Fee-Fi-Fo-Fum, Form smells a Random Banter #235

[Rater202]

Yeah, I just ignore any philosophical conundrums about this sort thing and just say that I'm conscious. its one of "gaze into the abyss and the abyss gazes into you" things, all it leads to is needless depression. I'm conscious, free will exists, hope is not dead, don't ask questions that lead to questioning the foundations of my own being, nothing good comes of it.

My philosophy is a hodgepodge of things.

"Anything that suggests that the individual does not exist in a literal sense is probably wrong. A metaphorical "things believed to be separate aren't" sense is okay though."

"Nothing has any inherent meaning, therefore do your best to be the best posisble version of yourself."

"No matter what metric you measure a man by, some people will be better or worse than others by that metric. That doesn't mean that those who are 'better' get to treat others as 'lesser.' Especially if they're grading by an unreasonable metric or with a biased rubric."

"If it is within your power to prevent something bad from happening, and you deliberately choose to allow it to happen, you are responsible for it and the consequences thereof."

There's some other stuff but those are the big ones.

[Form]

Strictly speaking, we do that now, just not very efficiently.

Yes, my brain is structurally different now than it was when I was a child, but that is an internal process with strict continuity of self.

While there's a degree of continuity in what you suggest, the "copy" is created prior to the destruction of the conscious mind. It exists and grows in parrel to the deterioration of the orignal entity.

This coexistence breaks continuity of self even though continuity of memory is retained. The exocortex is thus a distinct indvidiual, not a continuation.

The ability to perfectly regenerate my neural connections to retain full memory and functionality, however, would be an internal process, there is no duplicate of myself developing in parallel, it would just be me.

I don't really see internal vs external as a meaningful distinction here. The exocortex doesn't really function differently from a brain that constantly regenerates itself. Suppose the exocortex very gradually switches itself on as needed to replace old parts of the brain, or you have a bunch of nanites constantly adding to it as necessary, or the exocortex is a constantly growing external, organic brain in some flesh vat and you're hooked up to it. Is that really all that different from the brain regenerating itself? Just because one process is internal and the other external? I don't see it as 2 entities coexisting so much as temporarily having 1 mind distributed across multiple components.

What about, let's say, a bunch of nanites unleashed on your brain gradually replacing old brain cells with new artificial ones as necessary. Would you accept that as a solution?

[Anonymouswizard]

It's an entirely valid philosophical position that we're having this conversation not due to thought or anything like that, but because when you apply the laws of reality to a certain arrangement of matter and energy this conversation is the result.

Of course people who believe that do so because they have no choice in the matter

[Rater202]

Is that really all that different from the brain regenerating itself?

Yes. Fundamentally.

There is a fundamental difference between replacing the brain with an external machine and the brain repairing and adapting.

If I'm plugged into an artificial brain in a vat that's taking over my brain functions and backing up my memories and then the plug gets cut, that's not one person in two places, that's two distinct individuals. The backup becomes its own discrete individual.

The simple fact that this is possible means that the original and the backup were always separate entities.

What about, let's say, a bunch of nanites unleashed on your brain gradually replacing old brain cells with new artificial ones as necessary. Would you accept that as a solution?

It depends on how closely the artificial cells imitate the orignal cells.

If the connections are identical, then continuity of memory and consciousness is retained, thus continuity of self is retained, but if the connections aren't perfectly replicated then continuity is broken and the nanites are jst building a new brain to replace the old one and continuity is broken. It becomes a case of a very slow-acting body snatcher.

Self-regeneration to a perfect state lacks tha problem as it's an eternal process, the brain, the body, repairing and preserving itself. No external backup, no duplicated consciousness, no replacing the old brain with a new one, just... The processes the human body already undergoes, but faster and more efficintly.

It's an entirely valid philosophical position that we're having this conversation not due to thought or anything like that, but because when you apply the laws of reality to a certain arrangement of matter and energy this conversation is the result.

Of course people who believe that do so because they have no choice in the matter

For a definition of valid that precludes philosophical thought.

If the self does not exist, then thought and observation do not exist, and if they do not exist then by definition there can be no philosophy as philosophy is the act of attempting to discern truth by thinking upon observations, thus any philosophy that suggests that the consciousness, the self, the ability to think and perceive do not exist is inherently paradoxical. The simple fact that you are physically capable of coming to such a conclusion disproves the conclusion.

[Form]

Yes. Fundamentally.

There is a fundamental difference between replacing the brain with an external machine and the brain repairing and adapting.

If I'm plugged into an artificial brain in a vat that's taking over my brain functions and backing up my memories and then the plug gets cut, that's not one person in two places, that's two distinct individuals. The backup becomes its own discrete individual.

