pendell
2018-03-19, 11:05 AM
Seen in iRelease (http://irelease.org/scientists-found-that-the-soul-doesnt-die-it-goes-back-to-the-universe/)
It turns out that the human brain could be similar to a “biological computer,” and that human consciousness may be like a program which is run by a quantum computer within the brain. What’s even more astonishing is that after someone dies, “their soul comes back to the universe, and it does not die.”
This is all according to American physicist Dr. Stuart Hameroff and mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose, both of whom argue that the soul is maintained in micro-tubules of brain cells. The two scientists refer to this process as “Orchestrated Objective Reduction,” or “Orch-OR.” Allegedly, when human beings are “clinically dead,” microtubules in the brain lose their quantum state but are still able to retain the information inside of them.
This theory was recently outlined on The Science Channel’s ongoing documentary show Through the Wormhole, in which Dr. Hameroff elaborates: “Let’s say the heart stops beating, the blood stops flowing; the micro-tubules lose their quantum state. The quantum information within the micro-tubules is not destroyed, it can’t be destroyed, and it just distributes and dissipates to the universe at large.
If the patient is resuscitated, revived, this quantum information can go back into the micro-tubules and the patient says ‘I had a near-death experience.’ If they’re not revived, and the patient dies, it’s possible that this quantum information can exist outside the body, perhaps indefinitely, as a soul.”
So evidently this idea has been around awhile ; it has a wikipedia article under Orchestrated Objective Reduction (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reduction)
And there is a healthy batch of issues with the idea listed under criticism, which I spoiler for length.
The Orch-OR theory was criticized by scientists who considered it to be a poor model of brain physiology.[18][20][37][irrelevant citation]
Penrose–Lucas argument
The Penrose–Lucas argument about the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem for computational theories of human intelligence was criticized by mathematicians,[9][10][11] computer scientists,[17] and philosophers,[12][13][14][15][16] and the consensus among experts in these fields is that the argument fails,[45][46][47] with different authors attacking different aspects of the argument.[47][48]
LaForte pointed out that in order to know the truth of an unprovable Gödel sentence, one must already know the formal system is consistent. Referencing Benacerraf, he then demonstrated that humans cannot prove that they are consistent,[9] and in all likelihood human brains are inconsistent. He pointed to contradictions within Penrose's own writings as examples. Similarly, Minsky argued that because humans can believe false ideas to be true, human mathematical understanding need not be consistent and consciousness may easily have a deterministic basis.[49]
Feferman faulted detailed points in Penrose's second book, Shadows of the Mind. He argued that mathematicians do not progress by mechanistic search through proofs, but by trial-and-error reasoning, insight and inspiration, and that machines do not share this approach with humans. He pointed out that everyday mathematics can be formalized. He also rejected Penrose's Platonism.[10]
Searle criticized Penrose's appeal to Gödel as resting on the fallacy that all computational algorithms must be capable of mathematical description. As a counter-example, Searle cited the assignment of license plate numbers to specific vehicle identification numbers, as part of vehicle registration. According to Searle, no mathematical function can be used to connect a known VIN with its LPN, but the process of assignment is quite simple—namely, "first come, first served"—and can be performed entirely by a computer. However, since an algorithm (as defined in the Oxford American Dictionary) is a 'set of rules to be followed in calculations or problem-solving operations', the assignment of LPN to a VIN is not an algorithm as such, merely the use of a database in which every VIN has a corresponding LPN. No algorithm could arbitrarily 'compute' database assignments. Thus, Searle's counter-example does not describe a computational algorithm that is not mathematically describable.[50]
Decoherence in living organisms
In 2000 Tegmark claimed that any quantum coherent system in the brain would undergo effective wave function collapse due to environmental interaction long before it could influence neural processes (the "warm, wet and noisy" argument, as it was later came to be known).[18] He determined the decoherence timescale of microtubule entanglement at brain temperatures to be on the order of femtoseconds, far too brief for neural processing. Other scientists sided with Tegmark's analysis, insisting that quantum coherence does not play, or does not need to play any major role in neurophysiology.[21][22][irrelevant citation]
In response to Tegmark's claims, Hagan, Tuszynski and Hameroff[51][52] claimed that Tegmark did not address the Orch-OR model, but instead a model of his own construction. This involved superpositions of quanta separated by 24 nm rather than the much smaller separations stipulated for Orch-OR. As a result, Hameroff's group claimed a decoherence time seven orders of magnitude greater than Tegmark's, although still far below 25 ms. Hameroff's group also suggested that the Debye layer of counterions could screen thermal fluctuations, and that the surrounding actin gel might enhance the ordering of water, further screening noise. They also suggested that incoherent metabolic energy could further order water, and finally that the configuration of the microtubule lattice might be suitable for quantum error correction, a means of resisting quantum decoherence.
