Fee-Fi-Fo-Fum, Form smells a Random Banter #235

[Rater202]

No, but both of them are [thing]. The original is you. The copy is also you. QED.

That statement is false.

I am me. The copy is a copy of me.

A copy is by definition not the orignal.

Therefore, a copy of me is not me.

fundamentally, inherently, if my attempt to live forever results in copies of me existing while my orignal self dies, my attempt to live forever was a complete failure as I did not live forever, I merely created a duplicate of myself.

If I know for a fact that it's a copy and not the orignal me, I would not make one in the first place becuase that misses the point.

If I cannot know for certain if it is me that comes out at the end, or a duplicate, I will not make one for all of the crippling existential issues that cause.

Nothing you say will convince me otherwise, becuase from my perspective, and I mean no insult by this, your insistence that a copy would be me sounds insane. Your logic to my perspective appears to be inherently flawed.

And, regardless, I know me better than you know me. I know how I would react in that situation.

And I do not need the existential dread of not knowing if I'm the real me on top of the anxiety I already feel.

[Peelee]

That statement is false.

Again, please give me a definition for "you" which includes Rater and precluded a perfect copy of Rater, such that the two are completely indistinguishable.

A picture of a tree is a picture of a tree. A copy of that is also a picture of a tree. One is the original, one is a copy, and yet they are both the same thing. As far as consciousness goes, both Raters have the exact same experiences, memories, likes, tastes, etc etc. Both are 100% indistinguishable from one another. Both can believe themselves to be the original.

"but it's a copy" doesn't cut the mustard. I'm not asking "is one a copy". I'm asking "is there any substantive difference between the original and the copy". Just continuing to say "it's a copy" isn't answering the question.

Also, I'm going to give up after this one. It's too much effort to sift through the pure semantic rebuttals for a fictional possibility to assuage a fictional fear regardless.

[Rater202]

Again, please give me a definition for "you" which includes Rater and precluded a perfect copy of Rater, such that the two are completely indistinguishable.

This is an unreasonable demand. The simple fact that a copy is by definition not the original is enough to determine that a copy of me is not me.

A photograph of a tree and a copy of that a photograph of a tree are both phrotographs of a tree.

But the copy of th photograph of a tree is not the samephotograph of a tree. The copy is a brand new photograph that simply has the same image printed on it.

A clone of "me," even a clone with all of my memories up to the exact moment of my death, is a human being just as I am a human being. But it is not me. It is a brand new person, excluding metaphysical any metaphysical handwaves, that simply has the same memories as me.

Asking for Substantive difference is irrelevant to the discussion at hand. IT's not about "how different can a copy be" it's about "is copy the orignal" and the answer to that is, by definition, no.

[Fyraltari]

This is an unreasonable demand.

No, it's the crux of the issue. You seem to consider that there exists an essential (metaphysical?) self to a person that is unrelated to the sum of that person's physical and mental components which others disagree with.

[Anonymouswizard]

To get back to the orignal point: cloning and brain uploading are not viable methods of immortality.

If you don't have a guarantee that the clone or upload is the exact same existence as your orignal self, then there's no point to it.

Bah! Stone of is are baron enough to want to know that, even if we did, the l we've still left a copy to annoy everybody in our place. Especially those expecting an inheritance.

My first copy shall have the middle name Orignal, in commemoration of this discussion.

[dafrca]

You guys are reminding me of that B-Grade SciFi Arnold movie "The 6th Day". That moment when he realizes he is the clone was a great moment in the film.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKMvXia5I_g

To have a moment when you realize you are the copy.

[Rater202]

No, it's the crux of the issue.

No, it's a completly unrelated issue that Peelee brought up during th dicussion, and I admit that I may have initially misunderstood his intent. I kind of get the feeling that we'r enot onythe same page.

A copy is by definition not the orignal.

A clone is by definition not the person they were cloned from.

A clone of me, be it in a biological sense or a duplicate of my mind, is thus by definition not me.

The simple fact tha t acopy is not an orignal would cause me personally existential dread.

Substantive difference or the nonexistence thereof is completely irrelevant to my point.

