedlung

It describes what has been called a 'folk movement' Eastward which took place in the High to Late Middle Ages. Like many medieval events it tends to be overgeneralized but the gist is this. Thinly populated areas East of the Elbe, and / or poorly developed areas (without much efficient farming and few urban centers) either actively recruited or were targeted by settlers, Crusaders, and skilled laborers who came in from German and Flemish speaking areas (as well as some French, Italian, even English and Scots-speaking) and settled in unpopulated areas.

This happened several times on different scales. For example after the big Mongol invasions in 1241. Some large areas had been depopulated, with many or most of the people either killed, run out due to starvation from burned crops etc., enslaved or just fled in panic.

Without getting too far down into the weeds, the Ostsiedlung, which went on from the 11th through the 15th Century, was associated with the granting of rights to lure more settlers. So for example, in land they controlled the Teutonic Knights put thousands of villages under Kulm Law, a variant of local German town law. This granted peasants the same rights as citizens, at least in theory, and for many of them it meant an improvement in conditions. In most places, certainly not everywhere but generally speaking in Poland for example, these rights were also granted to the local Slavs and Baltic people who were already there.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kulm_law

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_town_law

This was part of a general economic trend toward less active management of estates, the switch from corvee to cash rent (which had mixed affects on peasants to be sure) and looser control which generally led to a rising prosperity. Immigrants from Latinized zones in particular were more trusted to produce and pay their taxes. The gist is basically that 20% of $1000 is still more than twice of 100% of $100. if that makes sense.

The Free Cities
I don't know that much about the Danish history, but from what I gather, Denmark was not one of the places where they had a lot of Free Cities. I'm not even if they had the Royal City designation or not. But elsewhere in the Northern fringe of Europe this was quite common. Lübeck and Hamburg being probably the closest such neighbors to Denmark, were immensely powerful Free Cities which made their own foreign policy and got into various conflicts with robber knights, with regional princes and prince prelates, as well as neighboring Kingdoms including Denmark and sometimes with unruly peasants too.

Very generally speaking, towns in the period roughly 1100 - 1470 tended to extend at least some of their town rights to peasants living near the town, especially those in the Feldmark or the zone of territory that the town controlled. This was not always the case. In the Baltic for example some of the towns treated Estonians as subjects and didn't grant them rights. In medieval Switzerland Zurich usually considered neighboring peasants as sort of nominal citizens while more aristocratic leaning Berne treated her local peasants as subjects. But usually they granted some town rights because peasants were often military allies and provided the labor pool from which apprentices were recruited and cottage industries linked to the towns were closely integrated.

Labor pool was an issue because towns usually had a much lower birth rate than the countryside (something like 3.5 kids with at least one child typically dying) so they needed people to repopulate them, doubly so after famines, outbreaks of plague, or costly wars. This could also be the cause of wars, I know for a fact Bremen and Hamburg both went to war over the issue of nobles trying to take peasants back to their estates who had moved to town (in one case resulting in a terrible defeat for Bremen).

Warlike Peasants
Heavily armed peasants living in zones with somewhat difficult territory were often able to remain essentially Free Tribes much as they had been before Christianity.

In Sweden, when the Danish monarchy under the Kalmar Union (a treaty orchestrated by a mighty Danish queen in 1397 which put the Danish King in charge of Sweden and Norway, technically) attempted to assert the kind of strict and demeaning Feudalism which (as Tobtor described) they had imposed on Zealand, in many cases the Swedish peasants fought back. So when they felt like their rights were being trampled in the 1430's they went to war and ultimately won their seat in Parliament.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engelbrekt_rebellion

This did grant them substantial breathing room, if only because the local nobles weren't strong enough to muscle them into serfdom, though of course that did change for the worse in later centuries during the Early Modern period. But many things changed in the Early Modern period as I've often pointed out.

Another neighbor to Denmark is the Dithmarschen. They were not unique but were a good example of peasants that lived in the marshland between what is today. They were so tough that neither the local princes, the King of Denmark, nor the Free Cities like Hamburg could handle them. Ultimately the Hanseatic League made them a member (the only non City member other than the Teutonic Order) and Hamburg hired them to be their 'coast guard'.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dithmarschen

You also had many other local zones where Saxon, Frisian and other German, Nordic and Slavic tribes (Mecklenburg, now part of Germany, was a Slavic region in the middle ages) peasants had their own little mini-republics.

In Poland a big part of the wealthier peasantry (what the Germans called Bauer or what the English called Yeomanry) was already merging into what the Poles called the Szlachta. These were heavily armed gentry, and peasants to be blunt about it, who comprised much of the military in Poland and used that fact to squeeze remarkable concessions from the Polish King, amounting to near total freedom. As Tobtor noted, the rise of one part of the peasantry sometimes coincided with the decline of the rest, and this did happen in Poland too, but it's quite complicated (has to do with Poland merging with Lithuania and taking on many Ukranians of the Greek Orthodox religion) and it was basically a post-medieval phenomenon.

Finally in Lithuania itself you had the Samogitians, a ferocious Baltic people who lived in a dense forest in what is now Lithuania. They were able to resist 200+ years of Crusades by the Teutonic Knights, and sometimes by the Grand Duke of Lithuania himself, and were ultimately so difficult to 'tame' that they were granted their own self-government which lasted well into the 18th Century.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samogitia#History

So I think you can say, within the vicinity of Denmark, you can indeed find many areas where the peasants conditions were improving through most of the middle ages. You did start to see some changes in some areas already by the 1470's but this is a complex story.

And Tobtor is 100% correct to point out that simultaneous to this, you had other areas in the same region where conditions were getting worse. I've mentioned the Estonians who were horribly treated all through the Middle Ages. Norway was also I would say very generally, going through a bad time in most of the Middle Ages, and increasingly falling under foreign rule, and many German speaking regions notably Brandenburg began to fall under stricter control of their prince, including the imposition of some humiliating Feudal practices.

After the Middle Ages the general trend toward greater freedom that I was describing began to reverse itself - led by the increasingly powerful Duchy of Muscovy, and by the 17th Century you had what has been called the 'Second Serfdom' starting to take place.

Hope this helps! have a nice weekend everyone!

G

P.S. Tobtor I also owe you a reply on the notion of urban poor, but this is a long post already.

[Galloglaich]

An example of how towns used to extend their zone of influence beyond the Feldmark was by granting citizenship to other entities or estates in the neighborhood.

One version of this common in Swabia, parts of Bavaria and in the Swiss zone was called 'Burgrecht'. Basically the town would grant citizenship to some other person or place - a village, a friendly knight, an abbey or convent, or sometimes even a mercenary captain. This meant that the person or entity in question was treated as if they were a citizen of the town - and put them under the towns retaliation policy if someone hurt, captured or killed them. Or besieged them, say. The town would respond with the standard 'eye for an eye' policy that they used if one of their citizens was molested.

Knights and other armed people would provide military service in return. Peasants and villagers would provide troops in emergencies, and also more routinely assistance in building and maintaining city walls and small castles owned by the town. Monasteries would provide some food and money. In return in addition to military support the Burgerecht gave them the right to retreat within the town walls during times of war.

For powerful cities like Zurich, or Augsburg or Ulm, this could be a big deal. I wrote an essay about an incident in Strasbourg in the 1440's where they were fighting with the King of France and they let 4,000 peasants come into the town walls for the better part of 6 months before the French army retreated.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgrecht

G

[Martin Greywolf]

Yeah but where was the price of 120 gr per sword? i saw '2 gr and up' .... where was the `120?

It has a price of 2 kopy gr, and 1 kopa == 60 gr, therefore 2 kopy == 120 gr. Kopa translates as pile or heap, and was supposed to be the amount of coins you needed to get 1 mark of pure silver. In practice, the actual amount of silver varied, so you could need as many as 200 gr to get 1 marka, but kopa always meant 60 at this point. It was sometimes used for non-monetary counting, even.

And yes, this makes it super easy to trip up in any sort of calculation when you have a pricelist that uses both gr and kop gr.

