[Thought experiment] If alignments are objective how do we know what they represent?

[Segev]

What someone wants may, or may not be morally relevant, and if relevant may be moral or immoral. So while the overall question "What ought one do?" might have a large answer (John Stuart Mills thought the theory of Utilitarianism was the answer), I have no reason to presume the answer depends on what I want or to presume any other hidden purpose.

This core of disagreement might not be resolvable. And that is okay.

In objective morality, you either must define "moral/immoral" as the fixed axis, in which case you've essentially stated "moral = good" and thus it is no longer the #defined answer to the question "what ought I to do?" with no hidden assumptions about goals, or you must accept that the answer to the question "What ought I to do?" depends on what you want.

The moment you insist that "moral == good," you can try to claim that you ought to do the moral thing, but you are now open to the question, "Why should I be moral?" And now we're right back to it depending on what I want.

The only reason "moral" as defined previously - the answer to the question "What ought I to do?" - depends on what you want is because all "ought" questions require motivation. It is fundamentally impossible to have "ought" without a motivation.