[Thought experiment] If alignments are objective how do we know what they represent?

[OldTrees1]

I mean, there's a foundational problem, though: for any moral theory you care to outline, I can ask, "Why should I be moral?" There are ways to answer that, but all of them require things that have been rejected when I have proposed them. The trouble is that "should" and "ought" and the like require a purpose. They have a hidden assumption that there is a purpose for which you "should" do things. Without purpose, "should" is meaningless. When you say, "You should be moral," but define "moral" as "what you should do," you have a circular definition with no foundation.

So I ask this of anybody who cares to answer (though OldTrees1 is in particular invited to respond): "Why should I be moral?"

When you say, "You should be moral," but define "moral" as "what you should do," you have a circular definition with no foundation.

Correct. You could word the definition that way as a circular tautology. I frame it in a non circular, but no more helpful way.

What if the word "ought" did not require a purpose? What if instead of asking about instrumental ends, it was asking about intrinsic ends? What if it was asking which intrinsic end one ought to adopt/follow? What if that question is hard / impossible to answer so the asker labeled the answer "Moral" to save mental space while they kept working on the problem.

So while it is not framed as a circular definition, it is still not one that helps answer it.

Why should you be moral? Because the right answer is labeled moral. What is moral? That is the label for the right answer. What is the right answer? I can't know, but at least I have a name for it.

That does not stop people from developing theories based on moral intuitions, moral disgust, or their own values. It just means all those theories are rooted in a fallacious jump from the unhelpful tautological / empty start to a helpful but fallacious theory.