[rrgg]

Getting back to the subject of whether knights would deliberately choose to be a musketeer or arquebusier. The three musketeers aside, one curious attitude I've come across is that even writers who stress the importance of firearms and credit them with causing the most death on modern battlefields still consider the pike to be the most "honorable" weapon and the most fit for gentlemen. William Garrard ideally wanted all of the largest and strongest men to be made pikemen and smaller, more nimble men be given firearms, though some writers mention that at least musketeers need to be strong as well if not arquebusiers. Humphrey Barwick, who began his career as an arquebusier himself, wrote that seeing a man of noble birth become a musketeer or arquebusier was about as likely as seeing one become a trench master or fortifier. Instead he felt nobelmen were more fit to fight with a pike, halberd, lance, mace, or pistol. La Noue similarly though that the arquebus should be given to young recruits while older, more experienced troops should be given pikes.

[Galloglaich]

It has a price of 2 kopy gr, and 1 kopa == 60 gr, therefore 2 kopy == 120 gr. Kopa translates as pile or heap, and was supposed to be the amount of coins you needed to get 1 mark of pure silver. In practice, the actual amount of silver varied, so you could need as many as 200 gr to get 1 marka, but kopa always meant 60 at this point. It was sometimes used for non-monetary counting, even.

And yes, this makes it super easy to trip up in any sort of calculation when you have a pricelist that uses both gr and kop gr.

Sorry, I made a typo there which further confused the issue. You wrote originally:

"sword = 20 kop gr and higher" and then went on about how much that was. It was indeed, a huge amount. The source though doesn't say 20 Kop gr it says 2.

My sources on a grivina or a hrivina are that it is roughly equal to a mark most of the time, at least in the 15th Century. It was a bullion value which translated to an 8 or 12 ounce bar of silver, or the equivalent in fur pelts, so the value on a given day could fluctuate quite a bit.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1f/%D0%93%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0_%28%D0%B4%D1% 80%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%81 %D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F%29.jpg/640px-%D0%93%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0_%28%D0%B4%D1% 80%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%81 %D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F%29.jpg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grivna

But the price of a sword was nowhere near the price of a house or a suit of armor, which was the original issue at a hand.

My point = Swords were easily affordable to ordinary peasants, artisans and other commoners by the High let alone the late middle ages. Armor, though much more expensive than swords, was also clearly affordable to the wealthier peasants and most artisans.

G

[Storm Bringer]

Getting back to the subject of whether knights would deliberately choose to be a musketeer or arquebusier. The three musketeers aside, one curious attitude I've come across is that even writers who stress the importance of firearms and credit them with causing the most death on modern battlefields still consider the pike to be the most "honorable" weapon and the most fit for gentlemen. William Garrard ideally wanted all of the largest and strongest men to be made pikemen and smaller, more nimble men be given firearms, though some writers mention that at least musketeers need to be strong as well if not arquebusiers. Humphrey Barwick, who began his career as an arquebusier himself, wrote that seeing a man of noble birth become a musketeer or arquebusier was about as likely as seeing one become a trench master or fortifier. Instead he felt nobelmen were more fit to fight with a pike, halberd, lance, mace, or pistol. La Noue similarly though that the arquebus should be given to young recruits while older, more experienced troops should be given pikes.

Its worth noting that while the Musketeers of the Guard were elite troops, they were still the junior division of the maison militaire du roi (Royal Military Household, the Kings personal troops and guards), below the Swiss foot guards, the French foot guards, the Hundred Swiss, the assorted Guard cavalry companies, and the Body Guard (not all of these existed at the same time, there were quite a few companies of Guards that were formed for some historical reason and then disbanded again in for budgetary reasons a few decades later).


I think the emphasis on "Gentlemen" for the pike might have roots in a entirely practical matter, that of upbringing. specifically, in a time when the food supply was often interrupted, it might be the case that that the gentle man (ie someone rich enough not he doesn't have to work), having have a more stable diet throughout their childhood, might be significantly better developed that some peasant eking out a living at subsistence level.

on top of that, if we buy into the assumption that gentlemen were braver (or at least more willing to risk themselves for the cause, compared to a conscripted farmer), then It makes sense to put them in the more fearful and stressful position of closing to arms reach of an enemy and trying to stab him before he stabs you.

[LordEntrails]

Getting back to the subject of whether knights would deliberately choose to be a musketeer or arquebusier. .... La Noue similarly though that the arquebus should be given to young recruits while older, more experienced troops should be given pikes.



I think the emphasis on "Gentlemen" for the pike might have roots in a entirely practical matter, that of upbringing. specifically,... It makes sense to put them in the more fearful and stressful position of closing to arms reach of an enemy and trying to stab him before he stabs you.
Interesting and valid ideas. But I think pride and preconceptions may have just been as powerful motivators for these justifications. Now, I don't have anything but impressions and poor comparisons but consider;

There is an opinion that European nobility often has felt that certain tasks and positions are more honorable, more prestigious, and more worthy of their efforts than others. We also know that many times various groups put forth justifications for beliefs of superiority or inferiority of groups of people they don't associate. Think of any prejudice in history or current and the attempts to justify those views with "commonsense", "facts" or "science" that history has now shown us to be simple bias.

Now, I'm not totally pessimistic, and I suspect that the reasons given by others do play a part. But, I think prejudice and all its related aspects also play a part as well.

[Blackhawk748]

Simple question i dont really expect an answer to: Can anyone tell me how much a chariot would weigh on average?

To assist in the answer heres the three chariots im looking at:

Celtic
Egyptian
Hittite

If theres no official weight thats fine, solid estimates will be appreciated.

[Berenger]

German Wikipedia gives 24 kg for an egyption chariot in a florentine museum but gives neither a citation nor a picture or description of the exact type and age of the chariot.

[Blackhawk748]

German Wikipedia gives 24 kg for an egyption chariot in a florentine museum but gives neither a citation nor a picture or description of the exact type and age of the chariot.

That seems really light. Like, too light.

[Berenger]

I googled I bit and I think it's "Chariot - New Kingdom - 18th Dynasty - 15th century BC."

http://www.museumsinflorence.com/musei/Museum_of_archaeology.html

[Max_Killjoy]

I googled I bit and I think it's "Chariot - New Kingdom - 18th Dynasty - 15th century BC."

http://www.museumsinflorence.com/musei/Museum_of_archaeology.html

IIRC, the Egyptians made their combat chariots impressively light-weight.

[Blackhawk748]

IIRC, the Egyptians made their combat chariots impressively light-weight.

Apparently. SO a Hittite chariot, which is larger and can fit an extra person could reasonably be said to weigh 100 lbs?

[Vinyadan]

It's an original Egyptian fast charriot, a "merkebet" in ancient Egyptian, used for hunting and battle. 24 kg sounds like a really low weight, but it is possible. https://books.google.de/books?id=zHJPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA138&lpg=PA138&dq=egyptian+chariot+kg&source=bl&ots=2a1E3l5k_z&sig=oii6UstaO8yyC7SlrGJkcxyyri0&hl=it&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiM4v7y3ZbXAhVKOJoKHcCiCicQ6AEIOzAF A modern replica weighed around 90 kg and was made in 2008.

Tutankamen's chariot weighs 34.1 kg.

[Brother Oni]

That seems really light. Like, too light.

You have to bear in mind that a war chariot isn't intended to carry more than 2-3 fully armed and armoured men with an extra load of javelins/assorted ammunition. A civilian wagon intended to carry cargo would be much more sturdily built and hence much heavier.

There's another reproduction of an Egyptian 2 man, 2 horse chariot that weighs less than 30kg in the Roemer und Pelizaeus Museum and I found a source from Decker 1986:42 which confirms that value of 24kg for that chariot in Florence (although it notes that some parts were omitted, so that chariot may be a bit lighter than it actually was).

I've found Chasing Chariots: Proceedings of the first international chariot conference (https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=zHJPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=weight+of+a+celtic+chariot&source=bl&ots=2a1E3l5lTF&sig=6K5b3Jm62jlXxz0QumlQSJPNQQc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiWsYuE3pbXAhUMwBQKHeqpA5kQ6AEIVTAJ#v=on epage&q=donkey&f=false), which is both full of practical information and frustratingly absent on broader technical details (they list the weights of the metal wheel rims, but not the weight of the chariot).
There's reference to a quadriga, a larger Roman era 4 horse chariot, in the August Kestner Museum in Hannover but my German isn't good enough to navigate their website.


Apparently. SO a Hittite chariot, which is larger and can fit an extra person could reasonably be said to weigh 100 lbs?