Since the 90's numerous counter-observations to the "warm, wet and noisy" argument existed at ambient temperatures, in vitro[23][42] and in vivo (i.e. photosynthesis, bird navigation). For example, Harvard researchers achieved quantum states lasting for 2 sec at room temperatures using diamonds.[53] Plants routinely use quantum-coherent electron transport at ambient temperatures in photosynthesis.[54] In 2014, researchers used theoretical quantum biophysics and computer simulations to analyze quantum coherence among tryptophan π resonance rings in tubulin. They claimed that quantum dipole coupling among tryptophan π resonance clouds, mediated by exciton hopping or Forster resonance energy transfer (FRET) across the tubulin protein are plausible.[55]
In 2007, Gregory S. Engel[who?] claimed that all arguments concerning the brain being "too warm and wet" have been dispelled, as multiple "warm and wet" quantum processes have been discovered.[56][57]
In 2009, Reimers et al. and McKemmish et al., published critical assessments.[19][37][58] Earlier versions of the theory had required tubulin-electrons to form either Bose–Einsteins or Frohlich condensates, and the Reimers group claimed that these were experimentally unfounded. Additionally they claimed that microtubules could only support 'weak' 8 MHz coherence. The first argument was voided by revisions of the theory that described dipole oscillations due to London forces and possibly due to magnetic and/or nuclear spin cloud formations.[6] On the second issue the theory was retrofitted so that 8 MHz coherence is sufficient to support the whole Orch-OR hypothesis.
McKemmish et al. made two claims: that aromatic molecules cannot switch states because they are delocalised; and that changes in tubulin protein-conformation driven by GTP conversion would result in a prohibitive energy requirement. Hameroff and Penrose responded to the first claim by stating that they were referring to the behaviour of two or more electron clouds, inherently non-localised. For the second claim they stated that no GTP conversion is needed since (in that version of the theory) the conformation-switching is not necessary, replaced by oscillation due to the London forces produced by the electron cloud dipole states.
Neuron cell biology
In 1998, Hameroff proposed that microtubule coherence reaches the synapses via dendritic lamellar bodies (DLBs), where it could influence synaptic firing and be transmitted across the synaptic cleft.[20][59] De Zeeuw et al. had already proved this to be impossible in 1995,[60] by showing that DLBs are located micrometers away from gap junctions. Bandyopadhyay et. al. speculated that this issue might be resolved if their notion of wireless transmission of information globally across the entire brain is proven.[61] Hameroff and Penrose doubt whether such a wireless transmission would be capable of transmitting superimposed quantum-states.[6]
Hameroff's 1998 hypothesis required that cortical dendrites contain primarily 'A' lattice microtubules,[41] but in 1994 Kikkawa et al.[62][63] showed that all in vivo microtubules have a 'B' lattice and a seam. Then Bandyopadhyay showed that microtubules can change their structure from B-lattice to A-lattice as part of the processing of information, and that tubulin in microtubules exists in multiple states.[64]
Orch-OR also required gap junctions between neurons and glial cells,[41] yet Binmöller et. al. proved in 1992 that these don't exist.[65] But a 1999 research supported the evidence between neurons and astrocytes.[66]
Hameroff speculated that visual photons in the retina are detected directly by the cones and rods instead of decohering and subsequently connect with the retinal glia cells via gap junctions,[41] but this too was falsified.[67]
Other biology-based criticisms have been offered.[68] Papers by Georgiev[20][59] point to problems with Hameroff's proposals, including a lack of explanation for the probabilistic firing of axonal synapses and an error in the calculated number of the tubulin dimers per cortical neuron. Hameroff insisted in a 2013 interview that those falsifications were invalid.[69]
Does anyone want to take a shot at this? As a layman, I am extremely skeptical. A smashed teacup may contain the same information as it did when intact, but that doesn't mean you can make use of it. Likewise, whatever quantum information is or isn't stored in the brain, it doesn't follow that you could ever reconstruct it in any useful fashion.
It also seems like a great galloping leap of faith between 'storing quantum information' of some sort and "human soul". I don't see how the dots get connected from the first assumption (which is not proven, and also heavily criticized; see spoilers) to the second.
Note: I am a religious believer. And as a believer of several decades I am well aware of the nonsense field that forms around anything whenever people start letting their beliefs cloud their scientific judgement. Science isn't about hope, or should-be's or is-oughtas. It's about fact. That's why I'm leary of scientific ideas that reinforce my own biases; they need double the skepticism that anything else would need, IMO.