You seem to consider that there exists an essential (metaphysical?) self to a person that is unrelated to the sum of that person's physical and mental components which others disagree with.

Quite the opposite.

Stepping very lightly here, there is no scientific proof of any such essential, metaphysical concepts.

Without evidence of such a quality, the only way to ensure that you are "you" is to have continuity of consciousness, continuity of memory, and continuity of self. The mental components are all that matters.,

A clone with your exact memories? And external backup of your consciousness? A memory upload? Those all break at least one of those continuities. The mental components are not preserved, they're duplicated. A duplicate of my mind is not my mind, by definition.

Thus it cannot be said, for fact, that any of those things are "you." Even if they are only created at your exact moment of death and have all of your memories up to that point, there's no guarantee that they aren't just copies.

If such quality were proven to exist, and such a quality was proven to be shared by a clone with full memory, or a brain upload, then that would be a different discussion.

[Jasdoif]

You guys are reminding me of that B-Grade SciFi Arnold movie "The 6th Day".

I'm reminded of The Prestige, myself.

[Peelee]

I'm reminded of The Prestige, myself.

I almost went there, in a way. At one point I started to go into the Star Trek Problem, but ended up just scrapping all of it because of potential tangents.

[Rater202]

The cats have been acting a little weird lately.

Like, not weird weird, but they've been sniffing around a little more than usual and last night when I was the only one up the big one bolted at me, started mewing in a "something's wrong and scary" type of tone and wouldn't calm down till I petted him, but checking he wasn't hurt, the other cat wasn't hurt, and nothing in the house was out of place.

Mom thinks they're trying to figure out where the dog went.

[Jasdoif]

The cats have been acting a little weird lately.

Like, not weird weird, but they've been sniffing around a little more than usual and last night when I was the only one up the big one bolted at me, started mewing in a "something's wrong and scary" type of tone and wouldn't calm down till I petted him, but checking he wasn't hurt, the other cat wasn't hurt, and nothing in the house was out of place.

Mom thinks they're trying to figure out where the dog went.

Sounds about right with the timeframe; they've realized the dog's been gone too long for a temporary absence and are now trying to figure out what the household's new social order will be.

[halfeye]

This is an unreasonable demand. The simple fact that a copy is by definition not the original is enough to determine that a copy of me is not me.

A photograph of a tree and a copy of that a photograph of a tree are both phrotographs of a tree.

But the copy of th photograph of a tree is not the samephotograph of a tree. The copy is a brand new photograph that simply has the same image printed on it.

What about digital cameras? The original original never leaves the camera, but I really want to say that the one I might edit on my computer is the *same* photograph, perhaps especially so before I edit it.

If you think that the photograph in the computer ought to have a complex about whether it's the real photograph, I think you are mistaken.

[Peelee]

What about digital cameras? The original original never leaves the camera, but I really want to say that the one I might edit on my computer is the *same* photograph, perhaps especially so before I edit it.

If you think that the photograph in the computer ought to have a complex about whether it's the real photograph, I think you are mistaken.

Doesn't even need to be digital. Old school 35mm works fine - a picture is just an image printed onto special photosensitive card stock. An original and a copy are the same photo printed on the same card stock. There's no difference between them at all. It is no different than having two originals.

But yeah. They're both "me" in the sense that "me" is a specific picture of a tree.

[Beeftank]

I really don’t think you guys are looking at this the right way.

I have a Chevy Cruz. If tomorrow it got demolished and somebody dropped off an identical car, it might be the same car in the sense of make and model, but it isn’t literally the same car I was driving around yesterday. As in it is a distinct, different object.

If someone flash-clones you then killed the original, it wouldn’t matter to the outside world because it would be the same, but to original you, meaning the consciousness that inhabits your body, you would be dead and it wouldn’t matter an identical version of you is running around doing Peelee things.

[Peelee]

I really don’t think you guys are looking at this the right way.

I have a Chevy Cruz. If tomorrow it got demolished and somebody dropped off an identical car, it might be the same car in the sense of make and model, but it isn’t literally the same car I was driving around yesterday. As in it is a distinct, different object.