That sounds about right. A biga or Roman racing chariot weighs 25-30kg and is intended to carry 100kg of weight, so a 150lb man with 40lb worth of gear = 190lb, three of them makes 580lb. Assuming a linear increase in chariot weight to weight load (which is an under-estimation of the ratio), that would put a 3 man chariot at 145lbs.

[Blackhawk748]

It's an original Egyptian fast charriot, a "merkebet" in ancient Egyptian, used for hunting and battle. 24 kg sounds like a really low weight, but it is possible. https://books.google.de/books?id=zHJPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA138&lpg=PA138&dq=egyptian+chariot+kg&source=bl&ots=2a1E3l5k_z&sig=oii6UstaO8yyC7SlrGJkcxyyri0&hl=it&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiM4v7y3ZbXAhVKOJoKHcCiCicQ6AEIOzAF A modern replica weighed around 90 kg and was made in 2008.

Tutankamen's chariot weighs 34.1 kg.

Ok, that sounds far better. 90 kg sounds like a decent average to base stuff off of, thanks.


*more helpful stuff*

Thank you, this is very helpful.

[VoxRationis]

IIRC, the Egyptians made their combat chariots impressively light-weight.

An Egyptian chariot is basically a basket with wheels, right? Just a couple wooden parts and the rest of wicker?

[Storm Bringer]

An Egyptian chariot is basically a basket with wheels, right? Just a couple wooden parts and the rest of wicker?

IIRC, they used some funky process involving soaking wood in water to soften it, then bending it to the shape they wanted. the net effect is that the main frame of the chariot was a single, continuous piece of wood with no joints or other weak points that would need reinforcing, so the whole thing was really lightweight. I'm sure I have read somewhere of chariot teams picking up and carrying their chariots over bad terrain in one account,

our ancestors may have been low tech, but they were not stupid, or lacking in ideas,

[Martin Greywolf]

Sorry, I made a typo there which further confused the issue. You wrote originally:

"sword = 20 kop gr and higher" and then went on about how much that was. It was indeed, a huge amount. The source though doesn't say 20 Kop gr it says 2.

...

But the price of a sword was nowhere near the price of a house or a suit of armor, which was the original issue at a hand.

My point = Swords were easily affordable to ordinary peasants, artisans and other commoners by the High let alone the late middle ages. Armor, though much more expensive than swords, was also clearly affordable to the wealthier peasants and most artisans.

G

Oh, that's what was going on. Yeah, it's 2 kop, or 120 gros, 7 swords per house at a minimum. That's still a pretty price-y for a sword, but a lot more reasonable than 10 times the price. As for armor, I wouldn't really say it was much more expensive, the same pricelist has its cheapest armor, simple cuirass (prostý pancíř), listed at 4 kop gr, so twice that of a sword, with a Milanese one at double that amount.

This nicely fits with the common depiction of a simple soldier - gambeson, helmet and sometimes a cuirass.



My sources on a grivina or a hrivina are that it is roughly equal to a mark most of the time, at least in the 15th Century. It was a bullion value which translated to an 8 or 12 ounce bar of silver, or the equivalent in fur pelts, so the value on a given day could fluctuate quite a bit.


Hm, you hit on an interesting point there, although it's specific to eastern Europe. From what I've seen, marka and hrivna aren't almost the same thing, they are two different names for the same thing, hrivna being slavic and marka being germanic in origin. You do see them refer to different amounts of silver across time and places, but the difference is always relatively small, and I think it's more of a function of typical lack of international (or national, for that matter) standardization.

Period sources often use the two terms interchangeably, at least, especially after the post-mongol invasion, when German settlers were invited into the country and german became a frequently heard and written language in some cities (mining cities especially).

I would also not use the term buillon value, since there was no reliable way to tell how pure exactly the silver in it was, the official line was that 1 marka equals a certain weight of "pure" (as in, we did our best to process the ore, here it is) silver. One of the reasons why money changers were so tightly regulated was that there was not a lot that stopped them from melting the things, adding a bit of some other metal and remaking the bars themselves, but with lower purity.

If you did this, or any other form of currency falsification, Hungarian law executed you and your family to the third degree with a loss of all privileges and holdings at the minimum - a punishment almost equal to the one suffered by Felician Zah who attempted to assassinate a king and hacked off four fingers off of a queen in the attempt (and also killed sons of some other nobles). Since this required the royal authority to have teeth, the falsifiers started to crop up massively when that was not the case - to name but one case, a recent discovery of an entire workshop at Pusty Hrad near Zvolen almost certainly comes from Arpad interregnum.

To get to the point, the currency of Hungary was therefore referred to as good/bad or strong/weak based mostly on this, and foreign merchants and cities had little problem when it came to dealing in Hungary's own hrivna/marka. I'd say that is another clue that tells us that those two are in fact the same thing.

Edit: I cannot even handle multiplication right now.

[Galloglaich]

Oh, that's what was going on. Yeah, it's 2 kop, or 120 gros, 7 swords per house at a minimum. That's still a pretty price-y for a sword, but a lot more reasonable than 10 times the price. As for armor, I wouldn't really say it was much more expensive, the same pricelist has its cheapest armor, simple cuirass (prostý pancíř), listed at 4 kop gr, so twice that of a sword, with a Milanese one at double that amount.

This nicely fits with the common depiction of a simple soldier - gambeson, helmet and sometimes a cuirass.

You couldn't get a job as a solider, typically, with just a gambeson. Cuirass and helmet would be bare minimum. You could get a job as the assistant or servant (valeti) of a servant with just a gambeson of course.

I think the average price for a new sword in the Late Medieval period was somewhere between 1/4 mark to 2 marks.



Hm, you hit on an interesting point there, although it's specific to eastern Europe. (snip)

I would also not use the term buillon value, since there was no reliable way to tell how pure exactly the silver in it was, the official line was that 1 marka equals a certain weight of "pure" (as in, we did our best to process the ore, here it is) silver. One of the reasons why money changers were so tightly regulated was that there was not a lot that stopped them from melting the things, adding a bit of some other metal and remaking the bars themselves, but with lower purity.

Great post overall there. Couple of points.

I agree with you that currency manipulation was one of the most serious crimes. Another really simple way was just shaving coins, literally taking a sharp knife and shaving thin strips of metal off of the edges of the coins. It's one of the reasons why coins in the 19th and 20th Centuries sometimes had ridges or patterns on the rim.

However currency manipulation was done by both criminals and by political entities such as princes, bishops and free cities (and anyone with the right to mint coins).

There is a bigger picture story here though that bears touching on briefly. Like so many things in the medieval world it's a deep rabbit hole but I'll try to sketch out a basic overview.



There was a limited number of productive mines for precious metals in Europe by the end of the Carolingian era. Many of the old Roman era mines were played out.

Mining and metalworking technologies advanced very rapidly from the High to Late medieval periods.

There were severe international currency crises in Latinized Europe at least 3 times.

Each time this happened, there was a surge of technological improvements in mining and chemistry which revolutionized precious metals production.


The gist of the problem was that the single strongest economic / trade engine for Europe, the Silk Road, was an enormous hard currency drain. Within Europe cash money was used a lot less than people think in the middle ages. On the lower level, barter remained common through the High Middle Ages. In the middle class world, written records like letters of credit and IOU's were very common in lieux of currency. At the highest levels cash was used but so were bills of exchange and something like checks.

Banking and Credit
Cashless economy, almost like a slow-motion version of our modern system of credit and debit cards, was pioneered by the Knights Templar, and banks like the banks of St. George of Genoa and the The Bank of Venice in the 13th and 14th Century (and streamlined by the Monti di Pasci di Sienna, the Fuggers and Welsers of Augsburg, and the Medici in the 15th), to avoid having their money shipments robbed when going over the Alps. Instead they used letters of credit and managed their foreign branches much the way many Corporations do today.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_banking#Italian_bankers

Cash was used when people didn't trust each other - which was admittedly a lot, but it was some smaller portion of overall economic transactions.

The polities on the Silk Road however, in China, Persia, India and so on, were fairly ruthless in demanding hard cash for their most valuable products: silk and spices / pepper etc.. They did buy many goods from the West but those were traded for other goods of equivalent value, but the only they they would take for Silk or pepper was silver, copper or gold.