Respectfully,
Brian P.
It turns out that the human brain could be similar to a “biological computer,” and that human consciousness may be like a program which is run by a quantum computer within the brain. What’s even more astonishing is that after someone dies, “their soul comes back to the universe, and it does not die.”
This is all according to American physicist Dr. Stuart Hameroff and mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose, both of whom argue that the soul is maintained in micro-tubules of brain cells. The two scientists refer to this process as “Orchestrated Objective Reduction,” or “Orch-OR.” Allegedly, when human beings are “clinically dead,” microtubules in the brain lose their quantum state but are still able to retain the information inside of them.
This theory was recently outlined on The Science Channel’s ongoing documentary show Through the Wormhole, in which Dr. Hameroff elaborates: “Let’s say the heart stops beating, the blood stops flowing; the micro-tubules lose their quantum state. The quantum information within the micro-tubules is not destroyed, it can’t be destroyed, and it just distributes and dissipates to the universe at large.
If the patient is resuscitated, revived, this quantum information can go back into the micro-tubules and the patient says ‘I had a near-death experience.’ If they’re not revived, and the patient dies, it’s possible that this quantum information can exist outside the body, perhaps indefinitely, as a soul.”
So evidently this idea has been around awhile ; it has a wikipedia article under Orchestrated Objective Reduction (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orchestrated_objective_reduction)
And there is a healthy batch of issues with the idea listed under criticism, which I spoiler for length.
The Orch-OR theory was criticized by scientists who considered it to be a poor model of brain physiology.[18][20][37][irrelevant citation]
Penrose–Lucas argument
The Penrose–Lucas argument about the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem for computational theories of human intelligence was criticized by mathematicians,[9][10][11] computer scientists,[17] and philosophers,[12][13][14][15][16] and the consensus among experts in these fields is that the argument fails,[45][46][47] with different authors attacking different aspects of the argument.[47][48]
LaForte pointed out that in order to know the truth of an unprovable Gödel sentence, one must already know the formal system is consistent. Referencing Benacerraf, he then demonstrated that humans cannot prove that they are consistent,[9] and in all likelihood human brains are inconsistent. He pointed to contradictions within Penrose's own writings as examples. Similarly, Minsky argued that because humans can believe false ideas to be true, human mathematical understanding need not be consistent and consciousness may easily have a deterministic basis.[49]
Feferman faulted detailed points in Penrose's second book, Shadows of the Mind. He argued that mathematicians do not progress by mechanistic search through proofs, but by trial-and-error reasoning, insight and inspiration, and that machines do not share this approach with humans. He pointed out that everyday mathematics can be formalized. He also rejected Penrose's Platonism.[10]
Searle criticized Penrose's appeal to Gödel as resting on the fallacy that all computational algorithms must be capable of mathematical description. As a counter-example, Searle cited the assignment of license plate numbers to specific vehicle identification numbers, as part of vehicle registration. According to Searle, no mathematical function can be used to connect a known VIN with its LPN, but the process of assignment is quite simple—namely, "first come, first served"—and can be performed entirely by a computer. However, since an algorithm (as defined in the Oxford American Dictionary) is a 'set of rules to be followed in calculations or problem-solving operations', the assignment of LPN to a VIN is not an algorithm as such, merely the use of a database in which every VIN has a corresponding LPN. No algorithm could arbitrarily 'compute' database assignments. Thus, Searle's counter-example does not describe a computational algorithm that is not mathematically describable.[50]
Decoherence in living organisms
In 2000 Tegmark claimed that any quantum coherent system in the brain would undergo effective wave function collapse due to environmental interaction long before it could influence neural processes (the "warm, wet and noisy" argument, as it was later came to be known).[18] He determined the decoherence timescale of microtubule entanglement at brain temperatures to be on the order of femtoseconds, far too brief for neural processing. Other scientists sided with Tegmark's analysis, insisting that quantum coherence does not play, or does not need to play any major role in neurophysiology.[21][22][irrelevant citation]
In response to Tegmark's claims, Hagan, Tuszynski and Hameroff[51][52] claimed that Tegmark did not address the Orch-OR model, but instead a model of his own construction. This involved superpositions of quanta separated by 24 nm rather than the much smaller separations stipulated for Orch-OR. As a result, Hameroff's group claimed a decoherence time seven orders of magnitude greater than Tegmark's, although still far below 25 ms. Hameroff's group also suggested that the Debye layer of counterions could screen thermal fluctuations, and that the surrounding actin gel might enhance the ordering of water, further screening noise. They also suggested that incoherent metabolic energy could further order water, and finally that the configuration of the microtubule lattice might be suitable for quantum error correction, a means of resisting quantum decoherence.