The simple fact that this is possible means that the original and the backup were always separate entities.

More likely you'll end up with a dead person or a severely brain damaged one. The original can't function as a full brain, because part of it is dead and that's what it needs the exocortex for and the exocortex can't function as a full brain because it is also incomplete. The exocortex only very gradually takes over brain functions. I mean, if you were to take a scoop out of my brain or separate it's two halves that will result in a dead or very brain damaged Form, not 2 distinct entities.

It depends on how closely the artificial cells imitate the orignal cells.

If the connections are identical, then continuity of memory and consciousness is retained, thus continuity of self is retained, but if the connections aren't perfectly replicated then continuity is broken and the nanites are jst building a new brain to replace the old one and continuity is broken. It becomes a case of a very slow-acting body snatcher.

But... a brain repairing itself, replacing old brain cells with new ones, won't perfectly replicate those connections either? A brain regenerating itself is also basically just building a new brain.

[Rater202]

More likely you'll end up with a dead person or a severely brain damaged one. The original can't function as a full brain, because part of it is dead and that's what it needs the exocortex for and the exocortex can't function as a full brain because it is also incomplete. The exocortex only very gradually takes over brain functions. I mean, if you were to take a scoop out of my brain or separate it's two halves that will result in a dead or very brain damaged Form, not 2 distinct entities.

Th fact that they won't survive separately from each other for very long is immaterial to the fact that they are discrete entities.

But... a brain repairing itself, replacing old brain cells with new ones, won't perfectly replicate those connections either? A brain regenerating itself is also basically just building a new brain.

I am assuming that for the purposes of a discussion that "brain regeneration" is significantly better than our own natural processes of reairing and maintaining the nervous system.

Otherwise, it's no different from what we have no and you'll still eventually shutdown and die from something in your brain breaking beyond the ability to repair, assuming something ele doesn't kill you first.

[Anonymouswizard]

Going by this logic, Rater is already two entities. From what I remember split brain patients can act as if they have two personalities in their head.

The question is, are we hearing the thoughts on Immortality of left brain Rater or right brain Rater?

[Form]

Th fact that they won't survive separately from each other for very long is immaterial to the fact that they are discrete entities.

They won't just not survive, they won't be functional at all from the very moment the connection is separated. Exactly the same as what happens if you just scoop out a part of someone's brain. I really don't see any meaningful distinction here. Would you consider the original brain and the scooped out part to be 2 distinct entities?

I am assuming that for the purposes of a discussion that "brain regeneration" is significantly better than our own natural processes of reairing and maintaining the nervous system.

Otherwise, it's no different from what we have no and you'll still eventually shutdown and die from something in your brain breaking beyond the ability to repair, assuming something ele doesn't kill you first.

So... would you consider yourself to have 'died' between now and when you were 5, 10 or 15? 'cause our brains certainly aren't exactly the same as then. They haven't perfectly regenerated, but they have certainly changed.

[Rater202]

So... would you consider yourself to have 'died' between now and when you were 5, 10 or 15? 'cause our brains certainly aren't exactly the same as then. They haven't perfectly regenerated, but they have certainly changed.

So Im pretty sure I've already mentioned this..

No, because 1: Those changes are mostly the result of maturation, development rather than damage and 2: There's a degree of continuity present in the natural processes that is lost when you introduce artificial replacements or external backups.

[Anonymouswizard]

The ecocortex had continuity. So why is it's continuity inherently different to that of a hunk of offal?

[Form]

So Im pretty sure I've already mentioned this..

No, because 1: Those changes are mostly the result of maturation, development rather than damage and 2: There's a degree of continuity present in the natural processes that is lost when you introduce artificial replacements or external backups.

You did, but your latest posts struck me as inconsistent with your initial answer, hence why I asked you again.

Anyway, there's just one more question I'd like to get your answer to before I drop this matter. I've been holding your feet to the fire enough. We clearly have very different views about what constitutes the self and I get the impression you assign a lot more value to the exact, physical form of our brains than I do. And I feel I've done enough evangelizing about my thoughts on transhumanism (the current discussion is kind of on the edge of that).

If you were to scoop out a part of someone else's brain, do you consider the brain and the scooped out part to be 2 distinct entities?

[HalfTangible]

I'm not 100% certain we aren't just a bunch of physical processes that have deluded themselves into thinking there's a mental part.

If you've deluded yourself, there must be a self to delude.

[DavidSh]

If you've deluded yourself, there must be a self to delude.

Does a "self" always imply a mental part? This post refers to itself, after all.