The Italians in particular made most of their money from trade down the Silk Road. And mysteriously, one way or another, (based on estimates by modern historians) something like half of the hard currency in Europe ended up in Italy every year, and from Italy disappeared into the coffers of the Chinese, Persians, Indians, Indonesians, Mamelukes, Ottomans and others far down the Silk Road.

Mining tech
In the early part of the High Medieval Europe, most mining wasn't done like today with deep underground tunnels and processing ore. It was done relatively shallow pits or tunnels near the surface (rarely more than 50' - 100' down) and done usually in hills, so that horizontal tunnels called adits could be dug to ventilate and drain the mines. The metals mined out of these mines were initially at least, for the most part relatively pure veins, as in the metal itself, not the ore.

Many of these veins were played out and the mines dug as deep as they could go before the air went bad or the mines filled with water.

When each of these currency crises hit, demand for precious metals suddenly surged past their already high value, and interest in mining resumed intensively. At the same time, new technology of things like water wheels gears, cam shafts, cam sliders, the archemedes screw and so on, were rapidly disseminating around Latinized Europe. These were applied to mining, without getting too deep into the details, which effectively by improving the abilities to pump water out, pump air in, and crush rock and so on, enabled mines to be dug much deeper. 150', 200', even 250' deep mines became much more common.

https://www.aditnow.co.uk/cache/Rammelsberg-Silver-Mine-User-Album/Rammelsberg-Silver-Mine-User-Album-70549.jpg

Alchemy
Simultaneously, revolutions in chemistry, called then alchemy, introduced many new chemical processes especially the distillation of strong acids, which allowed the rock and lesser metals like lead found in ore to be separated from the actual silver, copper and gold, and even allowed silver, copper and gold to be separated from each other as they sometimes occurred together.

This was, incidentally, the same method by which the purity of currency like coins or silver bars could be tested, with special acids such as Aqua Regia, Aqua Fortis etc.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_parting#Ancient_and_medieval_world

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nitric_acid

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aqua_regia

So for example big mines like the one at Kutna Hora in Bohemia which had declined sharply in output suddenly became wildly productive, leading to a kind of "gold rush" (silver rush) situation. You can see a fascinating depiction of this in Kutna Hora in this marvelous painting here:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/Silver_mine%2C_Kutna_Hora.jpg

In all 3 major currency crises, incidentally, this happened within 2-3 years.

This happened at a fortunate time for Bohemia, as it strengthened them economically since people loved the Prague groschen due to it's high quantity of silver, at the same time much of the rest of Europe was ganging up against them.

Currency manipulation
Meanwhile, kings routinely started cutting their hard currency as a way to "print money" kind of like the way the Federal Reserve Does today (and they did also make fiat currency in this way)

But as just once example, in the Baltic after the Teutonic Knights were defeated by the Poles in 1410, they forced the (basically German) Prussian cities under their control at that time to pay the enormous ransoms they owed the Polish King and Lithuanian Grand Duke to get their prisoners back. The towns resisted and the Danzig town-council had to be executed by the Knights in order to gain compliance.

Immediately after this however, the towns debased their currency substantially (with lead), for the purposes of paying the various feudal tithe or tax obligations they owed mostly to the Teutonic Knights and to hundreds of Church properties like Abbeys and Convents around Prussia and Livonia. Effectively they started paying about 10% of what they had previously paid, causing hardship for the church entities. Meanwhile they still used good (high purity) silver in their normal business transactions as part of the Hanseatic League.

This happened several times over the next few generations and became a standard way for the towns to shrug off financial pressure from princes or kings.

Copernicus, the astronomer, who was living in just such an entity, wrote a detailed treatise on currency devaluation which is a good way to get up to speed on all this if you want to.

Circling back to alchemy again, it was also a way to make fake currency. I'll do another post on that later there are some fascinating anecdotes from the period.

G

[Clistenes]

Getting back to the subject of whether knights would deliberately choose to be a musketeer or arquebusier. The three musketeers aside, one curious attitude I've come across is that even writers who stress the importance of firearms and credit them with causing the most death on modern battlefields still consider the pike to be the most "honorable" weapon and the most fit for gentlemen. William Garrard ideally wanted all of the largest and strongest men to be made pikemen and smaller, more nimble men be given firearms, though some writers mention that at least musketeers need to be strong as well if not arquebusiers. Humphrey Barwick, who began his career as an arquebusier himself, wrote that seeing a man of noble birth become a musketeer or arquebusier was about as likely as seeing one become a trench master or fortifier. Instead he felt nobelmen were more fit to fight with a pike, halberd, lance, mace, or pistol. La Noue similarly though that the arquebus should be given to young recruits while older, more experienced troops should be given pikes.

I have read about the transition from medieval armies to pike and shot blocks during the Renaissance. For a short period very important nobles would still lead their own private cavalry troops ("las Guardias Viejas", the Old Guard) as support to the royal tercios, but they felt sidelined and of little use, so they shifted to joining regular troops...

Low rank, low income nobles would just join a company like any other soldier. Rich nobles would start joining the retinue of a general as "aventureros", irregular soldiers outside the normal chain of command, and once they gained some experience their families might pull strings to get them a rank as captain, and they would recruit, arm and pay a company of their own. Ambrosio di Spinola, an italian banker, got promoter straight to the rank of general in exchange for recruiting, arming, training and paying an army on his own (but one of the reasons that promotion was approved was that his brother, an experienced officer, was expected to oversee him...).

Common soldiers prefered to become arquebussiers. It was perceived as a more adventurous, active, cooler role. Arquebussiers would run on the field, approach the enemy and do most damage, while pikemen would moved more slowly, had a less offensive role and had to withstand gun salvos and cavalry charges without moving...

However, it is true that swords and polearms were considered nobler weapons. Commanding officers usually wielded polearms, even while leading units of gunmen (both to defend themselves and to keep control of soldiers), bannermen would wear heavy armor and wield a sword in one hand, and the flag of the company in the other hand, and generals, maestres de campo and colonels would wield swords or polearms and fight with their retinues first in line in the pike block. The richest soldiers with the best armor would be put first in line in the pike block, and they had more options to get promoted...

It's not that guns were despised, quite the opposite, but the main role of an officer was to lead the soldiers and to give example by showing bravery, not to fight, and while a captain could give orders without trouble while holding a polearm in his hand, he couldn't do the same if he was busy aiming, shooting and reloading. And when they had to resort to close combat, the officers would give example engaging the enemy in front of their troops...

At the same time, knighthood lost its military meaning and became just an honorary rank.

EDIT: Also, arquebussiers required more agility, since they were expected to run towards the enemy, shoot and retreat back to the protection of the pikes when pressed back, while pikemen need more strength to use the pikes effectively.

[Misery Esquire]

Actually, while this discussion of the Pike & Shot age is going:

Did the early musketeers (fusiliers, etc) ever willingly engage in hand-to-hand fighting, pressing home the charge as their Napoleonic successors would, or was it left to the blocks of pike (& assorted polearms) and decreasingly extant swordsmen? (And those wacky Landsknechts.)

Trying to search mostly results in "Yes, of course musketeers fought in melee", which is fairly obvious because people without a gun will close and try to kill you, and you have to do something about that (run, fight or desperately reload...), but my curiousity is whether they ever chose to start the fight. The early options for a melee weapon seems to have been to bring along your own sword, or plug bayonets. With the change from matchlock to flintlock (a studier mechanism) and the socket bayonet I can see why the later soldiers would've been happier to temporarily treat their gun as a spear, but how much of a change was it really?

[Vinyadan]

There are some fun adventures of Thomas More and Erasmus with letters of credit. I think that the banker servicing Erasmus was called Maruffo or Meruffus, a Genoese family, although I never had heard of them before.

[No brains]

In terms of performance, how does a brigandine differ from a solid breastplate? My guesses are that a solid plate might be proportionally stronger in terms of weight, yet may be more expensive and harder to repair. I assume that in their own ways, they are equally labor-intensive to make, yet a solid plate requires more specialized knowledge.

[rrgg]

@clistenes

Thanks.