Since the 90's numerous counter-observations to the "warm, wet and noisy" argument existed at ambient temperatures, in vitro[23][42] and in vivo (i.e. photosynthesis, bird navigation). For example, Harvard researchers achieved quantum states lasting for 2 sec at room temperatures using diamonds.[53] Plants routinely use quantum-coherent electron transport at ambient temperatures in photosynthesis.[54] In 2014, researchers used theoretical quantum biophysics and computer simulations to analyze quantum coherence among tryptophan π resonance rings in tubulin. They claimed that quantum dipole coupling among tryptophan π resonance clouds, mediated by exciton hopping or Forster resonance energy transfer (FRET) across the tubulin protein are plausible.[55]
In 2007, Gregory S. Engel[who?] claimed that all arguments concerning the brain being "too warm and wet" have been dispelled, as multiple "warm and wet" quantum processes have been discovered.[56][57]
In 2009, Reimers et al. and McKemmish et al., published critical assessments.[19][37][58] Earlier versions of the theory had required tubulin-electrons to form either Bose–Einsteins or Frohlich condensates, and the Reimers group claimed that these were experimentally unfounded. Additionally they claimed that microtubules could only support 'weak' 8 MHz coherence. The first argument was voided by revisions of the theory that described dipole oscillations due to London forces and possibly due to magnetic and/or nuclear spin cloud formations.[6] On the second issue the theory was retrofitted so that 8 MHz coherence is sufficient to support the whole Orch-OR hypothesis.
McKemmish et al. made two claims: that aromatic molecules cannot switch states because they are delocalised; and that changes in tubulin protein-conformation driven by GTP conversion would result in a prohibitive energy requirement. Hameroff and Penrose responded to the first claim by stating that they were referring to the behaviour of two or more electron clouds, inherently non-localised. For the second claim they stated that no GTP conversion is needed since (in that version of the theory) the conformation-switching is not necessary, replaced by oscillation due to the London forces produced by the electron cloud dipole states.
Neuron cell biology
In 1998, Hameroff proposed that microtubule coherence reaches the synapses via dendritic lamellar bodies (DLBs), where it could influence synaptic firing and be transmitted across the synaptic cleft.[20][59] De Zeeuw et al. had already proved this to be impossible in 1995,[60] by showing that DLBs are located micrometers away from gap junctions. Bandyopadhyay et. al. speculated that this issue might be resolved if their notion of wireless transmission of information globally across the entire brain is proven.[61] Hameroff and Penrose doubt whether such a wireless transmission would be capable of transmitting superimposed quantum-states.[6]
Hameroff's 1998 hypothesis required that cortical dendrites contain primarily 'A' lattice microtubules,[41] but in 1994 Kikkawa et al.[62][63] showed that all in vivo microtubules have a 'B' lattice and a seam. Then Bandyopadhyay showed that microtubules can change their structure from B-lattice to A-lattice as part of the processing of information, and that tubulin in microtubules exists in multiple states.[64]
Orch-OR also required gap junctions between neurons and glial cells,[41] yet Binmöller et. al. proved in 1992 that these don't exist.[65] But a 1999 research supported the evidence between neurons and astrocytes.[66]
Hameroff speculated that visual photons in the retina are detected directly by the cones and rods instead of decohering and subsequently connect with the retinal glia cells via gap junctions,[41] but this too was falsified.[67]
Other biology-based criticisms have been offered.[68] Papers by Georgiev[20][59] point to problems with Hameroff's proposals, including a lack of explanation for the probabilistic firing of axonal synapses and an error in the calculated number of the tubulin dimers per cortical neuron. Hameroff insisted in a 2013 interview that those falsifications were invalid.[69]
Does anyone want to take a shot at this? As a layman, I am extremely skeptical. A smashed teacup may contain the same information as it did when intact, but that doesn't mean you can make use of it. Likewise, whatever quantum information is or isn't stored in the brain, it doesn't follow that you could ever reconstruct it in any useful fashion.
It also seems like a great galloping leap of faith between 'storing quantum information' of some sort and "human soul". I don't see how the dots get connected from the first assumption (which is not proven, and also heavily criticized; see spoilers) to the second.
Note: I am a religious believer. And as a believer of several decades I am well aware of the nonsense field that forms around anything whenever people start letting their beliefs cloud their scientific judgement. Science isn't about hope, or should-be's or is-oughtas. It's about fact. That's why I'm leary of scientific ideas that reinforce my own biases; they need double the skepticism that anything else would need, IMO.
Respectfully,
Brian P.