And each of those differences and distinctions are discernible. That's not an equitable analogy.

Instead, let's say you have a Chevy Cruz. It gets demolished. You witness it get demolished. You know it got demolished. The next day, someone drops off a Chevy Cruz. It is the same color. The radio station presets are the same. It has the same scratches, pits, dents, everywhere yours did. It smells the same. When you drive, it feels exactly like the Cruz you drove two days ago. It has the exact same maintenance history. It looks, feels, drives, and in all respects appears to be your car. If you hadn't watched it get demolished, you would swear it is your car. In fact, the paperwork is in your name, dating back to when you bought your Cruz. It has insurance records, with receipts that were paid by you for that time. You briefly wonder if you are going crazy, because even the VIN is the same.

This isn't simply "you got another same-year model". This is "in literally every possible way, this appears to be your exact car, as if it were never demolished".

And this is ignoring the continued consciousness, which your Chevy Cruz sadly lacks (I assume).

[Fyraltari]

Without evidence of such a quality, the only way to ensure that you are "you" is to have continuity of consciousness continuity of memory, and continuity of self. The mental components are all that matters.

So do you have an existential crisis every time you go to sleep? Because that breaks continuity of consciousness.
As for continuity of memory, if you download your memories into a perfect copy of you, it is conserved. And for continuity of self, well that's the very thing we are aguing about, isn't it?

[HalfTangible]

Pretty sure there's a webcomic about this...

[Rater202]

So do you have an existential crisis every time you go to sleep? Because that breaks continuity of consciousness.

People say this, but you still think and perceive things in your sleep, even if you don't recall it or have the ability to respond to stimuli. It's not like your brain completely shuts down. "Losing consciousness" is really more shifting into a different state of consciousness.

You only really "lose" consciousness when all higher brain activity permanently ceases.

[Beeftank]

And each of those differences and distinctions are discernible. That's not an equitable analogy.

Instead, let's say you have a Chevy Cruz. It gets demolished. You witness it get demolished. You know it got demolished. The next day, someone drops off a Chevy Cruz. It is the same color. The radio station presets are the same. It has the same scratches, pits, dents, everywhere yours did. It smells the same. When you drive, it feels exactly like the Cruz you drove two days ago. It has the exact same maintenance history. It looks, feels, drives, and in all respects appears to be your car. If you hadn't watched it get demolished, you would swear it is your car. In fact, the paperwork is in your name, dating back to when you bought your Cruz. It has insurance records, with receipts that were paid by you for that time. You briefly wonder if you are going crazy, because even the VIN is the same.

This isn't simply "you got another same-year model". This is "in literally every possible way, this appears to be your exact car, as if it were never demolished".

And this is ignoring the continued consciousness, which your Chevy Cruz sadly lacks (I assume).

Despite my confusion, it still would a a different car then the one I had before, and if it had a continued consciousness, my poor Cruz would be in the big parking lot in the sky, horrified an imposter had taken his place.

[Metastachydium]

Pretty sure there's a webcomic about this...

There is indeed, kind of. (I prefer their later stuff though.)

[Fyraltari]

There is indeed, kind of. (I prefer their later stuff though.)

*Coughs*

Imma drop this.

*Coughs*

[Peelee]

People say this, but you still think and perceive things in your sleep, even if you don't recall it or have the ability to respond to stimuli.

Hope you don't ever need general anasthesia for surgery, is all I'm gonna say.

Despite my confusion, it still would a a different car then the one I had before, and if it had a continued consciousness, my poor Cruz would be in the big parking lot in the sky, horrified an imposter had taken his place.

Nope. It's the exact same Chevy Cruz. There are no records of a second one with a VIN changed to match your own. You yourself drove it two days ago. It's a completely second, totally the same car.

If this makes no sense, then that's because fiction will always break down at some point, and we're discussing a purely fictional concept. But, assuming that you bought the car right off the factory floor, nobody but you had ever driven that second Cruz. It is, in every respect, the exact same car you had two days ago.