One other interesting possibility i've come across is that military treatises repeatedly stress the "honor" of being a pikeman Because carrying a gun was more popular and they wanted to shift that opinion. In the military thinking of the time the pike square was still the 'moral strength' of a battalion, ie if the pikemen broke then the shot nearby also broke and ran but if the pikemen held fast then the naked shot can seek safety with them and potentially rally if they start to waver. Thus battles were still won by quality pikemen even if shot were "the fury of the field". Normally officers like seargents and those guarding the ensigns would be carrying "short weapons" such as halberds, but writers specify that captains themselves should carry a pike, apparently as an example.

[Galloglaich]

So here is a little bit more about currency and mining.

First, a magnificent 16th Century book, De re metallica, by that fascinating Renaissance character Georgius Agricola, aka Georg Pawer or Georg Bauer.

His book is a fascinating, magisterial examination of mining in his day, and this wiki offers a very good breakdown of all the nuances and realities of Late medieval mining, and specifically gold and silver mining, as well as the role of things like water- (and human and animal) powered machines and alchemy, which i got into upthread, as well as the unique role of the independent and free-roaming mining guilds, which I didn't really get into. If you have any interest in this at all I recommend at least skimming the wiki.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_re_metallica

If you are really interested, you can find translations of this book into English on Amazon and elsewhere, including a very good translation by none other than US president Herbert Hoover.

This article on the Bergregal, or medieval Germanic mining laws, is also very interesting and worth a look

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mineral_rights_in_the_Holy_Roman_Empire

On Alchemy, a brief but tantalizing excerpt about another really interesting character from a bit earlier (15th Century) a female aristocrat named Barbara of Cillii

http://www.medievalists.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BarboraBellifortis-307x450.jpg
This is a depiction of Barbara from the contemporaneous war and alchemy (and black magic) manual, the Bellifortis of Conrad Keyser.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbara_of_Cilli

A powerful noblewoman, Barbara was initially perceived with some sympathy in Latin Europe as the young, pretty wife of the old Emperor appearing at the Council of Constance in 1409, where she made a good impression on the gathered nobles, burghers and Churchmen, in spite of the widespread dislike of her husband, Emperor Sigismund. Sigismund, perhaps warped by some rather harrowing experiences as a young man (including surviving the catastrophic Battle of Nicopolis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nicopolis) in 1396) was in his dotage an almost comically wicked figure by that time, kind of like a would-be version of "Emperor Palpatine" from Star Wars, perpetually hatching evil schemes though they didn't always pan out. He was notoriously cynical and devious, and made little attempt to hide it.

Barbara, who was educated and apparently quite intelligent, managed to live a somewhat separate life and built up some power for herself in Central Europe.

Later in life (after the Emperor's death) Barbara was persecuted by her enemies in the HRE, before being essentially saved by the King of Poland who put her under his protection and granted her a substantial estate. She continued to have many enemies however, led by the Hapsburgs, and an individual allied with them (John von Laaz) has left us a fascinating description of her allegedly criminal alchemical tricks:

She knew how to measure her replies with a woman’s subtilty. Before my eyes she took quicksilver, arsenic, and other things which she did not name. Out of these she made a powder, with which copper was dyed white. It stood the test of notching, but not the hammer. With this she has deceived many people.

Similarly I saw her strew heated copper with a powder, which penetrated it. The copper became as refined silver. But when it was melted it was copper once more as before. And she showed me many such deceitful tricks.

Another time she took Iron Saffron and Copper Calx and other Powders, mixed them, and cemented with them equal parts of Gold and Silver. Then the Metal had within and without the appearance of fine Gold. But when it was melted it lost the colour again. Therewith were many merchants duped by her.



This may very well have been made up, taken out of context or exaggerated to get her in trouble, precisely because the penalties for conterfeiting were so serious, but regardless it gives us some insight into alchemical practices of the time which were related to forgery and currency manipulation.

Barbara was not the only noblewoman to be accused of forgery and similar crimes. The 15th Century Danish noblewoman Brigitta Tott, who moved to Sweden where she was constantly being accused of mischief, was repeatedly accused of forging seals and using them to make fake documents, causing all kinds of trouble. Though she was put on trial, her powerful family protected her from any real consequences.

A little later I'll tell the story of the Giant Mountains and the great gnome which roamed it.

G

[PhoenixPhyre]

[I]
Similarly I saw her strew heated copper with a powder, which penetrated it. The copper became as refined silver. But when it was melted it was copper once more as before. And she showed me many such deceitful tricks.


This is probably the same trick we play in a introductory chemistry lab--take a penny (US pennies are a thin copper coating over zinc) and boil it in a zinc-containing solution. It forms a silver brass alloy. When you then heat that "silver" penny more, it becomes the familiar brassy brass color (looks like gold). I am amazed that they were able to purify so many different metals that well back then. Those alchemists knew a lot more than we give them credit for.

[Galloglaich]

This is probably the same trick we play in a introductory chemistry lab--take a penny (US pennies are a thin copper coating over zinc) and boil it in a zinc-containing solution. It forms a silver brass alloy. When you then heat that "silver" penny more, it becomes the familiar brassy brass color (looks like gold). I am amazed that they were able to purify so many different metals that well back then. Those alchemists knew a lot more than we give them credit for.

Thanks for posting, that's very interesting.

yes the big revolution in chemistry in medieval Europe was in the 13th Century mostly, with many anonymous publications like that of 'pseudo Geber' clearly outlining how to produce a surprisingly wide variety of chemicals, drugs and acids with basically every step in the lab process included like a modern recipe and also how to make all the equipment we find in a basic chemistry lab in the 20th Century - the alembic, the retort, and so on.

They still debate who this guy was and how he figured everything out though it's clear a lot of it comes from Muslim sources (like Al Jabir who he was claiming to be)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudo-Geber

[Knaight]

...and also how to make all the equipment we find in a basic chemistry lab in the 20th Century - the alembic, the retort, and so on.

Some of the equipment - even at the beginning of the 20th century a basic lab had more than that, some of which was newer. Sidearm flasks, various rubber seals, pipettes and burettes, etc. are all newer. That's without getting into the likes of IR and NMR, which cropped up heavily later in the 20th century.

[Galloglaich]

Some of the equipment - even at the beginning of the 20th century a basic lab had more than that, some of which was newer. Sidearm flasks, various rubber seals, pipettes and burettes, etc. are all newer. That's without getting into the likes of IR and NMR, which cropped up heavily later in the 20th century.

You are absolutely right - my bad, certainly no rubber, and most of the instruments would be far cruder and more simple. I just meant a 15th century alchemical lab would probably look surprisingly familiar in terms of the basic glassware and so on.

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-9T44KjBZkmY/UrzXigKbZ6I/AAAAAAAAAZ0/9B2dByG7Zp8/s1600/Frg67-blog.jpg

https://i.pinimg.com/564x/5f/2d/51/5f2d51c513604d2f933fe3ca84d47e0f.jpg

https://www.thenibble.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/geber-distillation-still-2-230.jpg

https://ka-perseus-images.s3.amazonaws.com/e3b43ecdee246bcb5a27bf19dee6f43207a7feff.jpg


We also know that some of their stranger experiments like Dianna's tree actually worked.

https://cdn.instructables.com/FT8/9JVR/HTZ3EVCO/FT89JVRHTZ3EVCO.MEDIUM.jpg

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diana%27s_Tree

not to mention all the pyrotechnic and gunpowder stuff etc., and all these mining chemicals i was mentioning. Alchemy could be used for fraudulent purposes but was also in many cases, totally legit.

[Galloglaich]

makes you wonder about some of the black magic grimoire's particularly the more far-out 15th Century ones which are mostly unpublished ;)

In war-manuals like the Bellifortis you have demon-summoning methods right alongside gunpowder formulas and cannon forging techniques.

At the very least it makes for some interesting game hooks

[Brother Oni]

The early options for a melee weapon seems to have been to bring along your own sword, or plug bayonets. With the change from matchlock to flintlock (a studier mechanism) and the socket bayonet I can see why the later soldiers would've been happier to temporarily treat their gun as a spear, but how much of a change was it really?

An alternative was to invert the musket and smack an attacker with the stock. While it sounds like an unwieldy weapon (and it was in the hands of the average musketeer) it could still inflict some serious damage (a typical ECW musket was around 57" long and weighed ~9lbs). There's been a bit of debate whether the Native American gunstock warclubs were a result of European influences or just a happenchance of convergent evolution of weapon design, but again it suggests that using a musket like a club isn't complete desperation.