[Beeftank]

Unless you’ve deluded yourself into thinking there is a self to delude. Just a never ending chain of nonexistent selves deluding themselves into thinking they exist.

Although since you don’t exist, you would be NOT deluding your non-self into NOT thinking you exist.

[HalfTangible]

Does a "self" always imply a mental part? This post refers to itself, after all.

No, but deluding something does.

To vastly oversimplify a philosophical concept: If everything about the reality you experience is a lie, a simple simulation created by (for example) a scientist feeding electrical impulses to a brain in a jar, then there must be something that is being fooled. This also applies to self-delusion.

I think, therefore I am.

[Tvtyrant]

If you've deluded yourself, there must be a self to delude.

I was just thinking about this the other day, and I think the self is actually formed by the tension between individual desires and the desire to conform to group expectations. We don't need a consciousness if we are tigers, we just do what our impulses tell us. Nor if we are a collective, we just do what the rules tell us. It's the tension between two often diametric desires that grants us consciousness.

[Rater202]

The ecocortex had continuity. So why is it's continuity inherently different to that of a hunk of offal?

I explained this already: The Exocortex has continuity of memory, but seeing as how it is an external backup, it by definition is external to the orignal person and therefore inherently lacks continuity of self. It is inherently a separate entity, even if it not survive without its connection to the orignal.

If you were to scoop out a part of someone else's brain, do you consider the brain and the scooped out part to be 2 distinct entities?

No. I would consider that to be a homicide. Under most circumstances that would literally kill someone, and in the case of a lobotomy done to alter someone's behavior, particularly the dreaded prefrontal lobotomy, you are literally removing or destroying the parts of the brain that define who someone is and how they behave becuase it's more convenient for you so you've metaphorically murdered someone

And if you're referring to alien hand syndrome, I don't think there's enough research on that to decide either way what exactly is going on but since the split-off section of the brain clearly has a mind of its own while the other half has direct continuity from the orignal, whole brain, it's very clear that either one person was split into two identical consciousnesses or the separated half of the brain developed it's own consciouesness.

[Peelee]

Functionally, nothing.

However, I believe I have established that I am of the mind that our memories and identities are the most important part of us. "Rater202" is a fundamentally different being than "a copy of Rater202" because those are different identities and I am anxious by nature and already experience periodic existential dread, as would presumably any accurate copy of myself.

I would not want the added stress of constantly wondering whether or not I was who I thought I was and I believe that I would be a colossal bastard to saddle any potential successor with that baggage in my place.

Beyond that... I believe I have established that I don't want to live forever through any works I might make, or in the memory of the people I leave behind. I want to live forever by not dying.

A process of immortality that involves permanent death, be it either my orignal self being destroyed in the process of making the copy, or the copy being placed in storage and activated upon my death by other means, would defeat the purpose.

But you just said there's functionally no difference. You wouldn't have this worry any less if you were the original, or any more if you were a copy.

[Rater202]

But you just said there's functionally no difference. You wouldn't have this worry any less if you were the original, or any more if you were a copy.

Functionally as in the copy would "function" as I would.

The problem is how I function: The possibility that I was just a copy would cause me existential panic.

Without a guarantee that the upload is the "real" me the simple possibility that I might not be would ruin my mental health.

In fact, the simple fact that there would functionally be no difference is part of the problem: Any successor of mine created in this way would have just as much panic and if they ever encountered proof that they were just a copy, that would break them.

And again, that's ignoring the fact that I don't want to live forever through my legacy. I don't want to live forever by being remembered for my works or my reputation or in the memory of my descendants.

I have seen firsthand how that doesn't work.

I want to live forever by living forever, or failing that by not staying dead.

A copy, even one identical to myself, isn't me. I'm still dead. It thus is not immortality, by definition. It's just creating a legacy. you're entrusting that your copy will maintain yur legacy... And the less perfectthe suplciation process is, the less likely that that will work out.

[Peelee]

Functionally as in the copy would "function" as I would.

No. "Functionally" as in "are there any substantive differences". Imagine two Raters. One is the original, one is a clone, or copy, or whatever you want to can it. Both are exact, identical versions of each other in all respects. Neither knows if he is the original or the copy. There is no way to tell, nor will there ever be.

What does it matter?

[Rater202]

No. "Functionally" as in "are there any substantive differences". Imagine two Raters. One is the original, one is a clone, or copy, or whatever you want to can it. Both are exact, identical versions of each other in all respects. Neither knows if he is the original or the copy. There is no way to tell, nor will there ever be.

What does it matter?

Ignrong the fact that they'd both end up in the loony bin or worse after being driven insane by sheer existential panic from the knowledge that there is a copy?

