[Thought experiment] If alignments are objective how do we know what they represent?

[Segev]

How would showing help? I have shown how it is used. "What Ought one do?" and "Ought one do X?" are examples. There is no hidden/unspoken "in order to [something]". If you change it to "Should one X in order to Y?" by presuming a purpose, I can change back to "Ought one Y?" by challenging the purpose.

It is okay if that is a communication barrier. I cannot make it more clear without more shared premises (even then, this is one of the root concepts so I don't know which other shared premises could help).

The part I bolded is, if I am parsing you correctly, the point I've been trying to get at. You seem to me to be trying to say that "the moral thing to do" is always the same thing, and I'm asking "why?" I'm challenging the hidden implied purpose of your statement, "You ought to do X." But I think this next bit is actually moving us closer, so I will address that and hope that this bit discussed here above is not necessary:

The right answer is always named/labeled "moral" as a way to make it talking about it more concise.

You might notice I did not say "It is always the right answer". I said "the right answer" is given the nickname "moral" as a shorter name / label. It is always the case that the right answer is itself, and we will name it "moral" to make it easier to talk about it.

The branch of Metaethics deals (among other things) with the rest of your questions about the nature of the answer to the question. I will not get into those topics at this time (including the subthread I left).

Okay. So the objectively right answer to any (alignment-related) question about what you should do is always "the moral thing." This is tautological and circular, which makes it not a very useful ANSWER, but it still is a useful TERM in this case.

The answer to the question of, "What is the moral thing for me to do?" when posed a situation will always, then, be, "whatever your (target) alignment dictates." If your alignment (or the alignment to which you aspire) dictates that you care nothing for the lives of others if they're not of use to you (evil alignments), then the answer to "What should I do with this child who caught me stealing and might tattle on me?" is probably "kill her, and hide the body/evidence." That would be the moral thing for an evil person to do in an objective morality system, under the definition of "moral" that says "the moral thing to do is defined as the right answer to the question, 'what ought I to do?'"

It feels strange to us, who live in a world and society where everyone at least thinks of "good" as the alignment to which to aspire, to say "it is moral to do evil," but in an objective alignment setting where there are people who actively want to adhere to alignments other than Good, that is a perfectly sensible statement, given the definition of "moral" you, OldTrees1, have given me. (I am not saying it's "your" definition; I believe you are citing other philosophers and philosophies. But I am trying to be very precise that I am using it by that specific definition, and not a definition that, for example, says "moral == good.")