A final word of warning from an ECW re-enactor that I talked to however - make sure the barrel still isn't blistering hot from shooting before you start using it as improvised club!

[Vinyadan]

The names in the page with different kinds of vases are quite readable.
Left to right, top to bottom:
Vaso doppio (e comun) l'anima? dei metalli = double vase to communicate the spirit of the metals
Orinale = chamberpot
Balia = water vase
Ovo physico = "physical egg"
Bozza (boccia) longa = long fat bottle
Capello = Hair
Storta = retort
Sazetto (sacetto) = ? (possibly "little bag")
Orinali = chamberpots
Recipiente = receiver
Tazza = cup
Bicchieri e ampolle = glasses and round-bottom flasks.

[fusilier]

An alternative was to invert the musket and smack an attacker with the stock. While it sounds like an unwieldy weapon (and it was in the hands of the average musketeer) it could still inflict some serious damage (a typical ECW musket was around 57" long and weighed ~9lbs). There's been a bit of debate whether the Native American gunstock warclubs were a result of European influences or just a happenchance of convergent evolution of weapon design, but again it suggests that using a musket like a club isn't complete desperation.

A final word of warning from an ECW re-enactor that I talked to however - make sure the barrel still isn't blistering hot from shooting before you start using it as improvised club!

This practice, of inverting the musket and swinging it like a club, is referred to as clubbed (or club) muskets. It was a common technique, imagery from as early as the 16th century shows it, and was still being used (and taught) well after the introduction of the bayonet.

It's probably easiest to research the practice during the English Civil War, due to its prevalence in English language sources and its popularity in reenacting.

[fusilier]

Actually, while this discussion of the Pike & Shot age is going:

Did the early musketeers (fusiliers, etc) ever willingly engage in hand-to-hand fighting, pressing home the charge as their Napoleonic successors would, or was it left to the blocks of pike (& assorted polearms) and decreasingly extant swordsmen? (And those wacky Landsknechts.)

Trying to search mostly results in "Yes, of course musketeers fought in melee", which is fairly obvious because people without a gun will close and try to kill you, and you have to do something about that (run, fight or desperately reload...), but my curiousity is whether they ever chose to start the fight. The early options for a melee weapon seems to have been to bring along your own sword, or plug bayonets. With the change from matchlock to flintlock (a studier mechanism) and the socket bayonet I can see why the later soldiers would've been happier to temporarily treat their gun as a spear, but how much of a change was it really?

They do seem to have willingly done so, generally speaking when the fighting got too close. On the open battlefield, there are reports of musketeers and arquebusiers throwing down their firearms and drawing swords. I also believe that skirmishers in the 16th century would sometimes lay into each other in hand-to-hand. Spanish skirmishers were known to carry the arquebus in the left hand (used to parry), while wielding the sword in the right hand.

However, I'm not really sure if it should be compared to a Napoleonic style charge -- the tactics were different. The sense I have is that it just happened when they got too close to the enemy, and rather than take time reloading they rushed into hand-to-hand. That said, storming parties could include a good number of arquebusiers or musketeers, depending upon the time period, and they definitely expected to engage in hand-to-hand combat.

Incanur can probably answer this question much better.

[Galloglaich]

The names in the page with different kinds of vases are quite readable.
Left to right, top to bottom:
Vaso doppio (e comun) l'anima? dei metalli = double vase to communicate the spirit of the metals
Orinale = chamberpot
Balia = water vase
Ovo physico = "physical egg"
Bozza (boccia) longa = long fat bottle
Capello = Hair
Storta = retort
Sazetto (sacetto) = ? (possibly "little bag")
Orinali = chamberpots
Recipiente = receiver
Tazza = cup
Bicchieri e ampolle = glasses and round-bottom flasks.


Here is a great article which gets into some of the reasons why medieval Alchemy was so misunderstood and maligned until fairly recently

https://www.ai-journal.com/articles/10.5334/ai.1508/

[fusilier]

Actually, while this discussion of the Pike & Shot age is going:

Did the early musketeers (fusiliers, etc) ever willingly engage in hand-to-hand fighting, pressing home the charge as their Napoleonic successors would, or was it left to the blocks of pike (& assorted polearms) and decreasingly extant swordsmen? (And those wacky Landsknechts.)

Here's a description of fighting at Breitenfeld (1631), by Lt Col. Muschamp who was with Scottish infantry fighting for the Swedish army:

". . . I suffered not my muskettiers to give their volleyes till I came within Pistoll-shot of the enemy, at which time I gave order to the first [three] rancks to discharge at once, and after them the other three: which done we fell pell mell into their ranckes, knocking them downe with the stocke of the Musket and our swords."

[snowblizz]

An alternative was to invert the musket and smack an attacker with the stock. While it sounds like an unwieldy weapon (and it was in the hands of the average musketeer) it could still inflict some serious damage (a typical ECW musket was around 57" long and weighed ~9lbs).


Actually, while this discussion of the Pike & Shot age is going:

Did the early musketeers (fusiliers, etc) ever willingly engage in hand-to-hand fighting, pressing home the charge as their Napoleonic successors would, or was it left to the blocks of pike (& assorted polearms) and decreasingly extant swordsmen? (And those wacky Landsknechts.)

Trying to search mostly results in "Yes, of course musketeers fought in melee", which is fairly obvious because people without a gun will close and try to kill you, and you have to do something about that (run, fight or desperately reload...), but my curiousity is whether they ever chose to start the fight. The early options for a melee weapon seems to have been to bring along your own sword, or plug bayonets. With the change from matchlock to flintlock (a studier mechanism) and the socket bayonet I can see why the later soldiers would've been happier to temporarily treat their gun as a spear, but how much of a change was it really?
Yes they did as Brother Oni says. It was relatively common for musketeers to fall in pell-mell* with their muskets as clubs, it was preferred over using a sword in many cases. They were rather massive solid things and having shocked the opponent with a salvo quite effective. You want to make sure you still ahve the musket later on so probably want to keep both hands on it.
I've read a number of accounts from the 30YW/ECW era*. However they did not press it home quite in the same way the Napoleonic troops did, since the latter had bayonets. In Napoleonic times it seems more a question of forcing a flight response, but earlier they really went at it duking it out for abit. I'd say a bayonet charge has a lot more in common with the advancing with pikes over attacking with the musket.
Musekteers were normally issued with a sword as a sidearm but as usual not everyone kept theirs (in good order), and it was usually preferred to keep hold of the musket anyway. I would broadly speaking say mostly musketeers in this way shocked other shot units, pike blocks being too large and solid to do so without your own pike block.


*"we fell on them pell-mell" is I believe how one soldier described it (and I see fusieler gave exactly one of the quotes I've run across)

Also, those whacky "Landsknechts" could be pikemen or arquebusiers, crossbowmen or the fewer polearm/doublehanded armed guys. Really it's just a regional name for the early iteration of pike and shot.

[Kiero]

18th/19th century line infantry was essentially all-musketeer, where they substituted the pikemen with a bayonet for every man. Thus musketeers could become "pikemen" with a few moments work. Worth noting that the earlier variations carried a hanger or short sabre as well as bayonet (whether plug or socket), though I think it was more of a utility thing in terms of its actual use rather than the intent of outfitters of soldiers. As mentioned, when your primary weapon is already heavy and sturdy, there's probably little use in carrying it in your off hand to draw a hanger.

On the use of the bayonet, by the time infantry had ditched their armour, it seems no one wanted to be around when that part happened. Standard British tactics of the era were to give a volley, fix bayonets then charge. With the assumption that most enemies being charged would be gone by the time the British got there.

[Storm Bringer]

On the use of the bayonet, by the time infantry had ditched their armour, it seems no one wanted to be around when that part happened. Standard British tactics of the era were to give a volley, fix bayonets then charge. With the assumption that most enemies being charged would be gone by the time the British got there.

borne out by events, as it happens. I've seen a analysis of recorded bayonet charges, and I out of several hundred attacks, very few (like only 20-30) actually connected with a enemy attempting to resist. most either petered out before connecting, were driven off by fire, or the defenders broke and ran before getting stabbed.