In fact, if one copy is confirmed to exist then neither of them can know for sure that they're the original: Even if one is proved to be a duplicate, that doesn't mean that the other isn't also a duplicate becuase if one copy exists ten a theoretically infinite number of copies exist.

You've proposed a scenario that is infinitely worse, from an existential perspective, than the scenario we were discussing regarding external backups or brain uploads.

That aside... Yes, fundamentally. It doesn't matter how perfect the copy is, a copy is not the orignal. I've already said this, but "copy of Rater" is fundamentally a different identity, fundamentally a different individual, a different self, a different existence, from "Rater."

Even if the copy is perfectly identical, the Copy is still not Me. Thus, if there is any possibility that I am not the original, that I am not really me, then not only is that Fundementally Not Immortality but ti would cause me existential dread that I simply do not need.

[Peelee]

Even if the copy is perfectly identical, the Copy is still not Me.

How so? If it's not you, then you can tell you're not the original. If you cannot tell you're not the original, then it is you in every meaningful way.

[Rater202]

How so?

By definition.

If it's not you, then you can tell you're not the original.

This is an unfounded assumption.

If you cannot tell you're not the original, then it is you in every meaningful way.

You're missing the point.

If there is any possibility that the entity that thinks it is "me" is merely a copy, then it becomes an existential issue. They can not know for certain if their life is or is not a complete lie.

[Lord Raziere]

By definition. This is an unfounded assumption. You're missing the point.

If there is any possibility that the entity that thinks it is "me" is merely a copy, then it becomes an existential issue. They can not know for certain if their life is or is not a complete lie.

That and its only meaningful for the copy and everyone around them socially speaking.

Its not meaningful for me, who would be dead. If your going clone yourself up a successor with your memories at least be honest about it and treat it as the offspring it is.

[Rater202]

To get back to the orignal point: cloning and brain uploading are not viable methods of immortality.

If you don't have a guarantee that the clone or upload is the exact same existence as your orignal self, then there's no point to it.

If you know for a fact that they're cops, then you're still dead and all you've done is made a copy to take your place.

If you don't know if they're the original or a copy, have no way of knowing, then it's a terrible existential nightmare that would destroy any enjoyment I could gain out of my continued life if it is me or curse my successor to the same philosophical hell if it's not.

I would rather be an undead brain in a jar than try to achieve "immortality" that way becuase at least that existential nightmare has a hypothetical way out.

[Peelee]

By definition.

What definition? How do you define yourself so as to exclude a perfectly identical copy of you? Take the aforementioned two Raters example. Neither can tell if they are the original or the copy. One of them is the original. From their perspective, both of them care you.

This is an unfounded assumption.

It's not, though. It's how the example was set up. There are no differences between the original and the copy.

You're missing the point.

If there is any possibility that the entity that thinks it is "me" is merely a copy, then it becomes an existential issue. They can not know for certain if their life is or is not a complete lie.

I'm not missing the point, I'm just demonstrating how I disagree with it. Under certain philosophies, you are already unable to know for certain if your life is a complete lie (assuming that being a copy is "a complete lie", which I am not willing to agree with, btw). Are you currently in a state of crippling, existential dread that would require you to be institutionalized? Because if not, then don't worry about your specific issue like you don't worry about any of those issues.

[Lord Raziere]

Are you currently in a state of crippling, existential dread that would require you to be institutionalized? Because if not, then don't worry about your specific issue like you don't worry about any of those issues.

Whether I'm currently in it is not the problem, its whether I will in the future. and any existential dread is bad enough on its own.

[Rater202]

What definition?

A copy is, by definition, not the original.

[Jasdoif]

If there is any possibility that the entity that thinks it is "me" is merely a copy, then it becomes an existential issue. They can not know for certain if their life is or is not a complete lie.

This comes down to the implementation of the copy process.


To oversimplify the first example that comes to mind, when a program executes a fork call the operation system creates a duplicate of the running program's allocated memory elsewhere in memory, in effect creating a perfect copy since that's literally everything the program is/has....But the very next thing, the return value from the call, is completely different: The original (parent process) gets an identifier for the copy, while the copy (child process) gets 0. So it's fundamentally obvious to each process if they're the original (and taking advantage of this is the whole reason you'd have a program make such a call in the first place, but that's quite a digression....).


Could have something similar with "person" copies, where the copy has all the memories of the original up to the point of being copied and their first original perception (and memory) is like a weird flash of light and suddenly being in a different (compared to the last "inherited" short-term memory) area of space and the visual perspective change that entails.

[Peelee]

A copy is, by definition, not the original.

No, but both of them are [thing]. The original is you. The copy is also you. QED.