[Beeftank]

Hope you don't ever need general anasthesia for surgery, is all I'm gonna say.

Nope. It's the exact same Chevy Cruz. There are no records of a second one with a VIN changed to match your own. You yourself drove it two days ago. It's a completely second, totally the same car.

It seems like we have some philosophical differences between what “same” and “different” mean. I understand where you are coming from but it doesn’t seem right so I think we are just going to have to agree to disagree on this one.

[Tvtyrant]

It seems like we have some philosophical differences between what “same” and “different” mean. I understand where you are coming from but it doesn’t seem right so I think we are just going to have to agree to disagree on this one.

Here is the thing though, what actually makes an object the same? There's basically three different aspects to it, the material aspect of the same underlying materials and the philosophical concept of the same shape. Finally is if the thing existed continuously.

Like if I make a lego death star, take it apart and make the same lego death star is it the same one?

Rater would say no, because there is no continuous existence of the death star.

Peelee would say yes because they are made of the same "parts" and the same "shape."

But the next step is: All lego pieces are functionally identical. If I make two lego death stars out of different piles of identical legos, are they the same death star?

Now in reality we are all made of completely identical particles, and it is simple arrangement that makes the differences. If those particles are disassembled and reassembled into the same person, then it is the same as example one. If different particles make the same person, it is the same as example two.

Is a thing just the shape of the thing, is it the shape and the same otherwise interchangeable parts, or does it have to be a continuous shape of the thing?

[Beeftank]

Is a thing just the shape of the thing, is it the shape and the same otherwise interchangeable parts, or does it have to be a continuous shape of the thing?

I think this right here is the crux of the issue. It looks like your second definition is close to what I think, whereas Peelee believes it’s the first. Reminds me of the ship of Theseus thought experiment, the answer depends on your point of view and definition for what exactly the ship is.

[Peelee]

The inherent problem with the Ship of Theseus is that we are all the Ship of Theseus. Our constituent parts are made of entirely different cells than they were a decade ago. We lose consciousness just all the time (even if we go by a weak "different state of consciousness" claim, then each state is still not continuous), such that there is no consitnuous stream. We even describe major psychological changes as "being a different person than I was years ago". And yet the sense of "me" is unchanged. I cannot see any reason other than desire to needlessly overcomplicate and overanalyze (and fairly poorly, at that, unless one is well trained in philosophy and psychology) for a copied body with the exact same thoughts, memories, experiences, etc to not be able to consider itself as the same entity as the old, dead body.

[Cazero]

The ship of Theseus is a sham. "Of Theseus" isn't a material thing, it is a relationship between things. So the ship of Theseus is wichever one belongs to Theseus. Possibly both.
Also this.

[Beeftank]

I read the comic the first time it was posted here, and like I said above, I understand the logic and reasoning behind what you guys are saying and on some level it does make sense. But for some reason it just doesn’t seem right to me, and apparently I’m not learned enough in philosophy or whatever to properly articulate why.

[Fyraltari]

The inherent problem with the Ship of Theseus is that we are all the Ship of Theseus.

That feels like a feature.

The ship of Theseus is a sham. "Of Theseus" isn't a material thing, it is a relationship between things. So the ship of Theseus is wichever one belongs to Theseus. Possibly both.
Also this.

There's only one ship in the Problem of the Ship of Theseus (at least in the most commonly used version), the question is whether it is still the ship Theseus used.

[Tvtyrant]

I read the comic the first time it was posted here, and like I said above, I understand the logic and reasoning behind what you guys are saying and on some level it does make sense. But for some reason it just doesn’t seem right to me, and apparently I’m not learned enough in philosophy or whatever to properly articulate why.

Well it is logic applied to a purely theoretical concept, and [sarcasm] as we all know logic never contradicts observation [/sarcasm]. Since we can't perfectly replicate individuals and their universe to see if there is an innate themness about them, its pure conjecture.

Here are some fun things on the subject:

Are the people in Groundhogs' Day the same individuals or different ones each day?

If you travel back in time are they the same individuals you knew in the future, given there is no longer a continuous connection between their parts? Did you kill them by going back and time?