[Vinyadan]

Apparently, there were occasions in which people actually took the time to count wounds by the kind. Dominique Jean Larrey was something of an innovator in this. After a fight where it had come to the bayonet, he counted 119 shot againt just 5 stabbed. Apparently, stabbing was more frequent in naval combat, with 12% of the wounded having been stabbed by bayonet.
http://www.napoleon-series.org/cgi-bin/forum/archive2013_config.pl?md=read;id=149184

[fusilier]

Apparently, there were occasions in which people actually took the time to count wounds by the kind. Dominique Jean Larrey was something of an innovator in this. After a fight where it had come to the bayonet, he counted 119 shot againt just 5 stabbed. Apparently, stabbing was more frequent in naval combat, with 12% of the wounded having been stabbed by bayonet.
http://www.napoleon-series.org/cgi-bin/forum/archive2013_config.pl?md=read;id=149184

There are similar studies for the American Civil War and they show a similar trend. The caveat applied to them is that they don't include those who died on the battlefield, as they were based on the field hospital returns. So it's possible they are biased -- the context of this discussion was the potential underreporting of casualties caused by artillery. It's possible bayonet wounds were more immediately fatal, and were underreported.

Nevertheless, I agree that most bayonet charges didn't result in hand-to-hand combat.

(I see if you read through the thread, the same issue is brought up).

[Mike_G]

Apparently, there were occasions in which people actually took the time to count wounds by the kind. Dominique Jean Larrey was something of an innovator in this. After a fight where it had come to the bayonet, he counted 119 shot againt just 5 stabbed. Apparently, stabbing was more frequent in naval combat, with 12% of the wounded having been stabbed by bayonet.
http://www.napoleon-series.org/cgi-bin/forum/archive2013_config.pl?md=read;id=149184

It's a lot harder to retreat in naval combat. You can only run so far on a ship, so I'm not surprised that more men actually got stabbed rather than chased off.

[Arenabait]

So, a bit of an unorthadox question, but how much would a ballista have weighed, especially during times with similar technology levels to D&D's Forgotten Realms?

http://alexisphoenix.org/imagesromania9/firstballista.jpg

[Vinyadan]

Your best bet is writing a mail to the guy who built the machine in the picture. http://wattsunique.com/blog/gallwey-carroballista/
I think a carroballista took two horses to draw, according to depictions.

[Vinyadan]

Does anyone know if the Cardinal's musketeers wore a different uniform from those of the kings, and how it looked like?

[Brother Oni]

So, a bit of an unorthadox question, but how much would a ballista have weighed, especially during times with similar technology levels to D&D's Forgotten Realms?

http://alexisphoenix.org/imagesromania9/firstballista.jpg

It's worth pointing out that a ballista was Roman Empire era tech and was regarded as obsolete by the Middle Ages, which is generally the technology level of most D&D settings.

I've seen values of ~200kg for a cheiroballista and other 'mid' sized non man portable ballistae, but as Vinyadan said, it's best to contact people who have made such replicas for an actual value.

[wolflance]

An alternative was to invert the musket and smack an attacker with the stock. While it sounds like an unwieldy weapon (and it was in the hands of the average musketeer) it could still inflict some serious damage (a typical ECW musket was around 57" long and weighed ~9lbs). There's been a bit of debate whether the Native American gunstock warclubs were a result of European influences or just a happenchance of convergent evolution of weapon design, but again it suggests that using a musket like a club isn't complete desperation.

A final word of warning from an ECW re-enactor that I talked to however - make sure the barrel still isn't blistering hot from shooting before you start using it as improvised club!
Makes me wonder why (modern) people are claiming that swords weighing over 3kg are either completely impractical or ceremonial/processional weapons, even though musketeers had been actively using heavier and less wieldy weapons and even preferred it over swords sometimes.


borne out by events, as it happens. I've seen a analysis of recorded bayonet charges, and I out of several hundred attacks, very few (like only 20-30) actually connected with a enemy attempting to resist. most either petered out before connecting, were driven off by fire, or the defenders broke and ran before getting stabbed.
One of the reasons to equip soldiers with armors is actually to give them enough confidence/sense of security to stand and fight back this kind of charge, hence the reason medieval/renaissance armies regularly faced even more devastating charge (by pikemen/armored heavy cavalry) yet they held ground and fight back just fine (most of the time).

Although often overlooked, the “morale boost" factor of armor is probably more important that the actual protective qualities of said armor.



It's worth pointing out that a ballista was Roman Empire era tech and was regarded as obsolete by the Middle Ages, which is generally the technology level of most D&D settings.

I've seen values of ~200kg for a cheiroballista and other 'mid' sized non man portable ballistae, but as Vinyadan said, it's best to contact people who have made such replicas for an actual value.
Roman ballista was actually more complex/sophisticated compared to later medieval springald, and performs better. It was a lot more "high tech", so to speak, than the medieval version, but that sophistication was probably also the reason why it got superseded.

Military men generally prefer simple, safe, robust, lightweight and reliable weapons over those with absolute best performance. So when mechanically simplier and cheaper crossbow/traction trebuchet came along and fulfilled all of the roles occupied by Roman ballista (even with slightly inferior performance), ballista became somewhat redundant/uneconomical.

Plus crossbow isn't necessarily weaker than a ballista anyway.

[fusilier]

Does anyone know if the Cardinal's musketeers wore a different uniform from those of the kings, and how it looked like?

According to this website they wore red:
http://musketeersmn.com/gpage3.html

That's usually how they are depicted in the movies, but I'm not really sure how much you can trust it.

[fusilier]

Does anyone know if the Cardinal's musketeers wore a different uniform from those of the kings, and how it looked like?

This website also says red, and provides a more detailed description:
http://www.lemondededartagnan.fr/SITE/ENG/mousquetaires_chap03.htm#

[gkathellar]

What do we actually know about historical flail technique? Are there extant manuals on its use?


Makes me wonder why (modern) people are claiming that swords weighing over 3kg are either completely impractical or ceremonial/processional weapons, even though musketeers had been actively using heavier and less wieldy weapons and even preferred it over swords sometimes.

For a club, the force of of a hit can be a direct function of the weapon's weight (subject to the stresses it puts on the wielder's ability to swing the weapon). There's a very clear reason to want a heavier cudgel.

A sword depends far more on agility than it does on weight. A 1kg sword, in general, can chop just as well as a 3kg sword, because realistically the edge and the strength of your arm do all of the work. In addition, the lighter sword will probably be far better in terms of defense, point control, etc. Sword work can also be very demanding on the wrists and fingers, so exhaustion and stress will be factors. For dao, I like to train with a heavier practice sword, but for serious fighting I'd want the lightest blade I could get without compromising the weapon's structural attributes.


Military men generally prefer simple, safe, robust, lightweight and reliable weapons over those with absolute best performance. So when mechanically simplier and cheaper crossbow/traction trebuchet came along and fulfilled all of the roles occupied by Roman ballista (even with slightly inferior performance), ballista became somewhat redundant/uneconomical.

So much of this. In a military setting, you can never count on optimal conditions. Your best tools will be the predictable ones that are practical to move, easy to fix, and stand up to abuse and repeat use.

[rs2excelsior]

Military men generally prefer simple, safe, robust, lightweight and reliable weapons over those with absolute best performance. So when mechanically simplier and cheaper crossbow/traction trebuchet came along and fulfilled all of the roles occupied by Roman ballista (even with slightly inferior performance), ballista became somewhat redundant/uneconomical.


So much of this. In a military setting, you can never count on optimal conditions. Your best tools will be the predictable ones that are practical to move, easy to fix, and stand up to abuse and repeat use.

Plus, if I understand correctly, many siege weapons in the medieval era were built on-site when you got to the enemy castle, rather than being built and then carried around from siege to siege (whereas Roman legions carried several ballistae with them on campaign). So being simple to construct would have also been a major plus in favor of the trebuchet.

[Galloglaich]

There is some stuff on flails, mainly the two-handed military type not the type you usually see in genre stuff, not much but for example Paulus Hector Meyer has some.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/27/Arte_De_Athletica_2b.jpg/520px-Arte_De_Athletica_2b.jpg

Medieval torsion artillery actually got very sophisticated in the 12th-13th century but two issues intervened to stall it out:

Crossbows got more and more powerful, notably the (typically composite prod) wall-crossbows started replacing torsion weapons because they outperformed them.

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/ed/23/1d/ed231d7048c950f60d7cbed06765af04--museum-frankfurt-crossbow.jpg

http://www.vikingsword.com/vb/attachment.php?attachmentid=120736&stc=1

by the time you get to "Forgotten Realms" level of tech, i.e. plate armor and so on, firearms and cannon start replacing most siege weapons. Instead of that ballista, you get stuff like this

http://www.histomin.com/linemma/mmaaccessories/mpma5x30.jpg

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/0e/70/08/0e70082858762ee43785f3024b8edaf8--medieval-weapons-th-century.jpg

https://www.blackgate.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/DSC_1695.jpg

And even demented stuff like this:

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/dc/65/a3/dc65a346bb7e3bf80243065dbe64a3da.jpg

G

[rs2excelsior]

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/dc/65/a3/dc65a346bb7e3bf80243065dbe64a3da.jpg

G

This thing is definitely gonna show up in an Orcish siege camp at some point. That is the single most orc-like piece of real world artillery I have ever seen :smallbiggrin:

[Galloglaich]

For a club, the force of of a hit can be a direct function of the weapon's weight (subject to the stresses it puts on the wielder's ability to swing the weapon). There's a very clear reason to want a heavier cudgel.

A sword depends far more on agility than it does on weight. A 1kg sword, in general, can chop just as well as a 3kg sword, because realistically the edge and the strength of your arm do all of the work. In addition, the lighter sword will probably be far better in terms of defense, point control, etc. Sword work can also be very demanding on the wrists and fingers, so exhaustion and stress will be factors. For dao, I like to train with a heavier practice sword, but for serious fighting I'd want the lightest blade I could get without compromising the weapon's structural attributes.


yes, this is super important. There is an incredibly persistent myth or trope of heavier = better for swords but that isn't how blades work.

Also two things:

1) Skilled vs. unskilled fighters. Musketters may know how to shoot but most will not have much training in hand-to-hand combat (Alexander Dumas notwithstanding) and they are probably pinning their hopes on one devastating attack.

2) Two of the basic things a skilled fencer or fighter will do effectively but unskilled will not is defend themselves with their weapon (something left out of most RPG's which don't have any way to parry - but it's real important in a sword fight) and do follow up attacks.

With something real unbalanced and heavy like a musket, you can get an attack off which can certainly kill if they don't void (dodge) or parry it, but your follow up may be pretty slow. with a sword you can parry, cut, parry again, and cut two more times in the same amount of time that it probably takes to swing a musket around a second time.

If you use the musket two-handed and train to compensate for it's limitations this can help a little, but you will still be at a disadvantage against a skilled opponent with a real hand-to-hand weapon.

Swordfights are fast if you know what you are doing. Not like game of thrones or something

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=esI1fIAHNgY

I think some musketeers may have preferred striking with their musket than their sword because it was bigger and because they weren't really trained for hand to hand fighting, as by the 17th or 18th century (etc.) you had a lot of guys who were sort of cannon fodder. Wouldn't belong to a fencing guild the way some 15th or early 16th century Landsknecht might.

This is probably why you will notice a lot of artwork showing elite mercenaries like Swiss Reislauffer walking around with longswords on their hip.

http://www.tforum.info/forum/uploads/post-1554-0-41969100-1360753498.jpg

The other thing is sidearms in the 17th-18th century were sometimes fairly flimsy weapons like sideswords or spadroons which probably couldn't parry a strike from a heavy object like a musket.

G

[Kiero]

A G alludes to, the period from the 17th to 19th century features the pendulum of quality v quantity of troops swinging back and forth several times. If your primary aim is to get as many men into the field as possible (as was the case in the Napoleonic era and again in the Franco-Prussian War for example), you don't care how good any individual is.

I do find the use of the musket in melee particular curious when the average soldier in this period wasn't short of melee options. For example, this is a British marine circa 1689:

https://i.pinimg.com/736x/78/c5/9d/78c59d61c52a36013702ca8902a11426--louis-xiv-armies.jpg

And this is a British grenadier circa 1704:

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/b8/a8/f9/b8a8f9d299d752723e6d313520ff3bf0.jpg

Note both men have a hanger and a plug bayonet - the latter is a perfectly serviceable fighting dagger when not attached to the musket. Or could function as a parrying/offhand weapon in combination with the hanger.

But many men preferred to use the big club that's also a gun instead.

[Galloglaich]

A G alludes to, the period from the 17th to 19th century features the pendulum of quality v quantity of troops swinging back and forth several times. If your primary aim is to get as many men into the field as possible (as was the case in the Napoleonic era and again in the Franco-Prussian War for example), you don't care how good any individual is.

I do find the use of the musket in melee particular curious when the average soldier in this period wasn't short of melee options. For example, this is a British marine circa 1689:

Note both men have a hanger and a plug bayonet - the latter is a perfectly serviceable fighting dagger when not attached to the musket. Or could function as a parrying/offhand weapon in combination with the hanger.

But many men preferred to use the big club that's also a gun instead.

Well reach is a big deal in any fight, especially if you aren't very skilled. So whatever the biggest weapon will probably have priority.

Also notice the flimsy swords, one looks like a smallsword and the other looks like a pretty light hanger.

I agree with you though if you knew what you were doing, bayonett in one hand and sword in the other would probably the most effective way to fight, but then what do you do with your musket? Not all of them even had a strap

[Storm Bringer]

I think G might have stumbled onto a overlooked but important reason for using a musket in melee, which was that it was already in your hands, and when there are dozens of angry people a few feet away, your not really going to mess about swapping that reassuringly heavy club in your hands for a sword.


plus, in every situation where we have what is described as a "melee", we have to remember that while the units might technically be in close combat with each other, in practice the fighters are going to be hovering just outside of striking distance, and darting in to make a quick strike before getting back out of reach. in such a situation it is quite possible that a musketeer could have enough room to keep on loading and firing his musket, in what Lindybiege nicknamed the musket jackpot (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFaVf3vVz6A)

[rrgg]

To add another example of early arquebusiers charging into melee, Blaise de Montluc described ordering his men to do just that in a skirmish against English Archers in the 1540s.


We marcht straight up to them, and so soon as they were come up within arrow shot, our Harquebuzeers gave their volley all at once, and then clapt their hands to their swords, as I had commanded, and we ran on to come to blows; but so soon as we came within two or three pikes length, they turn'd their backs with as great facility as any Nation that ever I saw,

It probably wasn't common for arquebusiers to charge headfirst into a well-formed pike square, but scattered hand-to-hand combat in skirmishes against other musketeers or other light infantry did occur from time to time. In the first half of the 16th century arquebusiers often still wore a shirt of mail or some light armor, although that did fall out fashion over time. It also wasn't uncommon for a troop of skirmishing shot to have some number of targeters or halberders mixed in with them to give the unit a bit more strength in case they came to hand-blows.

@the use of a musket as a club in melee

Matt Easton (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oM2cUbhJqGo) put out a video a while back where he suggests that clubbing with a musket when a bayonet was available was more of a secondary function. ie if the point of your bayonet is knocked off line then instead of trying to get it back in line you might step forward and go for a quick bash with the butt of the gun, although that doesn't really involve swinging it like a club.

[gkathellar]

Matt Easton (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oM2cUbhJqGo) put out a video a while back where he suggests that clubbing with a musket when a bayonet was available was more of a secondary function. ie if the point of your bayonet is knocked off line then instead of trying to get it back in line you might step forward and go for a quick bash with the butt of the gun, although that doesn't really involve swinging it like a club.

Just to concur with this - while I haven't studied bayonet myself, I've seen rifle/bayonet classes in progress, and this is something they did as a follow-up move/circular transition. Not quite the same thing as a heavier musket, of course, but the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

[Maquise]

A question about falchions and sabers; what exactly is the difference between them? I know that falchions and messers use the same sorts of blades but with different hilt; is a saber a third hilt type?

[gkathellar]

A question about falchions and sabers; what exactly is the difference between them? I know that falchions and messers use the same sorts of blades but with different hilt; is a saber a third hilt type?

Historically, saber is in a lot of ways a general classification rather than a specific weapon - military and dueling saber evolved totally separately, for instance. In addition, both have a lot of variation in form even within their types. Single-edged swords seem to have a lot of classification issues, in part because the way we talk about them mixes neologisms with historical terms, and in part because the historical terms were themselves pretty messy and generalized. Even the messer/falchion thing ends up being pretty unclear in practice.